{ "id": 4174110, "name": "CREDIGY RECEIVABLES, INC. v. BLANCHE WHITTINGTON, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "Credigy Receivables, Inc. v. Whittington", "decision_date": "2010-03-02", "docket_number": "No. COA09-465", "first_page": "646", "last_page": "660", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "202 N.C. App. 646" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "611 S.E.2d 191", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12632624 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "194", "parenthetical": "plaintiff held to have no injury in fact, and consequently no standing, where it had no enforceable contract right against the defendant" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/611/0191-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 25-3-104", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "negotiable instruments must contain either \"an unconditional promise or order to pay\" by the issuer" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 25-9-109", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-234", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "106 S.E.2d 717", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1959, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "debtor able to bring claim against assignee for usurious charges alleged to be part of the assigned contract" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "249 N.C. 340", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8614726 ], "year": 1959, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "debtor able to bring claim against assignee for usurious charges alleged to be part of the assigned contract" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/249/0340-01" ] }, { "cite": "189 S.E. 488", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "weight": 2, "year": 1937, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "490", "parenthetical": "an assignee takes with an instrument \"constructive notice of antecedent equities\"" }, { "page": "490" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "211 N.C. 160", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8625260 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1937, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "164", "parenthetical": "an assignee takes with an instrument \"constructive notice of antecedent equities\"" }, { "page": "164" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/211/0160-01" ] }, { "cite": "169 N.C. App. 820", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8474036 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "824", "parenthetical": "plaintiff held to have no injury in fact, and consequently no standing, where it had no enforceable contract right against the defendant" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/169/0820-01" ] }, { "cite": "160 S.E. 484", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1931, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "485", "parenthetical": "Assignments are \"without prejudice to any setoff or other defense existing at the time of, or before notice of the assignment.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "201 N.C. 464", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8626198 ], "year": 1931, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "466", "parenthetical": "Assignments are \"without prejudice to any setoff or other defense existing at the time of, or before notice of the assignment.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/201/0464-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-57", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "504 U.S. 555", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11730070 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "560-61" }, { "page": "364" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/504/0555-01" ] }, { "cite": "574 S.E.2d 48", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "52", "parenthetical": "quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 119 L. Ed. 2d 351, 364 (1992)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "155 N.C. App. 110", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9249087 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "114", "parenthetical": "quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 119 L. Ed. 2d 351, 364 (1992)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/155/0110-01" ] }, { "cite": "574 S.E.2d 55", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "57" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "155 N.C. App. 624", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9251469 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "627" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/155/0624-01" ] }, { "cite": "269 S.E.2d 142", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "301 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561018 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/301/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "261 S.E.2d 21", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "23" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "44 N.C. App. 268", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8552165 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "269-70" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/44/0268-01" ] }, { "cite": "388 S.E.2d 205", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "206" }, { "page": "206", "parenthetical": "non-justiciable claims can arise \"at any stage of the proceeding\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "97 N.C. App. 327", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8520985 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "329" }, { "page": "329" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/97/0327-01" ] }, { "cite": "432 S.E.2d 339", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "342", "parenthetical": "quotation marks and citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "334 N.C. 303", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2532594 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "309", "parenthetical": "quotation marks and citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/334/0303-01" ] }, { "cite": "386 S.E.2d 226", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "229" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "96 N.C. App. 474", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523075 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "479" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/96/0474-01" ] }, { "cite": "344 S.E.2d 555", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "575" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "81 N.C. App. 311", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8522821 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "326" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/81/0311-01" ] }, { "cite": "373 S.E.2d 317", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "325", "parenthetical": "quoting Sprouse v. North River Ins. Co., 81 N.C. App. 311, 326, 344 S.E.2d 555, 575 (1986)" }, { "page": "325" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "91 N.C. App. 668", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526464 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "682", "parenthetical": "quoting Sprouse v. North River Ins. Co., 81 N.C. App. 311, 326, 344 S.E.2d 555, 575 (1986)" }, { "page": "682" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/91/0668-01" ] }, { "cite": "183 S.E. 732", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "weight": 14, "year": 1935, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "732" }, { "page": "732" }, { "page": "732" }, { "page": "732" }, { "page": "732" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "209 N.C. 585", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2221566 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1935, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "585" }, { "page": "586" }, { "page": "586" }, { "page": "586" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/209/0585-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 25-3-203", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "33 N.C. 331", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11275363 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1850, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "334-35", "parenthetical": "\"[A]n assignee is affected by the liabilities of his assignor, . . . [and] he shall be thus affected in respect of such liabilities, as existed at the time of the assignment and constituted a demand which was then available as a defense at law.\"" }, { "page": "334-35" }, { "page": "334-35" }, { "page": "334-35" }, { "page": "334-35" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/33/0331-01" ] }, { "cite": "38 N.C. 347", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2098315 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1844, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "354" }, { "page": "354" }, { "page": "354" }, { "page": "354" }, { "page": "354" }, { "page": "354" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/38/0347-01" ] }, { "cite": "601 S.E.2d 237", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "241", "parenthetical": "this Court must review \"all relevant pleadings and documents\" to determine if either of the above requirements are satisfied" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "166 N.C. App. 150", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8410897 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "153-54", "parenthetical": "this Court must review \"all relevant pleadings and documents\" to determine if either of the above requirements are satisfied" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/166/0150-01" ] }, { "cite": "400 S.E.2d 435", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "438" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 N.C. 254", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2541066 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "258" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/328/0254-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 6-21.5", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1159, "char_count": 32886, "ocr_confidence": 0.761, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.302582898820868e-08, "percentile": 0.5125310394544238 }, "sha256": "55edc13f71b73f4360db95635cd590fa7997c37e6d66989a16509c399c68ae83", "simhash": "1:576fed7754335466", "word_count": 5323 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:18:34.741992+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges ELMORE and STEELMAN concur." ], "parties": [ "CREDIGY RECEIVABLES, INC. v. BLANCHE WHITTINGTON, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "HUNTER, JR., Robert N., Judge.\nIn 2008, Credigy Receivables, Inc. (\u201cCredigy\u201d) purchased and became the assignee of a default judgment against \u201cBlanche Whittington\u201d of 107 Courtland Place, Goldsboro, Wayne County, North Carolina. The assignment granted Credigy the right to collect on the judgment, which concerned a delinquent credit card account opened in the name \u201cBlanche Whittington.\u201d After the purchase, Credigy initiated proceedings to collect the debt against 82-year-old Ms. Blanche Whittington of 2114 Michelle Drive, Kinston, Lenoir County, North Carolina.\nThe real Ms. Whittington, residing in Kinston, did not incur the debt underlying the judgment, but instead was the victim of identity theft by a Ms. Mary E. Atkinson. Ms. Atkinson appropriated Ms. Whittington\u2019s social security number in perpetrating a number of similar frauds on other creditors during the time the credit card debt was incurred.\nUpon receiving a notice to claim exemptions from Credigy, Ms. Whittington retained counsel, who immediately notified Credigy\u2019s counsel of the error. Subsequently, Ms. Whittington\u2019s counsel filed a Rule 60 motion, including a motion for attorneys\u2019 fees, to set aside the judgment. The matter proceeded to hearing, and the judgment was eventually set aside as to the true Ms. Whittington by consent of the parties.\nDespite this agreement, the trial court awarded Ms. Whittington $26,101.75 in attorneys\u2019 fees accumulated while defending against Credigy\u2019s enforcement efforts under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 6-21.5 (2009). Credigy appeals the attorneys\u2019 fees award and argues: (1) that it pursued a justiciable claim against Ms. Whittington in the preliminary stages of enforcement of the judgment, and (2) that the attorneys\u2019 fees were not reasonably incurred, since its enforcement efforts were suspended during an investigation of whether Ms. Whittington was, in fact, the debtor. For reasons stated herein, we affirm the trial court\u2019s award.\nI. BACKGROUND\nAt some point prior to 10 May 1999, Ms. Atkinson, posing as \u201cBlanche Whittington,\u201d applied for a credit card account with Fleet Bank. On the application, Ms. Atkinson represented to Fleet Bank that: (1) her name was \u201cBlanche Whittington\u201d; (2) her social security number ended in 1234; and (3) she lived at 107 Courtland Place, Goldsboro, Wayne County, North Carolina. The credit account became delinquent as of 10 May 1999, and Fleet Bank transferred the account to First Select Corporation (\u201cFirst Select\u201d). On 28 July 1999, First Select filed suit against Ms. Atkinson for nonpayment of the outstanding balance plus interest, $6,319.72. First Select used the name \u201cBlanche Whittington\u201d in the complaint heading.\nOn 21 August 2001, default judgment was entered in favor of First Select against a \u201cBlanche Whittington\u201d residing at \u201c107 Courtland Placet,] Goldsboro, North Carolina,\u201d and the judgment was registered in Wayne County, North Carolina. The judgment award included the principal sum of $6,205.47 with 8% interest per annum, $947.96 in attorneys\u2019 fees, and the costs of the action. The Clerk of Superior Court of Wayne County entered default judgment in favor of First Select upon a showing by its attorney that service of the summons and complaint was obtained by certified mail on 20 July 2001. The mail summons was delivered to the residence of 107 Courtland Place, and someone at the residence signed their name as \u201cBlanche Whittington\u201d to receive service. Prior to completing service by mail, First Select\u2019s counsel had six summons and complaints returned without service, because the Wayne County Sheriff\u2019s office could not locate any person by the name \u201cBlanche Whittington\u201d at 107 Courtland Place in Goldsboro.\nIn October 2001, First Select attempted to serve a Notice of Right to Have Exemptions Designated on \u201cBlanche Whittington[,] 107 Courtland Place[,] Goldsboro, North Carolina.\u201d The deputy sheriff returned the notice unserved on 23 October 2001, and stated that the \u201cBlanche Whittington\u201d purportedly residing at 107 Courtland Place was not able to be located and that no forwarding address was available.\nOn 26 March 2003, First Select assigned the default judgment to Credigy for $10.00, and the assignment was registered in Wayne County. On 16 April 2003, Credigy\u2019s counsel mailed a notice of the assignment to \u201cBlanche Whittington\u201d at 107 Courtland Place in Goldsboro.\nCredigy obtained a Notice of Right to Have Exemptions Designated for \u201cBlanche Whittington[,] 107 Courtland Place[,] Goldsboro, North Carolinaf,]\u201d on 25 May 2007. The notice was returned by the Wayne County Sheriff\u2019s Office on 1 July 2007 with the notation: \u201cDoes not live at given address[.] Lives out of state[.]\u201d Credigy\u2019s counsel thereafter conducted a \u201cskip trace\u201d search through Lexis using the social security number listed in the credit application. A \u201cskip trace\u201d search is a tool provided by several online search companies to help debt .buyers locate missing debtors. By entering only Ms. Whittington\u2019s social security number into the appropriate Lexis search data field, Credigy\u2019s counsel acquired a new address for \u201cBlanche Whittington\u201d: 2114 Michelle Drive, Kinston, North Carolina.\nOn 18 February 2008, counsel for Credigy sent a letter to Blanche Whittington of 2114 Michelle Drive, Kinston, North Carolina. The letter offered Ms. Whittington the opportunity to settle the outstanding debt of $11,620.36 for a 20% discount.\nMs. Whittington immediately informed her counsel, who sent a letter by first class mail on 22 February 2008 to notify Credigy\u2019s counsel that an identity theft had occurred, and that Ms. Whittington did not owe the debt underlying the default judgment. The letter was properly addressed and was not returned. In a sworn statement at trial, Credigy\u2019s counsel stated that neither Credigy nor its counsel had any record of receiving the 22 February 2008 letter.\nOn 1 April 2008, the Sheriff of Lenoir County, North Carolina, served a Notice of Right to Have Exemptions Designated on Ms. Whittington. Ms. Whittington again informed her counsel, who sent another letter by certified mail and facsimile on 3 April 2008, denying Ms. Whittington\u2019s liability on the judgment. On 16 April 2008, Ms. Whittington sought relief from Credigy\u2019s judgment by motion under Rules 6 and 60 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. As grounds for relief from judgment, Ms. Whittington\u2019s counsel stated that Ms. Whittington had never resided at the 107 Courtland Place address, and that Ms. Whittington had never been served with process with respect to the default judgment. The motion was accompanied by an affidavit from Ms. Whittington, where Ms. Whittington provided: (1) she had never resided outside Lenoir County, and she had resided at her Michelle Drive address since 1964; and (2) Ms. Atkinson had stolen her identity several years prior, and Ms. Whittington had spent years dealing with Ms. Atkinson\u2019s creditors. In her motion, Ms. Whittington asked the trial court for attorneys\u2019 fees.\nShortly after receiving service of Ms. Whittington\u2019s motion on 16 April 2008, one of Credigy\u2019s counsel called counsel for Ms. Whittington, and left Ms. Whittington\u2019s counsel a voicemail stating that \u201ca mistake had been made and that the mistake should be corrected.\u201d Later that afternoon, Ms. Whittington\u2019s counsel received a call from another attorney for Credigy. The second caller also indicated that a mistake had been made, and that the Rule 60 motion to set aside the judgment should be allowed. Ms. Whittington\u2019s counsel asked Credigy\u2019s counsel to discontinue Credigy\u2019s collection efforts. Though counsel for Credigy concurred that the Notice of Right to Have Exemptions Designated and all collection efforts should be stopped, he declined to make a binding agreement to do so unless Ms. Whittington withdrew her motion for attorneys\u2019 fees. The dispute continued.\nOn 21 April 2008, a preliminary hearing was held on Ms. Whittington\u2019s motion to set aside the judgment. At the hearing, counsel for Credigy said that all collection efforts would be suspended as to Ms. Whittington; however, he did not withdraw the Notice of Right to Have Exemptions Designated. Instead, Credigy\u2019s counsel asked for an extension of time in order to give his client an opportunity to investigate the facts contained in Ms. Whittington\u2019s affidavit. Another hearing was scheduled for 30 June 2008.\nOn 16 June 2008, Ms. Whittington\u2019s counsel filed a motion for attorneys\u2019 fees under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 6-21.5. In the motion, Ms. Whittington claimed that Credigy had pursued a non-justiciable claim against Ms. Whittington, because Ms. Whittington had never been served with process with respect to the default judgment in issue. Ms. Whittington argued that the judgment was void and unenforceable against her. The motion was thereafter accompanied by two affidavits detailing the times and hours calculating the attorneys\u2019 fees sought. Ms. Whittington\u2019s initial counsel filed one affidavit, and the other was filed by an attorney associated with initial counsel. Up until the filing of the affidavits on 30 June 2008, the total hours accrued between both counsel was 89.4 hours.\nOn 30 June 2008, Credigy filed a motion in opposition to Ms. Whittington\u2019s motion for relief from judgment, where Credigy moved the trial court to deny Ms. Whittington\u2019s motion for attorneys\u2019 fees. In the brief, Credigy contended that attorneys\u2019 fees were not proper, because it had no notice of a potential identity theft until 3 April 2008, and Ms. Whittington had refused to fill out an industry standard Fraud/Identity Theft Affidavit. Credigy stated that, without the affidavit, it lacked \u201csufficient justification\u201d to suspend post-judgment collection efforts, and that it lacked \u201csufficient documentation\u201d of \u201can act of fraud or identity theft.\u201d Credigy also noted that it had purchased the judgment \u201cwithout prior knowledge or notice of any disputes involving the subject account, and as such, is a bona fide purchaser for value.\u201d\nOn 30 June 2008, the trial court conducted a hearing on Ms. Whittington\u2019s motions. Credigy\u2019s counsel informed the trial court that Credigy had concluded, after \u201cinvestigation,\u201d that Ms. Whittington did not commit the acts described in the default judgment. On 16 July 2008, Credigy filed a motion in opposition to Ms. Whittington\u2019s motion for attorneys\u2019 fees under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 6-21.5. In the motion, Credigy contended again that it did not have notice of any deficiency in the judgment until 3 April 2008, and that Ms. Whittington had refused to fill out a Fraud/Identity Theft Affidavit in accordance with industry standards. Credigy averred in particular that Ms. Whittington \u201cknew or with the exercise of due care should have known through the course of her efforts to correct her credit report of the existence of the judgment involving the subject account prior to her receipt of [Credigy\u2019s] [d]emand [l]etter dated February 18, 2008.\u201d\nOn 4 September 2008, the trial court filed an order granting Ms. Whittington\u2019s motions to set aside the judgment and to award attorneys\u2019 fees. From the 4 September 2008 order, Credigy appeals.\nII. ANALYSIS\nOn appeal, Credigy argues the imposition of attorneys\u2019 fees is unjustified because: (1) the pleadings and the default judgment were presumptively valid, and presented a justiciable issue as to Ms. Whittington\u2019s identity and indebtedness, and (2) Credigy suspended its enforcement efforts upon receiving competent evidence that Ms. Whittington was not liable on the judgment. We do not agree.\nA. Standard of Review\nWhen reviewing an award of attorneys\u2019 fees under section 6-21.5, this Court must review all relevant pleadings and documents of a case in order to determine if either: (1) the pleadings contain \u201ca complete absence of a justiciable issue of either law or fact,\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 6-21.5; or (2) \u201cwhether the losing party persisted in litigating the case after a point where he should reasonably have become aware that the pleading he filed no longer contained a justiciable issue.\u201d Sunamerica Financial Corp. v. Bonham, 328 N.C. 254, 258, 400 S.E.2d 435, 438 (1991). See Lincoln v. Bueche, 166 N.C. App. 150, 153-54, 601 S.E.2d 237, 241 (2004) (this Court must review \u201call relevant pleadings and documents\u201d to determine if either of the above requirements are satisfied).\nB. Assignment\nIt has long been the law in North Carolina that \u201cthe assignee stands absolutely in the place of his assignor, and it is ... as if the contract had been originally made with the assignee, upon precisely the same terms as with the original parties.\u201d Smith v. Brittain, 38 N.C. 347, 354, 1844 N.C. LEXIS 157, at *13 (1844); see Turner v. Beggarly, 33 N.C. 331, 334-35, 1850 N.C. LEXIS 66, at *6-7 (1850) (\u201c[A]n assignee is affected by the liabilities of his assignor, . . . [and] he shall be thus affected in respect of such liabilities, as existed at the time of the assignment and constituted a demand which was then available as a defense at law.\u201d). In the context of negotiable instruments, this concept is codified in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 25-3-203 (2009), which grants the transferee of an instrument \u201cany right of the transferor to enforce the instrument.\u201d\nThis State\u2019s Supreme Court addressed the doctrine of assignment with respect to purchased judgments in Jones v. T. S. Franklin Estate, 209 N.C. 585, 183 S.E. 732 (1935). In that case, Jones, an attorney, purchased for value a judgment prosecuted by the North Carolina Corporation Commission (the \u201cCommission\u201d) against T. S. Franklin Estate. Franklin Estate, 209 N.C. at 585, 183 S.E. at 732. The purchased judgment entitled the Commission to levy a stock assessment against T. S. Franklin Estate after the failure of the Central Bank and Trust Company of Asheville, North Carolina. Id. After levying on twenty shares of stock, judgment was entered in favor of the Commission for two thousand dollars. Id. Thereafter, Jones purchased the judgment, and the assignment was docketed in November 1931. Id.\nBoth during the initial prosecution and after the assignment to Jones, Julian Price was the executor of T. S. Franklin Estate. Id. About three and a half years after the assignment, Jones filed a motion in superior court in order to make Price a party \u201cindividually and as trustee\u201d to the purchased cause of action. Id. at 586, 183 S.E. at 732. In the motion, Jones alleged that Price was the \u201cactual owner\u201d of the stock that was levied by the Commission, even though the stock at issue \u201cstood on the books of the [failed] bank in the name of . . . T. S. Franklin Estate[.]\u201d Id. The trial court denied Jones\u2019s motion, and Jones appealed to the North Carolina Supreme Court. Id.\nIn affirming the trial court\u2019s decision, the Franklin Estate Court concisely presented the relevant question:\nDoes the simple assignment of a judgment on the judgment docket entitle the assignee in a subsequent proceeding to bring in others, who were not parties to the original action, and subject them to liability for the payment of the judgment which had been rendered against the original debtor only?\nId. The Court concluded that the doctrine of assignment does not allow such an action against third parties who are unnamed in the judgment, and further observed:\nThe mere assignment of a judgment transfers to the assignee all the rights and remedies of the assignor with respect to the judgment and carries with it the right to enforce the judgment by a resort to .every legal or equitable remedy available to the assignor, but, unless expressly provided for, this does not confer upon the assignee the additional right thereafter to subject to liability on the judgment others who were not parties to the original action, though the assignor, the original plaintiff, might have had a cause of action against them but [forbore] to pursue it.\nId.\nHere, when Credigy purchased the default judgment in issue, it acquired a right to collect on the underlying debt only to the extent of its predecessors in interest: First Select and Fleet Bank. Id.; see Smith, 38 N.C. at 354, 1844 N.C. LEXIS 157, at *13. Credigy has admitted that someone other than Ms. Whittington signed the contract with Fleet Bank that was later transferred to First Select. First Select, as transferee of Fleet Bank\u2019s interest, prosecuted its rights to the outstanding obligation under the contract, and obtained a valid judgment against the party incurring the debt under the credit card agreement, Ms. Atkinson. It was under these circumstances that Credigy obtained its rights as assignee of the default judgment, and accordingly, these facts outline the boundaries by which its collection efforts are subject. See Turner, 33 N.C. at 334-35, 1850 N.C. LEXIS 66, at *6-7.\nWithin these strictures, it is apparent that Credigy never had the right to enforce its purchased judgment against Ms. Whittington, because it stepped directly into the shoes of Fleet Bank, who never had a- claim against Ms. Whittington for the underlying debt. Credigy has conceded that Ms. Whittington did not open the credit card account with Fleet Bank, and that she was never made a party to the judgment through service of process. Thus, Credigy, through operation of law, did not purchase the right to seek payment of the judgment from Ms. Whittington, and it had no right under the holding of Franklin Estate to make her part of any subsequent proceedings. Franklin Estate, 209 N.C. at 586, 183 S.E. at 732.\nCredigy argued at the June hearing that the delinquent account had always been tracked by three things: (1) the name \u201cBlanche Whittington,\u201d (2) the address at 107 Courtland Place, and (3) the social security number ending in 1234. This information, while helpful in potentially locating the real debtor, did not expand Credigy\u2019s rights as an assignee stepping into the shoes of its predecessors in interest. Absent a right to involve Ms. Whittington in the enforcement of the judgment, we now turn to whether attorneys\u2019 fees were proper.\nC. Justiciability and Attorneys\u2019 Fees\nUnder N.C.G.S. \u00a7 6-21.5, attorneys\u2019 fees may be awarded by the trial court in its discretion, where \u201cupon motion of the prevailing party, . . . the court finds that there was a complete absence of a justiciable issue of either law or fact raised by the losing party in any pleading.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 6-21.5. In North Carolina, a justiciable issue is one that is \u201c \u2018real and present as opposed to imagined or fanciful.\u2019 \u201d In re Williamson, 91 N.C. App. 668, 682, 373 S.E.2d 317, 325 (1988) (quoting Sprouse v. North River Ins. Co., 81 N.C. App. 311, 326, 344 S.E.2d 555, 575 (1986)).\n\u201cIn order to find complete absence of a justiciable issue it must conclusively appear that such issues are absent even giving the pleadings the indulgent treatment they receive on motions for summary judgment or to dismiss.\u201d K & K Development Corp. v. Columbia Banking Fed. Savings & Loan, 96 N.C. App. 474, 479, 386 S.E.2d 226, 229 (1989). Under this deferential review of the pleadings, a plaintiff must either: (1) \u201creasonably have been aware, at the time the complaint was filed, that the pleading contained no justiciable issue\u201d; or (2) be found to have \u201cpersisted in litigating the case after the point where [he] should reasonably have become aware that pleading [he] filed no longer contained a justiciable issue.\u201d Brooks v. Giesey, 334 N.C. 303, 309, 432 S.E.2d 339, 342 (1993) (quotation marks and citations omitted). Section 6-21.5 was enacted \u201cto discourage frivolous legal action and that purpose may not be circumvented by limiting the statute\u2019s application to the initial pleadings. Frivolous action in a lawsuit can occur at any stage of the proceeding and whenever it occurs is subject to the legislative ban.\u201d Short v. Bryant, 97 N.C. App. 327, 329, 388 S.E.2d 205, 206 (1990).\nOur conclusion that Credigy did not purchase the right to enforce its judgment against Ms. Whittington pursuant to Franklin Estate, goes to the heart of a justiciable, civil cause of action: standing.\n\u201cThe gist of standing is whether there is a justiciable controversy being litigated among adverse parties with substantial interest affected so as to bring forth a clear articulation of the issues before the court.\u201d Texfi Industries, Inc. v. City of Fayetteville, 44 N.C. App. 268, 269-70, 261 S.E.2d 21, 23 (1979), aff\u2019d, 301 N.C. 1, 269 S.E.2d 142 (1980). The burden is on the plaintiff to demonstrate that the requirement of standing is satisfied. Am. Woodland Indus., Inc. v. Tolson, 155 N.C. App. 624, 627, 574 S.E.2d 55, 57 (2002). In civil cases, standing requires a plaintiff to prove three elements:\n\u201c(1) \u2018injury in fact\u2019 \u2014 an invasion of a legally protected interest that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.\u201d\nNeuse River Found., Inc. v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 155 N.C. App. 110, 114, 574 S.E.2d 48, 52 (2002) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 119 L. Ed. 2d 351, 364 (1992)).\nBy purchasing the default judgment from First Select, Credigy stepped not only into the shoes of First Select, but also those of the contracting party, Fleet Bank. Smith, 38 N.C. at 354, 1844 N.C. LEXIS 157, at *13; Franklin Estate, 209 N.C. at 586, 183 S.E. at 732. Credigy was therefore subject to \u201cany setoff or other defense, existing at the time of, or before notice of, the assignment[.]\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-57 (2009); see Trust Co. v. Williams, 201 N.C. 464, 466, 160 S.E. 484, 485 (1931) (Assignments are \u201cwithout prejudice to any setoff or other defense existing at the time of, or before notice of the assignment.\u201d). The defense relevant to the case sub judice is Credigy\u2019s lack of standing against Ms. Whittington.\nSince Fleet Bank did not contract with Ms. Whittington, Credigy, as an assignee, cannot show that it suffered an \u201cinjury in fact\u201d under the first element, because no legally protected contractual interest was purchased as to Ms. Whittington. Beachcomber Properties, L.L.C. v. Station One, Inc., 169 N.C. App. 820, 824, 611 S.E.2d 191, 194 (2005) (plaintiff held to have no injury in fact, and consequently no standing, where it had no enforceable contract right against the defendant). Moreover, Credigy\u2019s injury is also not \u201cfairly traceable\u201d to Ms. Whittington under the second element, because Ms. Whittington did not default on the credit card account underlying the default judgment. The failure of these two elements is sufficient to show that Credigy did not have standing to enforce the judgment against Ms. Whittington, and any action that Credigy thought it had against Ms. Whittington was \u201cimagined or fanciful\u201d as a matter of law. In re Williamson, 91 N.C. App. at 682, 373 S.E.2d at 325; see Short, 97 N.C. App. at 329, 388 S.E.2d at 206 (non-justiciable claims can arise \u201cat any stage of the proceeding\u201d).\nAs to the requirement under section 6-21.5 that Credigy must have been aware of its lack of standing, the law of assignment imputes Credigy with the knowledge that it lacked standing at the time it attempted to enforce the judgment. Smith, 38 N.C. at 354, 1844 N.C. LEXIS 157, at *13; Turner, 33 N.C. at 334-35, 1850 N.C. LEXIS 66, at *6-7; Pickett v. Fulford, 211 N.C. 160, 164, 189 S.E. 488, 490 (1937) (an assignee takes with an instrument \u201cconstructive notice of antecedent equities\u201d); cf. 1 Samuel Williston, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts \u00a7 74:56, at 607 (Richard A. Lord ed., 4th ed. 1990) (When transacting under section 9-404 of the UCC, \u201cthe assignee steps into . . . the assignor\u2019s shoes absolutely, and, if the shoes are dirty, then that dirt sullies the assignee no less than it did the assignor.\u201d). Fleet Bank, as the creditor, should have been aware that it would have standing against no one other than the signing party in the case of a default on the credit account. Upon transferring its rights promptly to First Select at the first signs of collection trouble, this knowledge of standing was also transferred and was made part of the default judgment by operation of law, because it was First Select\u2019s burden to show standing at the time it filed the complaint. Am. Woodland Indus., Inc., 155 N.C. App. at 627, 574 S.E.2d at 57. When Credigy purchased the judgment, it was \u201cas if [Fleet Bank\u2019s] contract had been originally made with [Credigy], upon precisely the same terms[.]\u201d Smith, 38 N.C. at 354, 1844 N.C. LEXIS 157, at *13. Accordingly, Credigy had constructive notice through the principles of assignment that the judgment did not present a justiciable issue as to Ms. Whittington.\nHowever, Credigy\u2019s imputed knowledge aside, Credigy also should have recognized that the pleadings on their face, even under an \u201cindulgent\u201d review, fail to present a colorable claim that Ms. Whittington was the debtor.\nOn 28 July 1999, First Select filed a complaint seeking to enforce its rights as to Ms. Atkinson\u2019s delinquent credit card account. The complaint alleges in relevant part:\n2. Upon information and belief, the defendant [\u201cBlanche Whittington\u201d] is a resident of Wayne County, North Carolina.\n3. The attached account agreement is a true and accurate copy of the terms and conditions of the written account agreement between the parties.\n4. The defendant is in default under the terms of that account agreement, in that said defendant has failed to make the payments due thereunder.\nThe complaint contains no social security number, and lists no address for the \u201cBlanche Whittington\u201d named as the defendant. The account agreement attached to the complaint, as shown in the record in this appeal, contains only the terms and conditions of the credit card account upon being transferred to First Select, and does not mention the identity of the debtor. The complaint makes no mention of a credit card application, nor does it state the contents of such application. The county of residence mentioned for the debtor, \u201cBlanche Whittington,\u201d has never been the county of residence for Ms. Whittington. The only link to Ms. Whittington and the \u201cBlanche Whittington\u201d named in the complaint\u2019s heading is the bare mention of the same name.\nFirst Select filed a motion for default judgment dated 20 August 2001 based on this complaint. The motion was accompanied by two affidavits: one from Credigy\u2019s counsel stating that service of process was obtained through certified mail under Rule 4(j)(l), and the other from First Select verifying the amount due under the credit card agreement. Neither affidavit contains an address, social security number, or any other information identifying the debtor except for using the name \u201cBlanche Whittington\u201d and listing the credit card account number.\nOn the default judgment itself, the address at 107 Courtland Place appears below the name \u201cBlanche Whittington\u201d in the judgment heading. No other indication of the debtor\u2019s identity is provided. Though Credigy argued at the June hearing that the same social security number was traced throughout the history of the account, nothing in the record shows that this piece of information was ever made part of the pleadings or judgment.\nPrior to enforcing their judgment, it was Credigy\u2019s burden to establish standing against Ms. Whittington. See Am. Woodland Indus., Inc., 155 N.C. App. at 627, 574 S.E.2d at 57. As assignee, Credigy purchased the inability of these pleadings and the judgment to implicate the real Ms. Whittington. Franklin Estate, 209 N.C. at 586, 183 S.E. at 732; Smith, 38 N.C. at 354, 1844 N.C. LEXIS 157, at *13; Turner, 33 N.C. at 334-35, 1850 N.C. LEXIS 66, at *6-7. Since Credigy did not have standing to pursue enforcement of the judgment against Ms. Whittington, and because the lack of allegations in the pleadings and judgment fail to connect the real Ms. Whittington to the underlying debt, Credigy should have been aware that no justiciable claim would lie against anyone other than the only person clearly identified on the judgment: \u201cBlanche Whittington\u201d residing at 107 Courtland Place in Wayne County. Thus, the award of attorneys\u2019 fees under section 6-21.5 was proper. These assignments of error are overruled.\nD. Credigy\u2019s Remaining Arguments\nCredigy has maintained at trial and on appeal that it was a bona fide purchaser of the default judgment without notice of any defects, and it contends that once it received competent evidence of an identity theft, it ceased to pursue its claim in a timely fashion. However, it is through simple operation of law that Credigy purchased a default judgment that was non-justiciable as to Ms. Whittington. Therefore, whether Credigy is a purchaser for value is not relevant to our determination here. As to notice, Credigy assumed the notice that Fleet Bank and First Select possessed upon Credigy\u2019s purchase of the judgment, see Pickett, 211 N.C. at 164, 189 S.E. at 490, and Credigy should have known from an examination of the pleadings that the default judgment was not enforceable against Ms. Whittington. We stress again that Credigy must assume the posture of its predecessors in interest, and be subject to the same liability and defenses at law that existed at the time it became the assignee of the judgment. Turner, 33 N.C. at 334-35, 1850 N.C. LEXIS 66, at *6-7; see also Overton v. Tarkington, 249 N.C. 340, 106 S.E.2d 717 (1959) (debtor able to bring claim against assignee for usurious charges alleged to be part of the assigned contract). The circumstance that the judgment was fatally flawed by Ms. Atkinson\u2019s fraud does not make the judgment justiciable as to Ms. Whittington, and does not change the context in which Credigy and its predecessors in interest should have known that no cause of action has ever existed against Ms. Whittington.\nCredigy also makes several arguments in its brief that the trial court\u2019s findings are not supported by competent evidence. However, because Credigy has admitted that Ms. Whittington was not the debtor, our analysis shows that the trial court properly concluded as a matter of law that no \u201cjusticiable issue of law or fact\u201d has ever been raised against Ms. Whittington.\nIII. CONCLUSION\nCredigy lacked standing to enforce the default judgment against Ms. Whittington, and the pleadings supporting Credigy\u2019s default judgment present no justiciable issue. Credigy reasonably should have been aware that it was pursuing a non-justiciable claim, and as such, attorneys\u2019 fees were properly granted under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 6-21.5. Accordingly, the order of the trial court is\nAffirmed.\nJudges ELMORE and STEELMAN concur.\n. These are fictitious numbers employed here to protect Ms. Whittington against further identity theft, but the numbers used were in fact the last four digits of Ms. Whittington\u2019s social security number.\n. The record does not disclose whether the default judgment was ever transcribed from Wayne County to Lenoir County pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-234 (2009).\n. We apply the common law instead of the Uniform Commercial Code in this case, because the default judgment in issue concerned an unsecured credit account, and the judgment, by itself, did not serve as collateral. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 25-9-109 (2009). The judgment is also not a negotiable instrument. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 25-3-104 (2009) (negotiable instruments must contain either \u201can unconditional promise or order to pay\u201d by the issuer).", "type": "majority", "author": "HUNTER, JR., Robert N., Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Ellis & Winters, LLP, by Jeffrey M. Young, for plaintiff appellant.", "John Robert Hooten; and White & Allen, P.A., by Matthew S. Sullivan, for defendant appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "CREDIGY RECEIVABLES, INC. v. BLANCHE WHITTINGTON, Defendant\nNo. COA09-465\n(Filed 2 March 2010)\n1. Attorney Fees\u2014 lack of standing \u2014 absence of justiciable issue \u2014 award proper\nThe trial court did not err in awarding defendant attorney fees under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 6-21.5 where plaintiff did not have the right to enforce its purchased judgment against defendant. Because plaintiff did not have standing to pursue enforcement of the judgment against defendant, and because the pleadings and judgment failed to connect defendant to the underlying debt, there was a complete absence of justiciable issues raised by plaintiff in its pleading.\n2. Attorney Fees\u2014 absence of justiciable issue \u2014 award proper\nPlaintiffs assertion that it was a bona fide purchaser for value of a default judgment, without notice of any defects, was irrelevant to the determination that there was a complete absence of justiciable issues raised by plaintiff in its pleading and, thus, that an award of attorney fees to defendant under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 6-21.5 was proper. Plaintiff purchased a default judgment that was non-justiciable as to defendant as a matter of law.\nAppeal by plaintiff from judgment entered 4 September 2008 by Judge Timothy I. Finan in Wayne County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 14 October 2009.\nEllis & Winters, LLP, by Jeffrey M. Young, for plaintiff appellant.\nJohn Robert Hooten; and White & Allen, P.A., by Matthew S. Sullivan, for defendant appellee." }, "file_name": "0646-01", "first_page_order": 674, "last_page_order": 688 }