{ "id": 4172878, "name": "DUPLIN COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, Plaintiff v. DUPLIN COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "Duplin County Board of Education v. Duplin County Board of County Commissioners", "decision_date": "2009-11-17", "docket_number": "No. COA09-397", "first_page": "113", "last_page": "123", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "201 N.C. App. 113" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "363 N.C. 500", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4151702 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/363/0500-01" ] }, { "cite": "616 S.E.2d 496", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633572 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "499", "parenthetical": "quoting State ex rel. Comm'r of Ins. v. N.C. Auto. Rate Admin. Office, 294 N.C. 60, 68, 241 S.E.2d 324, 329 (1978)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/616/0496-01" ] }, { "cite": "656 S.E.2d 296", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12640338 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "303" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/656/0296-01" ] }, { "cite": "628 S.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12635483 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "3" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/628/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "142 S.E.2d 8", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1965, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "264 N.C. 416", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573750 ], "year": 1965, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/264/0416-01" ] }, { "cite": "81 S.E.2d 256", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1954, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "262" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "240 N.C. 118", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8595299 ], "year": 1954, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "126" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/240/0118-01" ] }, { "cite": "675 S.E.2d 345", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "351", "parenthetical": "quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs, 240 N.C. 118, 126, 81 S.E.2d 256, 262 (1954)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "363 N.C. 165", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4151071 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "172", "parenthetical": "quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs, 240 N.C. 118, 126, 81 S.E.2d 256, 262 (1954)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/363/0165-01" ] }, { "cite": "241 S.E.2d 324", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "329" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "294 N.C. 60", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8570860 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "68" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/294/0060-01" ] }, { "cite": "359 N.C. 832", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3793573 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "837-38", "parenthetical": "quoting State ex rel. Comm'r of Ins. v. N.C. Auto. Rate Admin. Office, 294 N.C. 60, 68, 241 S.E.2d 324, 329 (1978)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/359/0832-01" ] }, { "cite": "681 S.E.2d 278", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 6, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "281" }, { "page": "281-82" }, { "page": "284" }, { "page": "283" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "188 N.C. App. 399", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4155805 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "408" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/188/0399-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 431", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)", "parenthetical": "if school board determines that county funding is inadequate, joint public meeting shall be held within seven days of county's decision on school appropriations" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "360 N.C. 384", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3789468 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "387" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/360/0384-01" ] }, { "cite": "655 S.E.2d 350", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "352", "parenthetical": "quoting Diaz v. Div. of Soc. Servs., 360 N.C. 384, 387, 628 S.E.2d 1, 3 (2006)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "362 N.C. 142", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4150290 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "145", "parenthetical": "quoting Diaz v. Div. of Soc. Servs., 360 N.C. 384, 387, 628 S.E.2d 1, 3 (2006)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/362/0142-01" ] }, { "cite": "363 N.C. 500", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4151702 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "507" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/363/0500-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 857, "char_count": 25013, "ocr_confidence": 0.763, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.061447019797991e-08, "percentile": 0.3185830525254561 }, "sha256": "cfb9ef814edf8ef5fb413baeb13b12aa6ee80d721aa51802da7e8b73c4ce2540", "simhash": "1:8b2fd020a72ae478", "word_count": 3991 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:19:33.177262+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges CALABRIA and HUNTER, Jr. concur." ], "parties": [ "DUPLIN COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, Plaintiff v. DUPLIN COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "BEASLEY, Judge.\nDefendant appeals from a judgment ordering appropriation of $4,795,784.00 to the Plaintiff\u2019s local current expense fund. For reasons stated below, we affirm.\nThis appeal arises from a dispute between Defendant (Duplin County Board of County Commissioners) and Plaintiff (Duplin County Board of Education) over the amount of money that Defendant appropriated to Plaintiff for the 2008-2009 Fiscal Year (FY 2009). On 28 April 2008 Plaintiff submitted its FY 2009 budget request to Defendant. On 16 June 2008 Defendant adopted a budget ordinance that appropriated to Plaintiff an amount less than its budget request. Two days later Plaintiff adopted a resolution stating that the amount appropriated to Plaintiff for local current expense and capital outlay was insufficient to support a system of free public schools in Duplin County. Plaintiff informed Defendant of its. resolution and requested mediation of the budget dispute. The parties selected a mediator, who presided over a joint public meeting on 23 June 2008. The parties did not resolve their dispute at this public meeting, and conducted further mediation sessions during June and July, 2008. The mediation ended on 1 August 2008 without an agreement.\nOn 6 August 2008 Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant, seeking \u201c(a) determination of the amount(s) of money needed from sources under the control of the Duplin County Board of Commissioners to maintain a system of free public schools, and (b) a judgment ordering the Board of Commissioners to appropriate such additional amount(s) to the Duplin County school administrative unit[.]\u201d Following a jury trial in September 2008, judgment was entered awarding Plaintiff $4,795,784.00 to its local current expense fund. From this judgment Defendant appeals.\nDefendant argues first that the judgment should be vacated on the grounds that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the parties\u2019 controversy. Defendant asserts that subject matter jurisdiction was defeated \u201cdue to the sovereign immunity of the Defendant\u201d and due to \u201cPlaintiff\u2019s failure to comply with the procedures of the specific statutory exemption to that immunity.\u201d\nDefendant argues elsewhere that N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-431 is unconstitutional on its face or as applied. However, Defendant does not dispute that N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-431 gives the trial court general subject matter jurisdiction over a suit to resolve a budget dispute between a county board of education and board of county commissioners. Defendant instead argues that the trial court was deprived of subject matter jurisdiction by Plaintiff\u2019s failure to comply with the requirements of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-431 (2007), which provides in pertinent part that:\n(a) If the board of education determines that the amount of money appropriated to the local current expense fund, or the capital outlay fund, or both, by the board of county commissioners is not sufficient to support a system of free public schools, the chairman of the board of education and the chairman of the board of county commissioners shall arrange a joint meeting of the two boards to be held within seven days after the day of the county commissioners\u2019 decision on the school appropriations.\nPrior to the joint meeting, the Senior Resident Superior Court Judge shall appoint a mediator unless the boards agree to jointly select a mediator. The mediator shall preside at the joint meeting and shall act as a neutral facilitator of disclosures of factual information, statements of positions and contentions, and efforts to negotiate an agreement settling the boards\u2019 differences.\nAt the joint meeting, the entire school budget shall be considered carefully and judiciously, and the two boards shall make a good-faith attempt to resolve the differences that have arisen between them.\n(b) If no agreement is reached at the joint meeting of the two boards, the mediator shall, at the request of either board, commence a mediation immediately or within a reasonable period of time. ...\nUnless both boards agree otherwise, or unless the boards have already resolved their dispute, the mediation shall end no later than August 1. The mediator shall have the authority to determine that an impasse exists and to discontinue the mediation. ... If no agreement is reached, the mediator shall announce that fact to the chairs of both boards, the Senior Resident Superior Court Judge, and the public. . . .\n(c) Within five days after an announcement of no agreement by the mediator, the local board of education may file an action in the superior court division of the General Court of Justice. The court shall find the facts as to the amount of money necessary to maintain a system of free public schools, and the amount of money needed from the county to make up this total. Either board has the right to have the issues of fact tried by a jury. When a jury trial is demanded, the cause shall be set for the first succeeding term of the superior court in the county, and shall take precedence over all other business of the court.. . . The issue submitted to the jury shall be what amount of money is needed from sources under the control of the board of county commissioners to maintain a system of free public schools.\nAll findings of fact in the superior court, whether found by the judge or a jury, shall be conclusive. When the facts have been found, the court shall give judgment ordering the board of county commissioners to appropriate a sum certain to the local school administrative unit, and to levy such taxes on property as may be necessary to make up this sum when added to other revenues available for the purpose.\n(d) An appeal may be taken to the appellate division of the General Court of Justice, and notice of appeal shall be given in writing within 10 days after entry of the judgment. All papers and records relating to the case shall be considered a part of the record on appeal. . . .\nDefendant directs our attention to the first sentence of \u00a7 115C-431(a), providing that \u201c[i]f the board of education determines that the amount of money appropriated to the local current expense fund, or the capital outlay fund, or both, by the board of county commissioners is not sufficient to support a system of free public schools,\u201d then the parties shall participate in a joint meeting and mediation sessions, in an effort to reach agreement.\nDefendant concedes that, following the adoption of its 16 June 2008 budget ordinance, Plaintiff on 18 June 2008 adopted a resolution that the amount appropriated to Plaintiff for local current expense and capital outlay was insufficient to support a system of free public schools in Duplin County. It is also undisputed that Plaintiff and Defendant took part in a joint public meeting and several mediation sessions but failed to reach an agreement, and that the mediator then informed the proper parties that Defendant and Plaintiff were at an impasse. Additionally, Defendant does not dispute that Plaintiff complied with the time limits of \u00a7 115C-431(c), by filing its complaint \u201c[w]ithin five days after an announcement of no agreement by the mediator^ ]\u201d Therefore, we conclude that Plaintiff complied with all the applicable statutory requirements.\nDefendant, however, argues that, regardless of Plaintiffs initial adherence to the statutory requirements, the trial court was stripped of subject matter jurisdiction by Defendant\u2019s appropriation of additional funds during the mediation sessions. The mediation sessions were conducted after Plaintiff adopted a resolution that the money provided by Defendant was insufficient, but before Plaintiff filed suit on 6 August 2008. During this time, Defendant appropriated an additional $800,000 to Plaintiff\u2019s current expense fund, and $1,010,203 to Plaintiff\u2019s capital outlay fund for repair and maintenance. This additional appropriation fully funded Plaintiff\u2019s budget request for capital outlay repair and maintenance expenses, but did not fully fund Plaintiff\u2019s requested current expenses fund, and did not provide any funds for Plaintiff\u2019s requested capital construction fund.\nDefendant\u2019s position is that its appropriation of additional funds towards Plaintiff\u2019s requested budget rendered Plaintiff\u2019s resolution ineffective. Defendant contends that Plaintiff was required to undertake a formal reconsideration of its needs and to adopt another formal resolution that the funds appropriated were insufficient. Defendant asserts that this renewed assessment is a prerequisite to the court\u2019s jurisdiction over the parties\u2019 budget dispute. We disagree, for several reasons.\n\u201cIt is axiomatic that \u2018[w]hen the language of a statute is clear and without ambiguity, it is the duty of this Court to give effect to the plain meaning of the statute, and judicial construction of legislative intent is not required.\u2019 \u201d Harrell v. Bowen, 362 N.C. 142, 145, 655 S.E.2d 350, 352 (2008) (quoting Diaz v. Div. of Soc. Servs., 360 N.C. 384, 387, 628 S.E.2d 1, 3 (2006)). In this case, \u00a7 115C-431 does not state that a school board\u2019s formal resolution, determining that county funding is insufficient, is a jurisdictional prerequisite for a later civil case. Rather, the statute plainly states that a school board\u2019s decision that the county has appropriated insufficient funds shall be followed by statutorily defined attempts to resolve the parties\u2019 budgetary dispute. If the school board and the board of commissioners fail to reach an agreement, the mediator will inform the appropriate parties. It is this determination by the mediator, establishing that the parties are at an impasse, which triggers a board\u2019s right to file suit.\nIt is also significant that the provisions of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C, Article 31, \u201cThe School Budget and Fiscal Control Act,\u201d consistently impose strict time limits on the budgetary process. See, e.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-427(b) (2007) (school board superintendent must submit requested budget to school board no later that May 1); N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-429(a) (2007) (school-board must submit budget to county commissioners no later than May 15); N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-429(b) (2007) (county commissioners must complete action on school budget by July 1); N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 431(a) (2007) (if school board determines that county funding is inadequate, joint public meeting shall be held within seven days of county\u2019s decision on school appropriations); N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-431(b) (2007) (mediation generally ends by August 1); N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-431(c) (2007) (school board must file suit within five days of mediator\u2019s announcement that the parties have reached an impasse; calendering of a requested jury trial \u201cshall take precedence over all other business of the court\u201d).\n\u201cThis statute, read as a whole, sets forth a detailed procedure for school budget disputes to be resolved as quickly as possible.\u201d Beaufort Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. Beaufort Cty. Bd. of Comm\u2019rs, 188 N.C. App. 399, 408, 656 S.E.2d 296, 303 (2008), rev\u2019d on other grounds, Beaufort Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. Beaufort Cty. Bd. of Comm\u2019rs, 363 N.C. 500, 681 S.E.2d 278 (2009). In the context of this clear preference for speedy resolution of budget disputes, we note that the interpretation of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-431 urged by Defendant would permit a board of county commissioners to postpone resolution of a budget debate indefinitely, simply by continuing to appropriate additional small sums to the board of education, requiring the board of education to repeat its determination of funding inadequacy and, presumably, repeat its mediation efforts as well.\n\u201cIt is well settled that \u2018in construing statutes courts normally adopt an interpretation which will avoid absurd or bizarre consequences, the presumption being that the legislature acted in accordance with reason and common sense and did not intend untoward results.\u2019 \u201d State v. Jones, 359 N.C. 832, 837-38, 616 S.E.2d 496, 499 (2005) (quoting State ex rel. Comm\u2019r of Ins. v. N.C. Auto. Rate Admin. Office, 294 N.C. 60, 68, 241 S.E.2d 324, 329 (1978)). Accordingly, \u201c \u2018[a]n unnecessary implication arising from one [statutory] section, inconsistent with the express terms of another on the same subject, yields to the expressed intent.\u2019 \u201d Wake Cares, Inc. v. Wake Cty. Bd. of Educ., 363 N.C. 165, 172, 675 S.E.2d 345, 351 (2009) (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Bd. of Cty. Comm\u2019rs, 240 N.C. 118, 126, 81 S.E.2d 256, 262 (1954)).\nWe conclude that Plaintiff complied with the appropriate statutory requirements, and that the trial court was not deprived of subject matter jurisdiction when Defendant appropriated an additional sum to Plaintiff. This assignment of error is overruled.\nDefendant argues next that the judgment must be vacated on the grounds that the statute authorizing Plaintiff\u2019s suit, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-431 (2007) is \u201cunconstitutional on its face or . . . unconstitutional as applied].]\u201d The Supreme Court of North Carolina recently issued its decision in Beaufort County Bd. of Educ. v. Beaufort County Bd. of Comm\u2019rs, 363 N.C. 500, 681 S.E.2d 278 (2009). In Beaufort, the Court rejected similar constitutional challenges to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-431. The defendant in Beaufort argued \u201cthat the statutory procedure in section 431(c) [] violates the constitutional ' requirement [of N.C. Const, art. I, \u00a7 6] that \u2018[t]he legislative, executive, and supreme judicial powers of the State government shall be forever separate and distinct from each other.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 502, 681 S.E.2d at 281. The Court rejected this argument, and held that:\nThe State Board of Education (the State Board) is given the general administrative and supervisory role over public education].] ... The statutory provisions enacted by the legislature and guidelines adopted by the State Board, when viewed together, comprehensively define the phrase \u201ca system of free public schools\u201d used in section 431(c). Since the General Assembly has so exhaustively defined its desired [school] system, the section 431(c) procedure does no more than invite the courts to adjudicate a disputed fact: the annual cost of providing a countywide system of education under the policies chosen by the legislature and the State Board. . . . After finding the facts, the trial court enters judgment against the county commission].]... It is the legislature, not the judiciary, which has assigned responsibility to local government by requiring that judgment be entered against the county commission if the court finds the cost of schooling is greater than the amount appropriated. The legislature has therefore neither assigned policy-making power to the courts nor otherwise delegated its authority, and the judiciary is at all times exercising a function traditionally assigned to it under our tripartite system of government.\nThe provisions of section 431(c) thus comport with the State Constitution, and any complaints about the policy or wisdom of the challenged procedures must necessarily be directed to the General Assembly.\nId. at 503-05, 681 S.E.2d at 281-82. In the instant case, Defendant incorporated by reference the arguments of the defendant in Beaufort, and concedes that the \u201cdecision in the Beaufort case should be determinative of the constitutional issues raised herein[.]\u201d We agree, and hold that the Beaufort decision resolves these issues in favor of Plaintiff. This assignment of error is overruled.\nDefendant argues next that the trial court committed reversible error by denying Defendant\u2019s motions for directed verdict, made at the end of the Plaintiff\u2019s evidence and the end of all evidence. Defendant contends that it was entitled to a directed verdict in its favor, on the grounds that the Plaintiff failed to present evidence of \u201cwhat sources [of funding] are under the control of the Board of County Commissioners to maintain a system of free public schools\u201d which Defendant characterizes as \u201ca key element of its statutory cause of action[.]\u201d Defendant contends that \u00a7 115C-431(c) mandates that Plaintiff must offer, as a \u201ccritical element\u201d of its claim, \u201cevidence of the financial resources of the county board of commissioners, and arguably other demands thereonf.]\u201d We disagree.\nUnder \u00a7 115C-431(c), if a school board files suit against the board of county commissioners:\nThe court shall find the facts as to the amount of money necessary to maintain a system of free public schools, and the amount of money needed from the county to make up this total. Either board has the right to have the issues of fact tried by a jury. . . . The issue submitted to the jury shall be what amount of money is needed from sources under the control of the board of county commissioners to maintain a system of free public schools.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-431 is titled \u201cProcedure for resolution of dispute between board of education and board of county commissioners.\u201d The statute is restricted to budget conflicts occurring at a county level, and does not address funding disputes between a local school board and a state or federal department or agency. This limitation is articulated in the statute\u2019s directive to the trial court to find \u201cthe amount of money necessary to maintain a system of free public schools, and the amount of money needed from the county to make up this total\u201d and is emphasized in the statute\u2019s provision that, if the claim is tried before a jury, \u201c[t]he issue submitted to the jury shall be what amount of money is needed from sources under the control of the board of county commissioners to maintain a system of free public schools.\u201d (emphasis added). In other words, the jury is charged with determining the amount of money needed by the local school board. The phrase \u201cfrom sources under the control of the board of county commissioners\u201d modifies or describes \u201camount of money\u201d and emphasizes that the jury is concerned only with the adequacy of the county appropriation, and not with the sufficiency of funds provided by the state or federal governments, or other sources. We conclude that, under \u00a7 115C-431(c), a school board must present evidence of (1) the amount of money it needs to maintain its school system, and (2) the amount it needs from the county in order to have the necessary amount. This assignment of error is overruled. .\nDefendant next argues that judgment should be vacated, on the grounds that Plaintiff failed to present evidence showing that Defendant \u201chad not provided sufficient funds to the statutorily specified categories for which the county commissioners may be obligated to fund.\u201d We disagree.\nDefendant concedes that our decision on this argument \u201cis contingent upon the Court\u2019s ruling on prior issues in this case.\u201d Specifically, Defendant acknowledges that we would reach this issue only if we first found that \u00a7 115C-431 \u201cconstitutional as applied, only if it relates to certain specific statutorily [sic] categories of funding.\u201d This argument was expressly rejected in Beaufort ' County, 363 N.C. at 507, 681 S.E.2d at 284. (\u201cWe therefore reject the argument that the General Assembly has not assigned responsibility for current expenses to local governments.\u201d). This assignment of error is overruled.\nDue to the timing of this appeal, the parties did not have the benefit of the Supreme Court of North Carolina\u2019s decision in Beaufort. In Beaufort, the Court invoked its general supervisory authority over lower courts provided for in Article IV, Section 12 of the North Carolina Constitution and addressed an issue not briefed by the parties: the trial court\u2019s instruction to the jury defining the word \u201cneeded\u201d in the jury\u2019s determination of the amount of money needed to maintain the county school system. The Court held that:\nThe trial court instructed the jury that the word \u201cneeded\u201d in section 431(c) means \u201cthat which is reasonable and useful and proper or conducive to the end sought.\u201d Rather than conveying a restrictive definition of \u201cneeded,\u201d . . . the instruction conveyed an impermissible, expansive definition of this statutory term. Because the instruction was in error, we must remand for a new trial. At that trial, the trial court should instruct the jury that section 431(c) requires the County Commission to provide that appropriation legally necessary to support a system of free public schools, as defined by Chapter 115C and the policies of the State Board. The trial court should also instruct the jury, in arriving at its verdict, to consider the educational goals and policies of the state, the budgetary request of the local board of education, the financial resources of the county, and the fiscal policies of the board of county commissioners.\nId. at 507, 681 S.E.2d at 283.\nThe jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of North Carolina is conferred and defined by the constitution and not by the North Carolina General Assembly. State ex rel. N.C. Utilities Commission v. Old Fort Finishing Plant, 264 N.C. 416, 142 S.E.2d 8 (1965). However, the North Carolina Court of Appeals\u2019 jurisdiction under Article IV, Section 12 is limited to \u201cappellate jurisdiction as the General Assembly may provide.\u201d The General Assembly has not granted to the North Carolina Court of Appeals general supervisory jurisdiction over the lower courts. Therefore, our court does not have broad remedial powers granted to the Supreme Court of North Carolina. Consequently, we have no jurisdictional authority to grant to the Appellants the same remedy granted in Beaufort regarding the jury instruction. As a result, since the jury instruction issue was not raised at trial or on appeal, we have no jurisdiction to remedy any defect therein. We must affirm the decision of the trial court.\nAffirmed.\nJudges CALABRIA and HUNTER, Jr. concur.\n. Beaufort does not state whether, in a trial brought under \u00a7 115C-431(c), evidence must be introduced regarding \u201cthe educational goals and policies of the state, the budgetary request of the local board of education, the financial resources of the county, and the fiscal policies of the board of county commissioners.\u201d Nor does the opinion indicate the respective responsibilities of Plaintiff and Defendant for production of such evidence.", "type": "majority", "author": "BEASLEY, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Schwartz & Shaw, P.L.L.C., by Brian C. Shaw and Richard Schwartz, for Plaintiff-Appellee.", "The Yarborough Law Firm, P.A., by Garris Neil Yarborough; and Wendy Sivori, for Defendant-Appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "DUPLIN COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, Plaintiff v. DUPLIN COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS Defendant\nNo. COA09-397\n(Filed 17 November 2009)\n1. Schools and Education\u2014 amount of money for fiscal year\u2014 subject matter jurisdiction\nThe trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over an action involving county appropriations for a school board where the board triggered a statutory process by resolving that the appropriated amount was insufficient, defendant appropriated an additional amount during the mediation that was part of that statutory process, and defendant then argued that the process must begin again. There is a clear legislative preference for speedy resolutions of school budget disputes.\n2. Constitutional Law\u2014 statute \u2014 constitutionality on face and as applied\nAlthough defendant county commissioners contended that the statute which authorized plaintiff school board\u2019s suit regarding the budget was unconstitutional on its face or as applied, defendant conceded that the decision in Beaufort Cnty. Bd of Educ. v. Beaufort Cnty. Bd. of Comm\u2019ns, 363 N.C. 500, was determinative and resolved the issues in favor of plaintiff.\n3. Schools and Education\u2014 directed verdict \u2014 sufficiency of evidence \u2014 amount to maintain school system \u2014 amount needed from county\nThe trial court did not err by denying defendant county commissioner\u2019s motions for directed verdict in a school funding case. Defendant contended that plaintiff was required to present evidence of the sources of funding that were under the control of the county commissioners for maintaining a system of free public schools, but the jury was concerned only with the adequacy of the county appropriation, not with the sufficiency of funds provided by other sources.\n4. Schools and Education\u2014 sufficiency of funds \u2014 sufficiency of evidence\nBeaufort Cnty. Bd of Educ. v. Beaufort Cnty. Bd. of Comm\u2019ns, 363 N.C. 500, expressly rejected the contention in this case that a judgment against the Board of Commissioners should be vacated because the school board did not present sufficient evidence that the school appropriation was not sufficient for statutory categories.\n5. Appeal and Error\u2014 jurisdiction of Court of Appeals\u2014 instruction issue not raised at trial or on appeal\nThe Court of Appeals does not have the same broad remedial powers granted to the North Carolina Supreme Court, and had no jurisdictional authority to grant to appellants the same remedy granted in Beaufort Cnty. Bd of Educ. v. Beaufort Cnty. Bd. of Comm\u2019ns, 363 N.C. 500.\nAppeal by Defendant from judgment entered 9 October 2008 by Judge Thomas D. Haigwood in Duplin County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 1 October 2009.\nSchwartz & Shaw, P.L.L.C., by Brian C. Shaw and Richard Schwartz, for Plaintiff-Appellee.\nThe Yarborough Law Firm, P.A., by Garris Neil Yarborough; and Wendy Sivori, for Defendant-Appellant." }, "file_name": "0113-01", "first_page_order": 141, "last_page_order": 151 }