{ "id": 4174800, "name": "MOSS CREEK HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., DELORIS GAIL BENTON, JO ANNE K. BISHOP, JANICE HAMBY, DAVID L. HAMILTON, DAVID J. KNOCHE, and CHARLES F. PEELER, Plaintiffs v. TED L. BISSETTE, MARY HOLLY BISSETTE, SCOTT W. RICH, LAURA K. RICH, and PROVIDENT FUNDING ASSOCIATES, LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, Defendants v. TED L. BISSETTE and MARY HOLLY BISSETTE, SCOTT W. RICH and LAURA K. RICH, Third Party Plaintiffs v. TERRY MILLER, JIM BENTON, ANGELA PEELER, FRED BISHOP and PEGGY HAMILTON, Third Party Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "Moss Creek Homeowners Ass'n v. Bissette", "decision_date": "2010-02-02", "docket_number": "No. COA08-1156-2", "first_page": "222", "last_page": "235", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "202 N.C. App. 222" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "638 S.E.2d 462", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12637360, 12637361, 12637359 ], "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/638/0462-02", "/se2d/638/0462-03", "/se2d/638/0462-01" ] }, { "cite": "360 N.C. 644", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3788965, 3789770, 3792846, 3789742, 3786224, 3792049, 3798111 ], "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/360/0644-05", "/nc/360/0644-01", "/nc/360/0644-02", "/nc/360/0644-07", "/nc/360/0644-04", "/nc/360/0644-06", "/nc/360/0644-03" ] }, { "cite": "634 S.E.2d 905", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12636713 ], "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/634/0905-01" ] }, { "cite": "662 S.E.2d 551", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12641313, 12641314 ], "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/662/0551-01", "/se2d/662/0551-02" ] }, { "cite": "362 N.C. 373", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 12641313, 12641396, 12641273, 12641271 ], "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/662/0551-01", "/se2d/662/0667-02", "/se2d/662/0395-03", "/se2d/662/0395-01" ] }, { "cite": "652 S.E.2d 310", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12639688 ], "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/652/0310-01" ] }, { "cite": "662 S.E.2d 900", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12641417, 12641418, 12641419, 12641420 ], "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/662/0900-01", "/se2d/662/0900-02", "/se2d/662/0900-03", "/se2d/662/0900-04" ] }, { "cite": "362 N.C. 354", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 12641491, 12641420, 12641421 ], "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/663/0312-01", "/se2d/662/0900-04", "/se2d/662/0901-01" ] }, { "cite": "652 S.E.2d 677", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12639738 ], "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/652/0677-01" ] }, { "cite": "616 S.E.2d 543", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633584, 12633585 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/616/0543-01", "/se2d/616/0543-02" ] }, { "cite": "616 S.E.2d 234", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633472, 12633473, 12633471 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/616/0234-02", "/se2d/616/0234-03", "/se2d/616/0234-01" ] }, { "cite": "616 S.E.2d 542", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633582, 12633583 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/616/0542-01", "/se2d/616/0542-02" ] }, { "cite": "359 N.C. 635", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3800390, 3801911, 3796688, 3804371, 3798739, 3795063, 3794298 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/359/0635-04", "/nc/359/0635-05", "/nc/359/0635-03", "/nc/359/0635-02", "/nc/359/0635-07", "/nc/359/0635-01", "/nc/359/0635-06" ] }, { "cite": "611 S.E.2d 463", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12632676 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "466" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/611/0463-01" ] }, { "cite": "658 S.E.2d 485", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12640638, 12640639 ], "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/658/0485-01", "/se2d/658/0485-02" ] }, { "cite": "362 N.C. 177", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 12640561, 12640460 ], "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/657/0667-01", "/se2d/657/0373-02" ] }, { "cite": "652 S.E.2d 284", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12639684 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "292", "parenthetical": "quoting Draughon v. Harnett County Bd. of Educ., 158 N.C. App. 705, 708, 582 S.E.2d 343, 345 (2003)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/652/0284-01" ] }, { "cite": "179 N.C. App. 635", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8238783 ], "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/179/0635-01" ] }, { "cite": "187 N.C. App. 55", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8371823 ], "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/187/0055-01" ] }, { "cite": "186 N.C. App. 512", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8158345 ], "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/186/0512-01" ] }, { "cite": "563 S.E.2d 190", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "355 N.C. 493", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 220106, 220010, 220045, 219924, 220085 ], "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/355/0493-04", "/nc/355/0493-01", "/nc/355/0493-05", "/nc/355/0493-02", "/nc/355/0493-03" ] }, { "cite": "558 S.E.2d 199", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "148 N.C. App. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9363461 ], "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/148/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "525 S.E.2d 481", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "484", "parenthetical": "\"Where findings of fact are challenged on appeal, each contested finding of fact must be separately assigned as error, and the failure to do so results in a waiver of the right to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the finding.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "136 N.C. App. 587", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11241064 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "591", "parenthetical": "\"Where findings of fact are challenged on appeal, each contested finding of fact must be separately assigned as error, and the failure to do so results in a waiver of the right to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the finding.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/136/0587-01" ] }, { "cite": "403 S.E.2d 307", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 N.C. 729", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2539829 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/328/0729-01" ] }, { "cite": "393 S.E.2d 570", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "awarding attorneys' fees in a contempt action to enforce equitable distribution award" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "99 N.C. App. 380", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523187 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "awarding attorneys' fees in a contempt action to enforce equitable distribution award" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/99/0380-01" ] }, { "cite": "173 S.E.2d 513", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "awarding attorneys' fees in a contempt action to enforce child support" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "8 N.C. App. 61", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8548943 ], "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "awarding attorneys' fees in a contempt action to enforce child support" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/8/0061-01" ] }, { "cite": "527 S.E.2d 667", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "671" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "137 N.C. App. 98", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11092024 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "103" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/137/0098-01" ] }, { "cite": "327 S.E.2d 60", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "63" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "73 N.C. App. 594", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525088 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "599" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/73/0594-01" ] }, { "cite": "610 S.E.2d 210", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "214-15" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "169 N.C. App. 151", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8468804 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "159" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/169/0151-01" ] }, { "cite": "609 S.E.2d 439", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "443" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "169 N.C. App. 118", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8468687 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "123" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/169/0118-01" ] }, { "cite": "522 S.E.2d 317", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "321" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "135 N.C. App. 752", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11242921 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "757" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/135/0752-01" ] }, { "cite": "266 S.E.2d 812", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "814-15", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "300 N.C. 286", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561053 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "289", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/300/0286-01" ] }, { "cite": "150 S.E. 702", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "weight": 2, "year": 1929, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "703" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "198 N.C. 96", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8598298 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1929, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "97" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/198/0096-01" ] }, { "cite": "175 S.E. 836", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1934, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "838", "parenthetical": "where theory argued on appeal was not raised before the trial court, \"the law does not permit parties to swap horses between courts in order to get a better mount\" before an appellate court" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "207 N.C. 6", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8621595 ], "year": 1934, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "10", "parenthetical": "where theory argued on appeal was not raised before the trial court, \"the law does not permit parties to swap horses between courts in order to get a better mount\" before an appellate court" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/207/0006-01" ] }, { "cite": "554 S.E.2d 634", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "641", "parenthetical": "citing Weil v. Herring, 207 N.C. 6, 10, 175 S.E. 836, 838 (1934) (where theory argued on appeal was not raised before the trial court, \"the law does not permit parties to swap horses between courts in order to get a better mount\" before an appellate court)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "354 N.C. 298", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 138307 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "309", "parenthetical": "citing Weil v. Herring, 207 N.C. 6, 10, 175 S.E. 836, 838 (1934) (where theory argued on appeal was not raised before the trial court, \"the law does not permit parties to swap horses between courts in order to get a better mount\" before an appellate court)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/354/0298-01" ] }, { "cite": "359 N.C. 631", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3793893, 3800229, 3794537, 3799052, 3804845, 3795663, 3804149, 3798264, 3796825 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/359/0631-07", "/nc/359/0631-01", "/nc/359/0631-05", "/nc/359/0631-04", "/nc/359/0631-08", "/nc/359/0631-03", "/nc/359/0631-06", "/nc/359/0631-02", "/nc/359/0631-09" ] }, { "cite": "609 S.E.2d 276", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "282" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "169 N.C. App. 69", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8468479 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "76" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/169/0069-01" ] }, { "cite": "359 N.C. 852", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3799365, 3803177, 3801579, 3795021, 3799539, 3799675 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/359/0852-01", "/nc/359/0852-06", "/nc/359/0852-03", "/nc/359/0852-02", "/nc/359/0852-04", "/nc/359/0852-05" ] }, { "cite": "170 N.C. App. 151", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9004620 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "155" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/170/0151-01" ] }, { "cite": "366 S.E.2d 856", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "321 N.C. 742", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2567528, 2567150, 2568243, 2572886, 2568278 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/321/0742-05", "/nc/321/0742-02", "/nc/321/0742-04", "/nc/321/0742-01", "/nc/321/0742-03" ] }, { "cite": "362 S.E.2d 619", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "621" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "88 N.C. App. 83", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8357805 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "85" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/88/0083-01" ] }, { "cite": "588 S.E.2d 891", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "357 N.C. 582", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 491429, 491686, 491731, 491481, 491708 ], "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/357/0582-03", "/nc/357/0582-01", "/nc/357/0582-04", "/nc/357/0582-05", "/nc/357/0582-02" ] }, { "cite": "584 S.E.2d 731", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "735" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "357 N.C. 396", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 491815 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "401" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/357/0396-01" ] }, { "cite": "274 S.E.2d 174", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "179" }, { "page": "179" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "302 N.C. 64", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8563796 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "71" }, { "page": "70" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/302/0064-01" ] }, { "cite": "220 S.E.2d 351", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "288 N.C. 731", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571022, 8570992, 8571090, 8571064, 8570909 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/288/0731-03", "/nc/288/0731-02", "/nc/288/0731-05", "/nc/288/0731-04", "/nc/288/0731-01" ] }, { "cite": "218 S.E.2d 471", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "475" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "27 N.C. App. 173", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8551615 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "178" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/27/0173-01" ] }, { "cite": "582 S.E.2d 343", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "345" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "158 N.C. App. 705", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9189113 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "708" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/158/0705-01" ] }, { "cite": "187 N.C. App. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8371651 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "10", "parenthetical": "quoting Draughon v. Harnett County Bd. of Educ., 158 N.C. App. 705, 708, 582 S.E.2d 343, 345 (2003)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/187/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "458 S.E.2d 26", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "28" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "119 N.C. App. 216", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11914192 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "218" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/119/0216-01" ] }, { "cite": "248 S.E.2d 862", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "295 N.C. 733", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8568801, 8568681, 8568761, 8568637, 8568734 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/295/0733-05", "/nc/295/0733-02", "/nc/295/0733-04", "/nc/295/0733-01", "/nc/295/0733-03" ] }, { "cite": "247 S.E.2d 252", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "256" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "37 N.C. App. 686", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8554594 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "692" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/37/0686-01" ] }, { "cite": "276 S.E.2d 283", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "271 S.E.2d 399", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "401" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "49 N.C. App. 311", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521088 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "314" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/49/0311-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-279.1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1227, "char_count": 29473, "ocr_confidence": 0.754, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.649935039333448e-07, "percentile": 0.823959427750421 }, "sha256": "e363fa528727a27d180b39340cbbea2451125ce25508650ec63cd99c389b43bb", "simhash": "1:1bc9d461f46b255e", "word_count": 4782 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:18:34.741992+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges WYNN and JACKSON concur." ], "parties": [ "MOSS CREEK HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., DELORIS GAIL BENTON, JO ANNE K. BISHOP, JANICE HAMBY, DAVID L. HAMILTON, DAVID J. KNOCHE, and CHARLES F. PEELER, Plaintiffs v. TED L. BISSETTE, MARY HOLLY BISSETTE, SCOTT W. RICH, LAURA K. RICH, and PROVIDENT FUNDING ASSOCIATES, LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, Defendants v. TED L. BISSETTE and MARY HOLLY BISSETTE, SCOTT W. RICH and LAURA K. RICH, Third Party Plaintiffs v. TERRY MILLER, JIM BENTON, ANGELA PEELER, FRED BISHOP and PEGGY HAMILTON, Third Party Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "HUNTER, JR., Robert N., Judge.\nTed and Mary Bissette (the \u201cBissettes\u201d) appeal from orders: (1) granting plaintiffs\u2019 and third-party defendants\u2019 summary judgment motion, (2) dismissing their claim for breach of fiduciary duty, and (3) awarding attorneys\u2019 fees for contempt and enforcement of subdivision restrictions. We affirm in part and reverse in part.\nFACTS\nMoss Creek is a single-family residential development in Guilford County, North Carolina, developed by Moss Creek Land Development Company, Inc. (\u201cDevelopment Company\u201d). On 18 June 1987, the Moss Creek Homeowners Association, Inc. (the \u201cAssociation\u201d) was incorporated; and following incorporation, Development Company filed a Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions for Moss Creek (the \u201cDeclaration\u201d) and the Bylaws of Moss Creek Home Owners Association (the \u201cBylaws\u201d) with the Guilford County Register of Deeds.\nThe Declaration reserves to the Development Company, as \u201cdeclarant,\u201d certain approval rights restricting purchasers of lots from locating buildings on lots, installing well and septic tanks, erecting mailboxes, and altering landscaping on property without the Association\u2019s approval. Moreover, the Declaration gives to the Association a first right of refusal to purchase lots and provides the Declarant, the Association or any lot owner the right to sue to enforce the covenants. Section 5 of Article III of the Declaration provides in particular that \u201c[n]o Lot covered by this Declaration may be subdivided by sale or otherwise as to reduce the total area of the Lot as shown on the maps and plats of any Sections of Moss Creek referred to above except by wrtten [sic] consent of the Declarant.\u201d\nOn 30 January 1990, Development Company transferred its rights as \u201cdeclarant\u201d to Byron Investments, Inc. (\u201cByron\u201d). Byron filed for bankruptcy protection in 1991, and received its discharge from bankruptcy on 24 August 2005. On 23 December 1993, the Bissettes acquired title to Lot 6 in Moss Creek Development, and subsequently built a house on the lot.\nOn 5 July 2002, the Bissettes acquired title to the parcel of property adjoining their lot known as Lot 8, and on 10 November 2003, the Bissettes recorded an Instrument of Combination combining the two lots formally. The Bissettes thereafter recorded a plat on 5 December 2003 which (1) split former Lot 8 into two pieces and labeled the new parcels Lot 1 and Lot 2, and (2) recombined Lot 6 and Lot 2 to create a new L-shaped Lot 6 which expanded the backyard of the Bissettes. On 27 January 2004, the Bissettes placed a deed of trust on the combined property of Lot 6 and Lot 2 for $165,500.00 payable to Provident Funding Associates, L.P. (\u201cProvident\u201d).\nOn 21 August 2004, the Association placed the Bissettes on notice that the Association would conduct a hearing on 31 August 2004 to determine whether the Bissettes were in violation of the subdivision covenant in the Declaration. The Bissettes failed to appear at the hearing, and were fined by the Association until such time as the violation was remedied.\nWithout prior notice to the Association, the Bissettes sold Lot 1 to Scott and Laura Rich (the \u201cRiches\u201d) on 28 April 2005. The sale of Lot 1 and the architectural plans of the Riches\u2019 home to be constructed thereon were not approved by the Association prior to the beginning of the construction of their house on 2 May 2005.\nPROCEDURAL HISTORY\nThe Association, Deloris Gail Benton, Jo Anne K. Bishop, Janice Hamby, David L. Hamilton, David J. Knoche, and Charles F. Peeler (collectively \u201cplaintiffs\u201d) filed a complaint for the present action on 18 May 2005. The Bissettes filed an answer, counterclaim, and third-party complaint against Terry Miller, Jim Benton, Angela Peeler, Fred Bishop and Peggy Hamilton (the \u201cboard members\u201d) on 25 July 2005. The Bissettes filed a motion for summary judgment on 17 November 2005.\nPlaintiffs filed their amended complaint on 7 June 2006, and sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the Bissettes and Riches for violating the restrictive covenants. Plaintiffs further asked the trial court to void the deed of trust executed by the Bissettes to Provident.\nOn 7 July 2006, the Bissettes filed an answer to the amended complaint while renewing their counterclaim and third-party complaint. The Bissettes\u2019 amended pleading denied liability as to plaintiffs\u2019 amended complaint; affirmatively pled laches, waiver, and estoppel; and sought damages for slander and breach of fiduciary duty against the board members.\nProvident filed an answer and cross-claim against the Bissettes on 11 July 2006; and on 17 July 2006, the Association filed a motion for summary judgment on all claims pending against the Bissettes. On 1 August 2006, plaintiffs and the board members (collectively \u201cappellees\u201d) filed a Rule 12 motion to dismiss, motion for judgment on the pleadings, motion for more definite statement, motion to strike, and motion for Rule 41 sanctions including involuntary dismissal against the Bissettes.\nOn 29 December 2006, Judge Ronald E. Spivey entered an order granting summary judgment to appellees: (1) denying the Bissettes\u2019 summary judgment motion; (2) finding that the Bissettes had violated the restrictive covenants; and (3) denying all the Bissettes\u2019 defenses \u201cincluding but not limited to[:]\u201d\nlaches, waiver, estoppel, improper election of [the Association\u2019s board of directors,] that Defendant Mary Holly Bissette and/or [Byron] constitute the Declarant [in the Declaration], and approval/ratification of [the Bissettes\u2019] actions by any person or entity.\nThe order further provided that the Bissettes pay: $16,290.00 in fines to the Association, $6,673.66 in costs of the action, and $60,026.07 in \u201cpartial\u201d attorney fees to plaintiffs.\nJudge Spivey entered a simultaneous second order with regard to appellees\u2019 motions under Rules 12 and 41 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, and awarded appellees an additional $11,656.25 in attorneys\u2019 fees and $240.79 in costs to be paid by the Bissettes within 45 days. The second order also denied appellees\u2019 requested Rule 41 motion, granted appellees\u2019 motion for a more definite statement on the issue of breach of fiduciary duty, and directed the Bissettes to file a more definite statement no later than 30 days from 29 December 2006.\nOn 29 January 2007, the Bissettes filed a more definite statement. On 14 February 2007, appellees renewed their Rules 12 and 41 motions to dismiss, and moved further for sanctions contending that the Bissettes had failed to comply with Judge Spivey\u2019s prior orders. On 15 February 2007, plaintiffs filed a show cause motion for contempt claiming that the Bissettes had failed to timely pay the costs awarded in the first 29 December 2006 order. On 7 March 2007, appellees filed a show cause motion on the Bissettes\u2019 failure to pay the costs assessed in the second 29 December 2006 order.\nContempt hearings were held on 6 and 30 March 2007, and Judge Steve A. Balog found the Bissettes in willful contempt. Despite multiple opportunities to purge themselves of contempt, the Bissettes failed to do so, additional legal fees were awarded, and Mary Holly Bissette was briefly incarcerated.\nOn 17 January 2008, the Bissettes moved for summary judgment arguing that the Declaration should be rescinded or reformed. Judge James M. Webb denied their motion on 4 March 2008, and granted plaintiffs\u2019 motion for summary judgment on \u201cany remaining claims not previously adjudicated.\u201d Notice of appeal was properly given, and this Court has jurisdiction to hear the matter. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-279.1 (2007).\nSTANDARD OF REVIEW\nThe standard of review on a summary judgment motion is whether there is a genuine issue of material fact and whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Oliver v. Roberts, 49 N.C. App. 311, 314, 271 S.E.2d 399, 401 (1980), cert. denied, 276 S.E.2d 283 (1981); Barbour v. Little, 37 N.C. App. 686, 692, 247 S.E.2d 252, 256, disc. review denied, 295 N.C. 733, 248 S.E.2d 862 (1978). \u201cIn ruling on the motion, the court must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, who is entitled to the benefit of all favorable inferences which may reasonably be drawn from the facts proffered.\u201d Averitt v. Rozier, 119 N.C. App. 216, 218, 458 S.E.2d 26, 28 (1995). Summary judgment may be properly shown by a party: \u201c \u2018(1) proving that an essential element of the plaintiffs case is non-existent, or (2) showing through discovery that the plaintiff cannot produce evidence to support an essential element of his or her claim, or (3) showing that the plaintiff cannot surmount an affirmative defense.\u2019 \u201d Kinesis Adver., Inc. v. Hill, 187 N.C. App. 1, 10, 652 S.E.2d 284, 292 (2007) (quoting Draughon v. Harnett County Bd. of Educ., 158 N.C. App. 705, 708, 582 S.E.2d 343, 345 (2003)), appeal dismissed, disc. review denied, 362 N.C. 177, 658 S.E.2d 485 (2008).\nDISCUSSION\nIn reviewing litigation involving restrictive covenants, this Court has held that restrictive covenants are contractual in nature, and that acceptance of a valid deed incorporating covenants implies the existence of a valid contract with binding restrictions. See Rodgerson v. Davis, 27 N.C. App. 173, 178, 218 S.E.2d 471, 475, disc. review denied, 288 N.C. 731, 220 S.E.2d 351 (1975). Restrictive covenants, \u201cclearly and narrowly drawn,\u201d are recognized as a valid tool for achieving a common development scheme. Hobby & Son v. Family Homes, 302 N.C. 64, 71, 274 S.E.2d 174, 179 (1981). Parties to a restrictive covenant may use almost any means they see fit to develop and enforce the restrictions contained therein. Wise v. Harrington Grove Cmty. Ass\u2019n, 357 N.C. 396, 401, 584 S.E.2d 731, 735, reh\u2019g denied, 357 N.C. 582, 588 S.E.2d 891 (2003). Restrictive covenants are to be strictly construed and \u201call ambiguities will be resolved in favor of the unrestrained use of land.\u201d Hobby & Son, 302 N.C. at 70, 274 S.E.2d at 179. Nonetheless, a restrictive covenant \u201cmust be reasonably construed to give effect to the intention of the parties, and the rule of strict construction may not be used to defeat the plain and obvious purposes of a restriction.\u201d Black Horse Run Ppty. Owners Assoc. v. Kaleel, 88 N.C. App. 83, 85, 362 S.E.2d 619, 621 (1987), cert. denied, 321 N.C. 742, 366 S.E.2d 856 (1988). Therefore, enforcing a restrictive covenant through summary judgment is proper unless genuine issues of material fact exist showing either: (1) the contract is invalid; (2) the effect of the covenant \u201cimpair[s] enjoyment of the estate\u201d; or (3) a term of the covenants \u201cis contrary to the public interest.\u201d Page v. Bald Head Ass\u2019n, 170 N.C. App. 151, 155, 611 S.E.2d 463, 466, disc. review denied, 359 N.C. 635, 616 S.E.2d 542, disc. review denied, 359 N.C. 852 (2005).\nSummary Judgment\nOn appeal, the Bissettes first contend that the trial court erred in awarding summary judgment because there existed material issues of fact sufficient to show that: (1) the restrictions in the Declaration are sufficiently ambiguous to require jury interpretation; (2) the bankruptcy of Byron rendered the restrictions unenforceable; and (3) the forecast of evidence of their affirmative defenses raised sufficient factual issues to overcome summary judgment. We disagree.\nAs to the Bissettes\u2019 first argument, the restrictive covenant at issue in this case provides:\nNo Lot covered by this Declaration may be subdivided by sale or otherwise as to reduce the total area of the Lot as shown on the maps and plats of any Sections of Moss Creek referred to above except by wrtten [sic] consent of the Declarant.\nSection 12 of Article I of the Declaration defines \u201cLot\u201d as \u201ca portion of the Properties other than the Common Area intended for any type of independent ownership and use as may be set out in this Declaration and as shall be shown on the plats of survey filed with this Declaration or amendments thereto.\u201d\nThe Bissettes attempt to create ambiguity by contending that the obvious language of these terms must be interpreted through definitions contained in North Carolina\u2019s General Statutes and Guilford County\u2019s subdivision regulations. However, this Court has consistently stated that \u201c \u2018[w]here the language of a contract is plain and unambiguous ... [a] court may not ignore or delete any of its provisions, nor insert words into it, but must construe the contract as written[.]\u2019 \u201d Hemric v. Groce, 169 N.C. App. 69, 76, 609 S.E.2d 276, 282 (citation omitted) (emphasis added), cert. denied and disc, review dismissed, 359 N.C. 631, 616 S.E.2d 234 (2005).\nThe Instrument of Combination filed in the Register of Deeds on 10 November 2003 by the Bissettes undisputedly reduced the size of Lot 8 from 2.352 acres of land to 1.211 acres of land. As such, this action clearly \u201creduce [d] the total area of [Lot 8] as shown on the maps and plats\u201d incorporated in the Declaration. This assignment of error is overruled.\nThe Bissettes next argue that the assignment of rights of the Declaration and the subsequent bankruptcy of Byron renders the covenant unenforceable. This argument is not properly before this Court and is otherwise without merit.\n\u201cThis Court has long held that issues and theories of a case not raised below will not be considered on appeal[.]\u201d Westminster Homes, Inc. v. Town of Cary Zoning Bd. of Adjust., 354 N.C. 298, 309, 554 S.E.2d 634, 641 (2001) (citing Weil v. Herring, 207 N.C. 6, 10, 175 S.E. 836, 838 (1934) (where theory argued on appeal was not raised before the trial court, \u201cthe law does not permit parties to swap horses between courts in order to get a better mount\u201d before an appellate court)).\nHere, the Bissettes introduced evidence at trial showing that the original declarant assigned its interest in Moss Creek to Byron on 30 January 1990, and that Byron exited bankruptcy on 24 August 2005. The Bissettes then claimed in their amended July 2006 answer that Byron quitclaimed its interest in Moss Creek to themselves personally, and that Byron had approved their recombination deed. This maneuver, whatever legal effect it might have had on the common stock of the bankruptcy, did not answer the issue of how the assets (including the realty interests of Byron) were allocated in bankruptcy and whether these interests remained with Byron afterward. More importantly for our review, the Bissettes\u2019 argument that the recombination was ratified or approved is not the argument raised here, which is whether the bankruptcy of Byron voided the restrictive covenants.\nYet, even if this issue is properly before this Court, the Bissettes fail to cite any authority which supports their contention. The Bissettes cite DeLaney v. Hart, 198 N.C. 96, 150 S.E. 702 (1929) for the proposition that the bankruptcy of a declarant holding the ability to enforce deed restrictions will prohibit their future enforcement. However, DeLaney is factually distinct from this case, because in that case the Court found there was no general plan of development and that the covenants could therefore be enforced by no one. DeLaney, 198 N.C. at 97, 150 S.E. at 703. Here, there is clearly an extensive development plan bolstered by restrictive covenants, and the Bissettes\u2019 argument is without merit. This assignment of error is overruled.\nLastly, the Bissettes argue that even if the restrictive covenants were violated, their affirmative defenses of waiver, estoppel, and laches present issues of fact which preclude summary judgment. We disagree.\nThe Bissettes cite case law holding that: landowners in violation of restrictive covenants may not themselves enforce such covenants in equity; waiver, estoppel, or laches may provide a defense to the enforcement of a covenant unless the covenant is no longer valid; and no North Carolina superior court judge may overrule another. However, the Bissettes apply no facts from the record to the case law cited. Accordingly, this argument is deemed abandoned. N.C. R. App. P. 28(b)(6) (2009).\nFines, Costs, and Attorneys\u2019 Fees\nThe Bissettes next argue that: (1) there was no violation of the restrictive covenants upon which to base the award of attorneys\u2019 fees, fines, and costs; and (2) no statutory bases exist to award attorneys\u2019 fees in this case. As previously discussed, the Bissettes\u2019 first contention has no merit; however, we reverse in part based on the second.\nThe first order filed by Judge Spivey on 29 December 2006 imposed attorneys\u2019 fees of $60,016.07 \u201cstemming from [the Bissettes\u2019] violations of the restrictive covenants.\u201d In his second order, Judge Spivey awarded $11,656.25 in attorneys\u2019 fees as sanctions in response to appellees\u2019 motion to dismiss under Rules 12 and 41 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. On 12 June 2007, Judge Balog ordered the Bissettes to pay $10,000 to plaintiffs for legal fees incurred by them in the contempt proceedings. On 3 March 2006, Judge Webb ordered the Bissettes to pay $80,563.15 in legal fees stemming from defendants\u2019 violations of the restrictive covenants. None of the orders awarding fees cite the statutory authority upon which they are based.\nWith regard to the awards of 29 December 2006 of $60,026.07 and 3 March 2006 of $80,563.13, our Supreme Court has held that a prevailing party may not recover attorneys\u2019 fees \u201c[e]ven in the face of a carefully drafted contractual provision indemnifying a party for such attorneys\u2019 fees ... absent statutory authority therefor. \u201d Enterprises, Inc. v. Equipment Co., 300 N.C. 286, 289, 266 S.E.2d 812, 814-15 (1980) (emphasis added). While appellees correctly contend that N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 47F-1-101, et seq., otherwise known as North Carolina\u2019s Planned Community Act (\u201cPCA\u201d), now provides a basis for an award of attorneys\u2019 fees, the PCA does not justify the trial court\u2019s order in this case.\nIn McGinnis Point Owners Ass\u2019n v. Joyner, 135 N.C. App. 752, 522 S.E.2d 317 (1999), this Court noted that N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 47F-3-120 authorizes the recovery of attorneys\u2019 fees in an action to enforce restrictive covenants brought pursuant to Chapter 47F. McGinnis Point Owners, 135 N.C. App. at 757, 522 S.E.2d at 321. At that time, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 47F-3-120 did not apply to planned communities created prior to February 1999 unless a community\u2019s declaration of covenants was amended to specifically incorporate Chapter 47. Id.\nIn 2005, several revisions were made to Chapter 47F, and N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 47F-1-102 (2007) was revised to make N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 47F-3-120 applicable \u201cto all planned communities created in this State on or after January 1, 1999[.]\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 47F-l-102(a); 2005 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 214, \u00a7 1. This revision made section 47F-3-120 effective as to all claims commenced on or after 20 July 2005. 2005 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 214, \u00a7 2.\nIn this case, Moss Creek was created in 1987, and the record does not show that the Declaration in this case has been amended to incorporate revised Chapter 47. Moreover, the Association commenced this action on 18 May 2005, and thus the PCA\u2019s provisions allowing attorneys\u2019 fees in actions to enforce the restrictive covenants do not apply in the absence of an express incorporation of Chapter 47F in the Declaration. As a result, the PCA provides no statutory basis for an award of attorneys\u2019 fees to plaintiffs. We therefore reverse Judge Spivey\u2019s 29 December 2006 award of $60,026.07 in attorneys\u2019 fees and Judge Webb\u2019s 3 March 2006 award of $80,563.13 in attorneys\u2019 fees.\nIn awarding $11,656.25 in attorneys\u2019 fees in his second order, the record shows that Judge Spivey was considering the award of attorneys\u2019 fees as he was ruling on appellees\u2019 motion to dismiss the Bissettes\u2019 various counterclaims and defenses under Rules 12 and 41 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. This included a ruling as to punitive damages.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 ID-45 (2007) provides:\nThe court shall award reasonable attorneys\u2019 fees, resulting from the defense against the punitive damages claim, against a claimant who files a claim for punitive damages that the claimant knows or should have known to be frivolous or malicious. The court shall award reasonable attorney fees against a defendant who asserts a defense in a punitive damages claim that the defendant knows or should have known to be frivolous or malicious.\nId. Therefore, since the trial court dismissed the Bissettes\u2019 punitive damages claim under Rule 12, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 ID-45 supports this award of attorneys\u2019 fees.\nIn their brief, the Bissettes make no argument regarding this award of fees other than stating that \u201cthere is simply no basis under any statute or Rule of Civil Procedure for such an award;\u201d Under our appellate rules, it is the duty of appellate counsel to provide sufficient legal authority to this Court, and failure to do so will result in dismissal. N.C. R. App. P. 28(b)(6). Thus, because the Bissettes have failed to cite any legal authority whatsoever in support of their argument as to these attorneys\u2019 fees, we conclude this issue does not warrant appellate review. Pritchett & Burch, PLLC v. Boyd, 169 N.C. App. 118, 123, 609 S.E.2d 439, 443 (assignment of error abandoned for failure to cite authority in support of argument), disc. review dismissed, 359 N.C. 635, 616 S.E.2d 543 (2005); Hatcher v. Hurrah\u2019s N.C. Casino Co., LLC, 169 N.C. App. 151, 159, 610 S.E.2d 210, 214-15 (2005).\nThe Bissettes lastly challenge the award of attorneys\u2019 fees under Judge Balog\u2019s 12 June 2007 order for contempt in failing to pay fees and costs in Judge Spivey\u2019s prior orders. As a general rule, \u201c[a] North Carolina court has no authority to award damages to a private party in a contempt proceeding[,]\u201d because \u201c[c]ontempt is a wrong against the state, and moneys collected ... go to the state alone.\u201d Glesner v. Dembrosky, 73 N.C. App. 594, 599, 327 S.E.2d 60, 63 (1985). Courts can award attorneys\u2019 fees in contempt matters only when specifically authorized by statute. Blevins v. Welch, 137 N.C. App. 98, 103, 527 S.E.2d 667, 671 (2000). However, this Court has acknowledged certain exceptions to this general rule such as child support and equitable distribution actions. Blair v. Blair, 8 N.C. App. 61, 173 S.E.2d 513 (1970) (awarding attorneys\u2019 fees in a contempt action to enforce child support); Hartsell v. Hartsell, 99 N.C. App. 380, 393 S.E.2d 570 (1990) (awarding attorneys\u2019 fees in a contempt action to enforce equitable distribution award), aff\u2019d, 328 N.C. 729, 403 S.E.2d 307 (1991).\nAppellees\u2019 current action did not arise in either of these contexts; and the cases cited by appellees in defense of the fee award support our case law that outside of the family law field, statutory authority is required for enforcement of contempt. Therefore, we reverse the $10,000 award in attorneys\u2019 fees to appellees incurred by enforcing the trial court\u2019s contempt orders.\nBreach of Fiduciary Duty Claim\nThe Bissettes finally argue that the trial court erred in dismissing their claim for breach of fiduciary duty because they substantially complied in providing a more definite statement of their claim.\nThe trial court granted summary judgment to appellees on the Bissettes\u2019 breach of fiduciary duty claim on 8 March 2007. In its order, the trial court found\nthat the allegations set forth within the pleading at issue were not sufficient to show a right to relief, do not provide the specificity and detail required[,] nor provide compliance with the previously entered Order of [Judge Spivey.]\n(Emphasis added.) The Bissettes here do not challenge the trial court\u2019s finding that their pleading was insufficient \u201cto show a right to relief.\u201d Accordingly, this finding is binding on review in this Court. Okwara v. Dillard Dep\u2019t Stores, Inc., 136 N.C. App. 587, 591, 525 S.E.2d 481, 484 (2000) (\u201cWhere findings of fact are challenged on appeal, each contested finding of fact must be separately assigned as error, and the failure to do so results in a waiver of the right to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the finding.\u201d). This assignment of error is overruled.\nBased on the foregoing, we reverse the trial court\u2019s award of $60,026.07 and $80,563.15 in attorneys\u2019 fees stemming from the violations of the restrictive covenants, reverse the award of $10,000.00 for attorneys\u2019 fees enforcing the trial court\u2019s contempt orders, and otherwise affirm the orders of the trial court.\nAffirmed in part and reversed in part.\nJudges WYNN and JACKSON concur.\n. The Bissettes cite N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 153A-335, 160A-376 (2007) and Guilford County, NC, Dev. Ordinance \u00a7 2-1.7 (2009).\n. The amended answer does not include the alleged approval by Byron in its exhibits. However, the record shows that Herbert B. Parks purported to assign Byron\u2019s interest in the Declaration on 13 October 2005, and that Mary Bissette approved the recombination on behalf of Byron on 1 November 2005.\n. Rodgerson, 27 N.C. App. 173, 218 S.E.2d 471.\n. Medearis v. Trustees of Meyers Park Baptist Church, 148 N.C. App. 1, 558 S.E.2d 199 (2001), disc. review denied, 355 N.C. 493, 563 S.E.2d 190 (2002).\n. Adams Creek Assocs. v. Davis, 186 N.C. App. 512, 652 S.E.2d 677 (2007), disc. review denied, 362 N.C. 354, 662 S.E.2d 900 (2008).\n. Plaintiffs\u2019 argument that the date of their amended complaint should be the date by which our Court measures the date the action commenced has no statutory basis. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 15(c) (2007).\n. Watson v. Watson, 187 N.C. App. 55, 652 S.E.2d 310 (2007), disc. review denied, 362 N.C. 373, 662 S.E.2d 551 (2008); Baxley v. Jackson, 179 N.C. App. 635, 634 S.E.2d 905, disc. review denied, 360 N.C. 644, 638 S.E.2d 462 (2006).", "type": "majority", "author": "HUNTER, JR., Robert N., Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Robertson, Medlin & Blocker, PLLC, by John F. Bloss for defendants and third-party plaintiff-appellants.", "Forman Rossabi Black, P.A., by T. Keith Black and Emily J. Meister; and Gregory A. Wendling, for plaintiffs and third-party defendant-appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "MOSS CREEK HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., DELORIS GAIL BENTON, JO ANNE K. BISHOP, JANICE HAMBY, DAVID L. HAMILTON, DAVID J. KNOCHE, and CHARLES F. PEELER, Plaintiffs v. TED L. BISSETTE, MARY HOLLY BISSETTE, SCOTT W. RICH, LAURA K. RICH, and PROVIDENT FUNDING ASSOCIATES, LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, Defendants v. TED L. BISSETTE and MARY HOLLY BISSETTE, SCOTT W. RICH and LAURA K. RICH, Third Party Plaintiffs v. TERRY MILLER, JIM BENTON, ANGELA PEELER, FRED BISHOP and PEGGY HAMILTON, Third Party Defendants\nNo. COA08-1156-2\n(Filed 2 February 2010)\n1. Deeds\u2014 restrictive covenants \u2014 summary judgment\nEnforcing a restrictive covenant through summary judgment is proper unless genuine issues of material fact exist showing that the contract is invalid, that the effect of the covenant impairs enjoyment of the estate, or that the term of the'covenant is contrary to public interest.\n2. Deeds\u2014 restrictive covenants \u2014 plain language \u2014 construed as written\nSummary judgment was properly granted for a homeowners association where a restrictive covenant provided that lots could not be subdivided except by consent and defendants reduced the size of their lot. Although defendants argued that the language of the covenants must be interpreted through definitions in the General Statutes and the county subdivision regulations, a contract must be construed as written where it is plain and unambiguous.\n3. Appeal and Error\u2014 preservation of issues \u2014 different argument presented below \u2014 supporting authority not cited\nDefendants did not properly raise on appeal the question of whether the bankruptcy of the developer and an assignment of rights rendered a covenant unenforceable where a different argument was presented at trial. Moreover, defendants did not cite supporting authority.\n4. Appeal and Error\u2014 preservation of issues \u2014 argument abandoned \u2014 facts not applied to law\nAn argument on appeal was deemed abandoned where facts from the record were not applied to the case law cited.\n5. Costs\u2014 attorney fees \u2014 restrictive covenants \u2014 Planned Community Act\nThe trial court erred by awarding certain attorney fees in an action arising from a restrictive covenant where the Planned Community Act, which had not been incorporated into the Declaration of Covenants, did not apply.\n6. Appeal and Error\u2014 preservation of issues \u2014 no legal authority cited \u2014 claim not reviewed\nAn argument concerning attorney fees was not reviewed on appeal where no legal authority was cited other than the statement that there was no basis for the award.\n7. Costs\u2014 attorney fees \u2014 contempt\u2014restrictive covenants\nAn award of attorney fees in a contempt order arising from a restrictive covenants action was reversed. Courts can award attorney fees in contempt proceedings only when specifically authorized by statute, except in family law claims.\n8. Fiduciary Relationship\u2014 breach \u2014 sufficiency of pleadings\nThe trial court did not err by dismissing a claim for breach of fiduciary duty where the trial court\u2019s finding that the pleading was insufficient was not challenged on appeal.\nAppeal by Ted and Mary Bissette (as defendants and third-party plaintiffs) from orders entered 3 May 2006 by Judge John O. Craig III, 29 December 2006 by Judge Ronald E. Spivey, 26 March and 12 June 2007 by Judge Steve A. Balog, 30 April 2007 by Judge Edgar B. Gregory, 28 November 2008 by Judge Paul C. Ridgeway, and 12 and 13 February and 4 March 2008 by Judge James M. Webb in Guilford County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 21 April 2009. Petition to Rehear allowed on 25 November 2009. This opinion supersedes opinion filed on 20 October 2009.\nRobertson, Medlin & Blocker, PLLC, by John F. Bloss for defendants and third-party plaintiff-appellants.\nForman Rossabi Black, P.A., by T. Keith Black and Emily J. Meister; and Gregory A. Wendling, for plaintiffs and third-party defendant-appellees." }, "file_name": "0222-01", "first_page_order": 250, "last_page_order": 263 }