{ "id": 4175593, "name": "DAVID E. COMBS, Plaintiff v. CITY ELECTRIC SUPPLY COMPANY, Formerly d/b/a COUNTY ELECTRIC SUPPLY CO., LTD., POINTSETTIA LTD., SEBEK LTD., TIANA LTD., THOLU LTD., KIELEY LTD., KIEBER LTD., ANDREW GREEN & EXPERTA TRUSTEES JERSEY LIMITED, and DARREN SMITH, Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "Combs v. City Electric Supply Co.", "decision_date": "2010-03-16", "docket_number": "No. COA09-108", "first_page": "75", "last_page": "88", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "203 N.C. App. 75" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "658 S.E.2d 485", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12640638, 12640639 ], "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/658/0485-01", "/se2d/658/0485-02" ] }, { "cite": "362 N.C. 177", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 12640561, 12640460 ], "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/657/0667-01", "/se2d/657/0373-02" ] }, { "cite": "652 S.E.2d 284", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12639684 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "289" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/652/0284-01" ] }, { "cite": "672 S.E.2d 548", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12642756 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "555" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/672/0548-01" ] }, { "cite": "666 S.E.2d 120", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12641824, 12641823 ], "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/666/0120-02", "/se2d/666/0120-01" ] }, { "cite": "362 N.C. 472", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 12641824, 12641826, 12641827, 12641790 ], "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/666/0120-02", "/se2d/666/0122-01", "/se2d/666/0122-02", "/se2d/665/0743-02" ] }, { "cite": "660 S.E.2d 118", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12640837 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "120" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/660/0118-01" ] }, { "cite": "604 S.E.2d 313", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12631973 ], "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/604/0313-01" ] }, { "cite": "529 S.E.2d 236", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "243" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "137 N.C. 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Stat.", "weight": 5, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "524 S.E.2d 821", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "826-27", "parenthetical": "reversing summary judgment and holding the plaintiff's evidence was sufficient to defeat a non-outsider's qualified privilege on the basis that her managers: (1" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "136 N.C. App. 455", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. 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Ed. 2d", "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "535 U.S. 1114", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 354625, 353731, 354760, 353448, 352172, 354576, 355188, 353749, 351828, 354680, 354745, 352827, 353947, 354297 ], "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/535/1114-11", "/us/535/1114-05", "/us/535/1114-06", "/us/535/1114-02", "/us/535/1114-09", "/us/535/1114-03", "/us/535/1114-10", "/us/535/1114-08", "/us/535/1114-07", "/us/535/1114-13", "/us/535/1114-04", "/us/535/1114-14", "/us/535/1114-12", "/us/535/1114-01" ] }, { "cite": "553 S.E.2d 885", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "897", "parenthetical": "quotation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "354 N.C. 268", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 138504 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "284", "parenthetical": "quotation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/354/0268-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. 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App. 620", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527872 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "622", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/107/0620-01" ] }, { "cite": "190 N.C. App. 405", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4157577 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "408" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/190/0405-01" ] }, { "cite": "400 S.E.2d 91", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "92", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "101 N.C. App. 462", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. 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App. 715", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8901076 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "718" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/164/0715-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1239, "char_count": 31357, "ocr_confidence": 0.757, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.4489106218158014e-08, "percentile": 0.34261997514140785 }, "sha256": "2805c57570ca3a04fab25a7661f7bd1a379e57cf6e95b84c8ec8aae47c46ebf2", "simhash": "1:0f02522a76e10c01", "word_count": 4940 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:32:21.116750+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges HUNTER, Robert C. and GEER concur." ], "parties": [ "DAVID E. COMBS, Plaintiff v. CITY ELECTRIC SUPPLY COMPANY, Formerly d/b/a COUNTY ELECTRIC SUPPLY CO., LTD., POINTSETTIA LTD., SEBEK LTD., TIANA LTD., THOLU LTD., KIELEY LTD., KIEBER LTD., ANDREW GREEN & EXPERTA TRUSTEES JERSEY LIMITED, and DARREN SMITH, Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "STEELMAN, Judge.\nViewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, more than a \u201cscintilla of evidence\u201d was presented tending to show City Electric had obtained money by false pretenses from its customers. Plaintiff\u2019s claim for wrongful discharge based upon the reporting of such conduct fell within the public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine. Plaintiff\u2019s evidence pertaining to his tortious interference with a contract claim tends to show that his employment was terminated by his supervisor based upon a wrongful purpose. The trial court improperly granted defendant\u2019s motion for directed verdict as to defendant Smith. Because plaintiff failed to make any argument on appeal as to whether sufficient evidence was presented at trial to establish that City Electric ratified Smith\u2019s alleged tortious conduct, this issue is deemed abandoned. Where there is a general employee/employer relationship and no evidence of any conduct between plaintiff and City Electric, which would \u201caffect commerce,\u201d the Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act is not applicable.\nI. Factual and Procedural Background\nFrom August 2001 until 21 July 2003, David E. Combs (plaintiff) was employed as an accounts receivable manager at City Electric Supply Company (City Electric) in Greensboro, North Carolina. Plaintiff was hired as an at-will employee. Plaintiff oversaw the company\u2019s Raleigh Division financial operations and his job duties included allocating the monies received by City Electric to its various customer accounts. Plaintiff also was responsible for preparing a monthly bank reconciliation report with his supervisor. In October 2002, plaintiff was also assigned to submit a monthly payment of North Carolina Sales Tax to the Department of Revenue.\nIn January 2003, plaintiff\u2019s immediate supervisor advised him not to mail month-end statements to customers who had a negative account balance. Plaintiff disagreed with this policy and scheduled a meeting with Darren Smith (Smith), the head supervisor of City Electric\u2019s Greensboro office, to discuss this practice. Plaintiff met with Smith on 3 February 2003 and asserted that City Electric was stealing money from its customers. After this meeting, plaintiff believed that he started to be treated differently as an employee and that Smith was \u201ctrying to get rid of [him].\u201d\nOn 28 May 2003, plaintiff received a written job performance review by Smith and received an unsatisfactory rating based upon the following:\n\u2014Lack of attention to detail \u2014 allocation errors left month after month until the credit manager resolves them.\n\u2014Not able to reconcile bank reconciliation with out [sic] the Credit Manager\u2019s help. Bank Rec. has only once been reconciled in the time frame allotted. Little or no over-time has been spent to meet this deadline. (Time frame allotted is 3-4 days from receipt of Bank Statement).\n\u2014A new rate of pay was offered for over-seeing the payroll department and no acceptance was given to the work when it was presented.\n\u2014Unallocated cash is left in large quantities at the end of every month \u2014 unallocated cash is the sole responsibility of the AR Manager.\n\u2014Incorrect cash sheets have been faxed to every Branch and Group manager, resulting in branch complaints and a general undermining of the accounts departments ability. This error has happened on more than one occasion.\n\u2014Discussing your salary with another member of staff excluding the payroll department and myself. Salary is highly confidential and should never be discussed with anybody except the payroll department or myself.\nAs a result of the unsatisfactory job performance rating, plaintiff\u2019s salary was reduced $2,000.00 and he was informed that \u201c[a] drastic improvement must be shown in executing [his] position and duties within a three-month period, or further disciplinarily [sic] action [would] be taken at that time.\u201d\nOn 21 July 2003, plaintiff\u2019s employment with City Electric was terminated. During plaintiff\u2019s exit interview, Smith informed plaintiff that his termination was based upon his inability to prepare a monthly bank reconciliation report in a timely manner and his failure to submit the sales tax report correctly to the Department of Revenue. On 30 May 2006, plaintiff filed a complaint against defendants alleging wrongful discharge, tortious interference with his contractual rights, and unfair and deceptive trade practices. Plaintiff alleged that his employment was terminated in retaliation for reporting that \u201cDefendant [was] stealing from its customers\u2019 accounts\u201d to City Electric\u2019s management. Plaintiff prayed for actual, punitive, and treble damages. Defendants filed an answer that denied the material allegations of plaintiff\u2019s complaint and asserted thirteen separate defenses. Defendants\u2019 answer also contained a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Rules of Civil Procedure. On 21 March 2008, defendants\u2019 moved for summary judgment. This motion was denied, and the trial commenced on 21 April 2008. At the conclusion of plaintiffs evidence, defendants moved for a directed verdict on all of plaintiffs claims. The trial court granted this motion and entered judgment in favor of defendants. Plaintiff appeals.\nII. Standard of Review\nWe review a trial court\u2019s order granting a motion for directed verdict de novo. Howlett v. CSB, LLC, 164 N.C. App. 715, 718, 596 S.E.2d 899, 902, disc. review denied, 359 N.C. 68, 604 S.E.2d 313 (2004). A motion for directed verdict \u201ctests the legal sufficiency of the evidence to take the case to the jury and support a verdict for the plaintiff.\u201d Manganello v. Permastone, Inc., 291 N.C. 666, 670, 231 S.E.2d 678, 680 (1977) (citation omitted). \u201cThe party moving for ... a directed verdict, bears a heavy burden under North Carolina law.\u201d Taylor v. Walker, 320 N.C. 729, 733, 360 S.E.2d 796, 799 (1987). A directed verdict is not properly allowed \u201cunless it app\u00e9ars, as a matter of law, that a recovery cannot be had by the plaintiff upon any view of the facts which the evidence reasonably tends to establish.\u201d Manganello, 291 N.C. at 670, 231 S.E.2d at 680 (quotation and citation omitted). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, and give the nonmovant the benefit of every reasonable inference arising from the evidence. Crist v. Crist, 145 N.C. App. 418, 422, 550 S.E.2d 260, 264 (2001). \u201cIf there is more than a scintilla of evidence supporting each element of the nonmovant\u2019s case, the motion for directed verdict should be denied.\u201d Snead v. Holloman, 101 N.C. App. 462, 464, 400 S.E.2d 91, 92 (1991) (citation omitted). We do not weigh the evidence or assess credibility, but take the plaintiff\u2019s evidence as true, resolving any doubt in their favor. Jones v. Robbins, 190 N.C. App. 405, 408, 660 S.E.2d 118, 120, disc. review denied, 362 N.C. 472, 666 S.E.2d 120 (2008).\nIII. Wrongful Discharge \u2014 Public Policy Exception\nIn his first argument, plaintiff contends the trial court erred by granting defendants\u2019 motion for a directed verdict as to his claim for wrongful discharge. We agree.\nIt is undisputed that City Electric hired plaintiff as an employee-at-will. \u201cAs a general rule, an employee-at-will has no claim for relief for wrongful discharge. Either party to an employment-at-will contract can terminate the contract at will for no reason at all, or for an arbitrary or irrational reason.\u201d Tompkins v. Allen, 107 N.C. App. 620, 622, 421 S.E.2d 176, 178 (1992) (citations omitted), disc. review denied, 333 N.C. 348, 426 S.E.2d 713 (1993). However, our Supreme Court created a public policy exception to this rule in Coman v. Thomas Manufacturing Co., 325 N.C. 172, 381 S.E.2d 445 (1989):\n[W]hile there may be a right to terminate a contract at will for no reason, or for an arbitrary or irrational reason, there can be no right to terminate such a contract for an unlawful reason or purpose that contravenes public policy. A different interpretation would encourage and sanction lawlessness, which law by its very nature is designed to discourage and prevent.\nId. at 175, 381 S.E.2d at 447 (quoting Sides v. Duke University, 74 N.C. App. 331, 342, 328 S.E.2d 818, 826 (1985)). While there is no specific list that enumerates what actions fall within this exception, \u201cwrongful discharge claims have been recognized in North Carolina where the employee was discharged (1) for refusing to violate the law at the employer\u2019s request, (2) for engaging in a legally protected activity, or (3) based on some activity by the employer contrary to law or public policy.\u201d Ridenhour v. IBM Corp., 132 N.C. App. 563, 568-69, 512 S.E.2d 774, 778 (internal citations omitted), disc. review denied, 350 N.C. 595, 537 S.E.2d 481 (1999). These narrow exceptions to the at-will employment doctrine \u201chave been grounded in considerations of public policy designed either to prohibit status-based discrimination or to insure the integrity of the judicial process or the enforcement of the law.\" Kurtzman v. Applied Analytical Industries, Inc., 347 N.C. 329, 333-34, 493 S.E.2d 420, 423 (1997) (emphasis added).\nPlaintiff argues that he was discharged in retaliation for reporting to its management that City Electric had engaged in illegal and fraudulent activity by \u201cstealing from its customers\u2019 accounts\u201d and cited N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 14-72 (larceny) and 14-100 (obtaining property by false pretenses) as criminal statutes that City Electric violated. We must therefore determine whether plaintiff presented a \u201cscintilla of evidence\u201d supporting his claim that City Electric\u2019s conduct violated N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 14-72 or 14-100 to surmount defendant\u2019s motion for directed verdict as to his wrongful discharge claim under the public policy exception.\nBecause this Court is reviewing a ruling on a motion for a directed verdict, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff and take all of his evidence to be true. In support of plaintiff\u2019s claim that City Electric was violating N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 14-72 and 14-100, he offered a compilation of various City Electric documents into the evidence as plaintiff\u2019s exhibit 15. Plaintiff\u2019s exhibit 15 contains 212 pages of documents. Plaintiff\u2019s testimony largely focused upon three customer accounts from the time period of January through March 2003 as evidence that City Electric was \u201cstealing\u201d from its customers.\nThe first account belonged to Entertainment and Sports Arena located in Raleigh. In a monthly statement dated 25 January 2003, it showed that Entertainment and Sports Arena had a negative account balance of $-2,585.18 as of 15 April 2002. Since that time, Entertainment and Sports Arena was invoiced in amounts of $94.70, $34.78, $385.20, and $587.43. However, City Electric\u2019s \u201cCustomer Profile\u201d shows payments had been submitted for those invoices on 30 January 2003, 17 February 2003, and 20 February 2003, leaving the negative account balance undisturbed. There is an entry in the profile on 14 February 2003 labeled \u201cDSC TKN\u201d in the amount of $2,585.19. Plaintiff testified that on that date, City Electric made a $0.01 adjustment to the negative balance, and removed it from Entertainment and Sports Arena\u2019s account. In next month\u2019s statement, dated 25 February 2003, the $-2,585.18 negative balance was not reflected or applied to the balance due of $318.86.\nPlaintiff also introduced into the evidence Defendants\u2019 Responses To Plaintiff\u2019s Second Request For Admissions. This document shows plaintiff submitted the following request to defendants: \u201c14. Admit that City Electric Supply Co. previously known as County. Electric Supply never reimbursed Entertainment Sports Arena for the amount of $2,585.19.\u201d Defendants responded: \u201cAdmitted that Entertainment Sports Arena never requested and City Electric Supply Company, Inc. never paid the sum of $2,585.19 to Entertainment Sports Arena.\u201d\nThe second account belonged to Tumage Corporation located in Morehead City. In the statement dated 25 January 2003, it showed that Turnage Corporation had a negative account balance of $-1,360.45 as of 2 August 2002. Turnage Corporation was invoiced twenty-three times after 2 August; however, its customer profile shows payments were made for each invoice prior to 25 February 2003. On 14 February 2003, City Electric made a $0.01 adjustment to the negative account balance, and removed it from Turnage Corporation\u2019s account.\nSubsequent statements on 25 February and 25 March 2003 did not show a $-1,360.45 balance and did not apply it to the amounts due those months. Further, in response to plaintiff\u2019s request for admissions, defendants admitted: \u201cthat Tumage Corporation never requested and City Electric Supply Company, Inc. never paid the sum of $1,360.46 to Turnage Corporation.\u201d\nThe third account plaintiff focused upon was Wilbur\u2019s BBQ & Restaurant, Inc. located in Goldsboro. Wilbur\u2019s 25 January statement showed it had obtained a negative account balance in the amount of $-218.95. Plaintiff testified that he had found no statements for this customer for the month of February 2003 and City Electric\u2019s customer profile shows no invoice or payment activity from 7 January until 26 February 2003. The customer profile showed that on 14 February 2003 City Electric made an entry labeled \u201cDSC TEN,\u201d adjusted the negative balance by $0.01, and removed it from Wilbur\u2019s account. A subsequent statement dated 25 March 2003 did not show a balance of $-218.95. As was the case with Entertainment and Sports Arena and Tumage Corporation, defendant admitted that \u201cWilbur\u2019s BBQ & Restaurant never requested and City Electric Supply Company, Inc. never paid the sum of $218.96 to Wilbur\u2019s BBQ & Restaurant.\u201d\nThere are also two documents in the record, i.e. the cash discount allocation log and cash receipt register, that show the monies paid by each of these customers that resulted in the negative balances were transferred from the customer\u2019s account to a City Electric account referenced as a \u201c4020 account.\u201d Defendants do not dispute that this transfer occurred. At trial and on appeal, defendants also very candidly admit that they did not send statements to customers with negative balances. Defendants argue that the complained of conduct did not constitute obtaining property by false pretenses or larceny under the General Statutes. We disagree.\nThe elements of the crime of obtaining property by false pretenses are: \u201c(1) a false representation of a subsisting fact or a future fulfillment or event, (2) which is calculated and intended to deceive, (3) which does in fact deceive, and (4) by which one person obtains or attempts to obtain value from another.\u201d State v. Parker, 354 N.C. 268, 284, 553 S.E.2d 885, 897 (2001) (quotation omitted), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1114, 153 L. Ed. 2d 162 (2002); see also N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-100 (2007). The false pretense need not come through spoken words, but instead may be by act or conduct. Id. However, \u201c[t]here must be a causal relationship between the representation alleged to have been made and the obtaining of the money or property.\u201d State v. Davis, 48 N.C. App. 526, 531, 269 S.E.2d 291, 294-95 (1980).\nThe preceding evidence establishes that City Electric deliberately withheld these customers\u2019 negative account balance statements in January 2003. Defendant testified that he was told that the reason for this practice was \u201cthat it wasn\u2019t in the interest of the company,\u201d and that \u201c[e]thics doesn\u2019t [sic] apply in our business transactions.\u201d City Electric then sent out statements in February and March, which indicated that each one of these customers owed a balance on their account. At that time, the money previously paid that resulted in the negative balance had been transferred from their customer account into City Electric\u2019s \u201c4020 account,\u201d and the negative balance was not shown on their subsequent February and March statements. As a result of this false misrepresentation, both Turnage Corporation and Wilbur\u2019s BBQ & Restaurant paid each invoice that was submitted to them in these statements for a total of $4,170.83 and $358.56, respectively.\nDefendants\u2019 contention that there was never a representation that the negative account balance was not available to be applied to outstanding invoices at the customer\u2019s request is disingenuous based upon City Electric\u2019s active concealment of the negative balance. We hold that taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and taking his evidence as true, the evidence presented at trial tended to show that City Electric violated N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-100 by purposely withholding negative balance statements, transferring these monies to a separate account, and sending out subsequent statements that did not show the negative balance, which induced the customers to pay the amounts for each of the invoices listed therein. Because plaintiff\u2019s wrongful discharge claim is based upon being terminated in retaliation for reporting this conduct, his claim falls within the very narrow public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine. The trial court erred by granting defendants\u2019 motion for directed verdict as to this claim. Plaintiff\u2019s claim for wrongful discharge is remanded to the trial court for a new trial.\nIV. Tortious Interference with a Contract\nIn his second argument, plaintiff contends that the trial court erred by granting defendants\u2019 motion for directed verdict as to his claim of tortious interference with a contract as to defendant Smith. We agree.\nTo establish a claim of tortious interference with a contract, a plaintiff must show:\n(1) a valid contract between the plaintiff and a third person which confers upon the plaintiff a contractual right against a third person; (2) defendant knows of the contract; (3) the defendant intentionally induces the third person not to perform the contract; (4) and in doing so acts without justification; (5) resulting in actual damage to the plaintiff.\nEmbree Construction Group v. Rafcor, Inc., 330 N.C. 487, 498, 411 S.E.2d 916, 924 (1992) (quotation omitted). This cause of action has been found to be applicable to an employment contract that was terminable at will. See, e.g., Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 289 N.C. 71, 85, 221 S.E.2d 282, 291 (1976); Childress v. Abeles, 240 N.C. 667, 678, 84 S.E.2d 176, 184 (1964); Lenzer v. Flaherty, 106 N.C. App. 496, 512, 418 S.E.2d 276, 286, disc. review, denied, 332 N.C. 345, 421 S.E.2d 348 (1992).\nThe only element defendants challenged at trial and on appeal is whether Smith was justified in terminating plaintiffs employment. For claims of tortious interference with a contract, North Carolina makes a distinction between defendants who are \u201coutsiders\u201d and \u201cnon-outsiders\u201d to the contract. An outsider is\none who was not a party to the terminated contract and who had no legitimate business interest of his own in the subject matter thereof. Conversely, one who is a non-outsider is one who, though not a party to the terminated contract, had a legitimate business interest of his own in the subject matter.\nSmith, 289 N.C. at 87, 221 S.E.2d 292. \u201c \u2018[N]on-outsiders\u2019 often enjoy qualified immunity from liability for inducing their corporation or other entity to breach its contract with an employee.... The qualified privilege of a non-outsider is lost if exercised for motives other than reasonable, good faith attempts to protect the non-outsider\u2019s interests in the contract interfered with.\u201d Lenzer, 106 N.C. App. at 513, 418 S.E.2d at 286 (citations omitted).\nSmith, as the head supervisor of City Electric\u2019s Greensboro office, had a legitimate business interest in the subject matter of the contract and is considered a \u201cnon-outsider.\u201d See id. Defendants argue that plaintiff is precluded from bringing this cause of action against Smith as a matter of law based upon this qualified privilege and contend that \u201cthe evidence shows that [plaintiff] was terminated for poor performance; not because he allegedly reported \u2018stealing\u2019 to City Electric.\u201d\nIn the light most favorable to plaintiff, the evidence at trial tended to show that on 27 January 2003 plaintiff\u2019s immediate supervisor, Tom Cherchuck, told plaintiff not to send out negative account balance statements. Plaintiff stated that he knew of several accounts that had a \u201clarge negative balance\u201d and that these customers were entitled to be informed of this balance. On 3 February 2003, plaintiff met with Smith and requested that City Electric credit these customers\u2019 accounts or refund this money. Smith responded \u201cthat it wasn\u2019t in the interest of the company and if the customer didn\u2019t have a good enough accounting office to catch problems, its their fault,\u201d and that \u201c[e]thics doesn\u2019t [sic] apply in our business transactions.\u201d Plaintiff then asserted that City Electric was stealing money from its customers. Smith \u201cbecame short with [plaintiff] and got busy with his work . . . and ignored [plaintiff], right in the middle of [the] meeting.\u201d Plaintiff stated that Smith did not want to discuss these matters further. Plaintiff testified that the work environment at City Electric immediately changed within days after this meeting. Someone started going through plaintiff\u2019s desk on a routine basis. Plaintiff was informed by other employees that he was being watched by Smith and that he was on his \u201chit list.\u201d Plaintiff testified that he believed Smith was \u201ctrying to get rid of [him]\u201d in retaliation for challenging City Electric\u2019s practice of not sending out negative account balance statements and asserting that City Electric was stealing from its customers.\nPlaintiff also testified that the written job performance review \u201cwas a complete lie\u201d and that none of the unsatisfactory points contained therein had any factual basis. Plaintiff testified that he had never received any complaints about his work performance until after the 3 February 2003 meeting with Smith.\nPlaintiff\u2019s testimony was buttressed by two witnesses: Yolanda Pritchett (Pritchett) and Joyce Robin Shown (Shown), employees of City Electric at the time plaintiff was employed. Pritchett testified that plaintiff was \u201ca very professional employee, very timely, trustworthy, and well-liked.\u201d Pritchett noticed that in approximately February 2003, other employees stopped inviting plaintiff to eat lunch with them and that Smith \u201cbegan to watch him from down the hall.\u201d Pritchett also testified that she had observed Smith looking through plaintiff\u2019s desk and his paperwork. Pritchett was told by another employee that plaintiff was on the managers\u2019 \u201chit list.\u201d Shown\u2019s testimony mirrored Pritchett\u2019s testimony in that she stated plaintiff was professional and hard-working, and that she had also been told that plaintiff was on the managers\u2019 \u201chit list.\u201d Neither Pritchett nor Shown articulated the reason plaintiff was on this alleged \u201chit list.\u201d\nPlaintiff has forecasted \u201cmore than a scintilla of evidence\u201d in support of his allegation that he was terminated for a wrongful purpose, which would defeat a non-outsider\u2019s qualified privilege to interfere with his contract. See Barker v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 136 N.C. App. 455, 463, 524 S.E.2d 821, 826-27 (2000) (reversing summary judgment and holding the plaintiff\u2019s evidence was sufficient to defeat a non-outsider\u2019s qualified privilege on the basis that her managers: (1) \u201cout of personal hostility and ill-will toward the [pjlaintiff, schemed to come up with false and defamatory accusations against the [p]laintiff with the intent to bring about the termination of her employment^]\u201d (2) one defendant had a \u201chit list\u201d with names of employees he intended to \u201cget rid of\u2019 and the plaintiff\u2019s name was on the list; and (3) when the plaintiff confronted the defendant he admitted his desire to terminate her employment). Because the other elements of tortious interference with a contract were not challenged, we do not address them. The trial court erred by granting defendants\u2019 motion for directed verdict as to this cause of action. We reverse the trial court\u2019s order and remand for a new trial on plaintiff\u2019s tortious interference with a contract claim against Smith.\nPlaintiff alleged in his complaint and argued before the trial court that City Electric was liable for Smith\u2019s tortious conduct based upon the doctrine of ratification. However, plaintiff failed to raise this issue in his appellate brief, cite any authority supporting this theory, or point to any evidence in the record that would establish that City Electric had ratified Smith\u2019s conduct. Because plaintiff failed to make this argument on appeal, it is deemed abandoned. N.C.R. App. P. 28(b)(6).\nV. Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices\nIn his third argument, plaintiff contends that the trial court erred by granting defendants\u2019 motion for directed verdict as to his claim of unfair and deceptive trade practices pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 75-1.1. We disagree.\nIn order to establish a prima facie claim under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 75-1.1, a plaintiff must be able to show: \u201c(1) defendant committed an unfair or deceptive act or practice, (2) the action in question was in or affecting commerce, and (3) the act proximately caused injury to the plaintiff.\u201d Dalton v. Camp, 353 N.C. 647, 656, 548 S.E.2d 704, 711 (2001) (citation omitted). North Carolina appellate courts have consistently held that the Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act does not apply to general employer/employee relationships. See id. at 656, 548 S.E.2d at 710; Schlieper v. Johnson, 195 N.C. App. 257, 268, 672 S.E.2d 548, 555 (2009); Kinesis Adver., Inc. v. Hill, 187 N.C. App. 1, 21, 652 S.E.2d 284, 289 (2007), disc. review denied, 362 N.C. 177, 658 S.E.2d 485 (2008); Buie v. Daniel International Corp., 56 N.C. App. 445, 448, 289 S.E.2d 118, 119-20, disc. review denied, 305 N.C. 759, 292 S.E.2d 574 (1982).\nPlaintiff cites Sarah Lee Corp. v. Carter, 351 N.C. 27, 519 S.E.2d 308 (1999) and Walker v. Sloan, 137 N.C. App. 387, 529 S.E.2d 236 (2000) in support of the proposition that N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 75-1.1 is applicable to the facts of this case. In both Sarah Lee Corp. and Walker, the Court focused upon conduct that constituted activity \u201caffecting commerce\u201d that occurred between the employer and employee and held that N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 75-1.1 was applicable to those cases. Sarah Lee Corp., 351 N.C. at 33, 519 S.E.2d at 312; Walker, 137 N.C. App. at 396, 529 S.E.2d at 243. In the instant case, there was no evidence presented before the trial court of any conduct that would constitute activity \u201caffecting commerce\u201d between plaintiff and City Electric. Plaintiff only asserts that he was fired in retaliation for \u201cblowing the whistle\u201d on City Electric\u2019s practice of not sending out negative balance statements at the end of each month. Thus, the analyses and holdings in Sarah Lee Corp. and Walker are inapplicable. This case involves a simple employment dispute and does not fall within the purview of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 75-1.1. Schlieper, supra. This contention is without merit.\nVI. Conclusion\nBecause plaintiff presented more than a \u201cscintilla of evidence\u201d that City Electric had obtained money by false pretenses from its customers, his claim for wrongful discharge based upon the reporting of this conduct fell within the public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine. The trial court improperly granted defendants\u2019 motion for directed verdict as to this claim. This claim is remanded for a new trial.\nBecause plaintiff presented sufficient evidence that his employment was terminated by Smith based upon some wrongful purpose, the trial court erred by granting defendants\u2019 motion for directed verdict on plaintiff\u2019s tortious interference with a contract claim as to Smith. Plaintiff failed to argue on appeal that City Electric ratified Smith\u2019s alleged tortious conduct, and this issue is deemed abandoned. Plaintiff\u2019s claim against Smith, individually, is remanded for a new trial.\nThe Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act is not applicable to a simple employment dispute between an employer and employee. The trial court properly granted defendants\u2019 motion for directed verdict as to plaintiff\u2019s unfair and deceptive trade practices claim.\nAFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; and REMANDED.\nJudges HUNTER, Robert C. and GEER concur.\n. Plaintiff testified that a negative account balance could be attained by \u201ca payment [that] came in before the invoice has hit the system for someone\u2019s account. It could be double payments. It could be any number of things. Somebody could have returned merchandise and was due a credit on their account because the merchandise was returned.\u201d\n. Yolanda Pritchett, who was also an employee of City Electric from 26 December 2001 to 20 February 2004, was a named plaintiff in the original complaint. Pritchett alleged that she had also been discharged in retaliation for reporting illegal conduct occurring at City Electric. Pritchett voluntarily dismissed her claims against defendants with prejudice on 5 May 2008. Pritchett testified as a witness for plaintiff at trial.", "type": "majority", "author": "STEELMAN, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Kennedy, Kennedy, Kennedy and Kennedy, L.L.P, by Harvey L. Kennedy and Harold L. Kennedy, III, for plaintiff-appellant.", "James N. Jorgensen, P.A., by James N. Jorgensen, for defendant-appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "DAVID E. COMBS, Plaintiff v. CITY ELECTRIC SUPPLY COMPANY, Formerly d/b/a COUNTY ELECTRIC SUPPLY CO., LTD., POINTSETTIA LTD., SEBEK LTD., TIANA LTD., THOLU LTD., KIELEY LTD., KIEBER LTD., ANDREW GREEN & EXPERTA TRUSTEES JERSEY LIMITED, and DARREN SMITH, Defendants\nNo. COA09-108\n(Filed 16 March 2010)\n1. Employer and Employee\u2014 wrongful discharge \u2014 reporting misconduct to management \u2014 evidence sufficient\nThe trial court erred by granting defendants\u2019 motion for directed verdict on a claim for the wrongful discharge of an at-will employee where the claim was based upon a retaliatory termination after plaintiff reported to management that the company was withholding negative account balance statements from customers, transferring the monies to a separate account, and continuing to invoice customers in violation of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-100 (obtaining property by false pretenses).\n2. Employer and Employee\u2014 tortious interference with contract \u2014 termination\u2014wrongful purpose \u2014 evidence sufficient\nThe trial court erred by granting defendants\u2019 motion for directed verdict on a claim for tortious interference with a contract by defendant Smith where plaintiff reported misconduct within the company to Smith and was later terminated. Plaintiff forecasted more than a scintilla of evidence that he was terminated for a wrongful purpose.\n3. Appeal and Error\u2014 preservation of issues \u2014 argument not raised\nPlaintiff was deemed to have abandoned an argument on appeal that a corporation ratified the acts of a supervisor in a wrongful termination suit. Plaintiff did not raise the issue in his brief, cite authority, or point to evidence in the record.\n4. Unfair Trade Practices\u2014 employment dispute \u2014 not an unfair or deceptive trade practice\nThe trial court did not err by granting defendants\u2019 motion for a directed verdict on plaintiff\u2019s claim for unfair and deceptive trade practices after an alleged retaliatory firing. The case involved a simple employment dispute and did not fall within the purview of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 75-1.1.\nAppeal by plaintiff from judgment entered 20 June 2008 by Judge Franklin F. Lanier in Forsyth County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 19 August 2009.\nKennedy, Kennedy, Kennedy and Kennedy, L.L.P, by Harvey L. Kennedy and Harold L. Kennedy, III, for plaintiff-appellant.\nJames N. Jorgensen, P.A., by James N. Jorgensen, for defendant-appellees." }, "file_name": "0075-01", "first_page_order": 103, "last_page_order": 116 }