{
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  "name": "LOUIS H. WATKINS, Employee, Plaintiff v. TROGDON MASONRY, INC., Employer, and STONEWOOD INSURANCE COMPANY, Carrier, Defendants",
  "name_abbreviation": "Watkins v. Trogdon Masonry, Inc.",
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    "judges": [
      "Judges STEPHENS and STROUD concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "LOUIS H. WATKINS, Employee, Plaintiff v. TROGDON MASONRY, INC., Employer, and STONEWOOD INSURANCE COMPANY, Carrier, Defendants"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "BEASLEY, Judge.\nLouis H. Watkins (Plaintiff) appeals from an Opinion and Award of the North Carolina Industrial Commission concluding that Plaintiff did not suffer a compensable injury by accident arising out of his employment, and denying Plaintiffs claim for workers\u2019 compensation benefits. For the following reasons, we affirm.\nBackground\nThe factual and procedural history of this case is largely undisputed and may be summarized as follows: Plaintiff was born on 7 September 1932 and his employment history consisted primarily of truck driving. In 2007, Plaintiff was employed by Defendant Trogdon Masonry as a driver whose duties included transporting fuel and equipment to Defendant\u2019s job sites. On 8 May 2007, Edward Harold Trogdon (Mr. Trogdon), owner of Trogdon Masonry, Inc., called Plaintiff and told him to take Defendant\u2019s tractor trailer, loaded with scaffolding and a forklift, to \u201cRonnie\u2019s Country Store,\u201d to have the mechanics at Ronnie\u2019s repair a flat tire on Defendant\u2019s forklift. Plaintiff drove to Ronnie\u2019s in Defendant\u2019s truck, hauling the forklift. After examining the tire, an employee at Ronnie\u2019s told Plaintiff the forklift needed a new tire. However, Plaintiff did not have authorization to approve the additional expense of a new tire, and told the mechanic that he would need to get approval from Mr. Trogdon. Plaintiff tried several times to reach Mr. Trogdon on his cell phone but got no answer. While waiting to get in contact with Mr. Trogdon, Plaintiff sat down on a palette of feed bags. Eventually, a Ronnie\u2019s employee told Plaintiff that they \u201cneed[ed] to know\u201d whether or not Trogdon would approve the replacement tire. Plaintiff testified that he got up from the palette, stretched, straightened up and turned left, then walked maybe a half dozen steps, before falling on his left hip. Plaintiff later told Defendant\u2019s insurance adjuster that \u201cmy left leg just gave' away on me some how or another and I just hit, hit the floor.\u201d There were no witnesses to Plaintiff\u2019s fall.\nAfter his fall, Plaintiff was taken to Johnston Memorial Hospital in Smithfield, North Carolina, where he was diagnosed with an acetabular fracture resulting from the fall. Medical tests also revealed that Plaintiff suffered from chronic blocked coronary arteries. Plaintiff was transferred from the hospital in Smithfield to Wake Medical Center in Raleigh, North Carolina, for treatment of his hip fracture and newly-discovered heart disease. Plaintiff\u2019s treating cardiologist offered expert medical testimony that Plaintiff did not fall as a result of a heart attack as the condition of his coronary arteries was \u201cnot consistent\u201d with a recent heart attack. Plaintiff remained in the hospital for several weeks and did not work after his fall on 8 May 2007.\nOn 20 July 2007, Plaintiff filed an Industrial Commission Form 18 Claim for Workers\u2019 Compensation benefits. Defendant Trogdon Masonry, Inc. and their insurance carrier, Defendant Stonewood Insurance Company, filed an Industrial Commission Form 61 denying Plaintiff\u2019s claim. On 30 July 2007, Plaintiff filed an Industrial Commission Form 33, requesting a hearing. In their Industrial Commission Form 33-R response to Plaintiff\u2019s request for a hearing, Defendants asserted that \u201cplaintiff\u2019s injuries are the sole result of an idiopathic condition and are not related to his employment.\u201d\nOn 8 May 2008, a hearing was conducted before Deputy Commissioner Adrian Phillips. Plaintiff testified on his own behalf, and Defendants offered testimony from Mr. Trogdon and Defendant Trogdon Masonry\u2019s office manager, Debra Davison. The parties also deposed four of Plaintiff\u2019s treating physicians, as well as Marta Fitzpatrick, an insurance adjuster who conducted a tape-recorded telephone interview with Plaintiff. On 25 August 2008, Commissioner Phillips issued an Opinion and Award. The Commissioner found that Plaintiff had suffered a compensable injury by accident and awarded Plaintiff disability and medical workers\u2019 compensation benefits. Defendants appealed to the Full Commission, which issued an Opinion on 23 March 2009, reversing Deputy Commissioner Phillips. The Commission, in denying workers\u2019 compensation benefits to Plaintiff, concluded that Plaintiff\u2019s fall \u201cwas due to an idiopathic condition or physical infirmity which caused his leg to give way\u201d and that Plaintiff\u2019s injuries \u201cdid not result from an accident arising out of his employment with defendant.\u201d Plaintiff appeals from the Commission\u2019s Opinion denying his claim for workers\u2019 compensation benefits.\nStandard of Review\n\u201c \u2018Our review of a decision of the Industrial Commission is limited to determining whether there is any competent evidence to support the findings of fact, and whether the findings of fact justify the conclusions of law.\u2019 \u201d Egen v. Excalibur Resort Prof'l, 191 N.C. App. 724, 728, 663 S.E.2d 914, 918 (2008) (quoting Ramsey v. Southern Indus. Constructors Inc., 178 N.C. App. 25, 29-30, 630 S.E.2d 681, 685 (2006)). On appeal, the Commission\u2019s findings of fact can be set aside \u201cwhen there is a complete lack of competent evidence to support them.\u201d Estate of Gainey v. Southern Flooring & Acoustical Co., 184 N.C. App. 497, 501, 646 S.E.2d 604, 607 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, \u201c[t]he Commission is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony.\u201d Gore v. Myrtle/Mueller, 362 N.C. 27, 40-41, 653 S.E.2d 400, 409 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). \u201cThe Commission\u2019s legal conclusions are reviewable by the appellate courts de novo.\u201d Estate of Gainey, 184 N.C. App. at 503, 646 S.E.2d at 608.\nDefendants assert, and the Commission found, that Plaintiff\u2019s fall was not compensable because it was due solely to an \u201cidiopathic condition.\u201d Plaintiff argues that the competent evidence in the record does not support the Full Commission\u2019s conclusion that Plaintiff\u2019s fall did not arise out of his employment, but was due to an idiopathic condition, and therefore not compensable. We disagree.\nPlaintiff\u2019s 3 July 2007 Statement\nBefore addressing the main issue as to whether the Commission erred by finding and concluding that Plaintiff\u2019s fall did not arise out of his employment, we will address the evidentiary issue raised by Plaintiff regarding his recorded statement of 3 July 2007, as the relevant contested factual findings are based at least in part upon evidence from this statement. Plaintiff argues that the Commission erred by its admission and consideration of his recorded statement to Marta Fitzpatrick on 3 July 2007 because it was \u201cnot the best evidence documenting\u201d this statement. In the statement, Ms. Fitzpatrick asked Plaintiff to describe how his injury occurred, and he answered, in part, as follows:\nI couldn\u2019t hear on the phone so I got up and made a little . . . left turn and when I did made a left turn I just ah I mean I knew what was going on the whole time my leg my left leg just gave away on me some how or another and I just hit, hit the floor. And they had to get me up.\nPlaintiff argues that his 3 July 2007 statement was inadmissible under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rules 1002, 1003 and 1004, because Defendant used a transcript of the recording and did not provide the original recording and under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 403, arguing that the probative value of the statement was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. We note that Plaintiff failed to assign as error finding of fact No. 9:\n9. On 3 July 2007, the adjuster obtained plaintiffs recorded statement. Therein, plaintiff stated that he fell after his leg gave away. He also confirmed that he was just walking and his leg gave out.\nHowever, Plaintiff did assign error to finding of fact No. 10, which provides that\n10. Although plaintiff denied that his leg gave way at the hearing before the deputy commissioner, plaintiff consistently advised his employer and stated in his recorded statement that his left leg gave way, causing him to fall. After considering the testimony of plaintiff, Harold Trogdon, and Debbie Davison and the competent evidence of record, the Full Commission finds that the greater weight of the competent and credible evidence shows that plaintiffs fall is not unexplained and that it resulted from plaintiffs leg giving way due to an unknown physical infirmity.\nAlthough Plaintiffs assignments of error are not entirely consistent, Plaintiff has argued based upon the assignment of error to finding No. 10 that the Commission erred by considering Plaintiffs statement, so we will address this issue despite his failure to assign as error finding No. 9.\nPlaintiff argues that the transcript of his statement should not have been admitted under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 1003 (2009), which provides that: \u201cA duplicate is admissible to the same extent as an original unless (1) a genuine question is raised as to the authenticity of the original or (2) in the circumstances it would be unfair to admit the duplicate in lieu of the original.\u201d\nAlthough Plaintiff argues that he objected to the admission of the statement during Ms. Fitzpatrick\u2019s deposition, the record reveals that Plaintiff did not object on the basis that the original recording was not made available to him, but made only a general objection. In addition, Ms. Fitzpatrick stated that she had the original recording of the statement with her at the deposition, but Plaintiff\u2019s counsel did not ask for it or admit it into evidence. See Setzer v. Boise Cascade Corp., 123 N.C. App. 441, 445, 473 S.E.2d 431, 433 (1996) (\u201c[A] party\u2019s failure to enter a timely and specific objection constitutes a waiver of his right to challenge the alleged error on appeal.\u201d); N.C.R. App. P. 10(b)(1).\nMs. Fitzpatrick fully authenticated the transcription of the statement and also testified to her own independent recollection of her conversation with Plaintiff, thus providing independent and unchallenged evidence of the same statements by Plaintiff that his leg \u201cgave way.\u201d Plaintiffs remaining arguments regarding the statement are directed to its weight and credibility, such as his argument that he was still on pain medication at the time of the statement. However, any questions of the weight to give to the evidence or the credibility of Plaintiffs statements on 3 July 2007 as opposed to his testimony at the hearing are solely for the Commission to determine. Gore, 362 N.C. at 40-41, 653 S.E.2d at 409. Plaintiff\u2019s arguments as to the admission or consideration of his 3 July 2007 statement are without merit.\nArising Out of Employment\nPlaintiff argues that the Commission erred by finding that Plaintiff\u2019s fall was \u201cdue solely to an idiopathic condition\u201d as this finding is \u201cunsupported and contradicted by the testimony and evidentiary record[.]\u201d Plaintiff\u2019s brief indicates that this argument is based upon all twelve of his assignments of error, which challenge Findings of Fact 6, 7, 8, 10, and 12, and conclusion of law No. 3. However, the single issue presented here is whether the Commission erred by finding that Plaintiff\u2019s fall was not the result of an accident arising out of his employment.\n\u201cTo establish \u2018compensability\u2019 under the North Carolina Workers\u2019 Compensation Act ... a \u2018claimant must prove three elements: (1) [t]hat the injury was caused by an accident; (2) that the injury arose out of the employment; and (3) that the injury was sustained in the course of employment.\u2019 \u201d Clark v. Wal-Mart, 360 N.C. 41, 43, 619 S.E.2d 491, 492 (2005) (quoting Gallimore v. Marilyn\u2019s Shoes, 292 N.C. 399, 402, 233 S.E.2d 529, 531 (1977)). In this case, the parties disagree about whether Plaintiff\u2019s injury was caused by an \u201caccident arising out of and in the course of the employment[.]\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-2(6) (2009).\nWhether an accident arises out of the employment is a mixed question of fact and law, and the finding of the Commission is conclusive if supported by any competent evidence; otherwise, not. The words \u201cout of,\u201d refer to the origin or cause of the accident and the words \u201cin the course of,\u201d to the time, place and circumstances under which it occurred. For an accident to arise out of the employment there must be some causal connection between the injury and the employment. When an injury cannot fairly be traced to the employment as a contributing proximate cause, or if it comes from a hazard to which the employee would have been equally exposed apart from the employment, or from the hazard common to others, it does not arise out of the employment. In such a situation the fact that the injury occurred on the employer\u2019s premises is immaterial. A fall itself is usually regarded as an accident.\nCole v. Guilford Co. & Hartford Acci. & Indem. Co., 259 N.C. 724, 726-27, 131 S.E.2d 308, 310-11 (1963) (citations omitted).\nHere, there is no dispute that Plaintiff had an accident, the fall, which was in the course of his employment, as he was at work at the time of his fall. However, Plaintiff must also demonstrate that his fall arose out of his employment \u2014 that there was \u201csome causal connection between the injury and the employment.\u201d Id.\nFactually, Plaintiff argues that his fall was not caused by his heart condition and that the Commission erred by finding that his fall was \u201cnot unexplained and [that it was] due solely to an idiopathic condition.\u201d Plaintiff\u2019s argument seems to imply that the Commission found that the idiopathic condition which caused Plaintiff\u2019s fall was actually his heart condition. Plaintiff\u2019s argument suffers from two flaws. First, he confuses the meaning of the term \u201cidiopathic,\u201d and second, the Commission did not find that his heart condition caused his fall.\nThe word \u201cidiopathic\u201d has two definitions: (1) \u201carising spontaneously or from an obscure or unknown cause[;]\u201d (2). \u201cpeculiar to the individual^]\u201d Merriam-Webster\u2019s Collegiate Dictionary 616 (11th ed. 2003); See Hodges v. Equity Grp., 164 N.C. App. 339, 343, 596 S.E.2d 31, 35 (2004) (\u201cAn idiopathic condition is one arising spontaneously from the mental or physical condition of the particular employee.\u201d (internal quotation marks omitted)). It is true that Plaintiff\u2019s heart condition is idiopathic in the sense of the second meaning stated; his heart condition is a condition that is peculiar to him. However, there is no dispute that Plaintiff\u2019s heart condition did not cause his fall. The Commission did not so find and Defendant does not argue that the heart condition caused the fall.\nIn support of his argument that the Commission tacitly found that his fall was caused by his heart condition, Plaintiff notes testimony from Ms. Fitzpatrick that while Plaintiff was still hospitalized shortly after his fall, she was informed by someone from Trogdon Masonry that his fall was due to his heart condition. There appears to be no dispute that while being treated after his fall, Plaintiff\u2019s heart condition was discovered, and he was actually treated for this condition. As noted above however, it was later determined that he did not suffer a heart attack and his fall was unrelated to his heart condition. However, Plaintiffs argument implies that the Commission erroneously found that his fall was actually caused by his heart condition. Plaintiff argues that\n[t]he testimony in this matter clearly alludes to the fact the Defendants assumed the Plaintiffs heart condition caused him to faint and thus fall to the ground, which is clearly unsupported by the stipulated medical evidence. Therefore, the Full Commission of the Industrial Commission giving controlling weight to the testimony of the Defendants that the Plaintiffs leg gave way because of his heart condition or from fainting is clearly in error as it is unsupported by the medical testimony. As such, the Full Commission of the Industrial Commission erred in concluding the Plaintiff\u2019s fall was not compensable as the medical evidence and lay testimony do not support the inference that the fall was not unexplained and due solely to an idiopathic condition, (emphasis added).\nHowever, the Commission did not find that Plaintiff\u2019s fall was caused by his heart condition; the Commission actually made the following findings of fact, which Plaintiff has not assigned as error:\n9. On 3 July 2007, the adjuster obtained plaintiff\u2019s recorded statement. Therein, plaintiff stated that he fell after his leg gave away. He also confirmed that he was just walking and his leg gave out.\n11. The evidence does not establish, due to his employment, that plaintiff was at an increased risk of harm from a fall. He was not in an elevated position or next to dangerous machinery which could create a greater risk of injury from a fall. Plaintiff did not step on a foreign object on the floor; the floor was not uneven, slippery, or wet; plaintiff did not hit anything and was not pushed; and he did not fall down steps or stairs. Nothing about plaintiff\u2019s employment subjected him to a peculiar hazard to which the public is not generally exposed. Dr. Alioto and Dr. Chiavetta testified that the fall could have happened anywhere.\nThe Commission\u2019s additional challenged findings of fact which are relevant to the issue of whether the accident arose out of Plaintiff\u2019s employment are:\n7. Plaintiff\u2019s employer, Harold Trogdon, spoke with plaintiff on the phone shortly after his fall. During the conversation, plaintiff stated that when he stood up from the feed bag his left leg \u2018gave way\u2019 and he fell. Mr. Trogdon subsequently visited plaintiff in the hospital, during which time plaintiff advised that he would not be filing a workers\u2019 compensation claim because his heart caused him to fall. Consequently, Mr. Trogdon did not immediately notify the workers\u2019 compensation insurance carrier of plaintiff\u2019s incident and plaintiff filed his medical bills with his private health insurance carrier.\n8. Debbie Davison is the Office Manager for defendant. While Ms. Davison typically files a Form 19 within days of an accident at work, she did not file a Form 19 in this case until on or about 28 June 2007 because, prior to that time, plaintiff maintained that he was not going to file a workers\u2019 compensation claim. Ms. Davison testified that her understanding of the incident was that plaintiff\u2019s leg gave way, that plaintiff was being treated for his heart, and that plaintiff\u2019s heart was the reason he was unable to work.\n10. Although plaintiff denied that his leg gave way at the hearing before the deputy commissioner, plaintiff consistently advised his employer and stated in his recorded statement that his left leg gave way, causing him to fall. After considering the testimony of plaintiff, Harold Trogdon, and Debbie Davison and the competent evidence of record, the Full Commission finds that the greater weight of the competent and credible evidence shows that plaintiff\u2019s fall is not unexplained and that it resulted from plaintiff\u2019s leg giving way due to an unknown physical infirmity. (emphasis added).\nThe findings as to Plaintiff\u2019s heart condition were included to explain the reasons Plaintiff did not immediately file a workers\u2019 compensation claim and the employer did not file a Form 19 immediately after Plaintiff\u2019s fall. The findings of fact taken in their entirety, including findings which are unchallenged, demonstrate that the Commission was using the term \u201cidiopathic\u201d in its first sense: Plaintiff\u2019s fall was spontaneous and \u201cdue to an unknown physical infirmity.\u201d Although Plaintiff argues that the Commission erred in its finding that his fall \u201cresulted from plaintiff\u2019s leg giving way due to an unknown physical infirmity,\u201d there is no evidence in the record which offers any explanation of a cause for the fall other than the fact that his leg \u201cgave way\u201d and he fell. There is no evidence as to the reason his leg \u201cgave way\u201d and thus the conclusion of law No. 3 refers to his fall as \u201cdue to an idiopathic condition.\u201d\nPlaintiff also argues that certain portions of the findings of fact 7, 8, and 10 were not supported by the evidence. However, Plaintiffs arguments focus on the credibility of the witnesses and the weight which the Commission should give to each witness\u2019s testimony; Plaintiff does not argue that the witnesses did not testify to the facts as stated in the challenged findings of fact. Upon review of the testimony of these witnesses, we find that they did clearly testify to the facts as found by the Commission. Actually, even Plaintiff\u2019s own testimony does not significantly contradict the testimony of Ms. Fitzpatrick, Mr. Trogdon, or Ms. Davison as to any of the relevant facts about his fall. As the \u201c[t]he Commission is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony[,]\u201d Gore, 362 N.C. at 40-41, 653 S.E.2d at 409, Plaintiff\u2019s assignments of error regarding the findings of fact are overruled.\nIdiopathic Condition\nPlaintiff assigned error to conclusion of law No. 3, which states:\n3. As plaintiff\u2019s fall on 8 May 2007 was due to an idiopathic condition or physical infirmity which caused his leg to give way and as his employment did not create a hazard which increased his risk of injury from a fall on that occasion, plaintiff\u2019s injuries on 8 May 2007 did not result from an accident arising out of his employment with defendant.... Therefore, based upon the foregoing Conclusions of Law, plaintiff is not entitled to indemnity benefits under or medical compensation under the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act for his injuries on 8 May 2007.\nPlaintiff claims that \u201cthe Full Commission\u2019s reliance upon defendants [sic] assertion that plaintiff\u2019s fall is due solely to an idiopathic condition is unsupported and contradicted by the testimony and evidentiary record, therefore making the Full Commission\u2019s conclusion based thereon untenable.\u201d Again, Plaintiff\u2019s argument focuses on the facts supporting this conclusion, which we have already found above to be supported by the record. Because the facts fully support the Commission\u2019s conclusion that \u201cplaintiff\u2019s fall on 8 May 2007 was due to an idiopathic condition or physical infirmity which caused his leg to give way . . . plaintiff\u2019s injuries . . . did not result from an accident arising out of his employment with defendant,\u201d Plaintiff\u2019s assignment of error as to this conclusion of law is without merit.\nConclusion\nAs competent evidence in the record supports the Commission\u2019s findings of fact, and those findings of fact support the Commission\u2019s conclusions of law, Egen, 191 N.C. App. at 728, 663 S.E.2d at 918, we affirm the Commission\u2019s denial of Plaintiff\u2019s claim for workers\u2019 compensation benefits.\nAffirmed.\nJudges STEPHENS and STROUD concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "BEASLEY, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Hardison & Cochran, P.L.L.C., by J. Adam Bridwell, for Plaintiff-Appellant.",
      "Brooks, Stevens & Pope, P.A., by Bambee B. Blake and Ginny P. Lanier, for Defendants-Appellees."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "LOUIS H. WATKINS, Employee, Plaintiff v. TROGDON MASONRY, INC., Employer, and STONEWOOD INSURANCE COMPANY, Carrier, Defendants\nNo. COA09-758\n(Filed 6 April 2010)\n1. Workers\u2019 Compensation\u2014 evidence \u2014 best evidence rule\nThe Industrial Commission did not err by allowing into evi- ' dence the transcript of plaintiffs recorded statement made to defendant\u2019s insurance adjuster instead of the original recording pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 1003. The insurance adjustor fully authenticated the transcription of the statement and also testified to her own, independent recollection of the statement.\n2. Workers\u2019 Compensation\u2014 compensability \u2014 accident not arising out of employment\nThe Industrial Commission did not err in finding and concluding that plaintiff employee\u2019s fall was noncompensable because the evidence supported the findings of fact and the findings supported the conclusion of law that plaintiff\u2019s injury was due solely to an \u201cidiopathic condition\u201d and did not arise out of his employment. Plaintiff\u2019s argument that the Commission erred in finding that plaintiff\u2019s fall was caused by his heart condition was misguided as the Commission did not make such a finding.\nAppeal by Plaintiff from Opinion and Award entered 23 March 2009 by the North Carolina Industrial Commission. Heard in the Court of Appeals 5 November 2009.\nHardison & Cochran, P.L.L.C., by J. Adam Bridwell, for Plaintiff-Appellant.\nBrooks, Stevens & Pope, P.A., by Bambee B. Blake and Ginny P. Lanier, for Defendants-Appellees."
  },
  "file_name": "0289-01",
  "first_page_order": 317,
  "last_page_order": 327
}
