{ "id": 4174782, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. DIMITRY SIMONOVICH", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Simonovich", "decision_date": "2010-01-19", "docket_number": "No. COA09-585", "first_page": "49", "last_page": "60", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "202 N.C. App. 49" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "616 S.E.2d 515", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633574 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "530", "parenthetical": "internal citations omitted" }, { "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/616/0515-01" ] }, { "cite": "673 S.E.2d 874", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12643028 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "876", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Huggins, 338 N.C. 494, 497, 450 S.E.2d 479, 481 (1994)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/673/0874-01" ] }, { "cite": "491 S.E.2d 682", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 11, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "685" }, { "page": "685", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "683" }, { "page": "684" }, { "page": "684" }, { "page": "685", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "127 N.C. App. 536", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11798543 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "538-39" }, { "page": "539" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/127/0536-01" ] }, { "cite": "595 S.E.2d 197", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "206", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Deese, 127 N.C. App. 536, 538-39, 491 S.E.2d 682, 685 (1997)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "164 N.C. App. 70", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8895536 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "83", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Deese, 127 N.C. App. 536, 538-39, 491 S.E.2d 682, 685 (1997)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/164/0070-01" ] }, { "cite": "339 S.E.2d 664", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "79 N.C. App. 440", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521310 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/79/0440-01" ] }, { "cite": "433 S.E.2d 183", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "334 N.C. 437", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2529857, 2528988, 2532432, 2528433, 2532220 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/334/0437-04", "/nc/334/0437-03", "/nc/334/0437-01", "/nc/334/0437-02", "/nc/334/0437-05" ] }, { "cite": "429 S.E.2d 363", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 13, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "371" }, { "page": "365" }, { "page": "371" }, { "page": "371", "parenthetical": "internal citations omitted" }, { "page": "371" }, { "page": "371", "parenthetical": "internal citations omitted" }, { "page": "371" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "110 N.C. App. 138", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525080 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "142" }, { "page": "151" }, { "page": "152" }, { "page": "152" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/110/0138-01" ] }, { "cite": "564 S.E.2d 630", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "634", "parenthetical": "internal citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "151 N.C. App. 100", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9079433 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "105-06", "parenthetical": "internal citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/151/0100-01" ] }, { "cite": "573 S.E.2d 158", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "356 N.C. 441", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1511575, 1511571, 1511223, 1511192, 1511389 ], "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/356/0441-03", "/nc/356/0441-02", "/nc/356/0441-04", "/nc/356/0441-01", "/nc/356/0441-05" ] }, { "cite": "569 S.E.2d 717", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "723" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "153 N.C. App. 231", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9249194 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "241" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/153/0231-01" ] }, { "cite": "679 S.E.2d 395", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "363 N.C. 378", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "674 S.E.2d 727", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "731" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "359 N.C. 709", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3802205 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "729", "parenthetical": "internal citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/359/0709-01" ] }, { "cite": "214 S.E.2d 85", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "90", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "287 N.C. 147", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561233 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "154", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/287/0147-01" ] }, { "cite": "49 L. Ed. 2d 1207", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "428 U.S. 903", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6183298, 6181252, 6182756, 6183146, 6182571, 6181805, 6182223, 6181423, 6181585, 6182964, 6182388, 6181945, 6182076 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/428/0903-13", "/us/428/0903-01", "/us/428/0903-10", "/us/428/0903-12", "/us/428/0903-09", "/us/428/0903-04", "/us/428/0903-07", "/us/428/0903-02", "/us/428/0903-03", "/us/428/0903-11", "/us/428/0903-08", "/us/428/0903-05", "/us/428/0903-06" ] }, { "cite": "210 S.E.2d 407", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "413-14", "parenthetical": "internal citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "286 N.C. 304", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565329 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "312-13" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/286/0304-01" ] }, { "cite": "450 S.E.2d 479", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "481" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "338 N.C. 494", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2518686 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "497" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/338/0494-01" ] }, { "cite": "376 S.E.2d 753", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "756" }, { "page": "756", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "324 N.C. 227", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2488232 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "232" }, { "page": "232" }, { "page": "232" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/324/0227-01" ] }, { "cite": "461 S.E.2d 724", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "341 N.C. 585", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 793151 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/341/0585-01" ] }, { "cite": "131 L. Ed. 2d 569", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "514 U.S. 1071", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1339297, 1339621, 1340455, 1339305, 1339083, 1340365, 1339758, 1338927, 1339984, 1339085, 1339893, 1338716, 1339930, 1339164, 1338621 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/514/1071-08", "/us/514/1071-09", "/us/514/1071-13", "/us/514/1071-11", "/us/514/1071-01", "/us/514/1071-04", "/us/514/1071-06", "/us/514/1071-10", "/us/514/1071-03", "/us/514/1071-15", "/us/514/1071-02", "/us/514/1071-05", "/us/514/1071-14", "/us/514/1071-07", "/us/514/1071-12" ] }, { "cite": "449 S.E.2d 694", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "699" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "338 N.C. 168", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2519058 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "176" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/338/0168-01" ] }, { "cite": "444 S.E.2d 418", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "419", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "336 N.C. 592", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2535876 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "594", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/336/0592-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1030, "char_count": 26274, "ocr_confidence": 0.749, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.13685160795088824 }, "sha256": "66b4129b23b767a63ce57788004b69dbc8502866fe8ff3efc1eb28a460140eb8", "simhash": "1:8767d02a252f8c50", "word_count": 4283 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:18:34.741992+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges WYNN and BRYANT concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. DIMITRY SIMONOVICH" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "McGEE, Judge.\nDimitry Simonovich (Defendant) was convicted on 7 August 2008 of second-degree murder of his wife, Inna Simonovich (Inna). The trial court sentenced Defendant to an active term of 196 months to 245 months. Defendant appeals.\nThe evidence at trial tended to show that Defendant and Inna were natives of Belarus and were married to each other in Belarus on 8 August 2003. Inna emigrated to the United States with her parents less than three months later, while Defendant remained in Belarus. Defendant and Inna communicated regularly by telephone and Inna provided clothing and other material support to Defendant. Defendant\u2019s relationship with Inna began to deteriorate. They argued and Inna told Defendant she no longer loved him. They contemplated divorce, but Defendant remained hopeful and continued to work toward reuniting with Inna in the United States.\nDefendant came to the United States on 1 March 2007 and began to teach himself English. At the time of trial, he could not speak English. Defendant and Inna shared an apartment in Asheville, which was located in the same apartment complex as Inna\u2019s family. At trial, Defendant testified through an interpreter that he found a job installing marble and granite countertops. Inna\u2019s mother testified through an interpreter that Inna worked as a cleaner at various locations around Asheville. During April of 2007, Inna became pregnant with Defendant\u2019s child. Defendant testified that he had been praying for Inna to become pregnant and that, when she told him about the pregnancy, he \u201cwas very excited.\u201d\nDefendant further testified to the following at trial. Inna told Defendant that, while Defendant was still living in Belarus, she had sexual relationships with several men in the United States. On the evening Defendant arrived in the United States, Inna said to him: \u201cPlease forgive me. I have cheated on you.\u201d Defendant told Inna to \u201c[f]orget everything that was before me \u2014 that happened before me. I came here; now let\u2019s start a new life together.\u201d Inna told Defendant about her relationships with other men and she continued to receive telephone calls from a man Defendant identified as Inna\u2019s \u201cboyfriend.\u201d Defendant testified that Inna kept pornographic materials in their apartment and used a computer to view pornographic web sites and Russian dating web sites. Defendant wanted Inna to stop seeing other men and had several arguments with Inna about that.\nInna\u2019s mother and sister testified at trial through interpreters. Inna\u2019s mother testified that she did not know what Inna used the computer for. Inna\u2019s sister, Larisa, testified that she was not aware of Inna having any relationships outside of her marriage to Defendant nor was she aware of Inna\u2019s use of the internet for pornographic or dating purposes. Larisa also testified that she did not hear Inna tell Defendant that Inna had sex with other men.\nDefendant testified that at times the arguments were heated and physically threatening to Inna. During one argument, Defendant took Inna\u2019s telephone, intending to erase her boyfriend\u2019s telephone number from the telephone\u2019s memory, but became angry and broke the telephone instead. During another argument, Defendant broke Inna\u2019s discs containing pornographic materials and threw a pornographic magazine at her.\nDefendant described another incident during which Inna took Defendant\u2019s passport and locked herself in the bedroom. Defendant kicked open the bedroom door and Inna called out for her sister, who was a neighbor, to help. Inna refused to return Defendant\u2019s passport, and Defendant \u201cgrabbed her by the neck.\u201d Defendant and Inna struggled until Inna reached for a pair of scissors and Defendant then released her. Defendant again grabbed Inna and she bit him. Inna ran to her sister\u2019s apartment and Defendant went to sleep.\nDefendant testified that he and Inna fought again on 27 July 2007. Defendant wanted to have sex with Inna, but she was not interested. Inna told Defendant that she did not love him and that they could no longer live together. Inna also told Defendant that \u201c[i]f [she] wanted to have sex [she] could find [herself] another man.\u201d When Defendant told her that he did not want her to find another man, Defendant said Inna replied, \u201cI will do it just to make you angry. I will go with someone else or I will make a phone call and they will come and get me.\u201d Defendant took Inna\u2019s telephone and car keys and left the apartment for the night. Defendant worked all the next day.\nDefendant testified that when he returned home from work the next day, Inna was not there. She returned later with her mother and demanded that Defendant return her keys. Defendant and Inna argued and Inna again threatened to leave. After some time, Defendant asked Inna to forgive him and she replied, \u201c[n]ever.\u201d Defendant and Inna continued to argue, and at one point, Defendant testified he said: \u201cIf you don\u2019t want to stay with me, then give me half of the money and I will pack up my things and I will leave.\u201d Defendant testified Inna said they had no money to divide because she had taken their $5,000 savings and had rented and furnished a new apartment. Defendant testified that he \u201cgot really mad at her for this.\u201d\nThe argument escalated and Inna began making threats to \u201cgo with another man.\u201d Defendant replied \u201c[i]f you ... do this, then I would probably choke you.\u201d Defendant testified that he \u201cwanted to gather my clothes and go, maybe get in the car and go to sleep just like [the night before], but [he] thought \u2018tomorrow is the church services,\u2019 so [he] didn\u2019t want to go anywhere.\u201d Defendant remained in the apartment and the argument continued. Inna began to threaten to inflict bruises on herself, go to the courthouse where she worked, and have Defendant put in jail as an abusive spouse. Defendant testified he eventually said, \u201cInna, do not annoy me because you don\u2019t even realize how angry you\u2019re making me.\u201d Inna responded, \u201c[w]ell, I am going to create [sic] this for you.\u201d\nDefendant testified that he grabbed Inna at her throat because he wanted \u201cto close her mouth, to keep her quiet[.]\u201d Defendant \u201cdid not know what [he] was doing at that moment[,]\u201d but he testified that he put his hands on Inna\u2019s throat because he \u201csimply wanted her to shut up, not to aggravate [him], not to make [him] mad.\u201d Defendant held onto Inna\u2019s throat until she began to slide off the bed. Defendant then noticed that Inna\u2019s face was bloody and she was not breathing. Defendant could not feel Inna\u2019s pulse. He got dressed and drove toward the courthouse looking for a police officer.\nDefendant found an officer, made gestures indicating strangulation, and said \u201cmy wife.\u201d Defendant showed the officer his identification with his address on it and the officer began to understand what Defendant was trying to tell him. Defendant presented his hands to the officer and the officer placed him in handcuffs.\nDefendant was charged with first-degree murder and was tried on 28 July 2008. A jury found Defendant guilty of second-degree murder. The jury further found that Defendant \u201cknew at the time he committed the offense (2nd Degree Murder) that the victim was pregnant and that the foregoing was an aggravating factor.\u201d\nVoluntary Manslaughter\nDefendant first argues that the trial court erred by denying Defendant\u2019s request for a voluntary manslaughter jury instruction. We disagree.\n\u201cFirst-degree murder is the unlawful killing \u2014 with malice, premeditation and deliberation \u2014 of another human being.\u201d State v. Arrington, 336 N.C. 592, 594, 444 S.E.2d 418, 419 (1994) (citations omitted). \u201cVoluntary manslaughter is the killing of another human being without malice and without premeditation and deliberation under [1] the influence of some passion or [2] heat of blood produced by adequate provocation.\u201d State v. Watson, 338 N.C. 168, 176, 449 S.E.2d 694, 699 (1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1071, 131 L. Ed. 2d 569, overruled on other grounds by State v. Richardson, 341 N.C. 585, 461 S.E.2d 724 (1995).\nVoluntary manslaughter is a lesser included offense of first-degree murder. State v. Woodard, 324 N.C. 227, 232, 376 S.E.2d 753, 756 (1989). \u201cA jury must be instructed on a lesser included offense only when evidence has been introduced from which the jury could properly find that the defendant had committed the lesser included offense.\u201d Woodard, 324 N.C. at 232, 376 S.E.2d at 756 (citations omitted). \u201cIn order to receive an instruction on voluntary manslaughter, there must be evidence tending to show \u2018[a] killing [was] committed in the heat of passion suddenly aroused by adequate provocation, or in the imperfect exercise of the right of self-defense [.]\u2019 \u201d State v. Vincent,-N.C. App.-,-, 673 S.E.2d 874, 876 (2009) (quoting State v. Huggins, 338 N.C. 494, 497, 450 S.E.2d 479, 481 (1994)).\nDefendant does not argue that he acted \u201cin the imperfect exercise of the right of self defense,\u201d Id., but rather that Inna\u2019s \u201csexual taunting was tantamount to her being in bed with another man[,]\u201d and that, as a result of this taunting, Defendant \u201csnapped and grabbed his wife around the neck.\u201d Defendant requests us to consider these facts as sufficient to warrant a jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter. Specifically, Defendant argues the following factors support such an interpretation of the events:\n[(1)] [Inna] and [Defendant] were married when the adultery took place.\n[(2)] They were married when the threat to commit adultery again was made.\n[(3)] The passion suddenly aroused in [Defendant] was when the deceased told him \u2014 while they were in the marital bed \u2014 that she was going to have sex with other men (as she had done on other occasions during the marriage, and then told him about).\n[(4)] She was leaving him, she didn\u2019t love him and she had spent all of their savings.\n[(5)] The past adultery provided the basis for believing the threat to commit adultery.\nOur Supreme Court has held that it is not sufficient to simply show that a defendant acted in a heat of passion. There must also be a showing that \u201c[s]uch sudden heat of passion [arose] upon what the law recognizes as adequate provocation.\u201d Woodard, 324 N.C. at 232, 376 S.E.2d at 756 (citing State v. Ward, 286 N.C. 304, 210 S.E.2d 407 (1974) death penalty vacated mem., 428 U.S. 903, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1207 (1976)). Provocation which will justify an instruction on manslaughter \u201c \u2018must be more than mere words; as language, however abusive, neither excuses nor mitigates the killing[.]\u2019 \u201d State v. Watson, 287 N.C. 147, 154, 214 S.E.2d 85, 90 (1975) (citations omitted).\nOur Supreme Court held in Ward:\nWhen one spouse kills the other in a heat of passion engendered by the discovery of the deceased and a paramour in the very act of intercourse, or under circumstances clearly indicating that the act had just been completed, or was \u201cseverely proximate,\u201d and the killing follows immediately, it is manslaughter. However, a mere suspicion, belief, or knowledge of past adultery between the two will not change the character of the homicide from murder to manslaughter. The law extends its indulgence to a transport of passion justly excited and to acts done before reason has time to subdue it; the law does not indulge revenge or malice, no matter how great the injury or grave the insult which first gave it origin.\nWard, 286 N.C. at 312-13, 210 S.E.2d at 413-14 (internal citations omitted).\nIn the case before us, Defendant and Inna were in bed when they began arguing. Defendant testified he was aware of Inna\u2019s past relationships with other men and her stated intent to continue that behavior. There was no evidence that Defendant had found Inna \u201cin the very act of intercourse, or under circumstances clearly indicating that the act had just been completed, or was \u2018severely proximate[.]\u2019 \u201d Id. There was, therefore, no evidence that Defendant was driven to strangle Inna by a legally recognized heat of passion. To the contrary, Defendant himself testified that he put his hands on Inna\u2019s throat because he \u201csimply wanted her to shut up, not to aggravate [him], not to make [him] mad.\u201d\nAlthough Defendant acknowledges that he did not find Inna \u201cin the very act of intercourse, or under circumstances clearly indicating that the act had just been completed, or was \u2018severely proximate,\u2019 \u201d Id., he \u201crequests that [this Court] extend existing case law to consider the evidence of on-going adulterous behavior of a spouse, along with the promise to continue the adulterous intercourse, to be adequate provocation and sufficiently proximate to warrant a voluntary manslaughter instruction.\u201d Our Supreme Court has developed longstanding case law governing the range of legally adequate provocations for voluntary manslaughter. See Id. Defendant\u2019s conduct is clearly not within that range and our Court cannot extend existing case law in the manner requested by Defendant. Because there was no evidence that Defendant was driven to kill Inna by a legally recognized adequate provocation, we find no error in the trial court\u2019s refusal to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter.\nJury Instructions\nDefendant next assigns error to the trial court\u2019s denial of Defendant\u2019s request to provide a jury instruction concerning the definition of an \u201caggravating factor.\u201d We disagree.\nDuring the sentencing phase of Defendant\u2019s trial, the trial court submitted a verdict sheet to the jury, with the following question:\nDo you find from the evidence presented, beyond a reasonable doubt, the following factor:\nThat the Defendant knew at the time he committed the offense (2nd Degree Murder) the victim was pregnant and that the foregoing was an aggravating factor?\n_ Yes.\n_ No[.]\nPrior to the trial court\u2019s instructing the jury, Defendant and the trial court had the following exchange:\n[Defendant\u2019s Counsel]: Would you define for them an aggravating factor?\n[Judge]: Sir?\n[Defendant\u2019s Counsel]: Isn\u2019t there a definition in the statute of an aggravating factor?\n[Judge]: I don\u2019t know.\nHowever, Defendant submitted no special instruction to the trial court in writing at that time. The trial court instructed the jury in pertinent part as follows:\n[Defendant has denied not so much the existence of the factor \u2014 \u25a0 but you can consider that he has \u2014 but has denied the fact that it was aggravating. The fact that the State has alleged such factor exists is no evidence that it does, in fact, exist or that it is aggravating. Under our system of justice, when a defendant denies the existence of an aggravating factor and/or whether it is aggravating, he\u2019s not required to prove that it does not exist or that it is not aggravating. It is presumed that it does not exist and it is presumed that it is not aggravating. The State must prove to you beyond a reasonable doubt that such factor \u2014 aggravating factor exists.\nDefendant renewed his objection to the trial court\u2019s instruction on \u201caggravating factor.\u201d\nDefendant argues that the trial court\u2019s failure to define \u201caggravating factor\u201d \u201cimplicitly asked [the jury] to make a decision based on no more than their personal feelings and opinions about Inna\u2019s 15-week-old pregnancy.\u201d Defendant further argues that, because \u201cthe abortion issue\u201d is \u201cpolitically charged,\u201d a juror\u2019s opinion about it \u201ccould well color a juror\u2019s consideration of the non-statutory aggravating factor that the deceased had been pregnant.\u201d\n\u201cAt the close of the evidence or at an earlier time directed by the judge, any party may tender written instructions.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1231(a) (2009). Our Supreme Court has recognized that, \u201csuch requested special instructions \u2018should be submitted in writing to the trial judge at or before the jury instruction conference.\u2019 \u201d State v. Augustine, 359 N.C. 709, 729, 616 S.E.2d 515, 530 (2005) (internal citations omitted). The Supreme Court has also held that \u201ca trial court did not err where it declined to give requested instructions that had not been submitted in writing.\u201d Id. (citations omitted).\nIn the case before us. Defendant requested that the trial court instruct the jury as to the definition of \u201caggravating factor.\u201d When asked for clarification, Defendant responded by asking the trial court: \u201cIsn\u2019t there a definition in the statute of an aggravating factor?\u201d The trial court did not know whether there was such a definition. Defendant did not submit a proposed instruction in writing to the trial court. Defendant submitted to this Court an addendum to the record on appeal containing a document titled \u201cJury Instructions Not Given[,]\u201d which purports to define \u201caggravating factor.\u201d We note, however, that this instruction was not submitted to the trial court, in writing or otherwise. Because Defendant failed to submit a requested instruction in writing to the trial court, we hold that the trial court did not err by declining to instruct the jury as to a definition of \u201caggravating factor.\u201d\nMitigating Factors\nDefendant next argues that the trial court erred by failing to find certain mitigating factors. Specifically, Defendant contends that the trial court should have found as mitigating the following factor: that Defendant acted under strong provocation or that the relationship between Defendant and Inna was extenuating because of the uncontradicted evidence of Inna\u2019s infidelity.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1340.16(a) states that a trial court \u201cshall consider evidence of aggravating or mitigating factors present in the offense that make an aggravated or mitigated sentence appropriate, but the decision to depart from the presumptive range is in the discretion of the court.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1340.16(a) (2009). The trial court is required to consider the mitigating factors set forth in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1340.16(e) and to make written findings of fact concerning these factors. See State v. Johnson,-N.C. App.-,-, 674 S.E.2d 727, 731, appeal dismissed 363 N.C. 378, 679 S.E.2d 395 (2009). \u201c \u2018A sentencing judge must find a statutory mitigating sentence factor if it is supported by a preponderance of the evidence. A mitigating factor is proven when the evidence is substantial, uncontradicted, and there is no reason to doubt its credibility.\u2019 \u201d Id. (quoting State v. Kemp, 153 N.C. App. 231, 241, 569 S.E.2d 717, 723, disc. rev. denied 356 N.C. 441, 573 S.E.2d 158 (2002)). \u201cAtrial judge is given \u2018wide latitude in determining the existence of . . . mitigating factors,\u2019 and the trial court\u2019s failure to find a mitigating factor is error only when \u2018no other reasonable inferences can be drawn from the evidence.\u2019 \u201d State v. Norman, 151 N.C. App. 100, 105-06, 564 S.E.2d 630, 634 (2002) (internal citations omitted).\nDefendant argues the mitigating factor set forth in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1340.16(e)(8) that \u201c[t]he defendant acted under strong provocation, or the relationship between the defendant and the victim was otherwise extenuating\u201d applies to the facts before us, and that the trial court erred by failing to find this mitigating factor. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1340.16(e)(2007). Defendant relies on State v. Mixion, 110 N.C. App. 138, 429 S.E.2d 363, disc, review denied, 334 N.C. 437, 433 S.E.2d 183 (1993), to support his contention that he acted under strong provocation or that his relationship with Inna was otherwise extenuating. Our Court noted in Mixion that, though N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1340.16(e)(8) is listed as one factor, each component must be analyzed separately. Id. at 152, 429 S.E.2d at 371. We begin with a determination of whether \u201cthe relationship between . . . [Defendant and [Inna] was otherwise extenuating.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1340.16(e)(8).\nIn Mixion, we held that a trial court did not err in failing to find an extenuating relationship on the following facts. The victim and the defendant\u2019s sister-in-law entered their house and found the victim\u2019s husband, the defendant. Mixion, 110 N.C. App. at 142, 429 S.E.2d at 365. The victim was angry with the defendant and shouted at him. Id. The victim then drew a pistol and brandished it at the defendant. Id. A struggle ensued and the defendant eventually shot the victim, killing her. Id. The defendant claimed that the marriage was \u201c \u2018mutually stormy and difficult.\u2019 \u201d Mixion, 110 N.C. App. at 151, 429 S.E.2d at 371. The son of the defendant and the victim testified that each parent was at fault. Id. The wrongs to the defendant done by the victim included that she: \u201c[(1)] apparently shot a gun at [the] defendant during their marriage[;] [(2)] falsely accused [the] defendant of having venereal disease^] and [(3)] threatened to shoot [the] defendant [twice.]\u201d Id.\nIn Mixion, we noted:\nAn extenuating relationship should be found if circumstances show that part of the fault for a crime can be \u201cmorally shifted\u201d from defendant to the victim.\nPast difficulties in a marital relationship are not sufficient to support a finding of an extenuating relationship. In State v. Bullard, 79 N.C. App. 440, 339 S.E.2d 664 (1986), the Court stated that although the defendant and victim had been arguing over an extended period of time, this evidence did not compel a finding that they had an extenuating relationship, because this evidence did not \u201cnecessarily lessen the seriousness of the crime committed.\u201d\nId. at 151-52, 429 S.E.2d at 371 (internal citations omitted). So noting, we held that \u201cwe cannot conclusively determine that this mitigating factor exists.\u201d Id. at 152, 429 S.E.2d at 371.\nHere, Defendant contends that Inna\u2019s \u201csexual infidelity and betrayal\u201d were \u201cfar worse than just \u2018past difficulties^]\u2019 \u201d We disagree. The evidence at trial suggested that, at most, Inna repeatedly had extra-marital sexual relationships and that the couple repeatedly fought about that behavior. In light of the facts of Mixion, we are not persuaded that any of Inna\u2019s actions \u201cnecessarily lessen the seriousness of the crime committed.\u201d Mixion, 110 N.C. App. at 152, 429 S.E.2d at 371 (internal citations omitted). We therefore hold that the trial court did not err by failing to find as a mitigating factor an extenuating relationship between Inna and Defendant.\nDefendant further argues that Mixion supports his contention that he acted under a strong provocation. We note that, in Mixion, the trial court apparently found that the defendant had acted under a strong provocation, though that point was discussed only in passing and was not the subject of the appeal. Mixion, 110 N.C. App. at 152, 429 S.E.2d at 371. Our Court has held that: \u201cStrong provocation means the defendant did not act in a state of \u2018cool [] blood.\u2019 \u201d State v. Pelham, 164 N.C. App. 70, 83, 595 S.E.2d 197, 206 (2004) (quoting State v. Deese, 127 N.C. App. 536, 538-39, 491 S.E.2d 682, 685 (1997)). In Deese, we noted that \u201cevidence tending to show that the victim threatened or challenged the defendant is relevant in determining the existence of provocation.\u201d Deese, 127 N.C. App. at 539, 491 S.E.2d at 685 (citations omitted). As with an \u201cextenuating relationship,\u201d \u201c[t]he legislature has provided this statutory mitigating factor to reduce a defendant\u2019s culpability when circumstances exist that \u2018morally shift part of the fault for a crime from the criminal to the victim.\u2019 \u201d Id. (citations omitted).\nIn Deese, the victim and the defendant had a history of quarreling. Id. at 537, 491 S.E.2d at 683. The victim was the owner of the building in which the defendant lived and was checking the water meter. Id. The defendant confronted the victim, who threatened to \u201c \u2018beat [the defendant\u2019s] [a-]\u2019 with a metal cane.\u201d Id. When the victim approached the defendant, the defendant went inside his apartment to retrieve a loaded shotgun. Id. The victim began to walk away towards his car, but when the defendant returned with the gun, the argument began again. Id., 491 S.E.2d at 684. The victim approached the defendant with the metal cane raised and the defendant shot the victim, killing him. Id. at 537-38, 491 S.E.2d at 684.\nIn this case, there was no evidence suggesting that Inna physically threatened or challenged Defendant in any manner. The only threat or challenge she made to Defendant was the threat to commit further adultery and the threat to report him to law enforcement as an abuser. Considering our prior case law, and the facts of this case, we find no evidence which would \u201c \u2018morally shift part of the fault for a crime from the criminal to the victim.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 539, 491 S.E.2d at 685 (citations omitted). We therefore find that the trial court did not err by failing to find as a mitigating factor that Defendant acted under strong provocation.\nNo error.\nJudges WYNN and BRYANT concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "McGEE, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General Richard L. Harrison, for the State.", "M. Alexander Chams for Defendant-Appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. DIMITRY SIMONOVICH\nNo. COA09-585\n(Filed 19 January 2010)\n1. Homicide\u2014 requested instruction \u2014 voluntary manslaughter \u2014 failure to show heat of passion or provocation\nThe trial court did not err by denying defendant\u2019s request for a jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter because there was no evidence that defendant was driven to strangle his wife by a legally recognized heat of passion or provocation even though defendant testified he was aware of his wife\u2019s past relationships with other men and her stated intent to continue that behavior.\n2. Sentencing\u2014 requested instruction \u2014 aggravating factor \u2014 failure to submit proposed instruction in writing\nThe trial court did not err during the sentencing phase of a trial by denying defendant\u2019s request to provide a jury instruction concerning the definition of an aggravating factor because defendant did not submit a proposed instruction in writing to the trial court as required by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1231(a).\n3. Sentencing\u2014 mitigating factors \u2014 strong provocation\u2014 extenuating relationship\nThe trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to find certain mitigating factors under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1340.16(e)(8) that defendant acted under strong provocation or that the relationship between the parties was extenuating based on the evidence of the wife\u2019s alleged infidelity because there was no evidence which would morally shift part of the fault for the crime to the victim.\nAppeal by Defendant from judgment entered 7 August 2008 by Judge James U. Downs in Superior Court, Buncombe County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 27 October 2009.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General Richard L. Harrison, for the State.\nM. Alexander Chams for Defendant-Appellant." }, "file_name": "0049-01", "first_page_order": 77, "last_page_order": 88 }