{ "id": 3734835, "name": "FOUR SEASONS MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC., Petitioner v. TOWN OF WRIGHTSVILLE BEACH, BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT AND THE TOWN OF WRIGHTSVILLE BEACH, Respondents", "name_abbreviation": "Four Seasons Management Services, Inc. v. Town of Wrightsville Beach", "decision_date": "2010-07-06", "docket_number": "No. COA09-777", "first_page": "65", "last_page": "84", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "205 N.C. App. 65" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "616 S.E.2d 496", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633572 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "499", "parenthetical": "quoting Comm'r of Insurance v. Automobile Rate Office, 294 N.C. 60, 68, 241 S.E.2d 324, 329 (1978)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/616/0496-01" ] }, { "cite": "627 S.E.2d 650", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12635428 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "656", "parenthetical": "quoting Knight v. Town of Knightdale, 164 N.C. App. 766, 768, 596 S.E.2d 881, 883 (2004)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/627/0650-01" ] }, { "cite": "622 S.E.2d 713", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12634564 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "716" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/622/0713-01" ] }, { "cite": "293 S.E.2d 167", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "169" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "306 N.C. 357", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8568700 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "360" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/306/0357-01" ] }, { "cite": "241 S.E.2d 324", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "329" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "294 N.C. 60", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8570860 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "68" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/294/0060-01" ] }, { "cite": "359 N.C. 832", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3793573 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "837-38", "parenthetical": "quoting Comm'r of Insurance v. Automobile Rate Office, 294 N.C. 60, 68, 241 S.E.2d 324, 329 (1978)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/359/0832-01" ] }, { "cite": "134 S.E.2d 177", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1964, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "261 N.C. 120", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572012 ], "year": 1964, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/261/0120-01" ] }, { "cite": "397 S.E.2d 657", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "100 N.C. App. 615", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527331 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/100/0615-01" ] }, { "cite": "356 N.C. 656", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1511335 ], "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/356/0656-01" ] }, { "cite": "562 S.E.2d 108", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "110" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "149 N.C. App. 701", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9131417 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "703" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/149/0701-01" ] }, { "cite": "411 S.E.2d 655", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "659" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "105 N.C. App. 32", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8520953 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "39" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/105/0032-01" ] }, { "cite": "576 S.E.2d 324", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citing CG & T Corp. v. Bd. of Adjustment of Wilmington, 105 N.C. App. 32, 39, 411 S.E.2d 655, 659 (1992)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "356 N.C. 658", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1511411 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citing CG & T Corp. v. Bd. of Adjustment of Wilmington, 105 N.C. App. 32, 39, 411 S.E.2d 655, 659 (1992)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/356/0658-01" ] }, { "cite": "557 S.E.2d 631", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "635" }, { "page": "631" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "148 N.C. App. 52", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9363630 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "57" }, { "page": "52" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/148/0052-01" ] }, { "cite": "349 S.E.2d 598", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 N.C. 417", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4732777, 4738513, 4738804, 4734109, 4737790 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/318/0417-02", "/nc/318/0417-01", "/nc/318/0417-03", "/nc/318/0417-04", "/nc/318/0417-05" ] }, { "cite": "344 S.E.2d 821", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "81 N.C. App. 543", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524395 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/81/0543-01" ] }, { "cite": "423 S.E.2d 519", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "108 N.C. App. 346", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524266 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/108/0346-01" ] }, { "cite": "217 S.E.2d 551", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "559" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "288 N.C. 122", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565113 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "134" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/288/0122-01" ] }, { "cite": "265 S.E.2d 379", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "385" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "299 N.C. 620", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8575681 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "629" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/299/0620-01" ] }, { "cite": "102 S.E.2d 785", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1958, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "248 N.C. 153", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8621070 ], "year": 1958, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/248/0153-01" ] }, { "cite": "92 S.E.2d 189", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1956, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "243 N.C. 714", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8627035, 8627062 ], "year": 1956, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/243/0714-01", "/nc/243/0714-02" ] }, { "cite": "142 S.E.2d 36", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "39", "parenthetical": "citing In re O'Neal, 243 N.C. 714, 92 S.E.2d 189 (1956), and Perrell v. Service Co., 248 N.C. 153, 102 S.E.2d 785 (1958)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "264 N.C. 424", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573796 ], "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "428", "parenthetical": "citing In re O'Neal, 243 N.C. 714, 92 S.E.2d 189 (1956), and Perrell v. Service Co., 248 N.C. 153, 102 S.E.2d 785 (1958)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/264/0424-01" ] }, { "cite": "431 S.E.2d 183", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "187" }, { "page": "187-88" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "334 N.C. 132", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2528575 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "137" }, { "page": "138" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/334/0132-01" ] }, { "cite": "445 S.E.2d 28", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "336 N.C. 71", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2534314, 2537066, 2536085, 2534232, 2536670 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/336/0071-01", "/nc/336/0071-04", "/nc/336/0071-05", "/nc/336/0071-03", "/nc/336/0071-02" ] }, { "cite": "439 S.E.2d 199", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "201" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "113 N.C. App. 528", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523385 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "531" }, { "page": "531" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/113/0528-01" ] }, { "cite": "473 S.E.2d 442", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "444-45", "parenthetical": "citing Ayers v. Bd. of Adjust, for Town of Robersonville, 113 N.C. App. 528, 531, 439 S.E.2d 199, 201, disc. review denied, 336 N.C. 71, 445 S.E.2d 28 (1994), and quoting Capricorn Equity Corp. v. Town of Chapel Hill, 334 N.C. 132, 137, 431 S.E.2d 183, 187 (1993)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "123 N.C. App. 400", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11913460 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "404", "parenthetical": "citing Ayers v. Bd. of Adjust, for Town of Robersonville, 113 N.C. App. 528, 531, 439 S.E.2d 199, 201, disc. review denied, 336 N.C. 71, 445 S.E.2d 28 (1994" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/123/0400-01" ] }, { "cite": "511 S.E.2d 340", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "342" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "132 N.C. App. 387", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11238269 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "389" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/132/0387-01" ] }, { "cite": "540 S.E.2d 349", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "351 N.C. 357", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1155845, 1155765, 1155864, 1155930, 1155837 ], "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/351/0357-02", "/nc/351/0357-01", "/nc/351/0357-05", "/nc/351/0357-03", "/nc/351/0357-04" ] }, { "cite": "515 S.E.2d 715", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "717" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "133 N.C. App. 426", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11220043 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "429" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/133/0426-01" ] }, { "cite": "546 S.E.2d 397", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "quoting JWL Invs., Inc. v Guilford County Bd. of Adjust., 133 N.C. App. 426, 429, 515 S.E.2d 715, 717, disc. review denied, 351 N.C. 357, 540 S.E.2d 349 (1999)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "353 N.C. 280", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 135960, 135680, 135707, 135879 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "quoting JWL Invs., Inc. v Guilford County Bd. of Adjust., 133 N.C. App. 426, 429, 515 S.E.2d 715, 717, disc. review denied, 351 N.C. 357, 540 S.E.2d 349 (1999)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/353/0280-01", "/nc/353/0280-03", "/nc/353/0280-04", "/nc/353/0280-02" ] }, { "cite": "533 S.E.2d 525", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "527-28", "parenthetical": "quoting JWL Invs., Inc. v Guilford County Bd. of Adjust., 133 N.C. App. 426, 429, 515 S.E.2d 715, 717, disc. review denied, 351 N.C. 357, 540 S.E.2d 349 (1999)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "139 N.C. App. 269", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9496549 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "272", "parenthetical": "quoting JWL Invs., Inc. v Guilford County Bd. of Adjust., 133 N.C. App. 426, 429, 515 S.E.2d 715, 717, disc. review denied, 351 N.C. 357, 540 S.E.2d 349 (1999)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/139/0269-01" ] }, { "cite": "596 S.E.2d 881", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "883" }, { "page": "883" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "164 N.C. App. 766", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8901751 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "768" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/164/0766-01" ] }, { "cite": "177 N.C. App. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8300859 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "8", "parenthetical": "quoting Knight v. Town of Knightdale, 164 N.C. App. 766, 768, 596 S.E.2d 881, 883 (2004)" }, { "page": "8" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/177/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "323 S.E.2d 427", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "71 N.C. App. 771", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526415 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/71/0771-01" ] }, { "cite": "90 S.E.2d 879", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1956, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "243 N.C. 316", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8624665 ], "year": 1956, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/243/0316-01" ] }, { "cite": "175 N.C. App. 178", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8350861 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "182" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/175/0178-01" ] }, { "cite": "364 S.E.2d 671", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "321 N.C. 480", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2567648, 2572322, 2567851, 2572779, 2570637 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/321/0480-04", "/nc/321/0480-03", "/nc/321/0480-05", "/nc/321/0480-02", "/nc/321/0480-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 S.E.2d 309", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "312", "parenthetical": "stating that the extent to which \"an increase in the intensity of the nonconforming activity is permissible\" hinges upon a proper interpretation of the zoning ordinance" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "87 N.C. App. 359", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8358390 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "363" }, { "page": "364" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/87/0359-01" ] }, { "cite": "308 S.E.2d 735", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "65 N.C. App. 44", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521819 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/65/0044-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1348, "char_count": 46265, "ocr_confidence": 0.775, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.689036320876751e-08, "percentile": 0.4532167705530322 }, "sha256": "60aa4a94af38dadfca65c8b126c8f449f4c54ac259a19f9d1c6087f4661e0ed6", "simhash": "1:af28d40acb5e8f04", "word_count": 7352 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:30:55.510002+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Chief Judge MARTIN and Judge Robert C. HUNTER concur." ], "parties": [ "FOUR SEASONS MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC., Petitioner v. TOWN OF WRIGHTSVILLE BEACH, BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT AND THE TOWN OF WRIGHTSVILLE BEACH, Respondents" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "ERVIN, Judge.\nPetitioner Four Seasons Management Services, Inc., appeals from the trial court\u2019s order upholding a decision by Respondents Town of Wrightsville Beach and the Town of Wrightsville Beach Board of Adjustment denying Petitioner\u2019s request to build a four-story parking deck at a hotel which it owns in Wrightsville Beach, North Carolina, without seeking and obtaining an amendment to its conditional use permit. After careful consideration of Petitioner\u2019s challenges to Respondent\u2019s decision in light of the record and the applicable law, we conclude that the trial court\u2019s order should be affirmed.\nI. Factual Background\nOn 15 May 1972, the Town adopted a zoning ordinance, which became effective on the date of enactment. The zoning ordinance includes detailed provisions defining various zoning districts and the types of structures, buildings, and uses permitted in each district and establishing specific requirements relating to a number of subjects, including, but not limited to, the necessity for obtaining approval prior to undertaking certain construction projects, the number of parking spaces required at hotels and motels, and landscaping. The zoning ordinance also includes provisions addressing administration and enforcement issues.\nPetitioner owns and operates a hotel known as the Blockade Runner in Wrightsville Beach. A hotel has been operated at the site of the Blockade Runner for over a century. The Blockade Runner is not in compliance with the zoning ordinance in a number of respects. For example, the Blockade Runner does not have the required number of off-street parking spaces and violates the applicable setback requirements on its south side. Because it was constructed prior to the effective date of the zoning ordinance, the Blockade Runner is classified as a nonconforming use and is entitled, for that reason, to operate despite its noncompliance with various provisions of the zoning ordinance.\nThe Blockade Runner is located in a \u201cC-4\u201d zoning district, which allows \u201caccessory uses\u201d as a matter of right and permits the operation of hotels as a \u201cconditional use.\u201d As a nonconforming use, the Blockade Runner did not obtain a conditional use permit prior to construction. However, Petitioner applied for and obtained a conditional use permit authorizing the enclosing of a portion of the lobby area for use as a solarium on 26 April 1984. Subsequently, Petitioner obtained an amendment authorizing the construction of stairs associated with a health spa on 24 January 1985 and another amendment authorizing the construction of an open-air gazebo on 24 June 1991.\nOn 25 April 2006, Petitioner requested authorization to \u201cconstruct a one-story parking deck\u201d over its existing parking area. In addition, Petitioner sought approval for variances relating to setbacks and parking requirements. On 26 April 2006, the Town\u2019s Development Code Administrator denied Petitioner\u2019s request for the following reasons:\nAfter conferring with the Town Attorney, it has been determined that construction of the parking deck requires an amendment to the Blockade Runner\u2019s existing conditional use permit. The Town of Wrightsville Beach Table of Uses lists hotels and motels as a conditional-use in the C-4, Commercial District. It has been the practice of the Town to require amendments to existing conditional-use permits for changes or additions to structures requiring a conditional-use permit. In addition, the Town does not agree with your classification of the parking deck as an accessory structure or accessory use. . . .\nIn addition, as acknowledged in your application, the parking deck as proposed violates the requirements of \u00a7 155.047 regarding setbacks and \u00a7 155.060 regarding required parking. Furthermore, the proposed parking deck encroaches into the 20-ft. sight triangle required by \u00a7 155.014. It should be noted that the plans as proposed do not bring the parking lot into compliance with the Landscaping Ordinance as required by \u00a7 155.181(5).\nOn 5 May 2006, Petitioner appealed from the Administrator\u2019s decision to the Board of Adjustment.\nOn 12 October 2006, Petitioner submitted revised plans and requested authorization to build a four-story parking deck over its existing parking area. On 19 October 2006, the Town\u2019s Director of Planning and Parks denied Petitioner\u2019s revised request. In denying Petitioner\u2019s revised request, the Director restated the Town\u2019s previously-enunciated position that Petitioner could not \u201cconstruct the parking deck without going through the conditional-use process\u201d; reiterated the Town\u2019s disagreement with \u201cclassification of the parking deck as an accessory structure or accessory use\u201d; and pointed out that the proposed parking deck violated the requirements for the number of parking spaces and did \u201cnot bring the parking lot into conformity with the Landscaping Ordinance as required by \u00a7 155.181(5).\u201d Finally, the Director noted that the proposed plans would not bring the parking lot into conformity with the requirements for fire sprinklers contained in \u00a7 94.46 of the zoning ordinance. On 25 October 2006, Petitioner supplemented its 5 May 2006 appeal by appealing to the Board from the Director\u2019s 19 October 2006 decision.\nOn 29 November 2006, the Board conducted a hearing on Petitioner\u2019s appeal, at which it received testimony and considered the arguments of counsel. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Board voted not to reverse the Director\u2019s decision. On 29 February 2008, the Board issued a written order in which it stated the following conclusions:\n24. It is the Board\u2019s position that the issues to be addressed by it include the following:\na. Was the Administrator correct in denying the request to construct the 4-story parking deck without the Petitioner first seeking an amendment to its existing conditional use permit?\nb. Was the Administrator correct in denying the request to construct the 4-story parking deck because the construction of the proposed parking deck constitutes an expansion of a permitted non-conforming use?\nc. Is the Petitioner judicially estopped to challenge the requirement for a conditional use permit when the Petitioner, on at least three prior occasions, has accepted benefits under the ordinance requiring an amendment to its conditional use permit\nd. Was the Administrator correct in denying the request to construct the 4-story parking deck because the plan for the proposed parking deck fails to comply with the landscaping ordinance of the Town as set forth in \u00a7 155.180 et seq. Of the zoning ordinance?\n25. WAS THE ADMINISTRATOR CORRECT IN DENYING THE REQUEST TO CONSTRUCT THE 4-STORY PARKING DECK WITHOUT THE PETITIONER FIRST SEEKING AN AMENDMENT TO ITS EXISTING CONDITIONAL USE PERMIT?\nANSWER: Yes.\n26. This Board is of the opinion and concludes that the Petitioner must secure an amendment to its existing conditional use permit in order to construct the proposed parking deck. In support of this position, the Board concludes as follows:\na. The zoning ordinances permit accessory uses in all zoning districts. The table of uses does not address accessory buildings or accessory structures. Neither accessory buildings nor accessory structures are indicated as permitted in any district.\nb. The proposed parking deck is an accessory building. While parking may constitute an accessory use, a 4-story parking deck does not constitute an accessory use.\nc. In the alternative, the Board finds that the proposed parking deck is not accessory to the principal use, that being a hotel, but rather the proposed parking deck is part of the principal use of the property. It is clear from the testimony of the Petitioner\u2019s representatives that the hotel cannot exist without available parking.\nd. In attempting to discern the intent of the Town ordinances, the Board took into consideration the testimony of the Administrator that it has been the practice of the Town during the Administrator\u2019s ten years of employment to require property owners wishing to expand structures that are subject to an existing conditional use [permit] to secure an amendment to the existing conditional use permit.\n27. WAS THE ADMINISTRATOR CORRECT IN DENYING THE REQUEST TO CONSTRUCT THE 4-STORY PARKING DECK BECAUSE THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE PROPOSED PARKING DECK CONSTITUTES AN EXPANSION OF A PERMITTED NONCONFORMING USE?\nANSWER: Yes.\na. The existing hotel is non-conforming in that it violates the setbacks on at least one side of the structure and because the parking requirements are not currently met and will not be met even if the 4-story parking deck is constructed.\nb. Section 155.009 of the zoning ordinances prohibits the expansion of a permitted non-conforming use.\nC. The only way in which the parking deck can be constructed is for the hotel to be brought into compliance with current ordinances. Otherwise, the construction of the parking deck is an expansion of a permitted non-conforming use.\n28. IS THE PETITIONER JUDICIALLY ESTOPPED TO CHALLENGE THE REQUIREMENT FOR A CONDITIONAL USE PERMIT WHEN THE PETITIONER, ON AT LEAST THREE PRIOR OCCASIONS, HAS ACCEPTED BENEFITS UNDER THE ORDINANCE REQUIRING AN AMENDMENT TO ITS CONDITIONAL USE PERMIT?\nANSWER: Yes.\na. The Petitioner has previously applied for and been granted three conditional use permits or amendments to the existing conditional use permit.\nb. On each of these occasions, the Petitioner has acknowledged the need to secure an amendment to its existing conditional use permit in order to make additions or changes to its hotel.\nc. The Petitioner has taken advantage of each of the three previously issued conditional use permits and has constructed additions to the hotel pursuant to the. authority granted by those permits.\nd. Having taken advantage of the prior permits, the Petitioner is estopped to now challenge the requirement to secure an amendment to its existing conditional use permit.\n29. WAS THE ADMINISTRATOR CORRECT IN DENYING THE REQUEST TO CONSTRUCT THE 4-STORY PARKING DECK BECAUSE THE PLAN FOR THE PROPOSED PARKING DECK FAILS TO COMPLY WITH THE LANDSCAPING ORDINANCE OF THE TOWN AS SET FORTH IN \u00a7 155.180 ET SEQ. OF THE ZONING ORDINANCES?\nANSWER: Yes.\na. The Petitioner\u2019s witnesses at the hearing admitted that the proposed plan did not comply with the Town\u2019s landscaping ordinances.\nb. There is nothing in the Town\u2019s ordinances to excuse this proposed plan from the provisions of the landscaping ordinances as set forth in the Town ordinances.\nOn 29 December 2006, Petitioner filed a petition seeking the issuance of a writ of certiorari permitting review of the Board\u2019s decision in the New Hanover County Superior Court. On 6 March 2008, the trial court held a hearing for the purpose of allowing the parties to be heard with respect to the validity of the Board\u2019s decision. On 17 February 2009, the trial court entered an order affirming the Board\u2019s decision. In its order, the trial court concluded, among other things, that:\n10. The only way for Petitioner\u2019s argument to succeed is if this Court accepts the proposition that all accessory structures are accessory uses. For the reasons set forth below, this Court refused to accept this argument and for that reason, among others, finds that the Board of Adjustment acted properly in upholding the decision of the Town\u2019s Planning and Parks Director.\n12. The Zoning Ordinances draw a clear distinction between a \u201cUse\u201d and a \u201cStructure\u201d or \u201cBuilding.\u201d Use is defined as \u201cThe specific activity or function for which land, a building, or a structure is designated, arranged, intended, occupied, or maintained.\u201d The definitions of accessory structure and accessory building make clear references to actual physical structures of some kind. The Petitioner would have this Court accept the argument that an accessory use is the same as an accessory structure or an accessory building. The Zoning Ordinances of the Town simply do not support this contention. Further, the only use permitted in all districts without the issuance of a conditional use permit is an \u201caccessory use.\u201d Accessory structures and accessory buildings are not mentioned specifically in the Table of Uses found in the Town\u2019s Zoning Ordinances and therefore are not permitted as a matter of right in all zoning districts. . . .\n14. Application of these rules leads to the conclusion that accessory structures and accessory buildings are not the same as accessory uses and further, that accessory structures and accessory buildings are not permitted in any zoning districts as a matter of right under the Town\u2019s Zoning Ordinances. . . .\n27. The clear lesson from Cannon v. Bd. of Adjustment of Wilmington, 65 N.C. App. 44, 308 S.E.2d 735 (1983),] and Stegall v. Bd. of Adjustment of New Hanover, 87 N.C. App. 359, 361 S.E.2d 309 (1987), disc. review denied, 321 N.C. 480, 364 S.E.2d 671 (1988),] is that this Court must look to the zoning ordinances of the Town of Wrightsville Beach in order to determine if the proposed parking deck constitutes an expansion of a permitted nonconforming use. The [decision in Jirtle v. Board of Adjust, for the Town of Biscoe, 175 N.C. App. 178, 622 S.E.2d 713 (2005),] is of no help since that decision involves interpretation of an entirely different ordinance. The issue for this Court is whether the construction of the four story parking deck is a change in degree of activity or a change in the kind of activity.\n28. The Court concludes that the construction of a four story parking deck utilizing mechanical devices for the location of vehicles within that deck is a significantly different kind of activity from a conventional ground level parking deck. For that reason, the proposed four story parking deck constitutes an impermissible expansion of a permitted non-conforming use.\n32. As previously noted, the Petitioner has been issued three conditional use permits. ... In securing these permits, the Petitioner has gone through the process of acquiring an amendment to its conditional use permit. The Petitioner has accepted the benefits given to it under the conditional use permit process and has undertaken construction repairs and alterations of its hotel pursuant to the authority granted by these conditional use permits. Now the Petitioner claims it is not required to secure an amendment to its conditional use permit as a prerequisite to constructing the four story parking deck. The Town contends that the Petitioner is judicially estopped from claiming a right to construct the four story parking deck without going through the conditional use permit [process] on the grounds that the Petitioner has previously acknowledged on three separate occasions that conditional use permits are required for expansion, was granted amendments to conditional use permits and took advantage of the authority given under those permits. Since the Petitioner has previously applied for and been granted conditional use permits, and has taken advantage of the construction permitted by those permits, it is judicially estopped to now challenge the requirement for a conditional use permit.\n35. As in [Convent v. Winston-Salem, 243 N.C. 316, 90 S.E.2d 879 (1956), and Goforth Properties, Inc. v. Town of Chapel Hill, 71 N.C. App. 771, 323 S.E.2d 427 (1984),] the Petitioner has accepted the benefits of the conditional use permits previously granted. The Petitioner is now estopped to claim that it can proceed with a new addition to its hotel without seeking a conditional use permit.\n36. The landscaping ordinances are found in Sections 155.180 through 155.188 of the Town\u2019s Code of Ordinances. Sec. 155.181 provides that the sections dealing with landscaping shall apply \u201cwhen there is an expansion of the parking facility by a minimum of 10% of the parking with a minimum of 10 total spaces.\u201d Clearly this proposed parking deck falls under that requirement.\n37. Sec. 155.104 outlines the requirements for landscaping for parking facilities. The architect for the Petitioner . . . testified before the Board of Adjustment that he was \u201c . . . unable to really get the interior landscaping as the ordinance required.\u201d [The architect] went on to testify that the ordinance required a landscaping island to be every 15 feet and the plans which he prepared did not include such landscaping islands on the interior of the parking deck. [The] Planning and Parks Director for the Town, testified before the Board of Adjustment that the plans submitted by Petitioner did not comply with the landscape ordinance of the Town of Wrightsville Beach.\n38. It is clear from the testimony of [the architect] and [the Planning and Parks Director] that the plans submitted by the Petitioner did not comply with the landscaping ordinance of the Town and the Town officials were correct in denying the request to construct the four story parking deck.\nOn 16 March 2009, Petitioner noted an appeal to this Court from the trial court\u2019s order.\nII. Legal Analysis\nA. Standard of Review\nJudicial review of the decisions of a municipal board of adjustment is authorized by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-388(e2), which provides, in pertinent part, that \u201c[e]very decision of the board shall be subject to review by the superior court by proceedings in the nature of certiorari.\u201d \u201cUpon review of a decision from a Board of Adjustment, the trial court should:\n\u2018(1) review the record for errors of law; (2) ensure that procedures specified by law in both statute and ordinance are followed; (3) ensure that appropriate due process rights of the petitioner are protected, including the right to offer evidence, cross-examine witnesses, and inspect documents; (4) ensure that the decision is supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence in the whole record; and (5) ensure that the decision is not arbitrary and capricious.\u2019 \u201d\nWright v. Town of Matthews, 177 N.C. App. 1, 8, 627 S.E.2d 650, 656 (2006) (quoting Knight v. Town of Knightdale, 164 N.C. App. 766, 768, 596 S.E.2d 881, 883 (2004)). \u201cIf a petitioner contends the Board\u2019s decision was based on an error of law, 'de novo\u2019 review is proper. However, if the petitioner contends the Board\u2019s decision was not supported by the evidence or was arbitrary and capricious, then the reviewing court must apply the \u2018whole record\u2019 test.\u201d Sun Suites Holdings, LLC v. Board of Aldermen of Town of Garner, 139 N.C. App. 269, 272, 533 S.E.2d 525, 527-28, disc. review denied, 353 N.C. 280, 546 S.E.2d 397 (2000) (quoting JWL Invs., Inc. v Guilford County Bd. of Adjust., 133 N.C. App. 426, 429, 515 S.E.2d 715, 717, disc. review denied, 351 N.C. 357, 540 S.E.2d 349 (1999)). \u201c[W]hen sitting as an appellate court to review a [decision of a quasi-judicial body], [the trial court] must set forth sufficient information in its order to reveal the scope of review utilized and the application of that review.\u2019 \u201d Sun Suites, id. (quoting Sutton v. N.C. Dep\u2019t of Labor, 132 N.C. App. 387, 389, 511 S.E.2d 340, 342 (1999)). \u201cOn review of the trial court\u2019s order, this Court must determine whether the trial court correctly applied the proper standard of review.\u201d Wright, 177 N.C. App. at 8, 596 S.E.2d at 883.\nB. Specific Challenges to Trial Court\u2019s Order\n1. Necessity for Amendment to Conditional Use Permit\nOn appeal, Petitioner argues that the trial court erred by upholding the Town\u2019s \u201cadministrative determinations which denied the Petitioner the right to construct a multistory parking deck upon its property!.]\u201d As a preliminary matter, we note that the Town did not unequivocally \u201cdeny\u201d Petitioner the right to construct a parking deck. Instead, the Town denied Petitioner\u2019s request to construct the proposed parking deck without seeking and obtaining an amendment to its existing conditional use permit. As a result, the ultimate issue which we must resolve is the extent, if any, to which Petitioner was entitled under the zoning ordinance to construct the proposed parking deck without undergoing the conditional use permit process.\nA proper resolution of Petitioner\u2019s challenge to the Board of Adjustment\u2019s ruling requires us to interpret various provisions of the Wrightsville Beach zoning ordinance.\nQuestions involving interpretation of zoning ordinances are questions of law. Accordingly, the superior court is to apply a de novo standard of review to Board decisions involving application and interpretation of zoning ordinances, and the court may freely substitute its judgment for that of the Board. . . . [0]n appeal of the judgment of the superior court, this Court must apply a de novo standard of review in determining whether \u2018the superior court committed error of law in inteipreting and applying the municipal ordinance,\u2019 and may also freely substitute its judgment for that of the superior court.\nHayes v. Fowler, 123 N.C. App. 400, 404, 473 S.E.2d 442, 444-45 (1996) (citing Ayers v. Bd. of Adjust, for Town of Robersonville, 113 N.C. App. 528, 531, 439 S.E.2d 199, 201, disc. review denied, 336 N.C. 71, 445 S.E.2d 28 (1994), and quoting Capricorn Equity Corp. v. Town of Chapel Hill, 334 N.C. 132, 137, 431 S.E.2d 183, 187 (1993)). Since Petitioner does not argue that the trial court applied the wrong standard in resolving this issue, we will proceed directly to an examination of the relevant provisions of the zoning ordinance.\n\u201cThe rules applicable to the construction of statutes are equally applicable to the construction of municipal ordinances.\u201d Cogdell v. Taylor, 264 N.C. 424, 428, 142 S.E.2d 36, 39 (1965) (citing In re O'Neal, 243 N.C. 714, 92 S.E.2d 189 (1956), and Perrell v. Service Co., 248 N.C. 153, 102 S.E.2d 785 (1958)). \u201cIn interpreting a municipal ordinance \u2018[t]he basic rule is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the legislative body.\u2019 \u201d Capricorn, 334 N.C. at 138, 431 S.E.2d at 187-88 (quoting Concrete Co. v. Board of Commissioners, 299 N.C. 620, 629, 265 S.E.2d 379, 385 (1980)). \u201cWe look to the language of the enabling act and the city ordinance to ascertain the intent of the legislative bodies.\u201d Financial Services v. Capitol Funds, 288 N.C. 122, 134, 217 S.E.2d 551, 559 (1975). \u201cUnless a term is defined specifically within the ordinance in which it is referenced, it should be assigned its plain and ordinary meaning. In addition, we avoid interpretations that create absurd or illogical results.\u201d Ayers, 113 N.C. App. at 531, 439 S.E.2d at 201 (citing Rice Associates v. Town of Weaverville Bd. of Adjust., 108 N.C. App. 346, 423 S.E.2d 519 (1992), and Pritchard v. Elizabeth City, 81 N.C. App. 543, 344 S.E.2d 821, disc. review denied, 318 N.C. 417, 349 S.E.2d 598 (1986)). In addition, because \u201cthe function of a board of adjustment is to interpret local zoning ordinances[, s]ome deference is given to the board\u2019s interpretation of its own city code.\u201d Tucker v. Mecklenburg Cty. Zoning Bd. of Adjust., 148 N.C. App. 52, 57, 557 S.E.2d 631, 635 (2001), aff\u2019d in part, disc. review improvidently granted in part, 356 N.C. 658, 576 S.E.2d 324 (2003) (citing CG & T Corp. v. Bd. of Adjustment of Wilmington, 105 N.C. App. 32, 39, 411 S.E.2d 655, 659 (1992)).\nPetitioner argues on appeal, as it did before the Board and the trial court, that it is not required to seek and obtain an amendment to its conditional use permit as a prerequisite to constructing the parking deck because the zoning ordinance permits a landowner to construct an \u201caccessory structure\u201d and use his property for an \u201caccessory use\u201d without obtaining prior authorization. In essence, Petitioner contends that: (1) it is entitled to engage in \u201caccessory uses\u201d of its property without obtaining prior authorization from the zoning administration and enforcement authorities; (2) parking is an \u201caccessory use\u201d under the zoning ordinance; (3) a parking deck is an \u201caccessory structure\u201d under the zoning ordinance since the use of-such a structure is subordinate and incidental to the operation of a hotel; (4) one needs \u201caccessory structures\u201d in order to engage in \u201caccessory uses\u201d; and (5) for that reason, the right to engage in an \u201caccessory use\u201d on one\u2019s property without obtaining prior approval necessarily includes the right to construct an \u201caccessory structure\u201d in which to conduct the proposed \u201caccessory use\u201d without obtaining prior approval. In other words, Petitioner\u2019s argument equates an \u201caccessory use\u201d with an \u201caccessory structure.\u201d We do not find this logic persuasive for several reasons.\nThe validity of Petitioner\u2019s argument hinges upon the assumption that \u201caccessory structures\u201d are equivalent to \u201caccessory uses.\u201d The term \u201cuse\u201d is defined in the zoning ordinance as \u201c \u2018[t]he specific activity or function for which land, a building or a structure is designated, arranged, intended, or maintained.\u201d As we have previously noted, an \u201caccessory use\u201d is defined as a \u201cuse customarily incidental and subordinate to the principal use or building and located on the same lot with the principal use or building.\u201d Thus, the zoning ordinance clearly intends for the term \u201caccessory use\u201d to refer to something that someone does. A \u201cstructure,\u201d on the other hand, is defined as \u201c[a]nything constructed or erected, the use of which requires more or less permanent location on the ground, or attached to something having more or less permanent location on the ground.\u201d The zoning ordinance defines an \u201caccessory structure\u201d as a \u201cdetached subordinate structure [s], the use of which is incidental to that of the principal structure and located on the same lot therewith.\u201d As a result, the definitional provisions of the zoning ordinance clearly indicate that an \u201caccessory structure\u201d is a physical object. As a result, the relevant provisions of the zoning ordinance simply do not treat \u201caccessory uses,\u201d which are activities, and \u201caccessory structures,\u201d which are physical objects, as equivalent, so that the fact that \u201caccessory uses\u201d are permitted as a matter of right in the zoning district in which the Blockade Runner is located does not establish that Petitioner is entitled to construct an \u201caccessory structure\u201d on its property as a matter of right.\nAs further support for its assertion that, \u201c[generally speaking, accessory structures and uses are permitted without more permission,\u201d Petitioner cites Dobo v. Zoning Bd. of Adjust, of the City of Wilmington, 149 N.C. App. 701, 562 S.E.2d 108 (2002), reversing per curiam, 356 N.C. 656, 576 S.E.2d 324 (2003), and Tucker, 148 N.C. App. at 52, 557 S.E.2d at 631. However, neither of these decisions holds that accessory structures are \u201cgenerally\u201d treated like accessory uses or that accessory structures are \u201cgenerally\u201d allowed without the necessity for the landowner to obtain \u201cmore permission.\u201d On the contrary, Dobo addressed the issue of whether the landowner\u2019s operation of a portable sawmill in his yard constituted an \u201caccessory use,\u201d while Tucker addressed the issue of whether a kennel was a permissible accessory use in a multi-family zoning district or was barred under an ordinance provision prohibiting commercial kennels in such areas. Both decisions focused on the use made of the property in question; neither mentioned the subject of accessory structures. In addition, Petitioner cites Allen v. City of Burlington Bd. of Adjustment, 100 N.C. App. 615, 397 S.E.2d 657 (1990), for the proposition that accessory structures are allowed as a matter of right under the zoning ordinance. As was the case with Dobo and Tucker, however, Allen deals solely with the use to be made of existing property without mentioning any right to construct an accessory structure. Thus, none of the decisions upon which Petitioner relies provides any support for its position.\nMoreover, it is clear that the general import of the zoning ordinance is to require approval from the relevant zoning officials before any major construction project is undertaken. More specifically, \u00a7 155.126 of the zoning ordinance provides that \u201c[n]o building or other structure shall be erected, moved, added to, or structurally altered without a permit therefor issued by the Planning and Inspections Department.\u201d As a result, we conclude that the zoning ordinance evidences a general intent to supervise construction of any \u201cbuilding or other structure\u201d which intent would be undercut by the adoption of an interpretation of the ordinance that allowed the construction of a large parking deck without any review by zoning administration and enforcement officials.\nFinally, the Wrightsville Beach zoning ordinance classifies hotels as conditional uses regardless of the zoning district in which they are located. According to the relevant provisions of the zoning ordinance, a project that is required to obtain a conditional use permit, such as a hotel, must submit a site plan, be the subject of consideration at a public hearing, and obtain a determination by the Board that the \u201cproposed structure [or] improvement. . . meet[s] all requirements of all applicable codes, ordinances, and specifications of the municipality, county, state, or federal governments or other agencies having proper jurisdiction^]\u201d The Town has consistently \u201crequire[d] amendments to the existing conditional use permits for changes or additions to structures requiring a conditional use permit.\u201d In light of the consider able scrutiny to which conditional uses, such as hotels, are subjected under the zoning ordinance, it would be contrary to the general treatment afforded to hotels for Petitioner to be allowed to construct a four story parking deck without the necessity for obtaining an amendment to its conditional use permit.\nAs a result, for all of these reasons, we conclude that Petitioner is required to obtain an amendment to its conditional use permit before constructing the proposed parking deck. Neither the zoning ordinance nor the appellate decisions upon with Petitioner relies support Petitioner\u2019s argument that accessory structures are permitted as a matter of right, regardless of the nature or size of the structure. Thus, the trial court did not err by upholding the Board of Adjustment\u2019s decision that Petitioner could not construct the proposed parking deck without seeking and obtaining an amendment to its conditional use permit.\n2. Expansion of Non-Conforming Use\nSecondly, Petitioner argues that the trial court erred by upholding the Board\u2019s conclusion that the Town properly denied Petitioner\u2019s request to build a multi-story parking deck because its proposed deck would constitute an expansion of a non-conforming use. We disagree.\n\u201cWhere the evidence is not in conflict, the question of whether a particular activity will be deemed a permissible continuation, or an impermissible expansion, of a nonconforming use is a question of law.\u201d Stegall, 87 N.C. App. at 363, 361 S.E.2d at 312 (citing In re Tadlock, 261 N.C. 120, 134 S.E.2d 177 (1964)). Petitioner does not argue that the trial court applied the wrong standard of review, and we conclude that the court properly evaluated the Board\u2019s decision using a de novo standard of review. As a result, we will proceed to evaluate the issue of whether the construction of Petitioner\u2019s proposed parking deck would constitute the expansion of a nonconforming use on the merits.\n\u00a7 155.009(C)(1) of the zoning ordinance provides, in pertinent part, that, \u201c[e]xcept as specifically provided in this division (C), it shall be unlawful for any person to engage in any activity that causes an increase in the extent of nonconformity of a nonconforming situation. . . .\u201d According to \u00a7 155.009(D), \u201c[a] nonconforming use shall not be changed to any but a use listed as permitted in the regulations for the district in which the nonconforming use is located.\u201d In addition, \u00a7 155.005(B) of the zoning ordinance provides that:\nAfter May 15, 1972, land or structures, or the uses of land or structures which conform to [zoning] regulations ... may be continued. However, any structural alteration or change in use shall conform with the regulations specified in this chapter.\nMoreover, \u00a7 155.009(1) of the zoning ordinance provides, in pertinent part, that \u201c[a]ny non-conforming building or structure, or any building containing a non-conforming use, or any building or structure constituting a non-conforming situation which is voluntarily substantially improved may only be rebuilt or altered so as to bring the structure into complete conformity with this code.\u201d As a result, the relevant provisions of the zoning ordinance clearly contemplate that any modifications to a non-conforming use are impermissible unless they bring the non-conformity to an end. Steagall, 87 N.C. App. at 364, 361 S.E.2d at 312 (stating that the extent to which \u201can increase in the intensity of the nonconforming activity is permissible\u201d hinges upon a proper interpretation of the zoning ordinance).\nThe construction of the proposed parking deck would clearly result in the expansion of an existing nonconformity as that concept is defined in the zoning ordinance. Given that the hotel\u2019s parking lot is an existing area of nonconformity, the construction of the proposed deck would result in an expansion of the existing nonconformity for several reasons, including the fact that Petitioner\u2019s proposed deck would still not have the required number of parking spaces, in violation of \u00a7 155.009(1), discussed above. Petitioner\u2019s reliance on Jirtle, 175 N.C. App. at 182, 622 S.E.2d at 716 (holding that the construction of a food pantry would not constitute the expansion of an existing nonconforming use under an ordinance providing that \u201cthe non-conforming use of land shall not be enlarged or increased, nor shall any non-conforming use be extended to occupy a greater area of land than that occupied by such use at the time of the passage of the ordinance\u201d) is misplaced given the significant difference between the language of the ordinance at issue there and the language of the Wrightsville Beach ordinance. As a result, given the clearly expressed intent of the zoning ordinance to regulate construction and to avoid expansion of nonconforming uses, we conclude that the Board did not err by determining that the construction of the proposed four story parking deck would constitute an \u201cexpansion of a permitted non-conforming use.\u201d\nPetitioner, however, argues that, since the proposed parking deck will \u201cmitigate\u201d the extent of the existing nonconformity by increasing the number of available parking spaces, the construction of the proposed parking deck cannot, as a matter of law, constitute the expansion of a nonconformity. At the hearing held before the trial court, Petitioner argued that:\nIf we go and build a six-story building for parking and 200 spaces . .. I\u2019ve eliminated all the nonconformity. Can I do that? If I want to do it, I can[.] . . . [A]nything that I do with a nonconforming structure that mitigates or reduces the nonconformity is legalf.] . . . rWle can build a 10-storv building or a eight-storv building for parkingf.l . . . (emphasis added).\n\u201cIt is well settled that \u2018in construing statutes courts normally adopt an interpretation which will avoid absurd or bizarre consequences, the presumption being that the legislature acted in accordance with reason and common sense and did not intend untoward results.\u2019 \u201d State v . Jones, 359 N.C. 832, 837-38, 616 S.E.2d 496, 499 (2005) (quoting Comm\u2019r of Insurance v. Automobile Rate Office, 294 N.C. 60, 68, 241 S.E.2d 324, 329 (1978)). In essence, Petitioner contends that, as long as its proposed building tends to reduce the discrepancy between the required number of parking spaces and the number of parking spaces that is actually available, it has a right to build a \u201cten story building\u201d for parking without obtaining an amendment to its conditional use permit, and regardless of its effect on the surrounding neighborhood. The adoption of such an argument, aside from its inconsistency with the literal language of the zoning ordinance, would lead to absurd results and justifies its rejection.\nIn addition, Petitioner argues that, under \u00a7 155.009(2) of the zoning ordinance, \u201cwhere a nonconforming situation exists, change may be permissible if it changes the activity only in degree rather than a change in the kind of activity.\u201d The relevant provision actually states, however, that \u201c[w]here a nonconforming situation exists, the equipment or process may be changed, if these or similar changes amount only to changes in degree of activity rather than changes in kind of activity and no other violations of other provisions of this chapter occur.\u201d Thus, under the zoning ordinance in effect in Wrightsville Beach, the mere fact that an alteration effects a change in degree rather than a change in kind does not suffice to take the proposed alteration out from under the prohibition against expanding a nonconforming use.\nIn addition, we conclude that this provision of the zoning ordinance does not justify a finding that the proposed parking deck is not the impermissible expansion of a non-conforming use. Firstly, Petitioner does not assert that construction of the proposed parking deck would constitute a change in \u201cequipment or process\u201d or explain how a provision addressing changes in \u201cequipment or process\u201d applies to the construction of a parking deck. Secondly, in addition to ruling that construction of the proposed parking deck would constitute an improper expansion of a nonconforming use, the Board denied Petitioner\u2019s request on several additional grounds, such as the failure of the proposed parking deck to comply with landscaping and sprinkler requirements. As a result, the construction of the proposed parking deck is not permissible under \u00a7 155.009(2) of the zoning ordinance since the prerequisites for the application of the subsection simply do not exist. Thus, the trial court did not err by upholding the Board\u2019s determination that the construction of the proposed parking deck would constitute an impermissible expansion of an existing non-conforming use.\n3. Judicial Estoppel\nFinally, Petitioner argues that the Board erred by ruling that Petitioner was judicially estopped from challenging the requirement that it obtain an amendment to its conditional use permit. Given our other holdings, we conclude that we need not address this issue.\n\u201cIn its broadest and simplest sense, the doctrine of estoppel is a means of preventing a party from asserting a legal claim or defense which is contrary to or inconsistent with his prior actions or conduct.\u201d Godley v. County of Pitt, 306 N.C. 357, 360, 293 S.E.2d 167, 169 (1982). In this case, neither the Board nor the trial court declined to address Petitioner\u2019s challenge to the Town\u2019s ruling that it was required to obtain an amendment to its conditional use permit as a prerequisite for constructing its proposed parking deck. Furthermore, this Court has carefully considered and addressed Petitioner\u2019s challenges to the trial court\u2019s order on the merits and concluded that the trial court correctly upheld the Board\u2019s ruling. Therefore, despite the Board\u2019s conclusion that Petitioner should be estopped from challenging the need for an amendment to its conditional use permit and the trial court\u2019s decision to affirm that determination, Petitioner has not been prevented from challenging the Town\u2019s determination before either the Board, the trial court, or this Court. As a result, we need not address Petitioner\u2019s challenge to the trial court\u2019s decision that Petitioner was judicially estopped from challenging the Town\u2019s determination that it was required to seek and obtain an amendment to its conditional use permit before constructing a proposed parking deck.\nIII. Conclusion\nTherefore, for the reasons discussed above, we conclude that the trial court did not err by upholding the Board\u2019s order affirming the decisions of the Town\u2019s zoning administrators to deny Petitioner\u2019s request to construct a parking deck without seeking and obtaining an amendment to its conditional use permit. Thus, the trial court\u2019s order should be, and hereby is, affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nChief Judge MARTIN and Judge Robert C. HUNTER concur.\n. A \u201cstructure\u201d is defined in \u00a7 155.002 of the zoning ordinance as \u201c[a]nything constructed or erected, the use of which requires more or less permanent location on the ground, or attached to something having more or less permanent location on the ground.\u201d\n. A \u201cbuilding\u201d is defined in \u00a7 155.002 of the zoning ordinance as \u201c[a]ny structure enclosed and isolated by exterior walls constructed or used for residence, business, industry, or other public or private purpose, or accessory thereto.\u201d\n. A \u201cuse\u201d is defined in \u00a7 155.002 of the zoning ordinance as \u201c[t]he specific activity or function, for which land, a building, or a structure is designated, arranged, intended, occupied, or maintained.\u201d\n.According to \u00a7 155.002 of the zoning ordinance, a \u201cnonconforming use\u201d is defined as \u201c[a]ny building, land or other areas subject to this chapter lawfully occupied by a use on the effective date of this chapter or amendment thereto which does not conform after the passage of this chapter or amendment with the use requirements of the district in which it is situated,\u201d including \u201cthe activity that constitutes the use made of the property.\u201d\n. An \u201caccessory use\u201d is defined in \u00a7 155.002 of the zoning ordinance as \u201c[a] use customarily incidental and subordinate to the principal use or building and located on the same lot with the principal use or building.\u201d\n. A \u201cconditional use permit\u201d is \u201c[Required for all stated conditional uses including building, development, land use, and the like\u201d and involves the use of a process that \u201crequires that certain stipulations, projections, prerequisites, qualifications, and the like will be fulfilled if the proposed project is to be permitted\u201d according to \u00a7 155.002 of the zoning ordinance. The zoning ordinance, in \u00a7 155.025(A), requires conditional use permits for certain land uses which, \u201cbecause of their unique characteristics, cannot be properly classified in any particular district, or districts, without consideration, in each case of the impact of those uses upon neighboring land uses and of the public need for the particular use in the particular location.\u201d\n. An \u201caccessory structure\u201d is defined in \u00a7 155.002 of the zoning ordinance as a \u201cdetached subordinate structure^), the use of which is incidental to that of the principal structure and located on the same lot therewith.\u201d\n. The transition from a one story parking deck to a four story parking deck obviated the necessity for Petitioner to obtain the variances that had been requested in its original application.\n. The validity of this point is reinforced by the fact that the Table of Uses contained in the zoning ordinance makes no reference to \u201caccessory structures.\u201d\n. Dobo addresses a zoning ordinance that defined \u201caccessory use\u201d as \u201c[a] use or structure on the same lot with, and of a nature customarily incidental and subordinate to, the principal use or structure[.]\u201d Dobo, 149 N.C. App. at 703, 562 S.E.2d at 110. The reference to a \u201cuse or structure\u201d made the zoning ordinance at issue in that case different from the one at issue here, which does not equate uses and structures.\n. Petitioner has neither disputed the accuracy of this claim nor challenged its lawfulness.\n. The record reflects that the other two large resort hotels located in Wrightsville Beach operate subject to conditional use permits. For that reason, among others, we are unable to agree with Petitioner\u2019s suggestion that its rights under the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution and the law of the land clause of the North Carolina Constitution have been violated because both of these resorts have parking decks.\n. Petitioner also argues that its proposed parking deck is a \u201cstructure\u201d rather than a \u201cbuilding,\u201d that parking is an \u201caccessory use\u201d rather than a \u201cprincipal use,\u201d and that its proposed parking deck is an \u201caccessory structure\u201d rather than a \u201cprincipal structure.\u201d However, since we have concluded that \u201caccessory uses\u201d and \u201caccessory structures\u201d are not equivalent for purposes of the zoning ordinance, we need not address the extent to which Petitioner has correctly classified the proposed parking deck under the zoning ordinance.\n. We also note that, because Petitioner did not challenge the trial court\u2019s decision to uphold the Board\u2019s determination that the Town had correctly concluded that the proposed parking deck did not comply with the landscaping ordinance in its brief, so that Petitioner has abandoned any right it may have had to contest that aspect of the trial court\u2019s decision.", "type": "majority", "author": "ERVIN, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Shanklin & Nichols, LLP, by Kenneth A. Shanklin, and Matthew A. Nichols, for Petitioner-Appellant.", "Wessell & Raney, L.L.P., by John C. Wessell, III, for Respondents-Appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "FOUR SEASONS MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC., Petitioner v. TOWN OF WRIGHTSVILLE BEACH, BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT AND THE TOWN OF WRIGHTSVILLE BEACH, Respondents\nNo. COA09-777\n(Filed 6 July 2010)\n1. Zoning\u2014 conditional use permit \u2014 new parking deck\u2014 amendment required\nThe trial court did not err by upholding the Wrightsville Beach Board of Adjustment\u2019s decision that petitioner could not build a proposed parking deck without seeking and obtaining an amendment to its conditional use permit. Neither the ordinance nor the decisions upon which petitioner relied supported the argument that accessory structures are permitted as a matter of right regardless of the nature or size of the structure.\n2. Zoning\u2014 new parking deck \u2014 non-conforming use\u2014 expansion\nThe trial court did not err by upholding the Wrightsville Beach Board of Adjustment\u2019s conclusion that the Town had properly denied petitioner\u2019s request to build a multi-story parking deck because the deck would constitute expansion of a nonconforming use.\n3. Estoppel\u2014 judicial \u2014 challenge to ruling heard\nThe question of whether petitioner was judicially estopped from challenging the Town\u2019s decision that petitioner must obtain an amendment to its conditional use permit to build a parking deck was not addressed where petitioner was not prevented from challenging that determination before the Board of Adjustment, the trial court, or the Court of Appeals.\nAppeal by petitioner from judgment entered 17 February 2009 by Judge Charles H. Henry in New Hanover County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 11 January 2010.\nShanklin & Nichols, LLP, by Kenneth A. Shanklin, and Matthew A. Nichols, for Petitioner-Appellant.\nWessell & Raney, L.L.P., by John C. Wessell, III, for Respondents-Appellees." }, "file_name": "0065-01", "first_page_order": 93, "last_page_order": 112 }