{ "id": 4172078, "name": "TELERENT LEASING CORP., d/b/a VENDOR CAPITAL GROUP, Plaintiff v. MORDECHAI BOAZIZ, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "Telerent Leasing Corp. v. Boaziz", "decision_date": "2009-11-03", "docket_number": "No. COA09-171", "first_page": "761", "last_page": "767", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "200 N.C. App. 761" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "647 S.E.2d 672", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12638974 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "674", "parenthetical": "quoting Hillman v. United States Liability Ins. Co., 59 N.C. App. 145, 155, 296 S.E.2d 302, 309 (1982), disc. rev. denied, 307 N.C. 468, 299 S.E.2d 221 (1983)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/647/0672-01" ] }, { "cite": "650 S.E.2d 444", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12639338 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "447", "parenthetical": "quoting Glover v. First Union National Bank, 109 N.C. App. 451, 456, 428 S.E.2d 206, 209 (1993)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/650/0444-01" ] }, { "cite": "633 S.E.2d 883", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12636510 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "887", "parenthetical": "quoting Davis v. Dennis Lilly Co., 330 N.C. 314, 322-23, 411 S.E.2d 133, 138 (1991)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/633/0883-01" ] }, { "cite": "275 S.E.2d 424", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "302 N.C. 375", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565783 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/302/0375-01" ] }, { "cite": "285 S.E.2d 831", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "304 N.C. 390", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8568167, 8568205, 8568301, 8568272, 8568240 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/304/0390-01", "/nc/304/0390-02", "/nc/304/0390-05", "/nc/304/0390-04", "/nc/304/0390-03" ] }, { "cite": "278 S.E.2d 546", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "52 N.C. App. 203", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12170120 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/52/0203-01" ] }, { "cite": "263 S.E.2d 719", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "299 N.C. 465", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8575259 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/299/0465-01" ] }, { "cite": "266 S.E.2d 812", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "817" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "300 N.C. 286", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561053 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "293" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/300/0286-01" ] }, { "cite": "319 S.E.2d 650", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "655", "parenthetical": "citing Enterprises, Inc. v. Equipment Co., 300 N.C. 286, 293, 266 S.E.2d 812, 817 (1980)" }, { "page": "656" }, { "page": "655" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "70 N.C. App. 221", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521343 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "227", "parenthetical": "citing Enterprises, Inc. v. Equipment Co., 300 N.C. 286, 293, 266 S.E.2d 812, 817 (1980)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/70/0221-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 6-21.2", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "200 S.E.2d 40", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "42" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "284 N.C. 236", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560879 ], "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "238" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/284/0236-01" ] }, { "cite": "299 S.E.2d 221", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 N.C. 468", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8562977, 8562958, 8563031, 8563002, 8562940 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/307/0468-03", "/nc/307/0468-02", "/nc/307/0468-05", "/nc/307/0468-04", "/nc/307/0468-01" ] }, { "cite": "296 S.E.2d 302", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "309" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "59 N.C. App. 145", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525918 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "155" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/59/0145-01" ] }, { "cite": "185 N.C. App. 153", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8208915 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "155", "parenthetical": "quoting Hillman v. United States Liability Ins. Co., 59 N.C. App. 145, 155, 296 S.E.2d 302, 309 (1982), disc. rev. denied, 307 N.C. 468, 299 S.E.2d 221 (1983)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/185/0153-01" ] }, { "cite": "140 L. Ed. 2d 1099", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "523 U.S. 1142", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11562464, 11562529, 11562560, 11562626, 11562501, 11562406, 11562376, 11562665, 11562347, 11562476, 11562444, 11562361, 11562394, 11562427, 11562590 ], "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/523/1142-08", "/us/523/1142-11", "/us/523/1142-12", "/us/523/1142-14", "/us/523/1142-10", "/us/523/1142-05", "/us/523/1142-03", "/us/523/1142-15", "/us/523/1142-01", "/us/523/1142-09", "/us/523/1142-07", "/us/523/1142-02", "/us/523/1142-04", "/us/523/1142-06", "/us/523/1142-13" ] }, { "cite": "486 S.E.2d 219", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "346 N.C. 185", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 139553, 139621, 139351, 139480, 139647 ], "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/346/0185-02", "/nc/346/0185-05", "/nc/346/0185-01", "/nc/346/0185-04", "/nc/346/0185-03" ] }, { "cite": "481 S.E.2d 347", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "348-49" }, { "page": "349" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "125 N.C. App. 600", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11870405 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "602" }, { "page": "602" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/125/0600-01" ] }, { "cite": "493 S.E.2d 264", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "274", "parenthetical": "quoting T&T Development Co. v. Southern Nat. Bank of S.C., 125 N.C. App. 600, 602, 481 S.E.2d 347, 348-49, disc. rev. denied, 346 N.C. 185, 486 S.E.2d 219 (1997)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "347 N.C. 275", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 551151 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "293", "parenthetical": "quoting T&T Development Co. v. Southern Nat. Bank of S.C., 125 N.C. App. 600, 602, 481 S.E.2d 347, 348-49, disc. rev. denied, 346 N.C. 185, 486 S.E.2d 219 (1997)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/347/0275-01" ] }, { "cite": "262 S.E.2d 845", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "847", "parenthetical": "\" '[W]here individual responsibility is demanded, the nearly universal practice in the commercial world is that the corporate officer signs twice, once as an officer and again as an individual.' \"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "45 N.C. App. 213", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8548094 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "218", "parenthetical": "\" '[W]here individual responsibility is demanded, the nearly universal practice in the commercial world is that the corporate officer signs twice, once as an officer and again as an individual.' \"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/45/0213-01" ] }, { "cite": "600 S.E.2d 492", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "497", "parenthetical": "citing Keels v. Turner, 45 N.C. App. 213, 218, 262 S.E.2d 845, 847 (1980) (\" '[W]here individual responsibility is demanded, the nearly universal practice in the commercial world is that the corporate officer signs twice, once as an officer and again as an individual.' \")" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "165 N.C. App. 737", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8999958 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "742-43", "parenthetical": "citing Keels v. Turner, 45 N.C. App. 213, 218, 262 S.E.2d 845, 847 (1980" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/165/0737-01" ] }, { "cite": "428 S.E.2d 206", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "209" }, { "page": "209" }, { "page": "209" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "109 N.C. App. 451", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525721 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "456" }, { "page": "456" }, { "page": "456" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/109/0451-01" ] }, { "cite": "186 N.C. App. 68", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8154677 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "73", "parenthetical": "quoting Glover v. First Union National Bank, 109 N.C. App. 451, 456, 428 S.E.2d 206, 209 (1993)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/186/0068-01" ] }, { "cite": "331 S.E.2d 296", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "298" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "75 N.C. App. 635", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526567 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "637" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/75/0635-01" ] }, { "cite": "594 S.E.2d 425", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "429", "parenthetical": "quoting Five Oaks Homeowners Assoc., Inc. v. Efirds Pest Control Co., 75 N.C. App. 635, 637, 331 S.E.2d 296, 298 (1985)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "163 N.C. App. 748", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8920701 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "752", "parenthetical": "quoting Five Oaks Homeowners Assoc., Inc. v. Efirds Pest Control Co., 75 N.C. App. 635, 637, 331 S.E.2d 296, 298 (1985)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/163/0748-01" ] }, { "cite": "298 S.E.2d 193", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "194" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "60 N.C. App. 145", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8519692 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "146" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/60/0145-01" ] }, { "cite": "411 S.E.2d 133", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "138" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "330 N.C. 314", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2509560 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "322-23" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/330/0314-01" ] }, { "cite": "179 N.C. App. 357", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8236412 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "361-62", "parenthetical": "quoting Davis v. Dennis Lilly Co., 330 N.C. 314, 322-23, 411 S.E.2d 133, 138 (1991)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/179/0357-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 741, "char_count": 14974, "ocr_confidence": 0.755, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.13666626896008222 }, "sha256": "f565dc7b46a5746878c71d0392ce95ad00006730f94a8b14e56c8d1414689daa", "simhash": "1:0b00c06b041d28c6", "word_count": 2400 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:34:12.558956+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges McGEE and STEELMAN concur." ], "parties": [ "TELERENT LEASING CORP., d/b/a VENDOR CAPITAL GROUP, Plaintiff v. MORDECHAI BOAZIZ, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JACKSON, Judge.\nDefendant Mordechai Boaziz (\u201cdefendant\u201d) appeals the 15 August 2008 judgment in favor of plaintiff Telerent Leasing Corp. d/b/a Vendor Capital Group (\u201cplaintiff\u2019), the 15 August 2008 order denying his motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and the 15 August 2008 order granting plaintiff\u2019s motion for costs and legal fees. For the reasons stated herein, we hold no error.\nDefendant, through three separate limited liability companies (LLCs), owned or partially owned three hotels in Wichita, Kansas. In mid-July 2001 through August 2001, each LLC entered into a separate Master Lease Agreement and related Equipment Schedule (collectively \u201cAgreements\u201d) with plaintiff for electronic equipment used by the hotels, such as TVs, electronic locks, and telephone systems. Plaintiff understood that defendant was a 100% owner of all three hotels. Defendant signed the Agreements once as \u201cLessee\u201d on behalf of each LLC and again as \u201cCo-Lessee.\u201d The Agreements went into default, and in December 2004, all three hotels filed for bankruptcy. Plaintiff repossessed the equipment, sold it, and applied the $302,635.00 credit to the amounts due under the Agreements. On 4 November 2005, plaintiff sued defendant, as co-lessee, for the remaining deficiency.\nThe case was stayed pending the resolution of the bankruptcy proceedings in Kansas. On 11 August 2008 defendant moved in limine to preclude plaintiff\u2019s introduction into evidence of a document entitled \u201cObjection to Motion for Relief From Stay and For Abandonment of Leave\u201d filed in the United States Bankruptcy Court, District of Kansas. The court denied defendant\u2019s motion. At the end of plaintiff\u2019s evidence, defendant moved for directed verdict, which was denied. At the close of all evidence, defendant again moved for directed verdict, and it was again denied. On 12 August 2008 the jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff for $421,680.67. The trial court also awarded $1,733.65 for costs and $92,208.76 for attorneys\u2019 fees. Defendant filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on 13 August 2008, which was denied on 15 August 2008. Defendant appeals the denial of his motions for directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the denial of his motion in limine, and the award of attorneys\u2019 fees in an amount that violates North Carolina General Statutes, section 6-21.2.\nDefendant\u2019s first argument is that the trial court improperly denied both his motion for directed verdict and his motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. We disagree.\nWhen reviewing a ruling on a motion for directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the standard of review is sufficiency of the evidence.\nThe standard of review of directed verdict is whether the evidence, taken in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, is sufficient as a matter of law to be submitted to the jury. When determining the correctness of the denial for directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the question is whether there is sufficient evidence to sustain a jury verdict in the non-moving party\u2019s favor, or to present a question for the jury. Where the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is a motion that judgment be entered in accordance with the movant\u2019s earlier motion for directed verdict, this Court has required the use of the same standard of sufficiency of evidence in reviewing both motions.\nTurner v. Ellis, 179 N.C. App. 357, 361-62, 633 S.E.2d 883, 887 (2006) (quoting Davis v. Dennis Lilly Co., 330 N.C. 314, 322-23, 411 S.E.2d 133, 138 (1991)). Motions for directed verdict are intended \u201cto test the legal sufficiency of the evidence\u201d and \u201cshould be denied if there is any evidence more than a scintilla to support plaintiffs\u2019 prima facie case[.]\u201d Wallace v. Evans, 60 N.C. App. 145, 146, 298 S.E.2d 193, 194 (1982).\nIn the case sub judice, plaintiff presented sufficient evidence concerning defendant\u2019s liability under the Agreements to overcome a directed verdict as well as sufficient evidence to allow the jury\u2019s verdict to stand. \u201cWhen the language of a written contract is plain and unambiguous, the contract must be interpreted as written and the parties are bound by its terms.\u201d Atlantic & E. Carolina Ry. Co. v. Wheatley Oil Co., 163 N.C. App. 748, 752, 594 S.E.2d 425, 429 (2004) (quoting Five Oaks Homeowners Assoc., Inc. v. Efirds Pest Control Co., 75 N.C. App. 635, 637, 331 S.E.2d 296, 298 (1985)). However, \u201c \u2018where [the contract] is ambiguous and the intention of the parties is unclear, interpretation of the contract is for the jury.\u2019 \u201d Kimbrell v. Roberts, 186 N.C. App. 68, 73, 650 S.E.2d 444, 447 (2007) (quoting Glover v. First Union National Bank, 109 N.C. App. 451, 456, 428 S.E.2d 206, 209 (1993)). \u201cAn ambiguity exists where the terms of the contract are reasonably susceptible to either of the differing interpretations proffered by the parties.\u201d Id. (citing Glover, 109 N.C. App. at 456, 428 S.E.2d at 209). \u201c \u2018The fact that a dispute has arisen as to the parties\u2019 interpretation of the contract is some indication that the language of the contract is, at best, ambiguous.\u2019 \u201d Id. (quoting Glover, 109 N.C. App. at 456, 428 S.E.2d at 209).\nDefendant signed the Agreements two times, once as an officer of the LLCs and once individually as \u201cco-lessee.\u201d Defendant contends that his second signature only bound him to a single provision of the Agreements, which specifically referred to a \u201cco-lessee.\u201d Plaintiff, however, argues that the inherent meaning of the term \u201cco-lessee\u201d is \u201cjoint lessee\u201d or having joint liability under the Agreements. This ambiguity, on which the case hinges, is one to be determined by the jury. Denying defendant\u2019s motion for directed verdict was, therefore, proper.\nPlaintiff\u2019s evidence also is sufficient to survive a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. When a party signs an instrument twice, once in a representative capacity and once in a personal capacity, the individual is personally liable on the contract. See RD&J Props, v. Lauralea-Dilton Enters., LLC, 165 N.C. App. 737, 742-43, 600 S.E.2d 492, 497 (2004) (citing Keels v. Turner, 45 N.C. App. 213, 218, 262 S.E.2d 845, 847 (1980) (\u201c \u2018[W]here individual responsibility is demanded, the nearly universal practice in the commercial world is that the corporate officer signs twice, once as an officer and again as an individual.\u2019 \u201d)). Furthermore, defendant provided his personal financial information to plaintiff prior to plaintiff\u2019s approval of the leases. Even though defendant argues that the term \u201cco-lessee\u201d is used only once in the Agreements and that the other provisions of the Agreements, therefore, do not apply to a co-lessee, plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to make the issue of defendant\u2019s personal liability a question for the jury. We hold that the trial court properly denied defendant\u2019s motions for directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.\nDefendant next contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion in limine to prevent the introduction into evidence of the \u201cObjection to Motion for Relief from Stay and for Abandonment of Leave\u201d filed in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Kansas. We hold, however, that defendant did not preserve this issue for appeal.\nA trial court\u2019s ruling on a motion in limine is \u201cmerely preliminary and subject to change during the course of trial, depending upon the actual evidence offered at trial[.]\u201d State v. Hill, 347 N.C. 275, 293, 493 S.E.2d 264, 274 (1997) (quoting T&T Development Co. v. Southern Nat. Bank of S.C., 125 N.C. App. 600, 602, 481 S.E.2d 347, 348-49, disc. rev. denied, 346 N.C. 185, 486 S.E.2d 219 (1997)), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1142, 140 L. Ed. 2d 1099 (1998). In order for a party to preserve this issue for appeal,\n[a] party objecting to an order granting or denying a motion in limine ... is required to object to the evidence at the time it is offered at the trial (where the motion was denied) or attempt to introduce the evidence at the trial (where the motion was granted).\nId. (quoting T&T Development Co., 125 N.C. App. at 602, 481 S.E.2d at 349).\nIn the instant case, defendant neither objected to plaintiff\u2019s line of questions that concerned the document nor objected to the admission of the document into evidence. In fact, defendant\u2019s counsel also used the document when questioning defendant. Because defendant failed to object to the introduction of this evidence at trial and therefore, failed to preserve the issue of the admissibility of the \u201cObjection to Motion for Relief from Stay and for Abandonment of Leave\u201d for appeal, we decline to address it here.\nDefendant\u2019s final argument is that the trial court erred in awarding $92,208.76 in attorneys\u2019 fees on a $421,680.67 verdict, in violation of the fifteen percent cap mandated by North Carolina General Statutes, section 6-21.2. We disagree.\nAs a general rule, in order \u201c \u2018to overturn the trial judge\u2019s determination [on the issue of attorneys\u2019 fees], the defendant must show an abuse of discretion.\u2019 \u201d Bruning & Federle Mfg. Co. v. Mills, 185 N.C. App. 153, 155, 647 S.E.2d 672, 674 (2007) (quoting Hillman v. United States Liability Ins. Co., 59 N.C. App. 145, 155, 296 S.E.2d 302, 309 (1982), disc. rev. denied, 307 N.C. 468, 299 S.E.2d 221 (1983)).\nA prevailing party is not entitled to attorneys\u2019 fees unless expressly authorized by statute. Hicks v. Albertson, 284 N.C. 236, 238, 200 S.E.2d 40, 42 (1973). North Carolina General Statutes, section 6-21.2 provides, in relevant part,\nObligations to pay attorneys\u2019 fees upon any note, conditional sale contract or other evidence of indebtedness, in addition to the legal rate of interest or finance charges specified therein, shall be valid and enforceable, and collectible as part of such debt, if such note, contract or other evidence of indebtedness be collected by or through an attorney at law after maturity, subject to the following provisions:\n(2) If such note, conditional sale contract or other evidence of indebtedness provides for the payment of reasonable attorneys\u2019 fees by the debtor, without specifying any specific percentage, such provision shall be construed to mean fifteen percent (15%) of the \u201coutstanding balance\u201d owing on said note, contract or other evidence of indebtedness.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 6-21.2 (2007). This statute \u201cis a remedial statute and should be construed liberally[.]\u201d Coastal Production v. Goodson Farms, 70 N.C. App. 221, 227, 319 S.E.2d 650, 655 (1984) (citing Enterprises, Inc. v. Equipment Co., 300 N.C. 286, 293, 266 S.E.2d 812, 817 (1980)).\nThis Court previously has held that \u201callowance of fees for participation in other proceedings to expedite collection or preserve assets would not constitute abuse of discretion.\u201d Id. at 228, 319 S.E.2d at 656. Specifically, we stated that \u201cwhen other actions are reasonably related to the collection of the underlying note sued upon, attorneys\u2019 fees incurred therein may properly be awarded under G.S. 6-21.2[.]\u201d Id. at 227-28, 319 S.E.2d at 655. \u201cOf course, the burden remains on the claimant to present evidence that the other proceedings are reasonably related to collection of the note.\u201d Id. at 228, 319 S.E.2d at 656 (citing Hudson v. Hudson, 299 N.C. 465, 263 S.E.2d 719 (1980)). \u201c[T]he law requires evidence and findings of fact supporting the reasonableness of the award.\u201d Id. at 226, 319 S.E.2d at 655 (citing Falls v. Falls, 52 N.C. App. 203, 278 S.E.2d 546, disc. rev. denied, 304 N.C. 390, 285 S.E.2d 831 (1981); In re Ridge, 302 N.C. 375, 275 S.E.2d 424 (1981)).\nIn the instant case, the Agreements provide only that in the event of default, lessee is responsible to lessor for \u201creasonable attorney\u2019s fees.\u201d The trial court found as fact that the attorneys\u2019 fees were reasonable \u201cin light of the multiple actions and multiple venues through which Plaintiff had to pursue collection].]\u201d The trial court also found that \u201c]a]s a result of the Plaintiff\u2019s efforts, including the expenditure of $31,311.19 of attorney fees in the ancillary Kansas bankruptcy proceedings, the defendant received a $302,635 credit on the amounts due and payable under the Master Lease Agreements.\u201d We are satisfied that the Kansas bankruptcy proceeding was reasonably related to the current action and to the collection of the debt pursuant to the Agreements. Considering that the balance of the debt collected in both the current action and the Kansas bankruptcy proceeding was $724,315.67, the trial court\u2019s award of $92,208.76 was well below the statutory ceiling of fifteen percent. In light of the mandate to construe the statute liberally and in acknowledgment of the practicality of encouraging early intervention to mitigate a debt, we hold that the trial court did not err in awarding plaintiff $92,208.76 in attorneys\u2019 fees.\nFor the reasons stated herein, we hold that the trial court did not err in denying defendant\u2019s motions for directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict. We hold that the trial court\u2019s ruling on defendant\u2019s motion in limine was not preserved for appeal. We also hold that the trial court\u2019s award of attorneys\u2019 fees was not an abuse of discretion.\nNo error.\nJudges McGEE and STEELMAN concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JACKSON, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Wyrick Robbins Yates & Ponton, LLP, by Hon. K. Edward Greene and Tobias S. Hampson, for plaintiff-appellee.", "Manning, Fulton & Skinner, P.A., by Michael T. Medford and William S. Cherry, III, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "TELERENT LEASING CORP., d/b/a VENDOR CAPITAL GROUP, Plaintiff v. MORDECHAI BOAZIZ, Defendant\nNo. COA09-171\n(Filed 3 November 2009)\n1. Guaranty\u2014 motion for directed verdict \u2014 motion for judgment notwithstanding verdict \u2014 co-lessee\nThe trial court did not err in an action seeking recovery for lease defaults by denying defendant\u2019s motions for directed verdict and JNOV where defendant signed an agreement as an officer of the LLCs and also as co-lessee. The meaning of co-lessee was to be determined by the jury and when an individual signs an instrument in a representative capacity and in a personal capacity, the individual is personally liable on the contract.\n2. Appeal and Error\u2014 preservation of issues \u2014 failure to object \u2014 motion in limine\nDefendant did not preserve for appeal an evidence issue concerning a bankruptcy proceeding where defendant did not object below and used the challenged document when questioning a witness.\n3. Costs\u2014 attorney fees \u2014 fifteen percent cap\nBy awarding $92,208.76 in attorney fees on a $421,680.67 verdict, the trial court did not violate the fifteen percent cap mandated by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 6-21.2 because the balance of the debt collected in both the current action and the reasonably related Kansas bankruptcy proceeding was $724,315.67, making the trial court\u2019s award well below the statutory ceiling.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment and orders entered 15 August 2008 by Judge Paul G. Gessner in Wake County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 2 September 2009.\nWyrick Robbins Yates & Ponton, LLP, by Hon. K. Edward Greene and Tobias S. Hampson, for plaintiff-appellee.\nManning, Fulton & Skinner, P.A., by Michael T. Medford and William S. Cherry, III, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0761-01", "first_page_order": 787, "last_page_order": 793 }