{ "id": 4176504, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JONATHAN RUSSELL McCRAVEY, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "State v. McCravey", "decision_date": "2010-05-04", "docket_number": "No. COA09-712", "first_page": "627", "last_page": "642", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "203 N.C. App. 627" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "619 S.E.2d 862", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12634057 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "865" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/619/0862-01" ] }, { "cite": "652 S.E.2d 40", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12639705 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "46", "parenthetical": "citations and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/652/0040-01" ] }, { "cite": "627 S.E.2d 665", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12635430 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "670", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/627/0665-01" ] }, { "cite": "671 S.E.2d 31", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12642475 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "34", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/671/0031-01" ] }, { "cite": "650 S.E.2d 595", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12639358, 12639359 ], "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/650/0595-01", "/se2d/650/0595-02" ] }, { "cite": "639 S.E.2d 110", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12637428 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "114" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/639/0110-01" ] }, { "cite": "673 S.E.2d 724", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12642968 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "730", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Clemmons, 181 N.C. App. 391, 397, 639 S.E.2d 110, 114, aff'd, 361 N.C. 582, 650 S.E.2d 595 (2007)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/673/0724-01" ] }, { "cite": "409 S.E.2d 96", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "98-99", "parenthetical": "citations and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "104 N.C. App. 226", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521064 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "231", "parenthetical": "citations and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/104/0226-01" ] }, { "cite": "372 S.E.2d 572", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "575", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "323 N.C. 350", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2560790 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "354", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/323/0350-01" ] }, { "cite": "284 S.E.2d 500", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "503" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "304 N.C. 534", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569411 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "539" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/304/0534-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-27.5", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-27.4", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-27.2", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "689 S.E.2d 510", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "517", "parenthetical": "The determination of whether an offense is an \"aggravated offense\" pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40A is based solely upon \"the elements of the offense of which a defendant was convicted and . . . not. . . the underlying factual scenario giving rise to the conviction.\"" }, { "page": "517" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-27.3", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)(l)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "174 N.C. App. 118", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8350640 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "123" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/174/0118-01" ] }, { "cite": "186 N.C. App. 542", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8158487 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "548", "parenthetical": "citations and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/186/0542-01" ] }, { "cite": "177 N.C. App. 33", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8300880 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "40", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/177/0033-01" ] }, { "cite": "594 S.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "19", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "358 N.C. 160", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2986939 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "187", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/358/0160-01" ] }, { "cite": "169 S.E.2d 879", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "888", "parenthetical": "citations and quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "888" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "275 N.C. 517", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559163 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "531", "parenthetical": "citations and quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "531" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/275/0517-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.6", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 21, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(4)" }, { "page": "(la)" }, { "page": "(la)" }, { "page": "(la)" }, { "page": "(la)" }, { "page": "(la)" }, { "page": "(la)" }, { "page": "(la)" }, { "page": "(4)" }, { "page": "(4)" }, { "page": "(5)" }, { "page": "(4)" }, { "page": "(la)" }, { "page": "(la)" }, { "page": "(la)" }, { "page": "(la)" }, { "page": "(la)" }, { "page": "(la)" }, { "page": "(la)" }, { "page": "(la)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "597 S.E.2d 724", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "733" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "358 N.C. 382", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2986879 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "391" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/358/0382-01" ] }, { "cite": "679 S.E.2d 430", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "432", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Garcia, 358 N.C. 382, 391, 597 S.E.2d 724, 733 (2004)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "681 S.E.2d 293", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "302" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "363 N.C. 438", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4151754 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "448-49" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/363/0438-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 N.C. 582", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3746005 ], "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/361/0582-01" ] }, { "cite": "181 N.C. App. 391", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8374401 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "397" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/181/0391-01" ] }, { "cite": "139 L. Ed. 2d 43", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "522 U.S. 825", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11489369, 11488674, 11489412, 11488711, 11489160, 11488843, 11488750, 11489262, 11488977, 11489309, 11488916, 11489111, 11489209, 11489053, 11488798 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/522/0825-14", "/us/522/0825-01", "/us/522/0825-15", "/us/522/0825-02", "/us/522/0825-10", "/us/522/0825-05", "/us/522/0825-03", "/us/522/0825-12", "/us/522/0825-07", "/us/522/0825-13", "/us/522/0825-06", "/us/522/0825-09", "/us/522/0825-11", "/us/522/0825-08", "/us/522/0825-04" ] }, { "cite": "478 S.E.2d 146", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "157" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "345 N.C. 73", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 54177 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "95" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/345/0073-01" ] }, { "cite": "590 S.E.2d 305", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "307", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Geddie, 345 N.C. 73, 95, 478 S.E.2d 146, 157, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 825, 139 L. Ed. 2d 43 (1996)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "162 N.C. App. 138", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8915317 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "142", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Geddie, 345 N.C. 73, 95, 478 S.E.2d 146, 157, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 825, 139 L. Ed. 2d 43 (1996)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/162/0138-01" ] }, { "cite": "683 S.E.2d 432", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "435", "parenthetical": "citations and quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "436" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "306 S.E.2d 844", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "845", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "64 N.C. App. 177", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526451 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "179", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/64/0177-01" ] }, { "cite": "456 S.E.2d 789", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "808", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "808" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "340 N.C. 119", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 790125 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "155", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "155" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/340/0119-01" ] }, { "cite": "373 S.E.2d 420", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "421", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "323 N.C. 466", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2562032 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "469", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/323/0466-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1303, "char_count": 36505, "ocr_confidence": 0.743, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.8668257043599897e-07, "percentile": 0.7256488698761974 }, "sha256": "538ef310f1cd09f55a3612b9f260f5b5ed3fd778512947b2c27d430e46c87163", "simhash": "1:1be82221577ecf50", "word_count": 6115 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:32:21.116750+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges STEPHENS and BEASLEY concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JONATHAN RUSSELL McCRAVEY, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "STROUD, Judge.\nJonathan Russell McCravey (\u201cdefendant\u201d) appeals from his convictions for second-degree rape, false imprisonment and assault inflicting serious injury and the order enrolling him in lifetime satellite-based monitoring upon the completion of his sentence. For the following reasons, we find no error.\nI. Background\nThe State\u2019s evidence tended to show that Tiffany McCravey (\u201cTiffany\u201d) and defendant were married in 2000, but had separated and reconciled at least four or five times. On 24 October 2007, defendant and Tiffany were not living together. Tiffany was living with her six-year-old son Mike in a house co-owned with defendant. However, because defendant had been threatening her and \u201chad been using drugs for a while [,]\u201d Tiffany was afraid that defendant would hurt her, and Tiffany\u2019s sister had been staying with her \u201cjust for security.\u201d Tiffany had not changed the locks on the doors but had barricaded them. On the night of 24 October 2007, Tiffany\u2019s sister was not present in the home, so Tiffany and her son were the only ones in the house. Around midnight, Tiffany heard a noise and immediately got out of bed. As Tiffany turned the hallway lights on, defendant was walking up the steps from the foyer into the hallway towards the bedroom. Tiffany immediately told defendant that he was not supposed to be there and that he needed to leave. Defendant told her that he was not leaving and started hitting Tiffany with his hands, first around her head, then all over her body. Tiffany fell down but got back up. Tiffany stated that \u201c[h]e looked as if he had been, you know, smoking or drinking or high\u201d and she had \u201cnever seen him so angry and so violent and so upset.\u201d Tiffany testified that defendant was \u201cranting and raving about someone else being in the house.\u201d Defendant asked her if there was another man in the house and went downstairs to search the house. Defendant then dragged Tiffany down the hallway to the bedroom. Tiffany managed to get away and ran downstairs to the door but defendant jumped from the top of the stairs and caught her, saying \u201cBitch, you\u2019re not going anywhere,\u201d and he hit her. Defendant then grabbed Tiffany by the hair and began dragging her back upstairs to the bedroom. Tiffany testified that \u201cat that time, I felt like I really needed to cooperate because he was just really \u2014 I mean, just \u2014 I had never seen him like that, like I mentioned before. At that time, he told me, he said, \u2018Bitch, I ought to kill you.\u2019 \u201d Defendant then went downstairs and returned with a steak knife. With \u201cthe knife in his hand[,]\u201d defendant said, \u201cBitch, I ought to cut your fucking throat.\u201d Defendant then ordered Tiffany into the master bathroom and went to their son Mike\u2019s bedroom to ask him about \u201cmommy\u2019s boyfriend[.]\u201d Defendant returned to the bathroom and dragged Tiffany by the hair into the bedroom and sat her on the bed. Defendant placed the knife on the night stand, then \u201crolled two joints[,]\u201d p.ut a sex movie in the DVD player and turned the television on. Defendant continued hitting Tiffany, asking her \u201cWas this nigger worth it?\u201d and was he worth \u201cgetting your ass beat?\u201d Defendant told Tiffany to take off her gown and underwear. Tiffany testified that at this point:\nI felt like I needed to do whatever he told me to do. I felt like inside it had to end, but I didn\u2019t know how it was going to end. I just wanted to be alive when it did. And I decided in the bathroom, whatever he asked me to do, I was going to do it.\nDefendant then told Tiffany, \u201cBitch, you\u2019re going to give me some pussy.\u201d Tiffany told him that she did not want to have sex, as she was \u201creally in pain[,]\u201d her lip was bleeding, her eye was swollen, and her son was upset. However, defendant told her \u201cYes, you are.\u201d Tiffany stated that she \u201cdidn\u2019t know if [defendant] was going to flip out and go in the room and try to hurt [Mike], so [her] whole thing was to try to keep him in [the bedroom] with [her] in terms of, you know, just cooperate.\u201d Tiffany then took off her gown and underwear. Defendant ordered Tiffany on the bed and proceeded to perform oral sex on Tiffany. Defendant then ordered Tiffany to perform oral sex on him and she did. Tiffany testified that defendant then \u201cput his penis in my vaginaf.]\u201d When defendant had finished, Tiffany asked him to take her to the hospital. Defendant initially agreed but then changed his mind and instead got her some ice and some Advil. Defendant told her to lie down to \u201c[l]et the medicine kick in\u201d and they both fell asleep.\nHours later, on the morning of 25 October 2007, Tiffany heard someone knocking at the door. She immediately got up and ran to the door. It was a sheriff\u2019s deputy. Tiffany opened the door and told the deputy that her husband had been beating her and to get her son out of the house. Tiffany was later transported to the hospital for treatment. She had a chipped front tooth and an orbital fracture to her right eye that required surgery. She was prescribed Vicodin for her pain and was out of work for three months. Tiffany testified that she was not using any drugs on the night in question.\nDeputy Daniel Lauten of the Forsyth County Sheriffs Office testified that on the morning of 25 October 2007 he responded to a call about a suspicious vehicle parked in someone\u2019s driveway. Deputy Lauten ran the license plate and the address of the registered owner came up to an address on Asheby Road, in Belews Creek, North Carolina. Deputy Lauten then went to the address and rang the doorbell. He testified that Tiffany opened the door and said, \u201cThank God you\u2019re here. He\u2019s going to kill me.\u201d Deputy Lauten could tell that she had been severely assaulted, as her lips and eyes were swollen. Deputy Lauten then locked her in his patrol vehicle and called for backup. When the backup officers arrived, they searched the house and found Mike but did not find defendant. Deputy Lauten searched for weapons in the house and found one kitchen knife behind a night stand in the bedroom and another kitchen knife between the cushions of the couch in the living room. Deputy Lauten also found a \u201ccrack pipe\u201d on the night stand in the bedroom.\nSergeant Chuck Barhaam of the Forsyth County Sheriff\u2019s Office testified that on 25 October 2007 he responded to Deputy Lauten\u2019s call for backup and went inside the home to search for defendant and Mike. Sergeant Barhaam testified that they did not find defendant in the home but set up a perimeter in an effort to locate defendant. Deputies later found defendant hiding in a nearby residence which was under construction and took defendant into custody.\nCorporal Amy Snider-Wells of the Forsyth County Sheriff\u2019s Office testified that Tiffany told her that she had a 50B domestic violence restraining order against defendant for two years but it had expired in August 2007. Corporal Snider-Wells interviewed defendant at the Forsyth County Sheriff\u2019s Office. Defendant told Corporal Snider-Wells that he beat up his wife because she had another man in his home. Defendant initially denied having sex with his wife, but then told Corporal Snider-Wells that they did have a sexual encounter, but it was consensual.\nDefendant testified in his own defense, stating that on 24 October 2007, he and Tiffany were not living together, but he was staying at his cousin\u2019s house up the street. Defendant admitted that he was on probation and, as part of that probation, he was not supposed to be around Tiffany. Defendant also admitted that as part of his probation he was on electronic house arrest, but he had violated his probation by cutting his electronic ankle bracelet off his leg. Defendant testified that Tiffany called him around 9:30 p.m. on 24 October 2007 to ask if he would come over to their house with some cocaine. Defendant stated that he arrived at their house around 11 p.m. and entered the back door using his key. Defendant stated that he went to the bedroom and Tiffany was awake watching television. Defendant testified that they snorted some of the cocaine that he brought and had oral sex and then intercourse. Defendant stated that while they were having intercourse, he heard something downstairs. He went to the kitchen, got a knife, and looked around the rest of the house. Defendant went back to the bedroom and asked Tiffany if anyone was in the house. Defendant then noticed that the bag of cocaine which had been in his pants pocket was missing. Defendant then asked Tiffany about the cocaine but \u201cshe said she didn\u2019t know what I was talking about.\u201d Defendant testified, \u201cThat\u2019s when I hit her, because I knew she was lying.\u201d Defendant admitted to hitting Tiffany for \u201cabout a good five/eight minutes[,]\u201d but claimed it was after they had intercourse. Defendant stated that Tiffany asked him to take her to the hospital, but instead he gave her some ice and Advil, and they both fell asleep. Defendant testified that the next thing he remembered was waking up and hearing the doorbell ringing. After defendant discovered that a deputy sheriff was at the door, he fled the house but was later found by deputies and taken into custody.\nOn or about 28 January 2008, defendant was indicted on charges of first-degree rape, first-degree kidnapping and felony assault inflicting serious bodily injury. Defendant was tried on these charges at the 21 July 2008 Criminal Session of Superior Court, Forsyth County. On 23 July 2008, the jury found defendant guilty of second-degree rape, false imprisonment, and misdemeanor assault inflicting serious injury. The trial court then sentenced defendant to consecutive terms of 100 to 129 months imprisonment for the second-degree rape, 45 days for false imprisonment and 75 days for assault inflicting serious injury.. The trial court also ordered defendant to enroll in lifetime satellite-based monitoring upon completion of his sentences. Defendant gave notice of appeal in open court.\nII. Trial Court\u2019s Comments\nDefendant first contends that when defense counsel asked Tiffany about a prior drug test, the trial court made an impermissible opinion statement which interfered with defendant\u2019s impeachment of the witness as well as defendant\u2019s right to present a defense.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1222 (2007) provides that \u201c[t]he judge may not express during any stage of the trial, any opinion in the presence of the jury on any question of fact to be decided by the jury.\u201d \u201cIt is immaterial how such opinion is expressed or implied, whether in the charge of the court, in the examination of a witness, in the rulings upon objections to evidence or in any other manner.\u201d State v. Ford, 323 N.C. 466, 469, 373 S.E.2d 420, 421 (1988) (citation and quotation marks omitted). \u201cIn evaluating whether a judge\u2019s comments cross into the realm of impermissible opinion, a totality of the circumstances test is utilized. Unless it is apparent that such infraction of the rules might reasonably have had a prejudicial effect on the result of the trial, the error will be considered harmless.\u201d State v. Larrimore, 340 N.C. 119, 155, 456 S.E.2d 789, 808 (1995) (citation and quotation marks omitted). \u201cWhile not every improper remark will require a new trial, a new trial may be awarded if the remarks go to the heart of the case.\u201d State v. Sidbury, 64 N.C. App. 177, 179, 306 S.E.2d 844, 845 (1983) (citation omitted). \u201cWhether the judge\u2019s language amounts to an expression of opinion is determined by its probable meaning to the jury, not by the judge\u2019s motive.\u201d State v. Springs, - N.C. App. -, -, 683 S.E.2d 432, 435 (2009) (citations and quotation marks omitted).\nDefendant challenges the trial court\u2019s statement, \u201cThis isn\u2019t about anybody\u2019s drug use[,]\u201d made in the following exchange during defense counsel\u2019s cross-examination of victim, Tiffany:\nDefense Counsel: Now, you said that last time you used marijuana was seven and a half years ago, is that right?\nTiffany: Yes, about; yes.\nDefense Counsel: But you\u2019ve used cocaine before as well, haven\u2019t you?\nTiffany: No, I have not.\nThe Court: Sustained. This is not about anybody\u2019s drug use.\nDefense Counsel: Can we approach the bench, Your Honor?\nThe Court: No.\nDefense Counsel: So on the evening in question, there was no other use on your part of any drugs; is that right?\nTiffany: No, I did not use any drugs.\nFollowing the above exchange and out of the presence of the jury, defense counsel and the trial court had the following discussion about the trial court\u2019s comment:\nThe Court: All right. Did you want to say anything about my not letting you ask her about the cocaine?\nDefense Counsel: Yes, Your Honor. For the record, I would be asking \u2014 I would ask her that and also followed up with a question of isn\u2019t it true that you failed the drug test in Guilford County that showed the presence of cocaine within the last two years, which under State versus Williams would go to her ability to see, hear and recall potentially as well as since I believe our offer of evidence later on will also relate to potential drug use that evening.\nThe Court: Well, you can ask her \u2014 I let you ask all you wanted about her drug use that evening. So you\u2019re not saying that this drug test was close to that day?\nDefense Counsel: No, it\u2019s not. Not within the time frame that would be something she would still be under the influence. The only question, it may show a pattern wherein when she denies the fact that she had used it and then there is a \u2014 may have to admit that there was a positive screen for cocaine within a recent time period. State versus Williams was a two-year range. But I don\u2019t need to follow up any further. I\u2019ll put it on in direct at that point.\nThe Court: Okay. Well, State versus Williams is a very different case from this one; that one involved substantial mental health issues and\u2014\nDefense Counsel: I think it involved a suicide question; yes.\nThe Court: Yes. I mean, there is absolutely nothing to\u2014\nDefense Counsel: They did indicate in State versus Williams that potential drug use would affect your ability to see, hear and recall, so . . .\nThe Court: Well, that\u2019s not how I remember the facts of that case playing out, and it\u2019s extremely different from this. Onetime cocaine use in the last seven and a half years is not relevant to somebody\u2019s credibility. And this is not about her drug use. So . . .\nDefense Counsel: I wouldn\u2019t contend it was a one-time cocaine use, but it\u2019s also \u2014 it\u2019s not a credibility issue either.\nThe Court: Well, what is it if it\u2019s not credibility? What\u2019s it relevant to?\nDefense Counsel: Later evidence from the defense will indicate that there was some [drug use during] that evening which would be a pattern of the parties. And clearly over the objection of the defense, the State brought out that Mr. McCravey has used drugs during the time period that they have been involved together on a regular basis.\nThe Court: All right. Well, I think we allowed enough questions about that under Rule 404, it\u2019s certainly \u2014 I don\u2019t see that it\u2019s relevant at all, but if it is it\u2019s marginal; and substantial unfair prejudice involved.\nDefense Counsel: \u2014Court\u2019s ruling.\nThe Court: All right. Anything else we need to do in this?\nAssistant District Attorney: Not for the State, Your Honor.\nThe Court: All right. You all are excused until 9:30 tomorrow morning.\nIn context, the trial court\u2019s comment was a ruling by the trial court as to the admissibility of evidence of Tiffany\u2019s prior drug usage, specifically her failure of a drug test at some time during the prior two years. Defendant argues that the trial court erred in making the above statement as it (1) was an impermissible opinion, (2) interfered with his cross-examination of Tiffany, and (3) was based on N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 404.\nA. Impermissible Opinion\nDefendant contends that the trial court\u2019s statement improperly influenced the jury to believe that \u201cdrug usage [was] irrelevant and was very damaging to the accused\u2019s theory of the case[.]\u201d\nDefendant argues that drug usage was very relevant to his case as he contended that on the night in question, he and Tiffany used cocaine together, then had consensual intercourse, and after intercourse, he discovered his cocaine missing and assaulted his wife. Defendant contends that the trial court improperly influenced that jury to believe that Tiffany\u2019s drug use was not relevant to the case and undermined defendant\u2019s theory before the jury.\nThe trial court\u2019s statement was made during defense counsel\u2019s cross-examination of Tiffany. Based upon defendant\u2019s contentions as to the events of the evening, Tiffany\u2019s use of cocaine on that night goes to \u201cthe heart of the case],]\u201d as it would support defendant\u2019s order of events, including the fact that the intercourse with Tiffany was consensual. Springs, - N.C. App. at -, 683 S.E.2d at 436. However, the trial transcript shows that immediately following the trial court\u2019s statement \u2014 \u201cThis is not about anybody\u2019s drug use],]\u201d\u2014 the trial court permitted defense counsel to ask Tiffany whether she was using any drugs on the night of 24 October 2007. Allowing defense counsel to question Tiffany about her drug use on the night in question clearly demonstrated to the jury that Tiffany\u2019s drug use on that night was relevant and allowed defendant the opportunity to introduce evidence supporting his defense. In the context of the entire transcript, particularly defendant\u2019s questioning of Tiffany regarding her drug use on the night of the incident and defendant\u2019s later testimony regarding the same, the trial court\u2019s statement would not influence the jury to believe that Tiffany\u2019s drug use was \u201cirrelevant].]\u201d Furthermore, during the final charge to the jury, the trial court instructed:\nThe law, as indeed it should, requires the presiding judge to be impartial. You should not draw any inference from a ruling I have made, expression on my face, inflection in my voice, or anything I\u2019ve said or done that I have any opinion about any aspect of this case. It is your exclusive province to find the facts of this case and to render a verdict reflecting the truth as you find it.\nTherefore, given the \u201ctotality of the circumstances],]\u201d the trial court\u2019s statement did not \u201creasonably have ... a prejudicial effect on the result of the trial\u201d and any error by the trial court is \u201cconsidered harmless.\u201d Larrimore, 340 N.C. at 155, 456 S.E.2d at 808.\nB. The Trial Court\u2019s Exclusion of Evidence\nDefendant also contends that the trial court\u2019s statement and interference with cross-examination regarding Tiffany\u2019s prior drug use interfered with his right to present his defense fully, because he was not allowed to introduce evidence that established a pattern of drug usage by Tiffany. Defendant argues that the trial court\u2019s ruling excluding this evidence was in error.\nThis Court has previously held that \u201c]t]o prevail on a contention that evidence was improperly excluded, either a defendant must make an offer of proof as to what the evidence would have shown or the relevance and content of the answer must be obvious from the context of the questioning.\u201d State v. Stiller, 162 N.C. App. 138, 142, 590 S.E.2d 305, 307 (2004) (quoting State v. Geddie, 345 N.C. 73, 95, 478 S.E.2d 146, 157, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 825, 139 L. Ed. 2d 43 (1996)). Further,\n[t]his Court has explained that \u2018[t]he reason for such a rule is that the essential content or substance of the witness\u2019 testimony must be shown before we can ascertain whether prejudicial error occurred. In the absence of an adequate offer of proof, we can only speculate as to what the witness\u2019 answer would have been.\u2019\nState v. Jacobs, - N.C. App. -, -, 673 S.E.2d 724, 730 (2009) (quoting State v. Clemmons, 181 N.C. App. 391, 397, 639 S.E.2d 110, 114, aff\u2019d, 361 N.C. 582, 650 S.E.2d 595 (2007)). The record shows that plaintiff did not make a specific offer of proof as to any evidence of Tiffany\u2019s prior drug use which was excluded by the trial court\u2019s ruling. The only additional evidence as to Tiffany\u2019s drug use mentioned in the record is defense counsel\u2019s above-quoted argument to the trial court that he wanted to ask Tiffany about a positive drug test at some point during the previous two years. We cannot speculate as to any additional evidence which, defendant may have wanted to present regarding Tiffany\u2019s prior drug use, and we fail to see how evidence of one positive drug test within a two-year period would establish a \u201cpattern\u201d of drug use by Tiffany. Additionally, defendant was allowed to testify that he and Tiffany \u201cperiodically\u201d used cocaine and that they used cocaine on the night in question. Because defendant did present evidence regarding Tiffany\u2019s prior drug use and because defendant failed to make an offer of proof as to any further evidence that would establish a pattern of drug use, we conclude that defendant has not properly preserved any objection regarding exclusion of evidence of Tiffany\u2019s prior drug use for review. Accordingly, we dismiss this argument.\nC. Ruling based on N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 404\nDefendant also argues that the trial court erred by stating that the ruling on the admissibility of Tiffany\u2019s prior drug use was pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 404. As noted above, defendant failed to make an offer of proof as to any additional evidence of Tiffany\u2019s prior drug use, so the only possible evidence we can consider is based upon defense counsel\u2019s statement that he wanted to ask her about a positive drug test within the prior two years. Prior to the trial court\u2019s ruling on the admissibility of evidence of Tiffany\u2019s prior drug use, defense counsel made the following comment about the trial court\u2019s prior ruling on another issue: \u201cAnd clearly over the objection of the defense, the State brought out that Mr. McCravey has used drugs during the time period that they have been involved together on a regular basis.\u201d In response to defense counsel\u2019s comment about her prior ruling, the trial court stated: \u201cWell, I think we allowed enough questions about that under Rule 404[.]\u201d (emphasis added). Therefore, in context, the trial court was simply responding to defense counsel\u2019s comments as to her prior ruling on the admissibility of evidence pursuant to Rule 404(b). As to the admissibility of evidence of Tiffany\u2019s prior drug use, the trial court then proceeded to exclude such evidence as there was \u201csubstantial unfair prejudice involved\u201d pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 403 (\u201crelevant[] evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence\u201d); See State v. Locklear, 363 N.C. 438, 448-49, 681 S.E.2d 293, 302 (2009) (Our appellate courts \u201creview a trial court\u2019s decision to admit or exclude evidence under Rule 403 for abuse of discretion[,]\u201d and \u201creverse the trial court only when the court\u2019s ruling is manifestly unsupported by reason or is so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.\u201d (citations and quotation marks omitted)). Defendant makes no argument as to how the trial court abused its discretion in making its ruling based on Rule 403. Therefore, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court\u2019s ruling on exclusion of evidence that Tiffany had a positive drug test within the prior two years.\nIII. Satellite Based Monitoring\nDefendant next contends that the trial court erred when it ordered that defendant enroll in lifetime satellite based monitoring (\u201cSBM\u201d) after finding that defendant had been convicted of an \u201caggravated offense.\u201d This Court has held that the standard of review for SBM orders is as follows: \u201c \u2018[W]e review the trial court\u2019s findings of fact to determine whether they are supported by competent record evidence, and we review the trial court\u2019s conclusions of law for legal accuracy and to ensure that those conclusions reflect a correct application of law to the facts found.\u2019 \u201d State v. Kilby, - N.C. App. -, -, 679 S.E.2d 430, 432 (2009) (quoting State v. Garcia, 358 N.C. 382, 391, 597 S.E.2d 724, 733 (2004)). Here, pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40A, the trial court found defendant had been convicted of a \u201creportable conviction\u201d as defined by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.6(4). The trial court also found that defendant was convicted of an \u201caggravated offense\u201d as defined by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.6(la) and ordered that upon completion of defendant\u2019s sentence, defendant was required to enroll in SBM for his natural life.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.6(la) (2007) defines an \u201caggravated offense\u201d as\nany criminal offense that includes either of the following: (i) engaging in a sexual act involving vaginal, anal, or oral penetration with a victim of any age through the use of force or the threat of serious violence[.] (emphasis added).\nDefendant contends that the statutory definition of \u201caggravated offense\u201d in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.6(la) is unconstitutionally vague because it does not specify what constitutes \u201cuse of force[.]\u201d\nIt is settled law that a statute may be void for vagueness and uncertainty. A statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first essential of due process of law. Even so, impossible standards of statutory clarity are not required by the constitution. When the language of a statute provides an adequate warning as to the conduct it condemns and prescribes boundaries sufficiently distinct for judges and juries to interpret and administer it uniformly, constitutional requirements are fully met.\nIn re Burrus, 275 N.C. 517, 531, 169 S.E.2d 879, 888 (1969) (citations and quotation marks omitted). \u201cStatutory language should not be declared void for vagueness unless it is not susceptible to reasonable understanding and interpretation. Mere differences of opinion as to a statute\u2019s applicability do not render it unconstitutionally vague.\u201d Rhyne v. K-Mart Corp., 358 N.C. 160, 187, 594 S.E.2d 1, 19 (2004) (citations omitted). We apply the rules of statutory interpretation to discern the meaning of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.6(la). Id.\n\u201cStatutory interpretation begins with [t]he cardinal principle of statutory construction . . . that the intent of the legislature is controlling. In ascertaining the legislative intent, courts should consider the language of the statute, the spirit of the statute, and what it seeks to accomplish.\u201d Benton v. Hanford, - N.C. App. -, -, 671 S.E.2d 31, 34 (2009) (citation and quotation marks omitted). \u201cWhere the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, the Court does not engage in judicial construction but must apply the statute to give effect to the plain and definite meaning of the language.\u201d In re Nantz, 177 N.C. App. 33, 40, 627 S.E.2d 665, 670 (2006) (citation and quotation marks omitted). \u201cIf the language is ambiguous or unclear, the reviewing court must construe the statute in an attempt not to defeat or impair the object of the statute [...] if that can reasonably be done without doing violence to the legislative language.\u201d Arnold v. City of Asheville, 186 N.C. App. 542, 548, 652 S.E.2d 40, 46 (2007) (citations and quotation marks omitted).\nIn so doing, a court may look to other indicia of legislative will, including: the purposes appearing from the statute taken as a whole, the phraseology, the words ordinary or technical, the law as it prevailed before the statute, the mischief to be remedied, the remedy, the end to be accomplished, statutes in pari materia, the preamble, the title, and other like means .... Statutory provisions must be read in context[,] [and those] dealing with the same subject matter must be construed in pari materia, as together constituting one law, and harmonized to give effect to each.\nTrayford v. N.C. Psychology Bd., 174 N.C. App. 118, 123, 619 S.E.2d 862, 865 (2005).\nDefendant argues that \u201cuse of force\u201d is a \u201cterm of art\u201d and the statute does not specify whether it means \u201cdeadly force[,] . . . excessive force, unreasonable force, de minimis force, or reasonable force.\u201d The plain language of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.6(la) does not specify what type of force is required, and Article 27A of Chapter 14 of the General Statutes does not specifically define what type of force N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.6(la) is referencing or provide for any further definition of force. However, if we consider the context of the definition of \u201caggravated offense\u201d stated in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.6(la), the meaning of \u201cuse of force\u201d becomes clear. First, we note that to be subject to SBM, a defendant must have a \u201creportable conviction\u201d as defined by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.6(4). Pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.6(4), a \u201creportable conviction\u201d includes conviction of \u201ca sexually violent offense.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.6(5) states that a \u201csexually violent offense\u201d includes second degree rape pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-27.3. Thus, second-degree rape is a \u201creportable conviction.\u201d See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 14-208.6(4) and 14-208.6(5). Only a \u201creportable conviction\u201d can be an \u201caggravated offense\u201d as defined by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.6(la). We therefore look to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-27.3, which defines second-degree rape, to determine if this crime is an \u201caggravated offense.\u201d See State v. Davison, - N.C. App. -, -, 689 S.E.2d 510, 517 (2009) (The determination of whether an offense is an \u201caggravated offense\u201d pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40A is based solely upon \u201cthe elements of the offense of which a defendant was convicted and . . . not. . . the underlying factual scenario giving rise to the conviction.\u201d). Second-degree rape pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-27.3 (2007) includes the element that the criminal offense be committed \u201cby force and against the will of the other person[.]\u201d We note that N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-27.3, like N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.6(la), does not include a definition of \u201cforce,\u201d but the force required in a sexual offense of this nature has been well-defined by case law.\nSexual offenses such as first-degree rape pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-27.2 (2007), second-degree rape pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-27.3, first-degree sexual offense pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-27.4 (2007), and second-degree sex offense pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-27.5 (2007), all include the element that the criminal offense be committed \u201cby force and against the will of the other personf.]\u201d In the context of the above-enumerated sexual offenses, our Supreme Court has determined that the statutory phrase, \u201cby force and against the will of the other person,\u201d means the same as it did at common law. State v. Locklear, 304 N.C. 534, 539, 284 S.E.2d 500, 503 (1981). Our Courts have further defined the element of force in these sexual offenses by stating that \u201c[t]he requisite force may be established either by actual physical force or by constructive force in the form of fear, fright, or coercion. \u2018Physical force\u2019 means force applied to the body.\u201d State v. Scott, 323 N.C. 350, 354, 372 S.E.2d 572, 575 (1988) (citations omitted). \u201cConstructive force is demonstrated by proof of threats or other actions by the defendant which compel the victim\u2019s submission to sexual acts. Threats need not be explicit so long as the totality of circumstances allows a reasonable inference that such compulsion was the unspoken purpose of the threat.\u201d State v. Hardy, 104 N.C. App. 226, 231, 409 S.E.2d 96, 98-99 (1991) (citations and quotation marks omitted). The language of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.6(la) \u2014 \u201cthrough the use of force or the threat of serious violence\u201d \u2014 reflects the established definitions as set forth in case law of both physical force and constructive force, in the context of the sexual offenses enumerated in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 14-27.2, 14-27.3, 14-27.4, and 14-27.5. (emphasis added).\nThe legislature intended that the same definition of force, as has been traditionally used for second-degree rape, to apply to the determination under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.6(la) that an offense was committed by \u201cthe use of force or the threat of serious violence.\u201d Given the similarity in the language describing the use of force as to the above-referenced criminal sexual offenses and the Legislature\u2019s use of the phrase \u201cthrough the use of force or the threat of serious violence\u201d in the statutory definition of \u201caggravated offense\u201d in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.6(la), a defendant would adequately be warned as to the conduct that would fall into the definition of an \u201caggravated offense\u201d which could subject him to SBM. Burrus, 275 N.C. at 531, 169 S.E.2d at 888. Therefore, we hold that the definition of \u201caggravated offense\u201d in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.6(la) is not unconstitutionally vague.\nDefendant further argues that even if the Court does not find that the statute is void for vagueness, the particular facts of this case do not constitute an \u201caggravated offense\u201d pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.6(la). However, as stated above, defendant\u2019s argument has been rejected by this Court in Davison, \u2014 N.C. App. at \u2014, 689 S.E.2d at 517 (\u201c[W]hen making a determination pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-208.40A, the trial court is only to consider the elements of the offense of which a defendant was convicted and is not to consider the underlying factual scenario giving rise to the conviction.\u201d). Here, defendant was convicted of second-degree rape. The essential elements of second-degree rape include vaginal intercourse \u201c[b]y force and against the will of the other person[.]\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-27.3(a)(l). Defendant does not contend that he did not have intercourse with Tiffany, but only that this act was not \u201cby force and against\u201d her will. The jury rejected defendant\u2019s contention that the intercourse was consensual and found that it was \u201cby force and against\u201d Tiffany\u2019s will by finding him guilty of second-degree rape. As the essential elements of second-degree rape are covered by the plain language of \u201caggravated offense\u201d as defined by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.6(la), we hold that second-degree rape is an \u201caggravated offense\u201d and the trial court did not err in ordering defendant to lifetime SBM pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40A.\nIV. Conclusion\nAs the trial court\u2019s comments were not prejudicial to the defendant, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence as to Tiffany\u2019s prior drug use, and the trial court did not err in ordering defendant to enroll in lifetime Satellite Based Monitoring, we find no error.\nNO ERROR.\nJudges STEPHENS and BEASLEY concur.\n. We have used the pseudonym \u201cMike\u201d to protect the minor child\u2019s identity.", "type": "majority", "author": "STROUD, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy A. Cooper, III, by Assistant Attorney General Catherine M. (Katie) Kay ser, for the State.", "M. Alexander Chams, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JONATHAN RUSSELL McCRAVEY, Defendant\nNo. COA09-712\n(Filed 4 May 2010)\n1. Evidence\u2014 cross-examination \u2014 exclusion of victim\u2019s prior failed drug test \u2014 trial court\u2019s comment \u2014 failure to make offer of proof \u2014 excluded as unfairly prejudicial\nThe trial court did not abuse its discretion in a second-degree rape, false imprisonment, and assault inflicting serious injury case by excluding evidence of the victim\u2019s failed drug test taken some time during the prior two years. Given the totality of the circumstances, the trial court\u2019s statement regarding the exclusion did not reasonably have a prejudicial effect on the result of the trial and any error was harmless. Further, defendant did not present evidence regarding the victim\u2019s prior drug use, failed to make an offer of proof as to any further evidence that would establish a pattern of drug use, and the evidence was excluded as unfairly prejudicial under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 403.\n2. Sexual Offenders\u2014 satellite-based monitoring \u2014 aggravated offense \u2014 second-degree rape\nThe trial court did not err by ordering that defendant enroll in lifetime satellite-based monitoring after finding that defendant had been convicted of an aggravated offense under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-208.6(la) through the use of force or the threat of serious violence. The term \u201caggravated offense\u201d was not unconstitutionally vague, and defendant was convicted of second-degree rape.\nAppeal by defendant from judgments entered on or about 23 July 2008 and on or about 24 July 2008 by Judge Catherine C. Eagles in Superior Court, Forsyth County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 29 October 2009.\nAttorney General Roy A. Cooper, III, by Assistant Attorney General Catherine M. (Katie) Kay ser, for the State.\nM. Alexander Chams, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0627-01", "first_page_order": 655, "last_page_order": 670 }