{ "id": 4176474, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ARTHUR DEVON LITTLE", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Little", "decision_date": "2010-05-04", "docket_number": "No. COA09-1223", "first_page": "684", "last_page": "692", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "203 N.C. App. 684" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "669 S.E.2d 25", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12642291 ], "weight": 9, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "28", "parenthetical": "citing Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485, 68 L. Ed. 2d 378, 386 (1981)" }, { "page": "28" }, { "page": "29" }, { "page": "156" }, { "page": "28" }, { "page": "158" }, { "page": "29" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/669/0025-01" ] }, { "cite": "522 U.S. 900", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11525121, 11525092, 11524582, 11524807, 11524710, 11525031, 11524847, 11524689, 11524884, 11524761, 11524635, 11524924, 11524734, 11524959 ], "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/522/0900-14", "/us/522/0900-13", "/us/522/0900-01", "/us/522/0900-07", "/us/522/0900-04", "/us/522/0900-12", "/us/522/0900-08", "/us/522/0900-03", "/us/522/0900-09", "/us/522/0900-06", "/us/522/0900-02", "/us/522/0900-10", "/us/522/0900-05", "/us/522/0900-11" ] }, { "cite": "512 U.S. 452", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 39831 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "461-62" }, { "page": "373" }, { "page": "461" }, { "page": "373" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/512/0452-01" ] }, { "cite": "501 U.S. 171", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1108476 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "178" }, { "page": "169" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/501/0171-01" ] }, { "cite": "679 S.E.2d 140", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "363 N.C. 376", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "451 U.S. 477", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6187603 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "485" }, { "page": "386" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/451/0477-01" ] }, { "cite": "194 N.C. 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Torres, 330 N.C. 517, 525, 412 S.E.2d 20, 24 (1992)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "333 N.C. 467", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2549576 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "478", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Torres, 330 N.C. 517, 525, 412 S.E.2d 20, 24 (1992)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/333/0467-01" ] }, { "cite": "139 L. Ed. 2d 177", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. 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App. 562", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11916476 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "565" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/119/0562-01" ] }, { "cite": "155 L. Ed. 2d 673", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. 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App. 756", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9131717 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "762" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/149/0756-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 874, "char_count": 18310, "ocr_confidence": 0.755, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.19933442387273e-08, "percentile": 0.43047181515215754 }, "sha256": "543ac6c017bac9dcbd50ee43ddccd553d80fc9a5e76ad71c7003547289108c79", "simhash": "1:c32a533a52e51366", "word_count": 3026 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:32:21.116750+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges STEELMAN and BEASLEY concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ARTHUR DEVON LITTLE" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "BRYANT, Judge.\nDefendant Arthur Devon Little was tried for first-degree murder at the 15 February 2009 Criminal Session of the Superior Court, Craven County. Prior to trial, on 12 February 2009, the trial court denied defendant\u2019s motion to suppress his statement to police. On 27 February 2009, the jury returned a verdict of guilty, and the trial court sentenced defendant to life in prison without the possibility of parole. Defendant appeals. For the reasons discussed herein, we affirm.\nFacts\nThe evidence tended to show the following. Defendant and the victim, Anthony Terail Jones, had a volatile relationship. In the fall of 2005, defendant planned to sell crack cocaine to Jones, but Jones pulled a gun on defendant and stole the drugs instead. Defendant also believed Jones had broken into his home, and defendant\u2019s longtime girlfriend, Anne Marie Santos, testified that Jones was one of two men who had robbed her at gunpoint. On 13 June 2006, defendant took another one of his girlfriends to the U.S. Cellular in New Bern and waited in the car while she went inside. Jones and his girlfriend were at the same store purchasing a phone. When defendant recognized Jones\u2019 car in the parking lot, defendant called his brother and a friend to come over and beat up Jones. The two men arrived at the store and waited outside; defendant remained in his car. As Jones and his girlfriend left the store, Jones saw defendant\u2019s brother and friend and ran away from them towards defendant\u2019s car. Defendant shot Jones several times and then drove away from the scene. Defendant testified that he shot Jones in a panic. Jones died from multiple gunshot wounds.\nAfter driving around and learning from family members that his brother had been arrested, defendant went to the New Bern police department to turn himself in. Defendant was met in the lobby by Deputy Matt Heckman, who knew defendant. Deputy Heckman patted defendant down and placed him in a report writing room with an open door. Deputy Heckman then left the room and asked another officer to \u201ckeep an eye on him.\u201d Deputy Heckman offered defendant pizza, which defendant accepted. Detective Paul Brown then arrived and asked defendant to step into an interview room upstairs. Detective-Brown assured defendant he was not under arrest and then interviewed defendant about the events at the U.S. Cellular store. Another detective observed the interview from an adjoining room and took notes. When the interview touched on Jones\u2019 shooting, defendant asked if he needed an attorney. Detective Brown replied \u201cI don\u2019t know, I can\u2019t answer that for you, are you asking for one?\u201d Defendant did not reply to this question and continued talking with the detective. At one point, defendant said he was leaving but did not, and instead, continued the interview. Defendant eventually admitted shooting Jones and gave the detective details about the crime. When Detective Brown asked defendant to write out a statement, defendant asked for an attorney and the interview ended. Defendant moved to suppress his statement to Detective Brown, which motion the trial court denied. Defendant appeals. As discussed below, we affirm.\nDefendant made one hundred and eleven assignments of error, but presents only a single argument in his brief to this Court. His argument is that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statement to the police. We affirm.\nStandard of Review\nDefendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. We disagree.\nOn appeal, our\n\u201creview of a trial court\u2019s denial of a motion to suppress in a criminal proceeding is strictly limited to a determination of whether the court\u2019s findings are supported by competent evidence, even if the evidence is conflicting, and in turn, whether those findings support the court\u2019s conclusions of law.\u201d In re Pittman, 149 N.C. App. 756, 762, 561 S.E.2d 560, 565 (citation omitted), disc. review denied, 356 N.C. 163, 568 S.E.2d 608 (2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 982, 155 L. Ed. 2d 673 (2003). \u201c[I]f so, the trial court\u2019s conclusions of law are binding on appeal.\u201d State v. West, 119 N.C. App. 562, 565, 459 S.E.2d 55, 57, disc. review denied, 341 N.C. 656, 462 S.E.2d 524 (1995).\nState v. Veazey, - N.C. App. \u2014, - S.E.2d -, \u2014 (2009). Where a defendant fails to challenge the findings of fact in an order denying a motion to suppress, this Court\u2019s review is \u201climited to whether the trial court\u2019s findings of fact support its conclusions of law.\u201d State v. Cheek, 351 N.C. 48, 63, 520 S.E.2d 545, 554 (1999), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1245, 147 L. Ed. 2d 965 (2000).\nHere, the trial court\u2019s order denying defendant\u2019s motion contains one hundred and seventeen findings of fact and eighteen conclusions of law. In his assignments of error, defendant challenges findings 6-8, 11-15,19-20, 26-30, 33-35, 37-47, 49, 52-54, 56-117, and all eighteen conclusions. However, in his brief defendant does not challenge any specific findings of fact as unsupported by competent evidence. Thus, all of the trial court\u2019s findings of fact are conclusive on appeal. Id. Instead, defendant quotes findings 18, 21-22, 32, 47-53, 55 and 99 in his brief with approval, asserting that \u201c[t]hese findings more clearly support the Conclusion of Law that [defendant] was in custody when he made all of his statements to Detective Brown.\u201d Defendant also argues that finding 58 does not support a conclusion that he did not request an attorney. We therefore review the trial court\u2019s order to determine whether the findings of fact support conclusions 2-7 which relate to whether defendant (I) was in custody and (II) requested an attorney during the interview.\nI\nDefendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress, contending that he was in custody when questioned by police and, thus, was entitled to be advised of his Miranda rights. We disagree.\nStatements obtained as a result of custodial interrogation when a defendant has not been advised of his constitutional rights are inadmissible. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 706 (1966). The appellate courts of this State have\nconsistently held that the rule of Miranda applies only where a defendant is subjected to custodial interrogation. See, e.g., State v. Phipps, 331 N.C. 427, 442, 418 S.E.2d 178, 185 (1992). . . . Custodial interrogation \u201c \u2018means questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.\u2019 \u201d Phipps, 331 N.C. at 441, 418 S.E.2d at 185 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. 436 at 444, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 at 706)....\nThe United States Supreme Court has held that in determining whether a suspect was in custody, an appellate court must examine all the circumstances surrounding the interrogation; but the definitive inquiry is whether there was a formal arrest or a restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest. Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 128 L. Ed. 2d 293, 114 S. Ct. 1526 (1994) (per curiam). The United States Supreme Court has recognized that any interview of a suspect by a police officer will have coercive aspects to it. Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 50 L. Ed. 2d 714, 97 S. Ct. 711 (1977) (per curiam). However, the United States Supreme Court has also recognized that Miranda warnings are not required \u201csimply because the questioning takes place in the station house, or because the questioned person is one whom the police suspect.\u201d Id. at 495, 50 L. Ed. 2d at 719.\nState v. Gaines, 345 N.C. 647, 661-62, 483 S.E.2d 396, 404-05, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 900, 139 L. Ed. 2d 177 (1997). Defendant cites State v. Hicks for the proposition that the test for determining whether he was in custody for Miranda purposes is \u201c \u2018whether a reasonable person in his position would feel free to leave\u2019 or would feel \u2018compelled to stay.\u2019 \u201d 333 N.C. 467, 478, 428 S.E.2d 167, 173 (1993) (quoting State v. Torres, 330 N.C. 517, 525, 412 S.E.2d 20, 24 (1992)). However, our Supreme Court has rejected the \u201cfree to leave\u201d test for Miranda purposes and specifically overruled Hicks and Torres to the extent they appear to endorse that test. State v. Buchanan, 353 N.C. 332, 340, 543 S.E.2d 823, 828 (2001). Instead, the ultimate inquiry on appellate review is whether there were indicia of formal arrest. Id.\nThe uncontested findings show the following. Defendant voluntarily drove to the police station approximately six hours after the shooting. There was no warrant for defendant\u2019s arrest nor had the police attempted to contact him or request his presence for an interview. Deputy Heckman, who knew defendant, met him in the public lobby and invited defendant into the secure area of the station. The secure area of the station required a passkey for entry, but anyone could leave the secure area to exit the building without any type of key. Deputy Heckman took defendant into a \u201creport writing room\u201d, patted him down for weapons and told him that an investigator wanted to speak with him. Defendant did not object to the frisk, and Deputy Heckman never mentioned the shooting or asked defendant any questions about it. The door to the room remained open while defendant waited. Deputy Heckman never told defendant he was under arrest or could not leave, never handcuffed him, and never spoke to him in an intimidating manner.\nDetective Brown met defendant approximately twenty to thirty minutes after defendant\u2019s arrival at the station. He introduced himself to defendant and told him he was not under arrest and was free to leave. Detective Brown then suggested to defendant that they speak upstairs where it was quieter. At the station elevator, Detective Brown again told defendant he was not under arrest and was free to leave. Defendant voluntarily accompanied Detective Brown and another officer upstairs. When they entered the upstairs interview room, Detective Brown told defendant once again that he was not under arrest and was free to leave. Unbeknownst to defendant, the other officer entered an adjacent room and took notes on the interview. Detective Brown then began to question defendant about his actions during the day and about the shooting. At one point defendant stood up and said \u201cI\u2019m trying to leave, I didn\u2019t do it.\u201d Detective Brown did not restrain defendant who then sat back down and continued talking. About sixty to ninety minutes into the interview, defendant made numerous inculpatory statements about the shooting. The interview continued until defendant was asked to write out a statement at which point he refused and requested an attorney. Detective Brown immediately ended the interview.\nDefendant contends that \u201c[bringing someone inside the secure area of the police station indicates some level of custody\u201d but cites no authority for this proposition. However, \u201cMiranda warnings are not required \u2018simply because the questioning takes place in the station house[.]\u2019 \u201d Gaines, 345 N.C. at 662, 483 S.E.2d at 405 (quoting Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495, 50 L. Ed. 2d at 719).\nDefendant next asserts that Deputy Heckman acted as a guard in standing outside the open door of the report writing room while awaiting Detective Brown\u2019s arrival and in asking another officer to watch defendant so he would not leave while Deputy Heckman was getting defendant some pizza. Defendant also cites the presence of the note-taking officer in the room adjacent to the interview room as a circumstance indicating the defendant was in custody. The trial court did find that Deputy Heckman stayed in the hallway to keep defendant from leaving but also found that defendant was unaware of the officer\u2019s intentions and was unaware that Deputy Heckman had asked another officer to watch him. Likewise, the trial court found that defendant was not aware of the officer who took notes during the interview. \u201c \u2018A policeman\u2019s unarticulated plan has no bearing on the question whether a suspect was \u201cin custody\u201d at a particular time; the only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect\u2019s position would have understood his situation.\u2019 \u201d Buchanan, 353 N.C. at 341-42, 543 S.E.2d at 829 (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442, 82 L. Ed. 2d 317, 336 (1984)). The presence of the note-taking officer and Deputy Heckman\u2019s unarticulated determination not to let defendant leave have no bearing on whether defendant was in custody since defendant was unaware of these facts.\nThe trial court\u2019s findings of fact support its conclusions that defendant was not in custody and was not entitled to Miranda warnings. We overrule defendant\u2019s assignments of error on this point.\nII\nDefendant next argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress, contending that he invoked his right to counsel prior to making inculpatory statements. We disagree.\nOnce a suspect invokes his right to counsel during a custodial interrogation, \u201call questioning must cease until an attorney is present or the suspect initiates further communication with the police.\u201d State v. Dix, 194 N.C. App. 151, 155, 669 S.E.2d 25, 28 (2008) (citing Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485, 68 L. Ed. 2d 378, 386 (1981)), appeal dismissed and disc. review denied, 363 N.C. 376, 679 S.E.2d 140 (2009). A suspect must \u201cat a minimum, [make] some statement that can reasonably be construed to be an expression of a desire for the assistance of an attorney ....\u201d McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 178, 115 L. Ed. 2d 158, 169 (1991). \u201cHowever, \u2018[i]f the suspect\u2019s statement is not an unambiguous or unequivocal request for counsel, the officers have no obligation to stop questioning him.\u2019 \u201d Dix, 194 N.C. App. at 155, 669 S.E.2d at 28 (quoting Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 461-62, 129 L. Ed. 2d 362, 373 (1994). In dicta, the Davis Court suggested that \u201cwhen a suspect makes an ambiguous statement it will often be good police practice for the interviewing officer]] to clarify whether or not he actually wants an attorney.\u201d Davis, 512 U.S. at 461, 129 L. Ed. 2d at 373.\nHere, the trial court found:\n(58) The Defendant then asked Brown, \u201cDo you want to know if I shot him?\u201d Brown said, \u201cDid you?\u201d The Defendant said, \u201cDo I need an attorney?\u201d and Brown replied, \u201cI don\u2019t know, I can\u2019t answer that for you, are you asking for one?\u201d\n(59) The Defendant\u2019s response was, \u201cI know a guy got shot at the U.S. Cellular by some guy named Troy.\u201d The Defendant did not respond to Brown\u2019s question regarding the Defendant\u2019s wishes regarding an attorney nor did he allude to an attorney again until the end of the interview. The Defendant did not try to leave.\nDefendant argues that he made a sufficiently unambiguous request for counsel to halt questioning and contends this exchange was similar to that in Torres. Defendant also cites Torres for the proposition that in custodial situations, \u201cwhen faced with an ambiguous invocation of counsel, interrogation must immediately cease except for narrow questions designed to clarify the person\u2019s true intent.\u201d 330 N.C. at 529, 412 S.E.2d at 27.\nWe first note that, as discussed above, defendant was not in custody at the time of the interview and, thus, there was no custodial interrogation. Therefore, defendant was not entitled to the protections of Miranda and its progeny. However, out of an abundance of caution and as a guide to our trial courts, we address this portion of defendant\u2019s argument as well.\nTorres, the only case cited by defendant on this point, was decided prior to Davis. This Court has since held that \u201cDavis [] imposes the burden of resolving any ambiguity as to whether a suspect wishes to invoke his right to counsel upon the individual, rather than leaving the question up to the interrogating officer.\u201d Dix, 194 N.C. App. at 157, 669 S.E.2d at 29. \u201c[Clarifying questions [by the interviewing officer] are not required.\u201d Id. at 156, 669 S.E.2d at 28. In Dix, the defendant stated \u201cI\u2019m probably gonna [sic] have to have a lawyer.\u201d Id. The interviewing officer then responded, \u201cIt\u2019s up to you if you wanna [sic] answer questions or not. I mean, you can answer till you don\u2019t feel comfortable, whatever and then not answer. Ya [sic] know, that\u2019s totally up to you. I know earlier you said you was [sic] wanting to talk to me because ....\u201d Id. at 158, 669 S.E.2d at 29. We held that \u201cthe trial court\u2019s assumption that [the interviewing officer] was required to ask clarifying questions, and its subsequent conclusion that it was required to resolve any ambiguity in the defendant\u2019s favor were error.\u201d Id.\nHere, defendant did not unambiguously ask for an attorney; rather, he asked Detective Brown\u2019s opinion about the matter. Although not required to do so, Detective Brown asked the clarifying question \u201care you asking for one?\u201d Defendant failed to respond and instead continued telling the detective about the shooting. Thus, Detective Brown went beyond what is required under State and federal case law. The trial court\u2019s findings fully support its conclusions that defendant did not unambiguously ask for an attorney. Defendant\u2019s assignments of error on this issue are overruled.\nAffirmed.\nJudges STEELMAN and BEASLEY concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "BRYANT, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Steven F. Bryant, for the State.", "Richard E. Jester for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ARTHUR DEVON LITTLE\nNo. COA09-1223\n(Filed 4 May 2010)\n1. Confessions and Incriminating Statements\u2014 interrogation not custodial \u2014 inside police station \u2014 officer\u2019s unarticulated intent\nThe trial court correctly ruled that a first-degree murder defendant was not in custody and was not entitled to Miranda warnings when he gave inculpatory statements to police. Defendant was brought into the secure area of the police station; although there was an officer outside the open door and another taking notes in an adjacent room, defendant was not aware of thes\u00e9 facts.\n2. Constitutional Law\u2014 right to counsel \u2014 interrogation room \u2014 request not custodial\nAlthough a first-degree murder defendant was not in custody, the Court of Appeals ruled as a guide to the trial courts that defendant did not unambiguously ask for an attorney.\nAppeal by defendant from order entered 12 February 2009 by Judge Kenneth F. Crow in Craven County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 24 February 2010.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Steven F. Bryant, for the State.\nRichard E. Jester for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0684-01", "first_page_order": 712, "last_page_order": 720 }