{ "id": 4176138, "name": "ALLEN GRAY, Employee, Plaintiff v. RDU AIRPORT AUTHORITY, Employer, TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY, Carrier, Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "Gray v. RDU Airport Authority", "decision_date": "2010-04-20", "docket_number": "No. COA09-1282", "first_page": "521", "last_page": "530", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "203 N.C. App. 521" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "633 S.E.2d 821", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12636495 ], "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/633/0821-01" ] }, { "cite": "616 S.E.2d 317", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633539 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "322" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/616/0317-01" ] }, { "cite": "124 S.E.2d 109", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1962, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "110", "parenthetical": "first alteration and emphasis added" }, { "page": "110", "parenthetical": "\"The North Carolina Workers'] Compensation Act does not provide compensation for injury, but only for injury by accident.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "256 N.C. 427", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573005 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1962, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "428", "parenthetical": "first alteration and emphasis added" }, { "page": "428" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/256/0427-01" ] }, { "cite": "407 S.E.2d 222", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 6, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "349" }, { "page": "233" }, { "page": "227" }, { "page": "349" }, { "page": "233" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "329 N.C. 330", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2553288 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/329/0330-01" ] }, { "cite": "157 S.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "3" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "271 N.C. 586", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565668 ], "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "588" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/271/0586-01" ] }, { "cite": "571 S.E.2d 586", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "356 N.C. 419", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1511171 ], "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/356/0419-01" ] }, { "cite": "563 S.E.2d 23", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "27" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "150 N.C. 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App.", "case_ids": [ 8524140 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "550" }, { "page": "550" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/77/0547-01" ] }, { "cite": "360 N.C. 535", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3794917, 3786735, 3786064, 3791731, 3792312 ], "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/360/0535-03", "/nc/360/0535-02", "/nc/360/0535-04", "/nc/360/0535-01", "/nc/360/0535-05" ] }, { "cite": "172 N.C. App. 176", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. 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Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-2", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(6)" }, { "page": "(6)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "566 S.E.2d 807", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "811" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "151 N.C. App. 641", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. 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RDU AIRPORT AUTHORITY, Employer, TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY, Carrier, Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "HUNTER, Robert C., Judge.\nPlaintiff Allen Gray appeals the opinion and award of the North Carolina Industrial Commission denying his claim for workers\u2019 compensation benefits. Plaintiff primarily argues that the Commission failed to make sufficient findings of fact to support its determination that his Achilles tendon injury was not a compensable injury by accident. We conclude that the Commission\u2019s findings, supported by competent evidence in the record, support its conclusion. We, therefore, affirm the Commission\u2019s decision.\nFacts\nAt the time of the hearing before the deputy commissioner, plaintiff was 52 years old. Plaintiff graduated from high school but had no other education or vocational training. After graduating from high school, plaintiff worked on his family\u2019s farm until he was 30. He then worked for Southbend, assembling commercial cook stoves. After working for Southbend for 17.5 years, plaintiff was employed by the Department of Agriculture for approximately one year, working as a security guard at the North Carolina State Fairgrounds.\nIn September 2006, plaintiff was hired by defendant-employer RDU Airport Authority to work as a traffic control officer. Plaintiff\u2019s responsibilities included monitoring and controlling vehicular traffic around the airport\u2019s terminals and stopping traffic to allow pedestrians to cross the roadway separating the airport\u2019s parking lots from the terminals. His work duties required him to be standing or walking during his entire shift, excluding breaks.\nPrior to plaintiff\u2019s injury on 20 November 2007, plaintiff sustained an injury to his left foot. Plaintiff suffered from a bone spur and tendinitis in his left Achilles tendon and was being treated by Dr. David Boone, a certified orthopedic surgeon with Raleigh Orthopaedic Clinic. After conservative medical treatment failed, Dr. Boone recommended surgery. In June 2007, plaintiff took a medical leave of absence, and on 13 June 2007, Dr. Boone performed a surgical excision of the bone spurring posterior to the calcaneus of the left foot and debridement of the Achilles tendon with re-attachment of the tendon.\nDuring routine follow-up visits on 28 August 2007, 25 September 2007, and 16 October 2007, plaintiff continued to complain of persistent pain. During the 16 October 2007 visit, Dr. Boone diagnosed plaintiff with persistent pain after surgery and explained to plaintiff that it could take up to a year to resolve. Plaintiff was written out of work until 10 September 2007, with plaintiff to return to full duty work on that date. Plaintiff returned to work sometime around 10 September 2007, with no work restrictions assigned by Dr. Boone, and plaintiff performed his usual work duties. Between 10 September 2007 and 20 November 2007, plaintiff\u2019s recovery was progressing normally.\nOn 20 November 2007, plaintiff was working outside Terminal C at RDU. Between Terminal C and the adjacent parking lot, there is a pedestrian crosswalk, which also serves as a speed bump, roughly six feet wide and six inches taller than the surrounding pavement. From the top, the crosswalk slopes downward to the pavement of the roadway. Plaintiff was standing in the crosswalk, stopping vehicular traffic to allow pedestrians to use the crosswalk, when he stepped backward onto the section of the crosswalk that slopes down to the roadway. Plaintiff felt a \u201cpopping sensation\u201d in his left leg, near his ankle.\nPlaintiff reported the incident to his supervisor and then drove himself to Western WakeMed Emergency. Plaintiff reported that he had undergone left heel spur surgery in June 2007 and had felt a \u201cpop\u201d with immediate onset of acute left heel pain after stepping backward on a curb. Based on x-rays, plaintiff was diagnosed with a ruptured Achilles tendon due to trauma. Plaintiff was restricted from work for three days and told to follow-up with his treating orthopedist.\nDr. Boone saw plaintiff on 27 November 2007 and noted that plaintiff had stepped back off a curb and felt a \u201cpop.\u201d Dr. Boone found a gap in the Achilles tendon near where it attaches to the calcaneus, consistent with an Achilles tendon rupture. X-rays showed that the suture anchors were in place and that there was no fracture. Dr. Boone recommended surgery to repair the Achilles tendon and told plaintiff that he would be non-weight bearing for at least six weeks. He also recommended a slower rehabilitation period. On 13 December 2007, Dr. Boone performed the surgery at Rex Healthcare to repair plaintiff\u2019s Achilles tendon. Dr. Boone also removed the hardware in the left calcaneus.\nAfter filing a claim for benefits, plaintiff requested on 31 December 2007 that the case be heard by a deputy commissioner. Dr. Boone saw plaintiff for his first post-operative visit on 18 December 2007. Plaintiff reported no complaints. Dr. Boone continued to write plaintiff out of work until 5 February 2008, at which time he released him to return to work with the restriction of seated work only. In a note dated 1 April 2008, Dr. Boone wrote plaintiff out of work until 4 April 2008, at which time plaintiff could return to work in a position that allowed flexible sitting and standing while wearing an orthopedic boot. A 29 April 2008 note released plaintiff to return to work with the restrictions of no running or jumping, but allowed plaintiff to stand and walk.\nAfter conducting an evidentiary hearing on 6 May 2008, the deputy commissioner entered an opinion and award on 12 February 2009 denying plaintiffs claim. Plaintiff appealed to the Full Commission on 23 March 2009. On 16 July 2009, the Full Commission entered its opinion and award affirming the deputy commissioner\u2019s decision with minor modifications. In denying plaintiff\u2019s claim, the Commission found that \u201c[tjhere was no unusual or unforeseen circumstance that interrupted [plaintiff\u2019s] work routine\u201d and that although the incident on 20 November 2007 \u201cwas the cause of the Plaintiff\u2019s tendon injury, the incident. . . was not an accident within the meaning of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act.\u201d Based on this ultimate finding, the Commission concluded that \u201cthere was no interruption of Plaintiff\u2019s work routine by an unlooked for event, and where Plaintiff was performing his normal job in the usual manner when his injury was sustained, there was no compensable accident.\u201d The Commission, consequently, denied plaintiff\u2019s claim for benefits. On 27 July 2009, plaintiff filed a motion for additional findings of fact, claiming that the Commission had failed to address \u201cthe evidence that plaintiff was unaware of his proximity to the downward slope of the crosswalk and unexpectedly stepped backward, onto its angled edge.\u201d The Commission denied plaintiff\u2019s motion on 27 August 2009, and plaintiff timely appealed to this Court from the Commission\u2019s opinion and award.\nDiscussion\nAppellate review of a decision by the Industrial Commission is limited to \u201creviewing whether any competent evidence supports the Commission\u2019s findings of fact and whether the findings of fact support the Commission\u2019s conclusions of law.\u201d Deese v. Champion Int\u2019l Corp., 352 N.C. 109, 116, 530 S.E.2d 549, 553 (2000). As the fact-finding body, \u201c \u2018[t]he Commission is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 115, 530 S.E.2d at 552 (quoting Adams v. AVX Corp., 349 N.C. 676, 680, 509 S.E.2d 411, 413 (1998)). The Commission\u2019s findings of fact are thus conclusive on appeal when supported by competent evidence, despite evidence in the record that would support contrary findings. McRae v. Toastmaster, Inc., 358 N.C. 488, 496, 597 S.E.2d 695, 700 (2004). Consequently, the Commission\u2019s findings may be set aside on appeal only \u201cwhen there is a complete lack of competent evidence to support them[.]\u201d Young v. Hickory Bus. Furn., 353 N.C. 227, 230, 538 S.E.2d 912, 914 (2000). The Commission\u2019s conclusions of law are, however, reviewed de novo. McRae, 358 N.C. at 496, 597 S.E.2d at 701.\nPlaintiff contends that the Commission erred in concluding that plaintiff did not sustain an injury by accident on 20 November 2007. A plaintiff is entitled to compensation for an injury under the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act \u201conly if (1) it is caused by an \u2018accident,\u2019 and (2) the accident arises out of and in the course of employment.\u201d Pitillo v. N.C. Dep\u2019t of Envtl. Health & Natural Res., 151 N.C. App. 641, 645, 566 S.E.2d 807, 811 (2002); N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-2(6) (2009). The plaintiff bears the burden of proving both elements of the claim. Morrison v. Burlington Industries, 304 N.C. 1, 13, 282 S.E.2d 458, 467 (1981). Neither party disputes that plaintiff\u2019s Achilles tendon injury arose out of and in the course of his employment with RDU. Rather, the parties dispute whether the manner in which plaintiff\u2019s injury occurred constitutes an \u201caccident\u201d within the meaning of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act.\nThe terms \u201caccident\u201d and \u201cinjury\u201d are separate and distinct concepts, and there must be an \u201caccident\u201d that produces the complained-of \u201cinjury\u201d in order for the injury to be compensable. O\u2019Mary v. Clearing Corp., 261 N.C. 508, 510, 135 S.E.2d 193, 194 (1964). An \u201caccident\u201d is an \u201cunlooked for event\u201d and implies a result produced by a \u201cfortuitous cause.\u201d Cody v. Snider Lumber Co., 328 N.C. 67, 70, 399 S.E.2d 104, 106 (1991) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). \u201cIf an employee is injured while carrying on [the employee\u2019s] usual tasks in the usual way the injury does not arise by accident.\u201d Gunter v. Dayco Corp., 317 N.C. 670, 673, 346 S.E.2d 395, 397 (1986). In contrast, when an interruption of the employee\u2019s normal work routine occurs, introducing unusual conditions likely to result in unexpected consequences, an accidental cause will be inferred. Id. The \u201cessence\u201d of an accident is its \u201cunusualness and unexpectedness . . . .\u201d Smith v. Creamery Co., 217 N.C. 468, 472, 8 S.E.2d 231, 233 (1940).\nThus, in order to be a compensable \u201cinjury by accident,\u201d the injury must involve more than the employee\u2019s performance of his or her usual and customary duties in the usual way. Renfro v. Richardson Sports Ltd. Partners, 172 N.C. App. 176, 180, 616 S.E.2d 317, 322 (2005), disc. review denied, 360 N.C. 535, 633 S.E.2d 821 (2006). Moreover, \u201conce an activity, even a strenuous or otherwise unusual activity, becomes a part of the employee\u2019s normal work routine, an injury caused by such activity is not the result of an interruption of the work routine or otherwise an \u2018injury by accident\u2019 under the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act.\u201d Bowles v. CTS of Asheville, 77 N.C. App. 547, 550, 335 S.E.2d 502, 504 (1985).\nIn determining that plaintiff\u2019s Achilles tendon injury was not an injury by accident, the Commission found:\n3. Plaintiff worked for Defendant-employer as a traffic control officer. Plaintiff was responsible for monitoring and controlling vehicular traffic around the airport\u2019s terminals. Plaintiff\u2019s responsibilities included stopping traffic to allow pedestrians to cross the roadway that separated the terminals from the airport\u2019s parking lots. All of his duties required him to stand or walk. He was not permitted to sit while on duty, and spent his entire work shift on his feet.\n16. Plaintiff\u2019s recorded statement shows that on [20 November 2007], he stepped back in the crosswalk. This was a maneuver he would make as a normal part of his job duties. Walking and directing traffic from the crosswalk was part of his normal job duties, as was stepping forward and backward in the crosswalk. Plaintiff mainly worked in the crosswalk, but he sometimes stepped up onto the sidewalk or off the crosswalk into the roadway. The incline change was usually behind him and he was normally facing traffic. It was not unusual for Plaintiff to step back in the crosswalk as often as two or three times an hour.\n17. The greater weight of the evidence shows that the Plaintiff did not trip or fall when he injured his Achilles tendon on November 20, 2007. There was no unusual or unforeseen circumstance that interrupted his work routine. . . . [W]hile this action was the cause of the Plaintiff\u2019s tendon injury, the incident... was not an accident within the meaning of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act.\nBased on its findings, the Commission concluded that \u201cthere was no interruption of Plaintiff\u2019s work routine by an unlooked for event, and where Plaintiff was performing his normal job in the usual manner when his injury was sustained, there was no compensable accident.\u201d\nIn arguing for reversal of the Commission\u2019s decision, plaintiff claims that his \u201cmisstep\u201d \u2014 \u201cstepping backward and unknowingly stepping from the crosswalk\u2019s flat surface onto its uneven, angled surface\u201d \u2014 was not a part of his normal work routine, but rather was an unexpected or unlooked-for event. Plaintiff argues that the Commission failed to address this \u201ccritical issue\u201d in its findings of fact and conclusions of law, pointing to his evidence indicating that, at the time of the incident, he was unaware of his relative position within the crosswalk and that when he stepped out of the way for the crossing pedestrians, he \u201cunknowingly and unexpectedly\u201d stepped from the flat portion of the crosswalk onto the sloped portion.\nPlaintiff contends that this evidence requires reversal under Konrady v. U.S. Airways, Inc., 165 N.C. App. 620, 626, 599 S.E.2d 593, 587 (2004), where this Court upheld the Commission\u2019s determination that the plaintiff in that case suffered an \u201cinjury by accident\u201d when she jarred her knee exiting a van that had pulled up closer than normal to the curb so that the bottom step overlapped the curb and the bottom step was shorter than other steps. Plaintiff overlooks the significance of the standard of review in workers\u2019 compensation cases. Because the Commission concluded in Konrady that the plaintiff had, in fact, suffered an injury by accident, the issue was whether there was competent evidence in the record to support the Commission\u2019s findings of fact and whether those findings, in turn, supported its conclusions of law. The Konrady Court concluded that there was competent evidence supporting the Commission\u2019s findings that \u201cthe van pulling closer to the curb and the shorter distance between the bottom step and the ground were an unforeseen circumstance and unusual condition and that [the plaintiff] could not recall ever before having encountered that situation.\u201d Id. at 626, 599 S.E.2d at 597.\nIn addressing whether the Commission\u2019s findings supported its conclusion that the plaintiff had suffered an injury by accident, the Court in Konrady reasoned:\n[T]he issue is not whether exiting vans is routine for [the plaintiff], . . . but whether something happened as she was exiting that particular van on that specific occasion that caused her to exit the van in a way that was not normal. Were there any unexpected conditions resulting in unforeseen circumstances? Here, the unexpected conditions found by the Commission included a step that was shorter than other steps and the overlapping of the step with the curb. The unforeseen circumstances found by the Commission were that the step down from the van was much shorter than [the plaintiff] anticipated, causing her to \u201cmisstep\u201d and hit the ground harder than she expected.\nId. (emphasis added).\nHere, the competent evidence supports the Commission\u2019s finding that \u201c[t]here were no unusual or unforeseen circumstances that interrupted [plaintiff\u2019s] work routine.\u201d In addition to his testimony that his normal work routine involved standing, walking, and directing traffic, plaintiff also testified that during an eight hour shift, he spent roughly an hour working in the crosswalk. When he was working in the crosswalk, which is shaped like a speed bump, he normally stood \u201capproximately 75% from the front of the crosswalk\u201d so that pedestrians could not walk behind him. He was trained to stand facing traffic so that the downward slope of the crosswalk was \u201cabout a foot, foot and half\u2019 behind him. Plaintiff also testified that when he stepped out of the way to let pedestrians cross, he \u201cwould often have to step back further than that quarter space\u201d and that he would often \u201cstep[] back onto the level surface and the gradual surface\u201d of the crosswalk. Thus, unlike the plaintiff in Konrady, plaintiff\u2019s own testimony indicates that he previously had \u201cencountered th[is] situation\u201d as part of his normal work routine. 165 N.C. App. at 626, 599 S.E.2d at 597; Bowles, 77 N.C. App. at 550, 335 S.E.2d at 504.\nAlthough plaintiff characterizes the incident as a \u201cmisstep,\u201d his testimony indicates that he routinely would have to step backward off the flat portion of the crosswalk and, in doing so, he would often step onto the inclined section. This evidence supports the Commission\u2019s finding that there was no unusual or unforeseen circumstance interrupting plaintiff\u2019s normal work routine when he sustained the injury to his Achilles tendon. See Landry v. U.S. Airways, Inc., 150 N.C. App. 121, 126, 563 S.E.2d 23, 27 (Hunter, J., dissenting) (holding that Commission\u2019s finding that plaintiff\u2019s normal work routine was not interrupted by an unusual or unforeseen circumstance when he injured his shoulder lifting a mail bag that was heavier than expected was supported by evidence showing that \u201cplaintiff\u2019s job required him to lift weights of up to 400 pounds; that plaintiff never knew prior to lifting mailbags how much they weighed; that it was not unusual for mailbags to be extremely heavy and that plaintiff would be unaware of the heavy weight of the bags until he lifted them; and that plaintiff was engaged in his normal duties and using his normal motions when injured\u201d), rev\u2019d per curiam for reasons stated in the dissent, 356 N.C. 419, 571 S.E.2d 586 (2002).\nPlaintiff, moreover, testified that during the incident on 20 November 2007, nothing hit him or tripped him, causing him to take the \u201cmisstep\u201d backward. He also stated that there was \u201cnothing wrong\u201d with the crosswalk on 20 November 2007. During a recorded interview to determine whether plaintiff was eligible for workers\u2019 compensation benefits, plaintiff was asked whether \u201canything unusual or out of the ordinary happened while [he] w[as] stepping back . . . ?\u201d Plaintiff responded: \u201cThe pain in the back of my leg.\u201d As the Supreme Court has explained, however, for the injury to be accidental in nature, \u201cthere must be some unforeseen or unusual event other than the bodily injury itself.\u201d Rhinehart v. Market, 271 N.C. 586, 588, 157 S.E.2d 1, 3 (1967).\nThe evidence in this case supports the Commission\u2019s ultimate finding that there were no unusual or unforeseen circumstances interrupting plaintiff\u2019s work routine, which, in turn, supports the Commission\u2019s conclusion that \u201cthere was no compensable accident.\u201d Thus, contrary to plaintiff\u2019s argument, the Commission did not fail to make sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect to whether plaintiff\u2019s Achilles tendon injury was an \u201cinjury by accident\u201d under the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act.\nPlaintiff nonetheless argues that the \u201c \u2018accidental\u2019 character of an injury is measured from the perspective of the injured employee\u201d and \u201cnot from \u2018quantifiable\u2019 considerations\u201d regarding an employee\u2019s normal work routine. Thus, plaintiff maintains, because he did not intend to \u201cmisstep,\u201d his injury is the result of an accident. In support of his argument, plaintiff relies primarily on Woodson v. Rowland, 329 N.C. 330, 407 S.E.2d 222 (1991), where the Supreme Court held that, u[f]rom the standpoint of the injured party, an injury intentionally inflicted by another can ... be an \u2018unlooked for and untoward event . . . not expected or designed by the injured employee.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 349, 407 S.E.2d at 233 (quoting Harding v. Thomas & Howard Co., 256 N.C. 427, 428, 124 S.E.2d 109, 110 (1962) (first alteration and emphasis added).\nPlaintiff misreads Woodson. The Woodson Court did not hold that the accidental nature of an employee\u2019s injury is to be determined from the subjective perspective of the employee, as plaintiff suggests, but rather that in cases involving intentional torts resulting in an injury to an employee, \u201cthe injury... is considered to be both by accident, for which the employee . . . may pursue a compensation claim under the Act, and the result of an intentional tort, for which a civil action against the employer may be maintained.\u201d Id. at 339, 407 S.E.2d at 227. In the portion of Woodson relied upon by plaintiff, the Court was simply explaining that it is \u201cnot inherently inconsistent to assert that an injury caused by the same conduct [i]s both the result of an accident, giving rise to the remedies provided by the Act, and an intentional tort, making the exclusivity provision of the Act unavailable to bar a civil action.\u201d Id. at 349, 407 S.E.2d at 233. In short, nothing in Woodson supports plaintiff\u2019s argument.\nPlaintiff\u2019s contention that the \u201caccidental character\u201d of an injury is to be assessed from the subjective perspective of the employee posits a fundamentally different test for an \u201cinjury by accident\u201d than the one used by our courts in construing the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act. Following plaintiff\u2019s argument to its logical conclusion, there would practically never be a non-compensable injury so long as it arose out of and in the course of employment: no employee expects to get injured on the job. Adopting plaintiff\u2019s argument would effectively render N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-2(6)\u2019s requirement that the injury be caused \u201cby accident\u201d superfluous since virtually every injury would be accidental from the point of view of the injured employee. But see Harding, 256 N.C. at 428, 124 S.E.2d at 110 (\u201cThe North Carolina Workers\u2019] Compensation Act does not provide compensation for injury, but only for injury by accident.\u201d). Plaintiff\u2019s argument is thus overruled.\nAffirmed.\nJudges CALABRIA and HUNTER, Robert N., Jr. concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "HUNTER, Robert C., Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Scudder & Hedrick, PLLC, by John A. Hedrick, for plaintiff-appellant.", "Hedrick, Gardner, Kincheloe & Garofalo, L.L.P., by Jennifer S. \u25a0 Jerzak, for defendants-appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "ALLEN GRAY, Employee, Plaintiff v. RDU AIRPORT AUTHORITY, Employer, TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY, Carrier, Defendants\nNo. COA09-1282\n(Filed 20 April 2010)\nWorkers\u2019 Compensation\u2014 injury by accident \u2014 Achilles tendon injury \u2014 no unusual or unforeseen circumstances\nThe Industrial Commission did not err in a workers\u2019 compensation case by concluding that plaintiff\u2019s Achilles tendon injury was not a compensable injury by accident. There were no unusual or unforeseen circumstances that interrupted plaintiff\u2019s work routine.\nAppeal by plaintiff from opinion and award entered 16 July 2009 by the North Carolina Industrial Commission. Heard in the Court of Appeals 24 February 2010.\nScudder & Hedrick, PLLC, by John A. Hedrick, for plaintiff-appellant.\nHedrick, Gardner, Kincheloe & Garofalo, L.L.P., by Jennifer S. \u25a0 Jerzak, for defendants-appellees." }, "file_name": "0521-01", "first_page_order": 549, "last_page_order": 558 }