{ "id": 4176030, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ANDREW WILLIAM JARRETT", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Jarrett", "decision_date": "2010-05-04", "docket_number": "No. COA09-1036", "first_page": "675", "last_page": "684", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "203 N.C. App. 675" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "654 S.E.2d 752", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12640074 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "754" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/654/0752-01" ] }, { "cite": "665 S.E.2d 581", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12641760 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "585", "parenthetical": "quoting Rose, 170 N.C. App. at 289, 612 S.E.2d at 339" }, { "page": "585" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/665/0581-01" ] }, { "cite": "662 S.E.2d 683", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12641411 ], "weight": 11, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "686", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "686-87", "parenthetical": "internal quotations and citations omitted" }, { "page": "687-88", "parenthetical": "internal quotations and citations omitted" }, { "page": "689" }, { "page": "689", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "689-90" }, { "page": "690", "parenthetical": "internal quotations and citations omitted" }, { "page": "690" }, { "page": "690-91" }, { "page": "691" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/662/0683-01" ] }, { "cite": "612 S.E.2d 336", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12632813 ], "weight": 8, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "339", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Mitchell, 358 N.C. 63, 66, 592 S.E.2d 543, 545 (2004)" }, { "page": "339" }, { "page": "342" }, { "page": "342" }, { "page": "342" }, { "page": "342", "parenthetical": "internal quotations and citation omitted" }, { "page": "342" }, { "page": "345" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/612/0336-01" ] }, { "cite": "661 S.E.2d 732", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "362 N.C. 344", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4150644 ], "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/362/0344-01" ] }, { "cite": "188 N.C. App. 42", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4156101 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "45" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/188/0042-01" ] }, { "cite": "556 S.E.2d 304", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "308", "parenthetical": "internal quotations and citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "147 N.C. App. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9377653 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "7", "parenthetical": "internal quotations and citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/147/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "527 S.E.2d 921", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "923", "parenthetical": "internal quotations and citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "351 N.C. 627", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1155623 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "630", "parenthetical": "internal quotations and citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/351/0627-01" ] }, { "cite": "681 S.E.2d 492", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "496", "parenthetical": "internal citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "531 U.S. 32", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9505377 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "48" }, { "page": "347" }, { "page": "457" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/531/0032-01" ] }, { "cite": "540 U.S. 419", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 8897260 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "427" }, { "page": "852" }, { "page": "891" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/540/0419-01" ] }, { "cite": "443 U.S. 47", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6179718 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "50" }, { "page": "361" }, { "page": "2640" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/443/0047-01" ] }, { "cite": "192 N.C. App. 517", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4160053 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "521", "parenthetical": "quoting Rose, 170 N.C. App. at 289, 612 S.E.2d at 339" }, { "page": "521" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/192/0517-01" ] }, { "cite": "191 N.C. App. 181", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4159195 ], "weight": 8, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "184", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "187" }, { "page": "190" }, { "page": "189" }, { "page": "191" }, { "page": "191" }, { "page": "191" }, { "page": "192" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/191/0181-01" ] }, { "cite": "592 S.E.2d 543", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "545" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "358 N.C. 63", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2987590 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "66" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/358/0063-01" ] }, { "cite": "170 N.C. App. 284", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9005095 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "288", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Mitchell, 358 N.C. 63, 66, 592 S.E.2d 543, 545 (2004)" }, { "page": "289" }, { "page": "293" }, { "page": "293" }, { "page": "298" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/170/0284-01" ] }, { "cite": "683 S.E.2d 174", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "205", "parenthetical": "internal citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "363 N.C. 382", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4151061 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "433-34", "parenthetical": "internal citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/363/0382-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 892, "char_count": 22416, "ocr_confidence": 0.735, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.2433150297471247e-07, "percentile": 0.6084609566040337 }, "sha256": "9e86bb7187f3cec7ddd91cdb2adc2a0f9ea3f1cd54d8e38150b211f78429e4e0", "simhash": "1:85a1e658fdd60f0e", "word_count": 3473 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:32:21.116750+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges GEER and STEPHENS concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ANDREW WILLIAM JARRETT" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "CALABRIA, Judge.\nAndrew William Jarrett (\u201cdefendant\u201d) appeals the trial court\u2019s order denying his motion to suppress evidence. We affirm.\nI. Background\nDuring the evening of 28 March 2008, the Forsyth County Sheriff\u2019s Department (\u201cSheriff\u2019s Department\u201d) conducted a stationary driver\u2019s license checkpoint (\u201cthe checkpoint\u201d) at the intersection of Styers Ferry Road and Dull Road in Forsyth County, North Carolina. The checkpoint was conducted pursuant to a written Sheriff\u2019s Department policy. Six officers with flashlights, two in each lane of traffic, stopped every car coming through the checkpoint to determine if the drivers possessed a valid driver\u2019s license and vehicle registration. Corporal Barry Sales was present at the checkpoint and supervised the officers. All officers at the checkpoint wore uniforms and traffic vests. Additionally, the Sheriff\u2019s Department vehicles at the checkpoint had activated their blue lights.\nAt approximately 11:16 p.m., defendant, accompanied by a passenger, approached the checkpoint driving his 1990 Honda Accord (\u201cthe Accord\u201d). As Deputy T.L. McMasters (\u201cDeputy McMasters\u201d) approached the driver\u2019s side of the Accord to request defendant\u2019s license and registration, he noticed an aluminum can located between the driver\u2019s seat and the passenger\u2019s seat. The can was open and a light liquid residue was evident on the top of the can. Deputy McMasters then observed the passenger leaning over toward defendant. It appeared to Deputy McMasters that the passenger was trying to conceal the can from view.\nDefendant provided Deputy McMasters with a valid license and registration. The license indicated that defendant was eighteen years old. Before returning defendant\u2019s documentation, Deputy McMasters asked the occupants of the Accord, \u201cWhat is in the can?\u201d Neither defendant nor the passenger answered the question. When Deputy McMasters asked again, the passenger responded by raising the can, revealing that it was a Busch Ice beer.\nDeputy McMasters directed defendant to drive the Accord to a nearby Citgo gas station parking lot. Deputy McMasters then told defendant to exit the Accord. Upon exiting, defendant admitted he had been drinking. Deputy McMasters then performed a series of field sobriety tests, which defendant failed. As a result, defendant was arrested and charged with driving while impaired (\u201cDWI\u201d) and driving by a person less than twenty-one years old after consuming alcohol.\nOn 25 June 2008, in Forsyth County District Court, defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained at the checkpoint. After the trial court denied the motion, defendant pled guilty to both charges. Defendant then timely filed a notice of appeal for his DWI conviction to superior court.\nOn 22 January 2009, defendant filed another motion to suppress the evidence obtained at the checkpoint, this time in Forsyth County Superior Court. On 6 February 2009, a suppression hearing was held. Deputy McMasters was the only witness to testify at the suppression hearing. On 17 February 2009, the trial court denied defendant\u2019s motion to suppress. Defendant then pled guilty to DWI on 6 April 2009, but reserved his right to appeal the denial of the motion to suppress. Defendant was sentenced to sixty days in the Forsyth County Jail. The active sentence was suspended and defendant was placed on supervised probation for twelve months. Defendant appeals.\nII. Standard of Review\nDefendant\u2019s sole argument on appeal is that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. \u201cWhen reviewing a motion to suppress evidence, this Court determines whether the trial court\u2019s findings of fact are supported by competent evidence and whether the findings of fact support the conclusions of law. If supported by competent evidence, the trial court\u2019s findings of fact are conclusive on appeal, even if conflicting evidence was also introduced. However, conclusions of law regarding admissibility are reviewed de novo.\u201d State v. Wilkerson, 363 N.C. 382, 433-34, 683 S.E.2d 174, 205 (2009) (internal citations omitted).\nIII. Constitutionality of the Checkpoint\nDefendant argues that the trial court erred by concluding that the checkpoint did not violate defendant\u2019s Fourth Amendment rights. We disagree.\n\u201c \u2018[Pjolice officers effectuate a seizure when they stop a vehicle at a checkpoint.\u2019 As with all seizures, checkpoints conform with the Fourth Amendment only \u2018if they are reasonable.\u2019 \u201d State v. Rose, 170 N.C. App. 284, 288, 612 S.E.2d 336, 339 (2005) (quoting State v. Mitchell, 358 N.C. 63, 66, 592 S.E.2d 543, 545 (2004)). Thus, \u201cpolice may briefly detain vehicles at a roadblock checkpoint without individualized suspicion, so long as the purpose of the checkpoint is legitimate and the checkpoint itself is reasonable.\u201d State v. Veazey, 191 N.C. App. 181, 184, 662 S.E.2d 683, 686 (2008) (citations omitted).\nWhen considering a challenge to a checkpoint, the reviewing court must undertake a two-part inquiry to determine whether the checkpoint meets constitutional requirements. First, the court must determine the primary programmatic purpose of the checkpoint. . . . Second, if a court finds that police had a legitimate primary programmatic purpose for conducting a checkpoint ... [the court] must judge its reasonableness, hence, its constitutionality, on the basis of the individual circumstances.\nId. at 185-86, 662 S.E.2d at 686-87 (internal quotations and citations omitted).\nA. Primary programmatic purpose\n\u201cIn considering the constitutionality of a checkpoint, the trial court must initially \u2018examine the available evidence to determine the purpose of the checkpoint program.\u2019 \u201d State v. Gabriel, 192 N.C. App. 517, 521, 665 S.E.2d 581, 585 (2008) (quoting Rose, 170 N.C. App. at 289, 612 S.E.2d at 339).\nOur Court has previously held that where there is no evidence in the record to contradict the State\u2019s proffered purpose for a checkpoint, a trial court may rely on the testifying police officer\u2019s assertion of a legitimate primary purpose. However, where there is evidence in the record that could support a finding of either a lawful or unlawful purpose, a trial court cannot rely solely on an officer\u2019s bare statements as to a checkpoint\u2019s.purpose. In such cases, the trial court may not simply accept the State\u2019s invocation of a proper purpose, but instead must carr[y] out a close review of the scheme at issue. This type of searching inquiry is necessary to ensure that an illegal multi-purpose checkpoint [is not] made legal by the simple device of assigning the primary puipose to one objective instead of the other[.]\nVeazey, 191 N.C. App. at 187, 662 S.E.2d at 687-88 (internal quotations and citations omitted). \u201c[W]hen a trooper\u2019s testimony varies concerning the primary purpose of the checkpoint, the trial court is \u2018required to make findings regarding the actual primary purpose of the checkpoint and ... to reach a conclusion regarding whether this purpose was lawful.\u2019 \u201d Gabriel, 192 N.C. App. at 521, 665 S.E.2d at 585 (quoting Veazey, 191 N.C. App. at 190, 662 S.E.2d at 689).\nIn the instant case, Deputy McMasters testified that the purpose of the checkpoint was to \u201c[c]heck the license and registration of every car coming through the checkpoint.\u201d However, on cross-examination, Deputy McMasters also admitted that officers at the checkpoint were looking for \u201cevidence that\u2019s in plain view of other crimes\u201d and \u201c[a]ny sign of a criminal activity.\u201d Additionally, Deputy McMasters testified that the location of the checkpoint was chosen in part because drivers in that area who \u201cdon\u2019t have a license or . . . [ha]ve been drinking or .. . want to get somewhere quickly and speed . . .\u201d would be likely to be traveling in the area of the checkpoint. Because variations existed in Deputy McMasters\u2019 testimony regarding the primary purpose of the checkpoint, the trial court was required to make findings regarding the actual primary purpose of the checkpoint.\nIn the order denying defendant\u2019s motion to suppress, the trial court found as fact, supported by Deputy McMasters\u2019 testimony, that the checkpoint was conducted according to a policy promulgated by the Sheriff\u2019s Department. Specifically, the trial court found that, in order to comply with the policy, (1) a supervising officer was present; (2) all cars coming through the checkpoint were stopped; and (3) the blue lights were activated on all Sheriffs Department vehicles. As a result of these findings, the trial court concluded that \u201cthe primary purpose of the checkpoint was to determine if drivers were complying with the driver\u2019s license laws of North Carolina and to deter citizens from violating these said laws.\u201d\n\u201cThe United States Supreme Court has previously suggested that checking for drivers\u2019 license and vehicle registration violations is a lawful primary purpose for a checkpoint. North Carolina Courts have also upheld checkpoints designed to uncover drivers\u2019 license and vehicle registration violations.\u201d Veazey, 191 N.C. App. at 189, 662 S.E.2d at 689 (citations omitted). Therefore, the primary programmatic purpose of the checkpoint, as determined by the trial court, was a lawful one.\nB. Reasonableness\nAlthough the trial court concluded that the checkpoint had a lawful primary purpose, \u201cits inquiry does not end with that finding.\u201d Rose, 170 N.C. App. at 293, 612 S.E.2d at 342. Instead, the trial court must still determine \u201cwhether the checkpoint itself was reasonable.\u201d Veazey, 191 N.C. App. at 191, 662 S.E.2d at 689-90.\n\u201cTo determine whether a seizure at a checkpoint is reasonable requires a balancing of the public\u2019s interest and an individual\u2019s privacy interest.\u201d Rose, 170 N.C. App. at 293, 612 S.E.2d at 342. In order to make this determination, this Court has required application of the three-prong test set out by the United States Supreme Court in Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50, 61 L. Ed. 2d 357, 361, 99 S. Ct. 2637, 2640 (1979). Id. at 293, 612 S.E.2d at 342. Under Brown, the trial court must consider \u201c[1] the gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure!;] [2] the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest!;] and [3] the severity of the interference with individual liberty.\u201d Id. at 293-94, 612 S.E.2d at 342 (internal quotations and citation omitted).\ni The gravity of the public concerns\n\u201cThe first Brown factor \u2014 the gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure \u2014 analyzes the importance of the purpose of the checkpoint. This factor is addressed by first identifying the primary programmatic purpose . . . and then assessing the importance of the particular stop to the public.\u201d Id. at 294, 612 S.E.2d at 342. As previously noted, the trial court determined that the primary purpose of the checkpoint was to uncover and deter driver\u2019s license violations. The trial court then concluded that \u201cthe deterrence goal was a reasonable one.\u201d\nBoth the United States Supreme Court as well as our Courts have suggested that license and registration checkpoints advance an important purpose. The United States Supreme Court has also noted that states have a vital interest in ensuring compliance with other types of motor vehicle laws that promote public safety on the roads.\nVeazey, 191 N.C. App. at 191, 662 S.E.2d at 690 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Therefore, the checkpoint adequately satisfied the requirements of the first prong of Brown.\nii. The degree to which the seizure advanced public interests\nUnder the second Brown prong \u2014 the degree to which the seizure advanced public interests \u2014 the trial court was required to determine \u201cwhether \u2018[t]he police appropriately tailored their checkpoint stops\u2019 to fit their primary purpose.\u201d Veazey, 191 N.C. App. at 191, 662 S.E.2d at 690 (quoting Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 427, 157 L. Ed. 2d 843, 852, 124 S. Ct. 885, 891 (2004)).\nOur Court has previously identified a number of non-exclusive factors that courts should consider when determining whether a checkpoint is appropriately tailored, including: whether police spontaneously decided to set up the checkpoint on a whim; whether police offered any reason why a particular road or stretch of road was chosen for the checkpoint; whether the checkpoint had a predetermined starting or ending time; and whether police offered any reason why that particular time span was selected.\nId.\nIn the instant case, the trial court\u2019s order found as fact, supported by Deputy McMasters\u2019 testimony, that the checkpoint \u201cis conducted \u2018every Friday and Saturday nights,\u2019 \u201d and that \u201c[t]hese checkpoints did result in charges for license violations as well as DWI arrests.\u201d Additionally, the trial court found that the checkpoint operated for a period of time between one and one-half to two hours. While these findings do not necessarily address all of the non-exclusive factors suggested by Veazey, they do indicate that the trial court considered appropriate factors to determine whether the checkpoint was sufficiently tailored to fit its primary purpose, satisfying the second Brown prong.\niii. The severity of the interference with individual liberty\nThe final Brown factor to be considered is the severity of the interference with individual liberty. \u201c[C]ourts have consistently required restrictions on the discretion of the officers conducting the checkpoint to ensure that the intrusion on individual liberty is no greater than is necessary to achieve the checkpoint\u2019s objectives.\u201d Veazey, 191 N.C. App. at 192, 662 S.E.2d at 690-91.\nCourts have previously identified a number of non-exclusive factors relevant to officer discretion and individual privacy, including: the checkpoint\u2019s potential interference with legitimate traffic; whether police took steps to put drivers on notice of an approaching checkpoint; whether the location of the checkpoint was selected by a supervising official, rather than by officers in the field; whether police stopped every vehicle that passed through the checkpoint, or stopped vehicles pursuant to a set pattern; whether drivers could see visible signs of the officers\u2019 authority; whether police operated the checkpoint pursuant to any oral or written guidelines; whether the officers were subject to any form of supervision; and whether the officers received permission from their supervising officer to conduct the checkpoint])]\nId. at 193, 662 S.E.2d at 691. \u201cOur Court has held that these and other factors are not \u201c\u2018lynchpin[s],\u201d but instead [are] circumstance[s] to be considered as part of the totality of the circumstances in examining the reasonableness of a checkpoint.\u2019 \u201d Id. (quoting Rose, 170 N.C. App. at 298, 612 S.E.2d at 345).\nIn the instant case, the trial court\u2019s findings, which were supported by Deputy McMasters\u2019 testimony, indicate that it considered some of the relevant factors under the third Brown prong. These findings included: (1) \u201cthe Sheriff cars had to have their blue lights on;\u201d (2) \u201c[t]he deputies were wearing the uniforms . . . [and] had a visibility of about 200 feet;\u201d (3) \u201c[a]ll cars that came through the license checkpoint from both directions were being stopped;\u201d (4) \u201c[a] supervisor of the Sheriff\u2019s Department had to be present on the scene of the license checkpoint;\u201d and (5) \u201c[t]his driver\u2019s license checkpoint was established and conducted pursuant to a written Predetermined Forsyth County Sheriff\u2019s Office Policy.\u201d These findings indicate the trial court adequately considered the appropriate factors under the third prong of Brown.\nThe trial court\u2019s order denying defendant\u2019s motion to suppress contained adequate findings of fact, supported by competent evidence, to satisfy the three prongs of the Brown test. These findings in turn support the trial court\u2019s conclusions of law that \u201cthe license check was not an unreasonable detention and therefore was valid under the Fourth Amendment\u201d and \u201csaid checkpoint was not unreasonably restrictive on the citizens.\u201d The trial court correctly determined that the Sheriff\u2019s Department had a legitimate primary programmatic purpose for conducting a checkpoint and that the checkpoint was reasonable under the circumstances. This assignment of error is overruled'.\nIV. Constitutionality of the Extended Seizure\nDefendant argues that, even if the checkpoint was constitutional, the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress because Deputy McMasters lacked reasonable, articulable suspicion to detain defendant after a valid license and registration was produced. We disagree.\nThe United States Supreme Court has held that \u201cpolice officers [may] act appropriately upon information that they properly learn during a checkpoint stop justified by a lawful primary purpose, even where such action may result in the arrest of a motorist for an offense unrelated to that purpose.\u201d City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 48, 148 L. Ed. 2d 333, 347, 121 S. Ct. 447, 457 (2000). However,\n[o]nce the original purpose of the stop has been addressed, in order to justify further delay, there must be grounds which provide the detaining officer with additional reasonable and articulable suspicion or the encounter must have become consensual. Where no grounds for a reasonable and articulable suspicion exist and where the encounter has not become consensual, a detainee\u2019s extended seizure is unconstitutional.\nState v. Jackson, - N.C. App. -, \u2014, 681 S.E.2d 492, 496 (2009) (internal citation omitted).\nIn the instant case, the primary purpose of the checkpoint was \u201cto determine if drivers were complying with the driver\u2019s license laws of North Carolina. . . .\u201d Therefore, the primary purpose of the stop was addressed when defendant produced a valid North Carolina driver\u2019s license and registration for Deputy McMasters. Accordingly, further delay of defendant by Deputy McMasters could only be constitutionally justified if either Deputy McMasters had formed reasonable and articulable suspicion that a crime was being committed or defendant consented to questioning. The State and defendant agree that no consent was given, but disagree as to whether Deputy McMasters possessed reasonable and articulable suspicion to justify further detention of defendant.\n[Wjhen an officer observes conduct which leads him reasonably to believe that criminal conduct may be afoot, he may stop the suspicious person to make reasonable inquiries. [T]he police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts, which taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant [the] intrusion.\nState v. Foreman, 351 N.C. 627, 630, 527 S.E.2d 921, 923 (2000) (internal quotations and citations omitted). \u201cThe reasonable and articulable suspicion standard requires that the court examine both the articulable facts known to the officers at the time they determined to approach and investigate the activities of [defendant], and the rational inferences which the officers were entitled to draw from those facts.\u201d State v. Butler, 147 N.C. App. 1, 7, 556 S.E.2d 304, 308 (2001) (internal quotations and citation omitted). \u201cTo determine whether the officer had reasonable suspicion, it is necessary to look at the totality of the circumstances.\u201d State v. Myles, 188 N.C. App. 42, 45, 654 S.E.2d 752, 754, aff\u2019d per curiam, 362 N.C. 344, 661 S.E.2d 732 (2008).\nIn the instant case, the trial court\u2019s findings indicate that when Deputy McMasters, who had seven years of law enforcement experience, approached the Accord, he saw an aluminum can located between the driver\u2019s seat and the passenger\u2019s seat. Additionally, Deputy McMasters witnessed the passenger leaning over toward defendant in an attempt to conceal the can. Based on these observations, Deputy McMasters twice asked the occupants of the Accord, \u201cWhat is in the can?\u201d At that point, the passenger raised the can, revealing that it was a Busch Ice beer. Deputy McMasters then ordered defendant, whom he knew to be eighteen years old, to drive to the parking lot near the Citgo station. After exiting the Accord, defendant admitted he had consumed alcohol.\nWe hold, under the totality of the circumstances, that Deputy McMasters possessed reasonable and articulable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot to further delay defendant by questioning him and his passenger about the contents of the aluminum can. While it is true, as defendant suggests, that the can could have contained any liquid, alcoholic or otherwise, Deputy McMasters only made a reasonable inquiry in order to determine the actual contents of the can. Once it was determined that the can was an alcoholic beverage, Deputy McMasters was justified in ordering defendant aside to conduct further inquiries. When, in response to these inquiries, defendant admitted he had been drinking, Deputy McMasters was justified in placing him under arrest. This assignment of error is overruled.\nV. Conclusion\nThe trial court\u2019s findings of fact were based upon competent evidence and supported the conclusion of law that the checkpoint, conducted by the Sheriff\u2019s Department on 28 March 2008, did hot violate defendant\u2019s Fourth Amendment rights. Further, the trial court\u2019s findings fully supported its conclusion of law that Deputy McMasters possessed reasonable and articulable suspicion to further delay, question and ultimately arrest defendant.\nAffirmed.\nJudges GEER and STEPHENS concur.\n. The district court arrested judgment on the conviction for driving by a person less than twenty-one years old after consuming alcohol.", "type": "majority", "author": "CALABRIA, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Sebastian Kielmanovich, for the State.", "William L. Gardo, II, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ANDREW WILLIAM JARRETT\nNo. COA09-1036\n(Filed 4 May 2010)\nMotor Vehicles\u2014 driving while impaired \u2014 driver\u2019s license checkpoint \u2014 motion to suppress evidence \u2014 reasonable articulable suspicion\nThe trial court did not err in a driving while impaired case by denying defendant\u2019s motion to suppress evidence obtained from his car during a driver\u2019s license checkpoint. The primary programmatic purpose of the checkpoint was lawful and reasonable. Under the totality of circumstances, the officer had reasonable articulable suspicion to detain defendant regarding the contents of an aluminum can after it was determined to contain an alcoholic beverage.\nAppeal by defendant from order entered 17 February 2009 by Judge Edgar B. Gregory in Forsyth' County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 11 February 2010.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Sebastian Kielmanovich, for the State.\nWilliam L. Gardo, II, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0675-01", "first_page_order": 703, "last_page_order": 712 }