{ "id": 4176691, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. THOMAS F. BROWN", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Brown", "decision_date": "2010-06-15", "docket_number": "No. COA09-1213", "first_page": "567", "last_page": "572", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "204 N.C. App. 567" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "632 S.E.2d 197", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12636287 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "201", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Mlo, 335 N.C. 353, 363-64, 440 S.E.2d 98, 102, cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1224, 129 L. Ed. 2d 841 (1994)" }, { "page": "201" }, { "page": "201" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/632/0197-01" ] }, { "cite": "72 L. Ed. 2d 155", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "455 U.S. 1038", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11385393, 11385354 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/455/1038-02", "/us/455/1038-01" ] }, { "cite": "283 S.E.2d 732", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "742" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "304 N.C. 201", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567383 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "216" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/304/0201-01" ] }, { "cite": "520 S.E.2d 545", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "554" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "351 N.C. 48", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1155790 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "63" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/351/0048-01" ] }, { "cite": "129 L. Ed. 2d 841", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "512 U.S. 1224", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 39160, 39938, 39939, 39750, 39722, 39628, 39629, 39118, 39343, 39122, 39839, 39610, 39132, 39837, 39647 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/512/1224-14", "/us/512/1224-01", "/us/512/1224-05", "/us/512/1224-15", "/us/512/1224-10", "/us/512/1224-04", "/us/512/1224-07", "/us/512/1224-03", "/us/512/1224-06", "/us/512/1224-09", "/us/512/1224-02", "/us/512/1224-13", "/us/512/1224-11", "/us/512/1224-08", "/us/512/1224-12" ] }, { "cite": "440 S.E.2d 98", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "102" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "335 N.C. 353", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2528296 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "363-64" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/335/0353-01" ] }, { "cite": "178 N.C. App. 447", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8378286 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "451", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Mlo, 335 N.C. 353, 363-64, 440 S.E.2d 98, 102, cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1224, 129 L. Ed. 2d 841 (1994)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/178/0447-01" ] }, { "cite": "155 L. Ed. 2d 673", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "538 U.S. 982", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9062083, 9061796, 9061898, 9062027, 9061947, 9061618, 9061298, 9061501, 9061750, 9061463, 9061849, 9061563, 9061533, 9061375 ], "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/538/0982-14", "/us/538/0982-09", "/us/538/0982-11", "/us/538/0982-13", "/us/538/0982-12", "/us/538/0982-07", "/us/538/0982-01", "/us/538/0982-04", "/us/538/0982-08", "/us/538/0982-03", "/us/538/0982-10", "/us/538/0982-06", "/us/538/0982-05", "/us/538/0982-02" ] }, { "cite": "568 S.E.2d 608", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "356 N.C. 163", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1511544, 1511451, 1511636, 1511574 ], "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/356/0163-01", "/nc/356/0163-02", "/nc/356/0163-03", "/nc/356/0163-04" ] }, { "cite": "561 S.E.2d 560", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "565" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "149 N.C. App. 756", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9131717 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "762" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/149/0756-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 522, "char_count": 10211, "ocr_confidence": 0.745, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.13701069058466342 }, "sha256": "3a5138a5b914c639ddf844777713fad37b718f52a17d3665cb80400ae07577a9", "simhash": "1:b1aa2462d68e1765", "word_count": 1702 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:38:54.150336+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges ELMORE and ERVIN concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. THOMAS F. BROWN" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "BRYANT, Judge.\nOn 23 July 2007, a Johnston County grand jury indicted defendant Thomas F. Brown for trafficking in cocaine by possession and trafficking in cocaine by transportation. Defendant moved to suppress his statements to law enforcement, which motion the trial court denied by order dated 26 March 2009. Defendant then pled no contest to trafficking in cocaine by possession and the trial court sentenced him to 35 to 42 months in the Department of Correction. Defendant appeals. As discussed herein, we affirm.\nFacts\nOn 19 June 2007, defendant was a passenger in a car pulled over for speeding by a State Highway Patrol trooper. When the trooper approached the car, he smelled marijuana and saw a green leafy substance on defendant\u2019s shirt. The trooper searched defendant and found a bag of white powder in his pocket. The officer arrested defendant and took him to a State Highway Patrol office where he was interrogated by State Bureau of Investigation Agent Michael Hall. Defendant admitted to Agent Hall that the bag of powder found in his pocket belonged to defendant, that he was a \u201cmule\u201d, that he planned to sell it for someone else he refused to name, and that he expected to make $1,500.00 on the transaction.\nOn appeal, defendant makes a single argument: the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statements to Agent Hall. We affirm.\nStandard of Review\n\u201cThis Court\u2019s review of a trial court\u2019s denial of a motion to suppress in a criminal proceeding is strictly limited to a determination of whether the court\u2019s findings are supported by competent evidence, even if the evidence is conflicting, and in turn, whether those findings support the court\u2019s conclusions of law.\u201d In re Pittman, 149 N.C. App. 756, 762, 561 S.E.2d 560, 565 (citation omitted), disc. review denied, 356 N.C. 163, 568 S.E.2d 608 (2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 982, 155 L. Ed. 2d 673 (2003). This standard applies even where the motion to suppress is based on alleged violations of constitutional rights such as those afforded by Miranda. Id. \u201cIn considering a motion to suppress a statement for lack of voluntariness, the trial court must determine whether the State has met its burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the statement was voluntarily and understandingly given.\u201d State v. Nguyen, 178 N.C. App. 447, 451, 632 S.E.2d 197, 201 (2006) (citing State v. Mlo, 335 N.C. 353, 363-64, 440 S.E.2d 98, 102, cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1224, 129 L. Ed. 2d 841 (1994)). However, where a defendant fails \u201cto separately assign error to any of the numbered findings of fact in the trial court\u2019s order denying defendant\u2019s motion to suppress. . . . our Court\u2019s review of this assignment of error is \u2018limited to whether the trial court\u2019s findings of fact support its conclusions of law.\u201d Id. at 451-52, 632 S.E.2d at 201 (quoting State v. Cheek, 351 N.C. 48, 63, 520 S.E.2d 545, 554 (1999)).\nAnalysis\nDefendant argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statements to Agent Hall. We disagree.\nIn his pretrial motion to suppress, defendant contended that defendant\u2019s waiver of his Miranda rights was invalid because it was not made knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily. The trial court made ten findings of fact in support of its three conclusions of law:\n1. That neither [] Defendant\u2019s State or Federal constitutional rights were violated by the interview of [] Defendant.\n2. There were no promises, offers of reward or threats to persuade or induce [] Defendant to make a statement.\n3. That the waiver of Defendant\u2019s right to have counsel before being interviewed by Law Enforcement was made freely, voluntarily, and understandingly as were the incriminating statements that followed.\nHere, defendant failed to assign error to any of the trial court\u2019s findings, limiting our review to whether the court\u2019s findings support its conclusions. Id. at 451-52, 632 S.E.2d at 201.\nDespite his failure to assign error to any findings, in his brief, defendant asserts \u201cthe trial court\u2019s factual finding that [defendant] understood and validly waived each of his Miranda rights is not supported by competent evidence.\u201d The trial court did not make such a finding. From the context of defendant\u2019s argument, however, he appears to challenge finding 6, which states:\n6. After completing the interview with [the woman with whom defendant was arrested], at or about 11:06 a.m., Agent Hall began a conversation with [] Defendant by first advising [] Defendant of his Miranda rights. Agent Hall read each of the Miranda rights one at a time, and after reading each right, asking [] Defendant if he understood, to which [] Defendant replied \u201cyes\u201d, Agent Hall put a checkmark beside each right [to which] Defendant responded in the affirmative as appears on Exhibit Ml, that is attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference.\nHaving not assigned error to this finding, it is conclusive on appeal. This finding, and the court\u2019s findings that defendant was coherent and did not appear to be under the influence of drugs or alcohol, and that no law enforcement officer offered any reward or inducement for his statements, fully support the trial court\u2019s conclusions.\nWe note that even had defendant properly preserved a challenge to finding 6 for our review, he would not prevail. During Agent Hall\u2019s hearing testimony, he recounted his reading of each statement on the Miranda form to defendant, waiting for defendant to respond in the affirmative and then checking off the statement on the form. The following colloquy ensued:\n[Agent Hall]: You have the right to remain silent. After I read that, I asked him did he understand that. He said, yes. Placed a check beside that. Anything you say can be used \u2014 can be and may be used as evidence against you in court. He understood that, as well. You have the right to talk to\u2014\n[Defense counsel]: Objection to that conclusion, as to whether or not he understood it. And he\u2019s saying what conversation they had\u2014\nThe Court: Objection sustained.\n[Defense counsel]: Thank you, Your Honor.\n[Agent Hall]: The next one I read was: You have the right to talk with a lawyer before questioning and have a lawyer with you while you\u2019re being questioned. I asked him if he understood that. He said, yes. I put a check beside that, as well.\nThe next [sic] I read to him is: If you want a lawyer before or during questioning but cannot afford to hire a lawyer, one would be appointed to you at no cost before questioning. I asked him if he understood that. He said, yes. I put a check beside that one, as well.\nAfter that, I asked him \u2014 there\u2019s another statement underneath that, and it is: I have read this statement of my rights and I understand what my rights are. And I put \u2014 and I asked him if he understood that \u2014 all that, and he said, yes.\nQ: Now, after you did that, what did you do next?\n[Agent Hall]: I put an \u201cX\u201d to where to sign, and I showed him \u2014 I said that \u2014 if you understand all these rights that I have read to you. And he said, yes, again. I asked him to sign it and he said he would not sign it; he refused to sign it.\nQ: Now as far as a waiver of rights, the bottom of that form, did you ask any questions concerning that, also?\n[Agent Hall]: I did.\nQ: And what questions did you ask?\n[Agent Hall]: I started out by, do you understand each of these rights that I have explained to you? He said, yes. I checked the yes box. . . .\nDefendant contends finding 6 is not supported because, after defense counsel\u2019s objection, Agent Hall never explicitly stated that defendant responded \u201cyes\u201d after being asked whether he understood that anything he said could be used against him. However, as defendant acknowledges, Agent Hall stated that he asked defendant \u201cif you understand all these rights that I have read to you. And he said, yes, again.\u201d Agent Hall later repeated this question, asking defendant, \u201cdo you understand each of these rights that I have explained to you? He said, yes.\u201d Defendant argues this was insufficient because defendant\u2019s \u201cassent to these broadly-worded questions cannot substitute for evidence specifically showing that he understood each individual Miranda warning.\u201d However, he cites no authority for the proposition that reading individual Miranda warnings to a defendant and then receiving responses of \u201cyes\u201d to repeated questions of whether defendant understood them is insufficient to protect defendant\u2019s constitutional rights. Our case law makes clear that the ultimate test of admissibility is whether a waiver is made knowingly and voluntarily and that this determination is made based on the totality of the circumstances. See State v. Rook, 304 N.C. 201, 216, 283 S.E.2d 732, 742 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1038, 72 L. Ed. 2d 155 (1982).\nAgent Hall\u2019s testimony supports finding 6 in that Agent Hall advised defendant of his Miranda rights, read each statement on the Miranda form and asked defendant if he understood them, put checkmarks on the list by each statement as he went through indicating that defendant had assented, and then twice confirmed that defendant understood all of the rights read to him. The totality of the circumstances present here, as reflected in the trial court\u2019s findings, fully support its conclusion that defendant\u2019s waiver of his Miranda rights was \u201cmade freely, voluntarily, and understandingly.\u201d\nAffirmed.\nJudges ELMORE and ERVIN concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "BRYANT, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General LaToya B. Powell, for the State. \u25a0", "Center for Death Penalty Litigation, by David Weiss, for defendant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. THOMAS F. BROWN\nNo. COA09-1213\n(Filed 15 June 2010)\nConstitutional Law\u2014 Miranda warning \u2014 voluntary waiver\u2014 motion to suppress properly denied\nThe trial court in a trafficking in cocaine case did not err in denying defendant\u2019s motion to suppress statements made to law enforcement. The evidence supported the trial court\u2019s findings of fact, which supported its conclusion of law, that defendant\u2019s waiver of his Miranda rights was made freely, voluntarily, and understandingly.\nAppeal by defendant from order dated 26 March 2009 by Judge Jack A. Thompson in Johnston County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 29 April 2010.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General LaToya B. Powell, for the State. \u25a0\nCenter for Death Penalty Litigation, by David Weiss, for defendant." }, "file_name": "0567-01", "first_page_order": 591, "last_page_order": 596 }