{ "id": 4176874, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. MICHAEL BROOKS", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Brooks", "decision_date": "2010-05-18", "docket_number": "No. COA09-1068", "first_page": "193", "last_page": "198", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "204 N.C. App. 193" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "632 S.E.2d 777", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12636398 ], "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/632/0777-01" ] }, { "cite": "670 S.E.2d 610", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12642405 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "614" }, { "page": "614" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/670/0610-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-27", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "689 S.E.2d 510", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "517" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-206.6", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(la)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "333 S.E.2d 749", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "751" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "76 N.C. App. 447", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527440 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "450" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/76/0447-01" ] }, { "cite": "179 N.C. App. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8233996 ], "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/179/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "689 S.E.2d 562", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "565" }, { "page": "566" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "677 S.E.2d 518", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "527" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "510 S.E.2d 177", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "177" }, { "page": "177" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "132 N.C. App. 42", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11236901 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "43" }, { "page": "43" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/132/0042-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.6", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(5)" }, { "page": "(6)" }, { "page": "(5)" }, { "page": "(5)" }, { "page": "(la)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 7, "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 506, "char_count": 12236, "ocr_confidence": 0.742, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.46548945041385e-07, "percentile": 0.8059622394973607 }, "sha256": "ddfc584d7ade3154af4920b6fac08a895151d52c0c61ce13c37c63fe06e8590d", "simhash": "1:0bab6462d33b0bc6", "word_count": 2025 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:38:54.150336+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges STEELMAN and BEASLEY concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. MICHAEL BROOKS" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "McGEE, Judge.\nMichael Brooks (Defendant) was indicted for second-degree rape, second-degree sexual offense, and assault by strangulation. He was also charged with sexual battery in a subsequently filed information. Defendant entered a guilty plea to assault by strangulation and sexual battery on 5 January 2009. The trial court found as an aggravating factor that Defendant was on probation when the crimes were committed and sentenced Defendant to consecutive terms of 25 to 30 months and 150 days in prison.\nPursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40B, the trial court conducted a hearing to determine Defendant\u2019s eligibility for enrollment in a satellite-based monitoring program (SBM) on 24 April 2009. The trial court made the following pertinent findings: (1) Defendant was convicted of a reportable offense under N.C. Gen. Stat. 14-208.6, in that his conviction was for a sexually violent offense under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.6(5); (2) Defendant was not classified as a sexually violent predator; (3) Defendant was not a recidivist; (4) Defendant\u2019s conviction was an aggravated offense; and (5) Defendant\u2019s conviction did not involve the physical, mental, or sexual abuse of a minor. Upon release from imprisonment, the trial court ordered Defendant to (1) register as a sex offender and (2) to enroll in an SBM program, both for the remainder of his natural life. Defendant appeals from the trial court\u2019s order requiring him to enroll in an SBM program for the remainder of his natural life.\nGrounds for Appellate Review\nDefendant gave oral notice of appeal at the SBM hearing from the trial court\u2019s order requiring him to enroll in an SBM program for the remainder of his natural life. While oral notice of appeal is proper in \u201ccriminal action[s,]\u201d as permitted under N.C.R. App. P. 4(a)(1), oral notice of appeal is insufficient to confer jurisdiction on this Court in civil proceedings. N.C.R. App. P. 3(a); Melvin v. St. Louis, 132 N.C. App. 42, 43, 510 S.E.2d 177, 177 (1999). We note that Defendant is appealing only from the trial court\u2019s order requiring him to enroll in SBM for life, and not from his underlying conviction. Because this is a jurisdictional issue, we must first determine whether Defendant\u2019s oral notice of appeal was sufficient in this case.\nOur Court has held that SBM hearings and proceedings are not criminal actions, but are instead a \u201ccivil regulatory scheme[.]\u201d State v. Bare, -N.C. App. -, -, 677 S.E.2d 518, 527 (2009). In State v. Singleton, -N.C. App. \u2014, 689 S.E.2d 562 (2010), our Court further determined that: \u201cTherefore, for purposes of appeal, a SBM hearing is not a \u2018criminal trial or proceeding\u2019 for which a right of appeal is based upon N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1442 or N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1444.\u201d Singleton, -N.C. App. at \u2014, 689 S.E.2d at 565. We note that in Singleton, our Court determined that we have \u201cjurisdiction to consider appeals from SBM monitoring determinations under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40B pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-27.\u201d Id. at -, 689 S.E.2d at 566. In light of our decisions interpreting an SBM hearing as not being a criminal trial or proceeding for purposes of appeal, we must hold that oral notice pursuant to N.C.R. App. P. 4(a)(1) is insufficient to confer jurisdiction on this Court. Instead, a defendant must give notice of appeal pursuant to N.C.R. App. P. 3(a) as is proper \u201cin a civil action or special proceeding].]\u201d N.C.R. App. P. 3(a).\nN.C.R. App. P. 3(a) requires that a party \u201cfil[e] notice of appeal with the clerk of superior court and serv[e] copies thereof upon all other parties].]\u201d Id. Because the record on appeal does not contain a written notice of appeal filed with the clerk of superior court, which was served upon the State, this appeal must be dismissed. Melvin, 132 N.C. App. at 43, 510 S.E.2d at 177; see also Putman v. Alexander, - N.C. App. -, -, 670 S.E.2d 610, 614 (2009). However, in his brief, Defendant requests that, should we find his notice of appeal insufficient, we treat his brief as a petition for writ of certiorari. In the interest of justice, and to expedite the decision in the public interest, we elect to grant Defendant\u2019s request to consider his brief as a petition for writ of certiorari. Putman, -N.C. App. at -, 670 S.E.2d at 614. We allow Defendant\u2019s petition for writ of certiorari and address the merits of his appeal.\nGrounds for Enrollment in SBM\nDefendant contends there was no basis for subjecting him to lifetime SBM. However, Defendant did not argue this issue in his brief. Ordinarily, an issue not argued in a brief is deemed abandoned. N.C.R. App. P. 28(a) (2009) (\u201cQuestions raised by assignments of error in appeals from trial tribunals but not then presented and discussed in a party\u2019s brief, are deemed abandoned.\u201d); N.C.R. App. P. 28(b)(6) (2009) (\u201cAssignments of error not set out in the appellant\u2019s brief, or in support of which no reason or argument is stated . . . will be taken as abandoned.\u201d). The State argues that our Court should, \u201cin the interest of justice,\u201d consider the issue of Defendant\u2019s eligibility for SBM. Likewise, in his reply brief, Defendant requests that we utilize our authority under N.C.R. App. P. 2 to consider this issue. We choose to exercise our discretion pursuant to Rule 2 in order to consider this issue. See State v. Hill, 179 N.C. App. 1, 632 S.E.2d 777 (2006). All other issues or questions not argued by Defendant in his brief are deemed abandoned. See Appeal of Parker, 76 N.C. App. 447, 450, 333 S.E.2d 749, 751 (1985).\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40B (2009) sets forth the procedure for determination of SBM eligibility. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40B(b) provides that a trial court shall conduct a hearing to make certain factual determinations. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40B(b) (2009).\nIf the court finds that (i) the offender has been classified as a sexually violent predator pursuant to G.S. 14-208.20, (ii) the offender is a recidivist, (iii) the conviction offense was an aggravated offense, or (iv) the conviction offense was a violation of G.S. 14-27.2A or G.S. 14-27.4A, the court shall order the offender to enroll in satellite-based monitoring for life.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40B(c) (2009). A sexually violent predator is\na person who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense and who suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes the person likely to engage in sexually violent offenses directed at strangers or at a person with whom a relationship has been established or promoted for the primary purpose of victimization.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.6(6) (2009). N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.6(5) contains a list of enumerated offenses which qualify as \u201c[s]exually violent offense[s.]\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.6(5) (2009).\nLikewise, \u201caggravated offense\u201d is defined in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.6(la) as\nany criminal offense that includes either of the following: (i) engaging in a sexual act involving vaginal, anal, or oral penetration with a victim of any age through the use of force or the threat of serious violence; or (ii) engaging in a sexual act involving vaginal, anal, or oral penetration with a victim who is less than 12 years old.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-206.6(la) (2009).\nIn the case before us, the trial court found that \u201cDefendant ha[d] not been classified as a sexually violent predator[,]\u201d and was not a recidivist. Further, Defendant was not \u201cconvicted of G.S. 14-27.2A or G.S. 14-27.4A[,]\u201d as required by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-208.40B(c). Thus, the only finding which supported the trial court\u2019s order requiring Defendant to enroll in SBM for life was its finding that \u201cthis conviction is an aggravated offense.\u201d\nOur Court recently held that, in determining whether an offense was an aggravated offense for the purposes of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-208.40A, a trial court looks only to the elements of the offense and not to the underlying facts giving rise to the conviction. State v. Davison, -N.C. App. -, -, 689 S.E.2d 510, 517 (2009). In Singleton, this interpretation was extended to hearings conducted pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-208.40B, such as the one in the case before us. Singleton, -N.C. App. at -, 689 S.E.2d at 567. Defendant in the present case was convicted of sexual battery, as defined in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-27.5A:\nA person is guilty of sexual battery if the person, for the purpose of sexual arousal, sexual gratification, or sexual abuse, engages in sexual contact with another person:\n(1) By force and against the will of the other person; or\n(2) Who is mentally disabled, mentally incapacitated, or physically helpless, and the person performing the act knows or should reasonably know that the other person is mentally disabled, mentally incapacitated, or physically helpless.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-27.5A(a) (2009). Comparing the elements of sexual battery with the definition of \u201caggravated offense\u201d set forth in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-208.6(la), we find significant differences between the two.\nAn aggravated offense requires, in pertinent part, \u201cengaging in a sexual act involving vaginal, anal, or oral penetration with a victim of any age through the use of force or the threat of serious violence[.]\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-208.6(la). As described above, a conviction for sexual battery does not require that a defendant engage in \u201cvaginal, anal, or oral penetration\u201d with the victim. Rather, sexual battery contemplates any \u201csexual contact\u201d with a victim carried out by force, and against the will of the victim, or against a person who is \u201cmentally disabled, mentally incapacitated, or physically helpless, and the person performing the act knows or should reasonably know that the other person is mentally disabled, mentally incapacitated, or physically helpless.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-27.5A(a). Thus, because sexual battery does not involve \u201cvaginal, anal, or oral penetration[,]\u201d sexual battery is not an \u201caggravated offense\u201d for the purposes of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-208.40B.\nBecause the trial court\u2019s sole basis for ordering Defendant to enroll in lifetime SBM was its erroneous finding that Defendant was convicted of an aggravated offense, we must reverse the trial court\u2019s order.\nThe State requests that we remand this case to the trial court for its determination of whether \u201cDefendant should be deemed a sexually violent offender and subjected to SBM on that basis.\u201d However, the State presents no argument that the trial court\u2019s determination that Defendant was not a sexually violent offender was error, and we are not convinced that this finding need be addressed on remand. We note that in Davison, our Court remanded to the trial court with instructions to follow the procedure set forth in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-208.40A. Davison, - N.C. App. at -, 689 S.E.2d at 517. However, in the matter before us, the trial court\u2019s error was not in failing to follow the procedure in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-208.40B. Instead, the trial court erred in concluding that sexual battery was an aggravated offence. Because the trial court\u2019s order was based on an erroneous conclusion and there was no further procedural error, we need only reverse the trial court\u2019s order. In light of our decision, we need not address Defendant\u2019s remaining assignments of error.\nReversed.\nJudges STEELMAN and BEASLEY concur.\n. We note that Defendant\u2019s appeal was filed on 17 August 2009, prior to the amendments to the Rules of Appellate Procedure, which took effect 1 October 2009. We therefore apply the version of the Rules effective prior to 1 October 2009.", "type": "majority", "author": "McGEE, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Thomas H. Moore, for the State.", "Robert W. Ewing for Defendant-Appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. MICHAEL BROOKS\nNo. COA09-1068\n(Filed 18 May 2010)\nSexual Offenders\u2014 satellite-based monitoring \u2014 sexual battery not an aggravated offense\nThe Court of Appeals exercised its discretion under N.C. R. App. P. 2 and determined that the trial court erred in an assault by strangulation and sexual battery case by requiring defendant to enroll in lifetime satellite-based monitoring. Sexual battery is not an \u201caggravated offense\u201d for the purposes of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-208.40B.\nAppeal by Defendant from order entered 24 April 2009 by Judge R. Allen Baddour in Superior Court, Orange County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 10 February 2010.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Thomas H. Moore, for the State.\nRobert W. Ewing for Defendant-Appellant." }, "file_name": "0193-01", "first_page_order": 217, "last_page_order": 222 }