{ "id": 4173338, "name": "McCRACKEN and AMICK, INCORPORATED d/b/a THE NEW VEMCO MUSIC CO. and RALPH AMICK, Plaintiffs v. BEVERLY EAVES PERDUE, in her official capacity as Governor of North Carolina, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "McCracken & Amick, Inc. v. Perdue", "decision_date": "2009-12-22", "docket_number": "No. COA09-431", "first_page": "480", "last_page": "493", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "201 N.C. App. 480" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "643 S.E.2d 904", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12638283 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "907" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/643/0904-01" ] }, { "cite": "623 S.E.2d 263", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12634571, 12634572, 12634573 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/623/0263-01", "/se2d/623/0263-02", "/se2d/623/0263-03" ] }, { "cite": "614 S.E.2d 328", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633132 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "335" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/614/0328-01" ] }, { "cite": "189 S.E.2d 266", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "269" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "281 N.C. 525", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8575564 ], "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "529" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/281/0525-01" ] }, { "cite": "2006 N.C. Sess. Laws 6", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "N.C. Sess. Laws", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "94 L. Ed. 2d 244", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3948404, 1131060 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/338/0440-01", "/us/480/0202-01" ] }, { "cite": "480 U.S. 202", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1131060 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/480/0202-01" ] }, { "cite": "44 Harv. J. on Legis. 39", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Harv. J. on Legis.", "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "51", "parenthetical": "\"Overall. . . Congress made clear that the purpose of [IGRA] was to benefit Indian tribes, not states, and to expand tribal opportunities for self-determination, self-government, economic development, and political stability.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "211 F.3d 1280", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 1743512, 8168706, 3673854 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1293", "parenthetical": "\"[C]ourts construe federal statutes liberally to benefit Native American nations.\" (Emphasis added.)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/211/1280-01", "/am-tribal-law/2/1280-01", "/us-app-dc/341/0222-01" ] }, { "cite": "448 U.S. 136", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1787603 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "143-44" }, { "page": "673" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/448/0136-01" ] }, { "cite": "467 U.S. 138", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6195885 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "150" }, { "page": "123" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/467/0138-01" ] }, { "cite": "471 U.S. 759", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6208461 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "766" }, { "page": "759" }, { "page": "767" }, { "page": "760" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/471/0759-01" ] }, { "cite": "369 F.3d 960", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 9248041, 7345474 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "971" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/369/0960-01", "/am-tribal-law/5/0960-01" ] }, { "cite": "325 S.E.2d 469", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "473" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 N.C. 626", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4757989 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "630" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/312/0626-01" ] }, { "cite": "49 S.E.2d 797", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1948, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "801" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "229 N.C. 360", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 12166064 ], "year": 1948, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "367" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/229/0360-01" ] }, { "cite": "157 L. Ed. 2d 278", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "540 U.S. 948", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 8971685, 8971750, 8971782, 8971846, 8971724, 8971820, 8971696, 8971766, 8971735, 8971800, 8971706, 8971868 ], "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/540/0948-01", "/us/540/0948-06", "/us/540/0948-08", "/us/540/0948-11", "/us/540/0948-04", "/us/540/0948-10", "/us/540/0948-02", "/us/540/0948-07", "/us/540/0948-05", "/us/540/0948-09", "/us/540/0948-03", "/us/540/0948-12" ] }, { "cite": "129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 167", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. Rptr. 2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "178", "parenthetical": "\"We find the text of section 2710(d)(1)(B) ambiguous.\"" }, { "page": "178", "parenthetical": "\"Quite simply, Congress exhibited no desire to command states to enact gaming laws so that private non-Indian enterprises would enjoy the same rights as Indian tribes.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "104 Cal. App. 4th 1125", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. App. 4th", "case_ids": [ 331680 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1138", "parenthetical": "\"We find the text of section 2710(d)(1)(B) ambiguous.\"" }, { "page": "1139" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/cal-app-4th/104/1125-01" ] }, { "cite": "163 L. Ed. 2d 571", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "546 U.S. 1032", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 5896036, 5952902, 6000231, 3805673, 5950442, 6012331, 5941004, 5938162, 5960980, 5959159, 5960408 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/546/1032-04", "/us/546/1032-07", "/us/546/1032-10", "/us/546/1032-09", "/us/546/1032-08", "/us/546/1032-06", "/us/546/1032-03", "/us/546/1032-01", "/us/546/1032-11", "/us/546/1032-05", "/us/546/1032-02" ] }, { "cite": "5 N.Y.3d 243", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.3d", "case_ids": [ 983958 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "261" }, { "page": "1190" }, { "page": "82" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ny3d/5/0243-01" ] }, { "cite": "305 F.3d 1015", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 11392558 ], "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/305/1015-01" ] }, { "cite": "146 F. Supp. 2d 1012", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp. 2d", "case_ids": [ 11092431 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1067", "parenthetical": "\"The State must first legalize a game, even if only for tribes, before it can become a compact term.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp-2d/146/1012-01" ] }, { "cite": "480 U.S. 421", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1131295 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "442-43", "parenthetical": "citation and internal quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "455", "parenthetical": "citation and internal quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/480/0421-01" ] }, { "cite": "413 S.E.2d 316", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "318", "parenthetical": "holding that legislative history of federal statute supported plain meaning of statutory language" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "105 N.C. App. 408", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523534 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "411-12", "parenthetical": "holding that legislative history of federal statute supported plain meaning of statutory language" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/105/0408-01" ] }, { "cite": "160 L. Ed. 2d 20", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "543 U.S. 815", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 5899107, 5892582, 5875850, 5905706, 5874156, 5973422, 5981808, 5968115, 5941331, 5932501, 3432441, 3446588, 5870718 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "51" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/543/0815-10", "/us/543/0815-08", "/us/543/0815-06", "/us/543/0815-04", "/us/543/0815-07", "/us/543/0815-13", "/us/543/0815-01", "/us/543/0815-02", "/us/543/0815-03", "/us/543/0815-11", "/us/543/0815-05", "/us/543/0815-12", "/us/543/0815-09" ] }, { "cite": "353 F.3d 712", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 9296490 ], "weight": 7, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "727" }, { "page": "724" }, { "page": "723", "parenthetical": "\"There is nothing in the text itself that definitively resolves whether Congress intended Indian tribes to fall within the scope of 'any person, organization, or entity' under this provision.\"" }, { "page": "730", "parenthetical": "\"IGRA is undoubtedly a statute passed for the benefit of Indian tribes.\"" }, { "page": "731", "parenthetical": "\"[T]he award of exclusive class III gaming franchises simply furthers the federal government's long-standing trust obligations to Indian tribes and helps promote their economic self-development. \"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/353/0712-01" ] }, { "cite": "216 F. Supp. 2d 1084", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp. 2d", "case_ids": [ 11434862 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1122" }, { "page": "1123" }, { "page": "1126" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp-2d/216/1084-01" ] }, { "cite": "610 S.E.2d 210", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "213", "parenthetical": "holding that \"trial court erred by concluding that North Carolina public policy is violated by the video poker machine operated by the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "169 N.C. App. 151", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8468804 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "156", "parenthetical": "holding that \"trial court erred by concluding that North Carolina public policy is violated by the video poker machine operated by the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/169/0151-01" ] }, { "cite": "42 S.E.2d 77", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1947, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "80" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "227 N.C. 307", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8624454 ], "year": 1947, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "311" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/227/0307-01" ] }, { "cite": "91 S.E.2d 231", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1956, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "234" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "243 N.C. 479", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8625792 ], "year": 1956, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "483" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/243/0479-01" ] }, { "cite": "594 S.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "8", "parenthetical": "quoting McMichael v. Proctor, 243 N.C. 479, 483, 91 S.E.2d 231, 234 (1956)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "358 N.C. 160", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2986939 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "169", "parenthetical": "quoting McMichael v. Proctor, 243 N.C. 479, 483, 91 S.E.2d 231, 234 (1956)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/358/0160-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 N.C. 318", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3740769 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "322" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/361/0318-01" ] }, { "cite": "388 S.E.2d 134", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "137" }, { "page": "137" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 N.C. 205", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 5307411 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "209" }, { "page": "209" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/326/0205-01" ] }, { "cite": "263 S.E.2d 719", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "724" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "299 N.C. 465", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8575259 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "472" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/299/0465-01" ] }, { "cite": "122 Fed. Appx. 628", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "Fed. Appx.", "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "630" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "25 U.S.C. \u00a7 2710", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(d)(l)(A)" }, { "page": "(d)(1)(B)" }, { "page": "(d)(1)(B)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "517 U.S. 44", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11744357 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "48" }, { "page": "262" }, { "page": "48-49" }, { "page": "261-62" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/517/0044-01" ] }, { "cite": "209 S.E.2d 494", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "499" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "286 N.C. 130", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8563771 ], "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "137" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/286/0130-01" ] }, { "cite": "360 N.C. 78", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3789190, 3790698, 3793132, 3793873, 3791767, 3790329, 3790458 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/360/0078-06", "/nc/360/0078-04", "/nc/360/0078-07", "/nc/360/0078-02", "/nc/360/0078-03", "/nc/360/0078-05", "/nc/360/0078-01" ] }, { "cite": "171 N.C. App. 58", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8434676 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "66" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/171/0058-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-306", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 8, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-306.1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "25 U.S.C. \u00a7 2703", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(6)" }, { "page": "(7)" }, { "page": "(8)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "25 U.S.C. \u00a7 2702", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(1)" }, { "page": "(l)" }, { "page": "(1)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "25 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 2701", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1322, "char_count": 33348, "ocr_confidence": 0.754, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.898186223696053e-08, "percentile": 0.4605834162532256 }, "sha256": "4b3b8b617f5c28e41dea30430393fbe2fc9a49128b374da6cf96f23027a42a4d", "simhash": "1:4da311fddbc407f3", "word_count": 5407 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:19:33.177262+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges GEER and STEPHENS concur." ], "parties": [ "McCRACKEN and AMICK, INCORPORATED d/b/a THE NEW VEMCO MUSIC CO. and RALPH AMICK, Plaintiffs v. BEVERLY EAVES PERDUE, in her official capacity as Governor of North Carolina, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "HUNTER, Robert G, Judge.\nThe State appeals from the trial court\u2019s order entering judgment in favor of plaintiffs McCracken and Amick, Incorporated, doing business as The New Vemco Music Co., and its principal owner, Ralph Amick, on their claim that the State is not permitted under federal Indian gaming law to grant the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians of North Carolina (\u201cthe Tribe\u201d) exclusive rights to conduct certain gaming on tribal land while prohibiting it throughout the rest of the State. We conclude, however, that state law providing the Tribe with exclusive gaming rights does not violate federal Indian gaming law. Consequently, we reverse the trial court\u2019s order.\nFacts and Procedural History\nIn 1988, Congress enacted the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 2701 through 2721 (\u201cIGRA\u201d), in order \u201cto provide a statutory basis for the operation of gaming by Indian tribes as a means of promoting tribal economic development, self-sufficiency, and strong tribal govemmentst.]\u201d 25 U.S.C. \u00a7 2702(1). IGRA creates three classes of gaming: Class I gaming is defined as \u201csocial games solely for prizes of minimal value or traditional forms of Indian gaming engaged in by individuals as a part of, or in connection with, tribal ceremonies or celebrations.\u201d 25 U.S.C. \u00a7 2703(6). Class II gaming includes bingo and card games (other than banking card games) operated in accordance with state law regarding the amount of wagers and hours of operation. 25 U.S.C. \u00a7 2703(7). Class III gaming encompasses \u201call forms of gaming that are not class I gaming or class II gaming,\u201d including slot machines, casino-style games, banking card games, video games, and lotteries. 25 U.S.C. \u00a7 2703(8). With respect to Class III gaming, IGRA requires a compact between the federally recognized Indian tribe and the State prior to the tribe being permitted to conduct Class III gaming on its land.\nIn August 1994, the Tribe entered into a compact with the State of North Carolina that permits the Tribe to conduct \u201craffles,\u201d \u201cvideo games,\u201d and \u201cother Class III gaming which may be authorized\u201d in writing by the Governor. Under the compact, the Tribe operates Harrah\u2019s Cherokee Casino in Cherokee, North Carolina, which attracts more than 3.5 million visitors a year and generates annual revenues over $250,000,000. In 2000, the terms of the compact were extended until 2030.\nPrior to 1 July 2007, video poker was legal in North Carolina but heavily regulated. In 2006, the General Assembly enacted Senate Bill 912, which became Chapter 6 of the 2006 Session Laws (\u201cS.L. 2006-6\u201d). S.L. 2006-6 phased out the number of video poker machines permitted in the State and banned them completely as of 1 July 2007. S.L. 2006-6 repealed N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-306.1 (2005), which legalized and regulated video poker, and enacted N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-306.1A (2007), which, effective 1 July 2007, made it \u201cunlawful for any person to operate, allow to be operated, place into operation, or keep in that person\u2019s possession for the purpose of operation any video gaming machine,\u201d including video poker machines. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-306.lA(a). Although N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-306.1A criminalizes video poker in general in North Carolina, the legislature carved out an exception from the ban for \u201ca federally recognized Indian tribe,\u201d making it lawful for a tribe to possess and operate video poker machines on tribal land \u201cif conducted in accordance with an approved Class III Tribal-State Compact applicable to that tribe . . . .\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-306.1A(a). S.L. 2006-6 also contains a voiding clause, providing that \u201c[i]f a final Order by a court of competent jurisdiction prohibits possession or operation of video gaming machines by a federally recognized Indian tribe because that activity is not allowed elsewhere in this State, this act is void.\u201d\nPlaintiffs own and operate video games, vending machines, and amusement devices, such as juke boxes, pinball machines, and pool tables. Prior to 1 July 2007, plaintiffs\u2019 business also included selling, leasing, distributing, operating, and maintaining video poker machines. On 10 November 2008, plaintiffs filed a declaratory judgment action against the State, alleging that the State is not permitted under IGRA to grant the Tribe a gaming \u201cmonopoly\u201d withing the State. Plaintiffs also asserted a \u201cseparation of powers\u201d violation in that \u201cthe authority to negotiate, approve and execute tribal-state compacts or amendments to the existing Compact is reserved to the General Assembly\u201d \u2014 not the Governor.\nOn 21 November 2008, the State moved to dismiss plaintiffs\u2019 complaint on multiple grounds, including: (1) lack of standing; (2) failure to state a claim for relief; and (3) failure to join a necessary party\u2014 the Tribe \u2014 to the action. On 18 February 2009,'plaintiffs took a voluntary dismissal of their separation of powers claim. With the consent of the parties, the trial court converted the State\u2019s motion to dismiss into a motion for judgment on the pleadings with respect to plaintiff\u2019s IGRA claim.\nThe trial court entered an order on 19 February 2009, concluding that \u201cIGRA does not permit a state to ban the possession and operation of video gaming machines elsewhere in the state while allowing their possession and operation on tribal lands.\u201d Thus, the trial court \u201cdeclarefd] that the State acted unlawfully in authorizing the Eastern Band of the Cherokee Indians to possess and operate video gaming machines on tribal lands within North Carolina because that activity is not allowed elsewhere in this State; pursuant to Section 12 of SL 2006-6, this declaration renders G.S. \u00a7 14-306.1A null, void and of no effect.\u201d Consequently, the trial court entered judgment on the pleadings in favor of plaintiffs. The State noticed appeal from the trial court\u2019s order and the trial court stayed \u201cthe operation and effect of [its] rulings . . . pending the resolution of the State\u2019s appeal.\u201d\nStandard of Review\nThe State contends that the trial court erred in entering judgment on the pleadings in favor of plaintiffs. On appeal, the trial court\u2019s grant of a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to N.C.R. Civ. P. 12(c) is reviewed de novo. Toomer v. Branch Banking & Tr. Co., 171 N.C. App. 58, 66, 614 S.E.2d 328, 335, disc. review denied, 360 N.C. 78, 623 S.E.2d 263 (2005). Judgment on the pleadings is proper \u201cwhen all the material allegations of fact are admitted in the pleadings and only questions of law remain.\u201d Ragsdale v. Kennedy, 286 N.C. 130, 137, 209 S.E.2d 494, 499 (1974).\nValidity of S.L. 2006-6\nAs the trial court correctly points out, this case \u201carises out of the interplay\u201d between IGRA, the tribal-state compact between the Tribe and the State of North Carolina, and the State\u2019s criminalization of video gaming machines pursuant to S.L. 2006-6. IGRA \u201cdivides gaming on Indian lands into three classes \u2014 I, II, and III \u2014 and provides a different regulatory scheme for each class.\u201d Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 48, 134 L. Ed. 2d 252, 262 (1996). IGRA dictates that Class III gaming, the category at issue here, is \u201clawful on Indian lands only if such activities are\u201d: (1) authorized by an approved tribal ordinance or resolution; (2) \u201clocated in a State that permits such gaming for any purpose by any person, organization, or entity\u201d; and (3) conducted in conformance with a tribal-state compact in effect. 25 U.S.C. \u00a7 2710(d)(l)(A)-(C); Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 48-49, 134 L. Ed. 2d at 261-62.\nThrough Chapter 71A of the General Statutes, the chapter dealing with \u201cIndians,\u201d the General Assembly permits gaming by federally recognized tribes on tribal lands provided that the gaming is authorized by a tribal-state compact:\nIn recognition of the governmental relationship between the State, federally recognized Indian tribes and the United States, a federally recognized Indian tribe may conduct games consistent with the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, Public Law 100-497, that are in accordance with a valid Tribal-State compact executed by the Governor pursuant to G.S. 147-12(14) and approved by the U.S. Department of Interior under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, and such games shall not be unlawful or against the public policy of the State if the State permits such gaming for any purpose by any person, organization, or entity.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 71A-8 (2007). The Fourth Circuit has recognized that \u201cNorth Carolina, citing the IGRA and acknowledging that the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians is a federally recognized Indian tribe, . . . authorized, subject to various regulations, Class III gaming, the operation of video gaming devices, and the administering of raffles.\u201d United States v. Garrett, 122 Fed. Appx. 628, 630 (4th Cir. 2005).\nIn 2006, the General Assembly enacted S.L. 2006-6, codified as N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-306.1A, which provides in pertinent part:\n(a) Ban on Machines. \u2014 It shall be unlawful for any person to operate, allow to be operated, place into operation, or keep in that person\u2019s possession for the purpose of operation any video gaming machine as defined in subsection (b) of this section, except for the exemption for a federally recognized Indian tribe under subsection (e) of this section for whom it shall be lawful to operate and possess machines as listed in subsection (b) of this section if conducted in accordance with an approved Class III Tribal-State Compact applicable to that tribe, as provided in G.S. 147-12(14) and G.S. 71A-8.\n(e) Exemption for Activities Under IGRA. \u2014 Notwithstanding any other prohibitions in State law, the form of Class III gaming otherwise prohibited by subsections (a) through (d) of this section may be legally conducted on Indian lands which are held in trust by the United States government for and on behalf of federally recognized Indian tribes if conducted in accordance with an approved Class III Tribal-State Gaming Compact applicable to that tribe as provided in G.S. 147-12(14) and G.S. 71A-8.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-306.lA(a), (e).\nDetermining whether S.L. 2006-6 and the Tribal-State compact violate IGRA requires interpretation of 25 U.S.C. \u00a7 2710(d)(1)(B), the provision regulating Class III gaming on Indian lands. Questions of statutory interpretation are questions of law, reviewed de novo on appeal. Hudson v. Hudson, 299 N.C. 465, 472, 263 S.E.2d 719, 724 (1980). The primary objective of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the legislature. Burgess v. Your House of Raleigh, 326 N.C. 205, 209, 388 S.E.2d 134, 137 (1990). To this end, the court must first determine whether the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, and if so, it \u201cwill apply the plain meaning of the words, with no need to resort to judicial construetion.\u201d Wiggs v. Edgecombe Cty., 361 N.C. 318, 322, 643 S.E.2d 904, 907 (2007). Judicial construction is necessary to ascertain legislative intent only where the statutory language is ambiguous. Burgess, 326 N.C. at 209, 388 S.E.2d at 137.\nThe parties\u2019 disagreement focuses on the proper meaning of 25 U.S.C. \u00a7 2710(d)(1)(B), which provides that \u201cClass III gaming activities shall be lawful on Indian lands only if such activities are . . . (B) located in a State that permits such gaming for any purpose by any person, organization, or entity[.]\u201d This provision raises two separate but related issues of interpretation: (1) whether S.L. 2006-6, which authorizes Class III gaming only by tribes and only on tribal land, satisfies \u00a7 2710(d)(l)(B)\u2019s prerequisite that North Carolina be a state that \u201cpermits such gaming\u201d; and (2) whether the scope of the language \u201cany person, organization, or entity\u201d includes Indian tribes.\n\u201cPermits Such Gaming\u201d\nWith respect to IGRA\u2019s \u201cpermits such gaming\u201d provision, plaintiffs maintain that a state that, with the exception of tribal gaming, prohibits Class III gaming statewide does not, as a matter of public policy, \u201cpermit such gaming.\u201d Plaintiffs contend that S.L. 2006-6 cannot be reconciled with 25 U.S.C. 2701(5), which provides that \u201cIndian tribes have the exclusive right to regulate gaming activity on Indian lands if the gaming activity is not specifically prohibited by Federal law and is conducted within a State which does not, as a matter of criminal law and public policy, prohibit such gaming activity.\" (Emphasis added.) Plaintiffs maintain that the public policy of the State, as expressed by the General Assembly in S.L. 2006-6, is generally to prohibit Class III gaming notwithstanding the exception provided for federally recognized tribes. Thus, plaintiffs argue, because the overarching public policy of the State is to prohibit Class III gaming, the State does not \u201cpermit such gaming\u201d under \u00a7 2710(d)(1)(B).\nThe State counters that the \u201cplain language\u201d of the statute \u201callows a State to ban video gaming statewide but to carve out an exception for gaming occurring on tribal land pursuant to a Tribal/State compact.\u201d The State argues that N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 71A-8 and N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-306.1A(e) clearly \u201carticulat[e]\u201d the public policy of North Carolina: \u201cThese laws reflect a policy decision by the General Assembly to extend preferential gaming rights in deference to a separate sovereign entity residing within its borders.\u201d Thus, the State claims, North Carolina \u201cpermits\u201d Class III gaming as required by IGRA.\n\u201cThe legislative branch of government is without question \u2018the policy-making agency of our government . . . \u201d Rhyne v. K-Mart Corp., 358 N.C. 160, 169, 594 S.E.2d 1, 8 (2004) (quoting McMichael v. Proctor, 243 N.C. 479, 483, 91 S.E.2d 231, 234 (1956)). \u201c[Wjhere the law-making power speaks on a particular subject over which it has power to legislate, public policy in such cases is what the law enacts.\u201d Cauble v. Trexler, 227 N.C. 307, 311, 42 S.E.2d 77, 80 (1947). Here, the General Assembly has expressed the public policy of the State through N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 71A-8, which explicitly authorizes Indian gaming in accordance with IGRA, and N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-306.1A, which criminalizes Class III gaming in North Carolina except for the Tribe\u2019s enterprises. See Hatcher v. Harrah\u2019s N.C. Casino Co., LLC, 169 N.C. App. 151, 156, 610 S.E.2d 210, 213 (2005) (holding that \u201ctrial court erred by concluding that North Carolina public policy is violated by the video poker machine operated by the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians\u201d). S.L. 2006-6\u2019s voiding clause, moreover, manifests the Legislature\u2019s intent that the Tribe should retain its Class III gaming rights under the tribal-state compact no matter what the outcome is of a challenge to S.L. 2006-6\u2019s legality \u2014 if upheld, the Tribe\u2019s Class III gaming is exempted from the statewide prohibition; if struck down, the statewide ban is invalidated.\nThis conclusion is bolstered by the reasoning of the district court in Artichoke Joe\u2019s v. Norton, 216 F. Supp. 2d 1084 (E.D. Cal. 2002) [hereinafter Artichoke Joe\u2019s I], aff\u2019d, 353 F.3d 712 (2003), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 815, 160 L. Ed. 2d 20 (2004). In interpreting IGRA\u2019s \u201cpermits such gaming\u201d requirement, the district court observed that Congress had \u201cemployed capacious language to clarify the situations in which it would be lawful for Indian tribes to offer class III gaming\u201d:\nThe Act does not define \u201cpermits\u201d; neither placing restrictions on the word nor otherwise limiting its meaning. Section 2710(d)(1)(B) does not say \u201cpermits such gaming independently of IGRA for any purpose by any person, organization, or entity.\u201d It does not say \u201cpermits such gaming for any purpose by any person, organization, or entity other than Indian tribes.\u201d And it is precisely because Congress did not write the Act in either of these ways that [a state], subject to the Secretary] of the Interior]\u2019s approval, may \u201cpermit\u201d class III gaming within the structure of IGRA, even though the permission is not entirely independent of IGRA, and even though IGRA prevents states from unilaterally legalizing tribal gaming. In short, the statute is written broadly, and it is consistent with the co-operative federalism at the heart of IGRA to allow the state to \u201cpermit\u201d tribal gaming under the Act by exempting the tribes from state prohibitions on [Class III gaming].\nId. at 1121.\nIGRA\u2019s legislative history also supports the State\u2019s position that IGRA permits states to grant tribes preferential gaming rights. See Lilly v. N.C. Dept. of Human Resources, 105 N.C. App. 408, 411-12, 413 S.E.2d 316, 318 (1992) (holding that legislative history of federal statute supported plain meaning of statutory language). When Congress was considering the Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Cabazon, two different bills were introduced: Senate Bill 555 and Senate Bill 1303. The majority of Senate Bill 555 was adopted and ultimately enacted by Congress as IGRA. The initial draft of Senate Bill 555, however, included \u00a7 11(d)(1) and (2), which provided in pertinent part:\n(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, class III gaming shall be unlawful on any Indian lands under section 1166 of title 18, United States Code.\n(2) (A) A gaming activity on Indian lands that is otherwise legal within the State where such lands are located may be exempt from the operation of paragraph (1) of this subsection where the Indian tribe requests the Secretary to consent to the transfer of all civil and criminal jurisdiction, except for taxing authority, pertaining to the licensing and regulation of gaming over the proposed gaming enterprise to the State within which such gaming enterprise is to be located and the Secretary so consents.\n133 Cong. Rec. 3740 (1987) (emphasis added). This language was taken out of the bill and the current, broader language was substituted from Senate Bill 1303. 133 Cong. Rec. 14332, \u00a7 10(b). Senate Bill 555\u2019s original language \u2014 \u201cotherwise legal within the State\u201d \u2014 supports plaintiffs\u2019 contention that persons, organizations, or entities other than the Tribe must be allowed to engage in Class III gaming activities in order for the State to permit the Tribe to conduct such gaming activities. As one federal appellate court observed, however: \u201cThe fact that the \u2018permits such gaming\u2019 text was taken from another bill suggests that the substitution was deliberate, and the particular substitution that the drafters chose implies that Congress intended a broader meaning than the one proposed by Plaintiffs.\u201d Artichoke Joe\u2019s II, 353 F.3d at 727. \u201cFew principles of statutory construction are more compelling than the proposition that Congress does not intend sub silentio to enact statutory language that it has earlier discarded in favor of other language.\u201d INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 442-43, 94 L. Ed. 2d 434, 455 (1987) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Based on the plain language of the statute, supported by its legislative history, we conclude that North Carolina satisfies \u00a7 2710(d)(l)(B)\u2019s \u201cpermits such gaming\u201d requirement.\n\u201cAnv Person. Organization, or Entity\u201d\nThe parties similarly disagree about the meaning of IGRA\u2019s phrase \u201cany person, organization, or entity.\u201d The State argues that because tribal gaming enterprises are not explicitly excluded from the phrase \u201cany person, organization, or entity,\u201d IGRA enables the State to grant the Tribe exclusive Class III gaming rights. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, contend that it stands \u00a7 2710(d)(1)(B) \u201con its head\u201d to read the phrase \u201cany person, organization, or entity\u201d as \u201cinclud[ing] the very tribe whose authority is at issue.\u201d Thus, plaintiffs argue, \u00a7 2710(d)(1)(B) must be read as requiring states to permit Class III gaming for any purpose by any non-Indian person, organization, or entity, if it permits it for the Tribe.\nThe focal point of the parties\u2019 arguments is the word \u201cany.\u201d Under the State\u2019s reading of \u00a7 2710(d)(1)(B), \u201cany\u201d means \u201cone\u201d \u2014 the State may grant the Tribe exclusive Class III gaming rights under IGRA if state law permits Class III gaming for at least one purpose for at least one person, organization, or entity, including the Tribe itself. The State\u2019s interpretation of \u00a7 2710(d)(1)(B) is both reasonable and supported by the decisions of other courts of other jurisdictions that have addressed this issue. See Artichoke Joe\u2019s I, 216 F. Supp. 2d at 1122 (\u201cThe word \u2018any\u2019 can mean \u2018every\u2019 or \u2018one.\u2019 However, interpreting \u2018any\u2019 in \u00a7 2710(d)(1)(B) to mean \u2018every\u2019 must be rejected. . . . [Section] 2710(d)(1)(B) is best understood as allowing class III gaming compacts in states that permit that kind of gaming for at least one purpose, by at least one person, organization, or entity.\u201d); American Greyhound Racing, Inc. v. Hull, 146 F. Supp. 2d 1012,1067 (D. Ariz. 2001) (\u201cThe State must first legalize a game, even if only for tribes, before it can become a compact term.\u201d), vacated on procedural grounds, 305 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir. 2002); Dalton v. Pataki, 5 N.Y.3d 243, 261, 835 N.E.2d 1180, 1190, 802 N.Y.S.2d 72, 82 (N.Y.) (con-eluding that \u201cif class III gaming is permitted in the state for any purpose, ... it will be permitted on Indian land\u201d), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1032, 163 L. Ed. 2d 571 (2005).\nAccording to plaintiffs\u2019 interpretation, however, \u201cany\u201d means \u201cevery\u201d \u2014 in order for the State to grant the Tribe Class III gaming rights, state law must also allow every other person, organization, or entity within the State to conduct Class III gaming, albeit subject to regulation. This interpretation is likewise not unreasonable. See Artichoke Joe\u2019s II, 353 F.3d at 724 (holding that \u201c[a]lthough the trend of judicial construction of \u00a7 2710(d)(1)(B) slightly favors\u201d reading \u201cany\u201d as \u201cone,\u201d interpreting \u201cany\u201d as \u201cevery\u201d not unreasonable). We, therefore, conclude \u2014 as have all other appellate decisions we have found addressing this issue \u2014 that the phrase \u201cany person, organization or entity\u201d is ambiguous. See id. at 723 (\u201cThere is nothing in the text itself that definitively resolves whether Congress intended Indian tribes to fall within the scope of \u2018any person, organization, or entity\u2019 under this provision.\u201d); Artichoke Joe\u2019s I, 216 F. Supp. 2d at 1123 (considering legislative history of IGRA \u201cto the extent that the language of \u00a7 2710(d)(1)(B) might be ambiguous\u201d); Flynt v. California Gambling Control Com., 104 Cal. App. 4th 1125, 1138, 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 167, 178 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (\u201cWe find the text of section 2710(d)(1)(B) ambiguous.\u201d), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 948, 157 L. Ed. 2d 278 (2003).\nWhen a statute is ambiguous, principles of statutory construction are necessary to discern legislative intent. Young v. Whitehall Co., 229 N.C. 360, 367, 49 S.E.2d 797, 801 (1948). The best indicia of legislative intent are the purpose and spirit of the statute, the goal it sought to accomplish, its legislative history, and the circumstances surrounding its enactment. Black v. Littlejohn, 312 N.C. 626, 630, 325 S.E.2d 469, 473 (1985).\nCongress provides that two of the primary purposes of IGRA are\n(1) to provide a statutory basis for the operation of gaming by Indian tribes as a means of promoting tribal economic development, self-sufficiency, and strong tribal governments; [and]\n(2) to provide a statutory basis for the regulation of gaming by an Indian tribe adequate to shield it from organized crime and other corrupting influences, to ensure that the Indian tribe is the primary beneficiary of the gaming operation, and to assure that gaming is conducted fairly and honestly by both the operator and players[.]\n25 U.S.C. \u00a7 2702(l)-(2). The stated purposes of IGRA \u201cstrongly suggest]] that the thrust of the [statute] is to promote Indian gaming, not to limit it.\u201d Grand Traverse Band v. Office of U.S. Atty., 369 F.3d 960, 971 (6th Cir. 2004). As recognized by other appellate courts, nowhere in Congress\u2019 \u201c[d]eclaration of policy\u201d is there any indication that IGRA was intended to establish parity between Indian and non-Indian gaming enterprises. See, e.g., Artichoke Joe\u2019s II, 353 F.3d at, 728 (\u201cNowhere is there any reference to the idea that IGRA serves as a means of policing equality between Indian and non-Indian gaming operations in the context of class III gaming.\u201d); Flynt, 104 Cal. App. 4th at 1139, 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 178 (\u201cQuite simply, Congress exhibited no desire to command states to enact gaming laws so that private non-Indian enterprises would enjoy the same rights as Indian tribes.\u201d).\nMore pertinent to this case, in Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759, 766, 85 L. Ed. 2d 753, 759 (1985), the United States Supreme Court held that \u201cthe standard principles of statutory construction do not have their usual force in cases involving Indian law.\u201d One of the canons of construction that apply specially to Indian law, known as the Blackfeet presumption or trust doctrine, provides that federal statutes passed for the benefit of Indian tribes are to be liberally construed, with ambiguities being resolved in favor of the tribes. Id. at 767, 85 L. Ed. 2d at 760; Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Engineering, 467 U.S. 138, 150, 81 L. Ed. 2d 113, 123 (1984). In applying the Blackfeet presumption, any doubt as to the proper interpretation of a federal statute enacted for the benefit of an Indian tribe will be resolved in favor of the tribe as \u201c[a]mbiguities in federal law have been construed generously in order to comport with . . . traditional notions of sovereignty and with the federal policy of encouraging tribal independence.\u201d White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143-44, 65 L. Ed. 2d 665, 673 (1980).\nPlaintiffs assert that the Blackfeet presumption \u201csimply has no application here, because the legislative enactment at issue \u2014 Chapter 6 of the 2006 Session Laws \u2014 cannot be interpreted in any manner that is \u2018unfavorable\u2019 to the Tribe.\u201d Plaintiffs misunderstand the subject of the presumption; it applies to federal Indian law, not state law. See Arizona Public Service Co. v. E.P.A., 211 F.3d 1280, 1293 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (\u201c[C]ourts construe federal statutes liberally to benefit Native American nations.\u201d (Emphasis added.)).\nIt cannot be seriously disputed that IGRA \u2014 titled the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act \u2014 -is a federal statute designed to benefit Indian tribes. In its declaration of policy, Congress provides that one of the purposes of the gaming regulations in IGRA is to \u201cpromot[e] tribal economic development, self-sufficiency, and strong tribal govemments[.]\u201d 25 U.S.C. \u00a7 2702(1); accord Artichoke Joe\u2019s II, 353 F.3d at 730 (\u201cIGRA is undoubtedly a statute passed for the benefit of Indian tribes.\u201d); see also Matthew L. M. Fletcher, Bringing Balance to Indian Gaming, 44 Harv. J. on Legis. 39, 51 (2007) (\u201cOverall. . . Congress made clear that the purpose of [IGRA] was to benefit Indian tribes, not states, and to expand tribal opportunities for self-determination, self-government, economic development, and political stability.\u201d). Thus, because \u00a7 2710(d)(l)(B)\u2019s phrase \u201cany person, organization or entity\u201d is ambiguous as to whether the Tribe is included within its scope, the Blackfeet presumption applies.\nPlaintiffs argue that there is no way to apply the Blackfeet presumption in this case because neither their interpretation of \u00a7 2710(d)(1)(B) nor the State\u2019s is \u201cmore favorable to the Tribe than the other.\u201d According to plaintiffs, if, as the trial court held, S.L. 2006-6 violates IGRA, then its voiding clause is triggered and the Tribe may continue to conduct its Class III gaming activities on tribal land. If, on the other hand, S.L. 2006-6 complies with IGRA\u2019s requirements, then the Tribe retains its gaming rights under the tribal-state compact. Thus, according to plaintiffs, \u201cthe General Assembly has placed the Tribe in a \u2018win-win\u2019 position with respect to the outcome of this case.\u201d\nPlaintiffs\u2019 characterization ignores the economic impact of invalidating S.L. 2006-6. The tribal-state compact between the Tribe and the State of North Carolina entitles the Tribe to conduct those Class III gaming activities specified in the compact. By prohibiting Class III gaming throughout the rest of the State, S.L. 2006-6 makes the Tribe\u2019s gaming rights exclusive. If S.L. 2006-6 were invalidated, the Tribe would no longer have preferential gaming rights, but instead would be in competition with other gaming enterprises, such as plaintiffs\u2019. As their complaint states, the motivation behind this lawsuit is to \u201crestore the plaintiffs\u2019 authority to engage in the video poker business.\u201d Plaintiffs\u2019 interpretation of \u00a7 2710(d)(1)(B) is inconsistent with IGRA\u2019s stated purposes of promoting tribal economic development, self-sufficiency, and strong tribal governments. See Artichoke Joe\u2019s II, 353 F.3d at 731 (\u201c[T]he award of exclusive class III gaming franchises simply furthers the federal government\u2019s long-standing trust obligations to Indian tribes and helps promote their economic self-development. \u201d).\nIn applying the presumption, we adopt the State\u2019s interpretation of the ambiguous phrase \u201cany person, organization or entity,\u201d concluding that S.L. 2006-6, which legalizes the Tribe\u2019s Class III gaming rights, satisfies \u00a7 2710(d)(l)(B)\u2019s requirement that North Carolina be a state \u201cthat permits such gaming for any purpose by any person, organization, or entity[.]\u201d The trial court, therefore, erred in concluding that IGRA precluded North Carolina from granting the Tribe exclusive Class III gaming rights and entering judgment on this basis. We note, in conclusion that North Carolina\u2019s\ndecision to \u201cpermit\u201d tribes to operate class III gaming facilities within the context of IGRA and the compacts, while denying those rights to other persons, organizations, and entities, is a policy judgment, which whether one agrees with it or not, does not conflict with IGRA\u2019s goal of maintaining state authority while protecting Indian gaming from discrimination. By contrast, to interpret IGRA to require the states to cho[o]se between no class III gaming anywhere and class III gaming everywhere would not further any of IGRA\u2019s goals and would limit the states\u2019 authority and flexibility without any resulting benefit to the tribes.\nArtichoke Joe\u2019s I, 216 F. Supp. 2d at 1126. The trial court\u2019s order is reversed.\nReversed.\nJudges GEER and STEPHENS concur.\n. IGRA was enacted in response to California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 94 L. Ed. 2d 244 (1987), where the United States Supreme Court held that states could not enforce state laws regulating gaming against Indian tribes\u2014 only criminal statutes prohibiting gaming could be enforced under federal law.\n. Act of June 6, 2006, ch. 6, sec. 4, 2006 N.C. Sess. Laws 6-6.\n. Amici curiae argue that the Tribe is a necessary party to this action and thus the trial court erred in not joining the Tribe prior to entering judgment. Although the State moved to dismiss on this basis, the trial court did not rule on this issue, the State did not assign error to the court\u2019s failure to address the issue, and the State presents no argument on appeal that the Tribe is an unjoined necessary party. As the issue is raised only in the amici curiae\u2019s brief, we decline to address the issue in the absence of exceptional circumstances. See Artichoke Joe\u2019s California Grand Casino v. Norton, 353 F.3d 712, 719 n.10 (9th Cir. 2003) [hereinafter Artichoke Joe\u2019s II] (declining to address whether tribe was necessary party to challenge to the validity of tribal-state gaming compacts because the issue was \u201craised only in an amicus brief\u2019), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 815, 51, 160 L. Ed. 2d 20 (2004).\n. Although not binding on North Carolina\u2019s courts, the holdings and underlying rationale of lower federal courts may be considered persuasive authority in interpreting a federal statute. Security Mills v. Trust Go., 281 N.C. 525, 529, 189 S.E.2d 266, 269 (1972).", "type": "majority", "author": "HUNTER, Robert G, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Everett Gaskins Hancock & Stevens, LLP, by Hugh Stevens, Michael J. Tadych, and James M. Hash, for plaintiffs-appellees.", "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General Mark A. Davis, for defendant-appellant.", "Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, by Attorney General Annette Tamawsky; Ben Oshel Bridgers, PLLC, by Ben Oshel Bridgers; and Holland & Knight LLP, by Frank Lawrence, Los Angeles, California, pro hac vice, for amici curiae Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, National Congress of American Indians, National Indian Gaming Association, United South and Eastern Tribes, Arizona Indian Gaming Association, and Poarch Band of Creek Indians of Alabama." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "McCRACKEN and AMICK, INCORPORATED d/b/a THE NEW VEMCO MUSIC CO. and RALPH AMICK, Plaintiffs v. BEVERLY EAVES PERDUE, in her official capacity as Governor of North Carolina, Defendant\nNo. COA09-431\n(Filed 22 December 2009)\nIndians\u2014 federal Indian gaming law \u2014 preferential gaming rights\nThe trial court erred in a declaratory judgment action by granting judgment in favor of plaintiffs on their claim that the State is not permitted under federal Indian gaming law to grant the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians of North Carolina exclusive rights to conduct certain gaming on tribal land while prohibiting it throughout the rest of the State. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 71A-8 reflects a policy decision by the General Assembly to extend preferential gaming rights in deference to a separate sovereign entity residing within its borders.\nAppeal by defendant from order entered 19 February 2009 by Judge Howard E. Manning, Jr. in Wake County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 14 October 2009.\nEverett Gaskins Hancock & Stevens, LLP, by Hugh Stevens, Michael J. Tadych, and James M. Hash, for plaintiffs-appellees.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General Mark A. Davis, for defendant-appellant.\nEastern Band of Cherokee Indians, by Attorney General Annette Tamawsky; Ben Oshel Bridgers, PLLC, by Ben Oshel Bridgers; and Holland & Knight LLP, by Frank Lawrence, Los Angeles, California, pro hac vice, for amici curiae Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, National Congress of American Indians, National Indian Gaming Association, United South and Eastern Tribes, Arizona Indian Gaming Association, and Poarch Band of Creek Indians of Alabama." }, "file_name": "0480-01", "first_page_order": 508, "last_page_order": 521 }