{ "id": 4176395, "name": "IN THE MATTER OF: W.V.", "name_abbreviation": "In re W.V.", "decision_date": "2010-06-01", "docket_number": "No. COA09-1568", "first_page": "290", "last_page": "300", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "204 N.C. App. 290" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "621 S.E.2d 647", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12634400 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "651-52" }, { "page": "652" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/621/0647-01" ] }, { "cite": "644 S.E.2d 588", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12638413 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "595" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/644/0588-01" ] }, { "cite": "641 S.E.2d 302", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12637819, 12637820 ], "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/641/0302-01", "/se2d/641/0302-02" ] }, { "cite": "637 S.E.2d 218", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12637222, 12637223 ], "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/637/0218-01", "/se2d/637/0218-02" ] }, { "cite": "631 S.E.2d 19", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12636086 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "22" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/631/0019-01" ] }, { "cite": "641 S.E.2d 395", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12637852 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "399" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/641/0395-01" ] }, { "cite": "528 S.E.2d 600", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "603" }, { "page": "603", "parenthetical": "\"Because section 7A-650 does not provide the trial court with authority to order a parent to obtain housing or employment, we modify the trial court's order to exclude this portion of the order.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "137 N.C. App. 504", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11094321 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "508" }, { "page": "508" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/137/0504-01" ] }, { "cite": "268 S.E.2d 185", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "189" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "300 N.C. 708", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564644 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "712" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/300/0708-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-13.4", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(c)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "353 S.E.2d 673", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "675" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "84 N.C. App. 666", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12169132 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "667" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/84/0666-01" ] }, { "cite": "174 N.C. App. 517", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8352485 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "521-23" }, { "page": "523" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/174/0517-01" ] }, { "cite": "183 N.C. App. 207", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8202464 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "215" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/183/0207-01" ] }, { "cite": "491 S.E.2d 672", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "676" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "127 N.C. App. 505", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11798267 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "511" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/127/0505-01" ] }, { "cite": "678 S.E.2d 778", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "781" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "582 S.E.2d 255", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "258" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "357 N.C. 279", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 491833 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "283" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/357/0279-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 N.C. 231", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3746300 ], "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/361/0231-01" ] }, { "cite": "360 N.C. 647", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3787875, 3788325, 3786094, 3793198, 3790550, 3798232, 3795833, 3794527 ], "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/360/0647-07", "/nc/360/0647-01", "/nc/360/0647-05", "/nc/360/0647-02", "/nc/360/0647-04", "/nc/360/0647-06", "/nc/360/0647-03", "/nc/360/0647-08" ] }, { "cite": "178 N.C. App. 110", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8376345 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "113" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/178/0110-01" ] }, { "cite": "436 S.E.2d 898", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "901-02" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "112 N.C. App. 747", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523795 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "752" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/112/0747-01" ] }, { "cite": "152 L. Ed. 2d 381", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "535 U.S. 971", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 354467, 355206, 354599, 352300, 354733, 355215, 354608, 353457, 353364, 351830, 352184, 353755 ], "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/535/0971-12", "/us/535/0971-05", "/us/535/0971-09", "/us/535/0971-01", "/us/535/0971-07", "/us/535/0971-04", "/us/535/0971-10", "/us/535/0971-08", "/us/535/0971-03", "/us/535/0971-11", "/us/535/0971-02", "/us/535/0971-06" ] }, { "cite": "554 S.E.2d 331", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "332" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "354 N.C. 336", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 138423 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "338" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/354/0336-01" ] }, { "cite": "316 S.E.2d 246", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "252-53" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "311 N.C. 101", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4679227 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "110-11" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/311/0101-01" ] }, { "cite": "539 S.E.2d 362", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "365", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "141 N.C. App. 475", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9441627 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "480", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/141/0475-01" ] }, { "cite": "182 N.C. App. 79", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8168761 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "86" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/182/0079-01" ] }, { "cite": "408 S.E.2d 729", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "731" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "330 N.C. 93", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2510111 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "97" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/330/0093-01" ] }, { "cite": "629 S.E.2d 178", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12635724 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "179", "parenthetical": "internal quotations and citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/629/0178-01" ] }, { "cite": "177 N.C. App. 459", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8301613 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "460", "parenthetical": "internal quotations and citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/177/0459-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 110-132", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(b)" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 110-129", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(7)" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-13.4", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(b)" } ], "opinion_index": 1 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 971, "char_count": 23572, "ocr_confidence": 0.746, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.972088569092228e-07, "percentile": 0.8503657935269585 }, "sha256": "45dda5676d60f757d95dc38400fb586e333c1708a865ed0db8040584221e451d", "simhash": "1:cde9c54ad629dff2", "word_count": 3854 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:38:54.150336+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judge STEPHENS concurs.", "Judge CALABRIA concurs in part and dissents in part in a separate opinion." ], "parties": [ "IN THE MATTER OF: W.V." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "BRYANT, Judge.\nPetitioner Buncombe County Department of Social Services filed a juvenile petition on 6 April 2009 alleging that W.V. (hereinafter referred to as \u201cchild\u201d) is neglected in that he does not receive proper care, supervision, or discipline from his parents and lives in an environment injurious to his welfare. The child\u2019s mother stipulated to the petition\u2019s allegations and to adjudication of the child as neglected. Respondent refused to stipulate to the allegations and requested a trial. By order filed 15 September 2009, the Buncombe County Superior Court adjudicated the child neglected and placed him in the home of his mother. Respondent appeals. As discussed below, we affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand.\nFacts\nRespondent has not contested the court\u2019s findings of fact which are therefore deemed binding. Koufman v. Koufman, 330 N.C. 93, 97, 408 S.E.2d 729, 731 (1991). These findings show the following: The child\u2019s mother and respondent are not married. On 12 September 2008, petitioner received a report that the Buncombe County Sheriff\u2019s Department found a marijuana plant and drug paraphernalia in the residence shared by respondent, the child, and the child\u2019s mother. In response to the report, a social worker visited the family at home. Respondent reported that he smokes marijuana regularly but outside of the house. He also acknowledged that he has a marijuana plant growing in the living room window but felt it was safe from the child\u2019s access because it was protected by a baby gate. The social worker noted that respondent did most of the talking and prevented the mother from responding to questions. When the social worker asked to speak to the mother alone, the maternal great-grandmother positioned herself out of respondent\u2019s line of sight and made a choking gesture. The social worker waited for respondent to return to work and spoke privately with the mother, who told her that she did not agree with having the marijuana plant in the home. The social worker also subsequently spoke to respondent\u2019s ex-wife, who reported a long history of domestic violence with respondent and that she had ended the marriage because of it.\nOn 13 October 2008, the mother reported to the social worker that approximately two weeks earlier she told respondent that she wanted to end their relationship and respondent ripped off her clothes and ripped the telephone off the wall. The mother also related that respondent had used the child as a shield as he pushed her repeatedly. She described another incident in which respondent choked her to unconsciousness while she was pregnant with the child. After meeting with the social worker, the mother obtained a domestic violence protective order and moved with the child to a new residence separate from respondent.\nOn 16 December 2008, a program manager for petitioner spoke to respondent by telephone. During this conversation respondent became verbally abusive, calling the program manager a \u201cbitch,\u201d and telling the program manager that she and all of the women at the department were stupid. On 29 December 2008, a social worker spoke to respondent after a supervised visit with the child about completing a case plan and attending domestic violence classes. Respondent refused to sign a case plan or attend any classes and accused DSS of being full of man-haters biased against him because of the prior domestic abuse involving his ex-wife.\nBased upon these findings, the court adjudicated the child neglected and directed the child be placed with his mother. The court also ordered respondent to obtain stable employment, to complete a domestic violence education program, to complete a substance abuse assessment and follow all recommendations, to keep two appointments per month with the social worker, to have supervised visitation with the child, to submit to DNA testing to verify paternity of the child, to attend all child and family team meetings, and to pay child support to the mother in the amount of $100 per month.\nRespondent makes six arguments on appeal: (I) the findings of fact did not support the conclusion that the child was neglected under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-101(15); (II) the findings were insufficient to support the visitation order; (III) the visitation order violates the requirements of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-905(c); (IV) the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to order respondent to pay child support; (V) the findings of fact were insufficient to support the conclusion that respondent pay child support; and (VI) the trial court lacked statutory authority to order respondent to obtain and maintain stable employment. As discussed herein, we affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand.\nStandard of Review\nWhen this Court reviews an order in a juvenile abuse, neglect or dependency proceeding, we determine whether the trial court made proper findings of fact and conclusions of law in its adjudication and disposition orders. In re J.S., 182 N.C. App. 79, 86, 641 S.E.2d 395, 399 (2007). In so doing, we consider whether clear and convincing evidence in the record supports the findings and whether the findings support the trial court\u2019s conclusions. In re Gleisner, 141 N.C. App. 475, 480, 539 S.E.2d 362, 365 (2000) (citations omitted). If there is evidence to support the trial court\u2019s findings of fact, they are deemed conclusive even though there may be evidence to support contrary findings. In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101, 110-11, 316 S.E.2d 246, 252-53 (1984). We consider matters of statutory interpretation de novo. Piedmont Triad Airport Auth. v. Urbine, 354 N.C. 336, 338, 554 S.E.2d 331, 332 (2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 971, 152 L. Ed. 2d 381 (2002).\nI\nRespondent first argues the trial court\u2019s findings of fact do not support its conclusion of law that the child was neglected. We disagree.\nBy statutory definition, a neglected juvenile is one \u201cwho does not receive proper care, supervision, or discipline from the juvenile\u2019s parent\u201d or \u201cwho lives in an environment injurious to the juvenile\u2019s welfare ... .\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-101(15) (2009). \u201c[T]his Court has consistently required that there be some physical, mental, or emotional impairment of the juvenile or a substantial risk of such impairment as a consequence of the failure to provide \u2018proper care, supervision, or discipline.\u2019 \u201d In re Safriet, 112 N.C. App. 747, 752, 436 S.E.2d 898, 901-02 (1993). \u201cIt is well-established that the trial court need not wait for actual harm to occur to the child if there is a substantial risk of harm to the child in the home.\u201d In re T.S., III & S.M., 178 N.C. App. 110, 113, 631 S.E.2d 19, 22, disc. review denied, 360 N.C. 647, 637 S.E.2d 218 (2006), aff\u2019d per curiam on other grounds, 361 N.C. 231, 641 S.E.2d 302 (2007). Our Supreme Court has stated that \u201csevere or dangerous conduct or a pattern of conduct either causing injury or potentially causing injury to the juvenile\u201d may include alcohol or substance abuse by the parent and driving while impaired with a child as a passenger. In re Stumbo, 357 N.C. 279, 283, 582 S.E.2d 255, 258 (2003). This Court has held that exposure of the child to drug use, acts of domestic violence, threatening or abusive behavior toward social workers and police officers, and infliction of injury by a parent to another child or parent, can be conduct causing or potentially causing injury to minors. See In re D.B.J., -N.C. App. -, -, 678 S.E.2d 778, 781 (2009); In re Helms, 127 N.C. App. 505, 511, 491 S.E.2d 672, 676 (1997).\nHere, unchallenged findings of fact show that respondent grew and consumed an illegal controlled substance in the child\u2019s home, engaged in domestic violence in the child\u2019s presence, choked the child\u2019s mother to unconsciousness while the child was in vitro, called a social worker by a derogatory word, insulted the intelligence of social workers, raised his voice to social workers, and engaged in domestic violence with a prior spouse. We hold these findings support the conclusion of law that the child lives in an environment injurious to his welfare and is therefore a neglected juvenile.\nII, III\nRespondent next argues the findings were insufficient to support the visitation order and the visitation order did not adopt an appropriate visitation plan. We hold that the findings support the visitation plan; however, the trial court erred in failing to provide a minimum outline for respondent\u2019s visitation.\n\u201cAny dispositional order under which a juvenile is removed from the custody of a parent, guardian, custodian, or caretaker . . . shall provide for appropriate visitation as may be in the best interests of the juvenile and consistent with the juvenile\u2019s health and safety.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-905(c) (2009). This Court reviews the trial court\u2019s decision whether it is in the best interests of the juvenile to award visitation to a parent for an abuse of discretion. In re C.M., 183 N.C. App. 207, 215, 644 S.E.2d 588, 595 (2007). If the court does award visitation to a parent, the order must include an appropriate visitation plan that sets out at least a minimum outline, such as the time, place, and conditions under which visitation may be exercised. In re E. C., 174 N.C. App. 517, 521-23, 621 S.E.2d 647, 651-52 (2005).\nRespondent contends the trial court failed to make sufficient findings of fact about both the appropriateness of supervised visitation and a minimum outline of visitation. As to the former, the trial court found that respondent \u201cdemonstrated a complete lack of understanding that his negative attitudes and violent behaviors are unacceptable and have negatively impact [sic] all of his children.\u201d The trial court further found that: respondent has not been consistent with his contact with the child; he has refused to enroll in classes offering assistance and education for the well-being of the child; although respondent states he loves the child, the guardian ad litem (\u201cGAL\u201d) \u201csees enough instability in the respondent father\u2019s emotional state to give the GAL alarm;\u201d petitioner recommended that it is in the best interest of the child that respondent have weekly visits supervised by petitioner; and the GAL recommended that it is in the best interest of the child that respondent \u201chave supervised, short visits only\u201d with the child. The court adopted petitioner\u2019s recommendation and found that it is in the child\u2019s best interest that respondent have weekly supervised visitation.\nWe hold these findings support the court\u2019s decision to award weekly visitation under petitioner\u2019s supervision. We find no abuse of discretion. However, nothing in the order establishes a minimum outline of visitation. The order only states that respondent shall have weekly visitations supervised by petitioner. We thus remand for proceedings to clarify respondent\u2019s visitation rights, including the establishment of a minimum outline of visitation. See In re E.C., 174 N.C. App. at 523, 621 S.E.2d at 652.\nIV, V\nRespondent also argues the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and statutory authority to order respondent to pay child support. We disagree. However, since the trial court failed to make sufficient findings of fact to support the amount ordered, we remand for further findings of fact and an appropriate child support order based thereupon.\nSubject matter jurisdiction \u201crefers to the power of the court to deal with the kind of action in question\u201d and \u201cis conferred upon the courts by either the North Carolina Constitution or by statute.\u201d Harris v. Pembaur, 84 N.C. App. 666, 667, 353 S.E.2d 673, 675 (1987). The district court \u201chas exclusive, original jurisdiction over any case involving a juvenile who is alleged to be abused, neglected, or dependent.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-200(a) (2009). In this case, DSS filed a juvenile petition with the district court alleging that the child was neglected and dependent. Accordingly, the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over the proceedings and orders at issue.\nPursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-903, dispositional alternatives for an abused, neglected, or dependent juvenile include \u201cplacement in the custody of a parent, relative, private agency offering placement services, [] some other suitable person[, or] the department of social services in the county of the juvenile\u2019s residence].]\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-903(2)(b) and (c). A court\u2019s authority to order a parent to pay child support in a dispositional order is derived from N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-904(d), which provides that\nwhen legal custody of a juvenile is vested in someone other than the juvenile\u2019s parent, if the court finds that the parent is able to do so, the court may order that the parent pay a reasonable sum that will cover, in whole or in part, the support of the juvenile after the order is entered.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-904(d) (2009) (emphasis added). We interpret the language of \u00a7 7B-904(d) as authorizing the trial court to order the parent with whom custody is not vested to pay child support to the party granted custody. Thus, where one parent is granted custody of the juvenile, the trial court may order the non-custodial parent to pay child support to the custodial parent. We find support for this reading in the subsection\u2019s use of the phrase \u201cthe parent\u201d rather than \u201ca parent\u201d or \u201cparents.\u201d Thus, we conclude that the trial court had the statutory authority to order respondent to pay the juvenile\u2019s mother child support.\nHowever, we further conclude the trial court failed to make sufficient findings of fact as required by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 7B-904(d) and 50-13.4(c) to support the amount ordered. Pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-13.4(c),\n[p]ayments ordered for the support of a minor child shall be in such amount as to meet the reasonable needs of the child for health, education, and maintenance, having due regard to the estates, earnings, conditions, accustomed standard of living of the child and the parties, the child care and homemaker contributions of each party, and other facts of the particular case.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 50-13.4(c).\nThus, under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 50-13.4(c), \u201can order for child support must be based upon the interplay of the trial court\u2019s conclusions of law as to (1) the amount of support necessary to \u2018meet the reasonable needs of the child\u2019 and (2) the relative ability of the parties to provide that amount.\u201d Coble v. Coble, 300 N.C. 708, 712, 268 S.E.2d 185, 189 (1980). These conclusions must be based upon specific factual findings which indicate to the appellate court that the trial court took \u201cdue regard\u201d of the particular \u201cestates, earnings, conditions, [and] accustomed standard of living\u201d of both the child and the parents. Id. (quoting N.C.G.S. \u00a7 50-13.4(c)). In the absence of such findings, an appellate court has no means of determining whether the order is adequately supported by competent evidence. Id.\nIn this case, finding of fact 14 states that \u201c [i]t is in the best interest of the minor child that. . . respondent father pay child support to the respondent mother in the amount of $100.00 per month . . . .\u201d However, the trial court failed to make any findings concerning the reasonable needs of the child and the relative ability of the father to provide that amount. Id. Accordingly, we remand this matter to the district court for further findings of fact and an appropriate child support order based on those findings.\nVI\nRespondent also argues the court lacked statutory authority to order him to obtain and maintain stable employment. We agree.\nA \u201ctrial court may not order a parent to undergo any course of conduct not provided for in [N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-904].\u201d In re Cogdill, 137 N.C. App. 504, 508, 528 S.E.2d 600, 603 (2000). Section 7B-904 provides that a court may order a parent to pay for certain specific treatments, counseling and classes for the child and/or parent, none of which are relevant here. The trial court may also order a parent to \u201c[t]ake appropriate steps to remedy conditions in the home that led to or contributed to the juvenile\u2019s adjudication or to the court\u2019s decision to remove custody of the juvenile from the parent.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-904(d1)(3). Nothing in the record suggests that respondent\u2019s employment situation, or lack thereof, led to or contributed to the juvenile\u2019s adjudication. Section 7B-904 does not grant juvenile courts the authority to order a parent to obtain and maintain employment. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-904; see also In re Cogdill, 137 N.C. App. at 508, 528 S.E.2d at 603 (\u201cBecause section 7A-650 does not provide the trial court with authority to order a parent to obtain housing or employment, we modify the trial court\u2019s order to exclude this portion of the order.\u201d). Accordingly, this portion of the order must also be vacated.\nConclusion\nIn summary, the trial court\u2019s adjudication is affirmed; the portion of the order permitting supervised visitation is remanded for clarification of the visitation plan; the portion of the order requiring respondent to pay child support is remanded for additional findings and entry of an appropriate support order based thereupon; and the portion of the order requiring defendant to obtain and maintain employment is vacated.\nAffirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.\nJudge STEPHENS concurs.\nJudge CALABRIA concurs in part and dissents in part in a separate opinion.\n. Initials have been used throughout to protect the identity of the juvenile.\n. Repealed by Session Laws 1998-202, s. 5, effective July 1, 1999. See now N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-904 (2009).", "type": "majority", "author": "BRYANT, Judge." }, { "text": "CALABRIA, Judge,\nconcurring in part and dissenting in part.\nI concur with the portions of the majority\u2019s opinion that affirm the trial court\u2019s adjudication. I also concur with remanding that portion of the trial court\u2019s order permitting supervised visitation for clarification of the visitation plan. However, I respectfully dissent from the portion of the majority\u2019s opinion remanding the instant case for additional findings of fact regarding child support. Rather than remand for findings of fact, I would simply vacate the portion of the trial court\u2019s order dealing with child support as well as the portion of the trial court\u2019s order requiring respondent father to obtain employment. The issues of the appropriate amount of child support and respondent father\u2019s employment can ultimately be determined in IV-D Court.\nIn the instant case, the trial court had the following exchange with respondent mother\u2019s counsel:\nTHE COURT: I would order the father to pay child support for the child. Has that \u2014 ? That\u2019s been set up before, has it not, in IV-D?\n[RESPONDENT MOTHER\u2019S COUNSEL]: I don\u2019t believe so, Your Honor. I believe that was [inaudible].\nTHE COURT: Oh, that was different children. Okay. I would ask the mother to go to IV-D and make arrangements for child, child support enforcement. I would order the father to cooperate with the IV-D child support enforcement agency in making financial contribution to the child. Pending the determination of an appropriate amount I would set a minimum of $100 per month for child support to be payable by the father to the child.\nIn its written order, the trial court ordered \u201c[t]hat the respondent father shall pay to the respondent mother for support of the minor child the sum of $100.00 a month beginning August 1, 2009 and payable on the first of each month thereafter until the respondent mother is able to have this case heard in IV-D court.\u201d\nChapter 110 of our statutes defines a IV-D case as \u201ca case in which services have been applied for or are being provided by a child support enforcement agency established pursuant to Title IV-D of the Social Security Act as amended and this Article.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 110-129(7) (2009). The trial court in a IV-D case is empowered to\nenter an order for the support of the child by periodic payments, which order may include provision for reimbursement for medical expenses incident to the pregnancy and the birth of the child, accrued maintenance and reasonable expense of the action under this subsection on the affidavit of parentage previously filed with said court.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 110-132(b) (2009). In addition, \u201c[t]he court may order the responsible parents in a IV-D establishment case to perform a job search, if the responsible parent is not incapacitated.\u201d Id.) see also N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-13.4(b) (2009).\n\u201cWhen determining a child support award, a trial judge has a high level of discretion, not only in setting the amount of the award, but also in establishing an appropriate remedy. However, the court\u2019s discretion is curtailed in IV-D cases in which services involve a child support enforcement agency.\u201d Guilford Cty. v. Davis, 177 N.C. App. 459, 460, 629 S.E.2d 178, 179 (2006) (internal quotations and citations omitted).\nThe trial court in the instant case was ultimately attempting to have the issue of child support resolved by the IV-D court. While I agree with the majority that the trial court erred by attempting to order child support without proper findings pending respondent mother\u2019s institution of a case in IV-D court, I do not believe that it would be appropriate to return this case to the trial court merely for findings. The IV-D court is much better equipped to determine the appropriate amount of child support and is statutorily authorized to assist respondent father in obtaining employment. All further action regarding child support needs to occur in IV-D court.", "type": "concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part", "author": "CALABRIA, Judge," } ], "attorneys": [ "J. Suzanne Smith for petitioner-appellee.", "M. Garridy Bender for guardian ad litem.", "Robert W. Ewing for respondent-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "IN THE MATTER OF: W.V.\nNo. COA09-1568\n(Filed 1 June 2010)\n1. Child Abuse, Dependency, and Neglect\u2014 neglect \u2014 sufficiency of findings of fact \u2014 environment injurious to child\u2019s welfare\nThe trial court did not err by its findings of fact supporting its conclusion of law that the child lived in an environment injurious to his welfare and was therefore a neglected juvenile. Unchallenged findings of fact showed, among other things, that respondent grew and consumed an illegal controlled substance in the child\u2019s home, engaged in domestic violence in the child\u2019s presence, and choked the child\u2019s mother to unconsciousness while the child was in vitro.\n2. Child Visitation\u2014 neglect \u2014 minimum outline required\nThe trial court erred in a child neglect case by failing to provide a minimum outline for respondent father\u2019s visitation, and the case was remanded for proceedings to clarify respondent\u2019s visitation rights including the establishment of a minimum outline of visitation.\n3. Child Custody and Support\u2014 child support \u2014 subject matter jurisdiction \u2014 insufficient findings of fact\nAlthough the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction and statutory authority under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-904(d) to order respondent father to pay child support, the case was remanded for further findings of fact as required by N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 7B-904(d) and 50-13.4(c), and an appropriate child support order based thereupon.\n4. Child Abuse, Dependency, and Neglect\u2014 neglect \u2014 no statutory authority to require father to obtain and maintain stable employment\nThe trial court lacked statutory authority under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-904 in a child neglect case to order respondent father to obtain and maintain stable employment. Nothing in the record suggested that respondent\u2019s employment situation, or lack thereof, led to or contributed to the juvenile\u2019s adjudication.\nJudge CALABRIA concurring in part and dissenting in part.\nAppeal by respondent from order entered 15 September 2009 by Judge Marvin P. Pope, Jr., in Buncombe County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 29 March 2010.\nJ. Suzanne Smith for petitioner-appellee.\nM. Garridy Bender for guardian ad litem.\nRobert W. Ewing for respondent-appellant." }, "file_name": "0290-01", "first_page_order": 314, "last_page_order": 324 }