{ "id": 3733962, "name": "IN THE MATTER OF: L.I.", "name_abbreviation": "In re L.I.", "decision_date": "2010-07-06", "docket_number": "No. COA09-1306", "first_page": "155", "last_page": "165", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "205 N.C. App. 155" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. 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App. 647", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9188347 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "653", "parenthetical": "\"[Physical evidence obtained in violation of Miranda is admissible unless obtained as a result of actual coercion.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/157/0647-01" ] }, { "cite": "451 S.E.2d 600", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "610", "parenthetical": "\"Physical evidence obtained as a result of a failure to give required Miranda warnings . . . need not be excluded.\"" }, { "page": "608" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "339 N.C. 207", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2558332 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "224", "parenthetical": "\"Physical evidence obtained as a result of a failure to give required Miranda warnings . . . need not be excluded.\"" }, { "page": "222" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/339/0207-01" ] }, { "cite": "127 L. 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App.", "case_ids": [ 12130171 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "520-21", "parenthetical": "holding that State did not meet its burden of demonstrating that constitutional violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where State did not address issue in its brief" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/140/0512-01" ] }, { "cite": "410 S.E.2d 847", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "857" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "330 N.C. 249", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2511929 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "266" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/330/0249-01" ] }, { "cite": "410 S.E.2d 55", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "330 N.C. 188", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2512094 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/330/0188-01" ] }, { "cite": "402 S.E.2d 851", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "854" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "102 N.C. 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App. 427", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. 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Ed. 2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "445 S.E.2d 917", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "926" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "336 N.C. 730", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2536958 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "745" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/336/0730-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 U.S. 436", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12046400 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "479" }, { "page": "726" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/384/0436-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1053, "char_count": 24715, "ocr_confidence": 0.751, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.4033266686372354e-08, "percentile": 0.3395701834354049 }, "sha256": "95837335718bd27f37fa5dd77010d22ac8bedc75f0e774a36167dfadf2fe5129", "simhash": "1:2bc1943a6d158d72", "word_count": 4067 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:30:55.510002+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judge CALABRIA concurs.", "Judge HUNTER, Robert N., Jr. concurs in result only." ], "parties": [ "IN THE MATTER OF: L.I." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "HUNTER, Robert C., Judge.\nJuvenile L.I. appeals from the trial court\u2019s orders adjudicating her delinquent and ordering a Level 2 disposition. Juvenile\u2019s main argument on appeal is that the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress her statement to the police officer during a traffic stop as well as the contraband seized during the stop. We conclude that juvenile\u2019s statement was obtained in violation of her constitutional and statutory rights, and thus the trial court should have suppressed the statement. With respect to the contraband, however, juvenile has made no argument that she was subjected to actual coercion and thus the trial court properly admitted this evidence. Accordingly, we reverse and remand the matter for a new adjudication hearing.\nFacts\nThe State\u2019s evidence tended to show the following facts: On 19 December 2008, Corporal Raheem Abdul Aleem, with the Durham County\u2019s Sheriff\u2019s Department, was patrolling the area of a recent robbery when he saw a Toyota 4Runner drive by and the male driver was not wearing his seatbelt. Corporal Aleem activated his blue lights and pursued the vehicle. Corporal Aleem stopped the car, exited his patrol car, and approached the driver\u2019s side window. For safety purposes, Corporal Aleem asked the driver to exit the vehicle and walk back toward his patrol car. Corporal Aleem then frisked the driver for weapons and placed him in \u201cinvestigative detention\u201d while he continued his investigation. Corporal Aleem next asked the front passenger to get out of the 4Runner and frisked him as well.\nJuvenile, one of four other passengers in the backseat of the 4Runner, was then asked to get out of the car. Based on his conversation with the front passenger, as juvenile was getting out of the vehicle, Corporal Aleem asked juvenile for the marijuana that he \u201cknew she had.\u201d When juvenile responded, \u201cwhat-marijuana?,\u201d Corporal Aleem stated: \u201cthe marijuana I know you have.\u201d Juvenile then turned away and appeared to reach in her pants. When Corporal Aleem tried to see what juvenile was \u201creaching for,\u201d she responded: \u201c[Y]o, you can\u2019t look in my pants.\u201d At this point, Corporal Aleem placed juvenile in investigative detention, handcuffed her, and placed her in the backseat of the patrol car.\nWhile waiting for a female officer to arrive to search juvenile, Corporal Aleem told juvenile that \u201cif you take drugs into the jail[,] it\u2019s an additional charge.\u201d Corporal Aleem then called juvenile\u2019s school to verify her age. After calling the school, Corporal Aleem \u201cwent over to her window\u201d because \u201cshe wanted to tell [him] something[.]\u201d Juvenile then told him that the drugs were not in her pants but were in her right coat pocket. Juvenile leaned out of the patrol car, showing Corporal Aleem where the drugs were located. Corporal Aleem got juvenile out of the patrol car, reached inside her pocket, and pulled out a plastic bag containing nine individual bags of \u201cgreen leafed material and two plastic bags of a powdered substance.\u201d Juvenile\u2019s mother arrived at the scene and Corporal Aleem explained to her that he was going to \u201cdo[] a petition on [juvenile]\u201d and left juvenile in her mother\u2019s custody.\nA juvenile petition was filed alleging that juvenile was delinquent for possessing marijuana with the intent to sell or deliver. Prior to the adjudication and disposition hearing, juvenile filed a motion to suppress her statements as well as the contraband. During the adjudication phase of the proceedings, defense counsel requested a voir dire to determine the admissibility of the statements and contraband. At the conclusion of the voir dire, the trial court entered an order from the bench denying juvenile\u2019s motion to suppress. The trial court subsequently adjudicated juvenile a delinquent juvenile and ordered a Level 2 disposition. Juvenile timely appealed to this Court.\nI\nJuvenile first contends that the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress her statement that she had marijuana in her coat pocket. She contends that the statement was obtained as a result of a custodial interrogation conducted in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-2101 (2009) and without her having been advised of her rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).\n\u201cA trial court\u2019s findings of fact following a hearing on the admissibility of a [juvenile]\u2019s statements are conclusive on appeal if supported by competent evidence, even if the evidence is conflicting.\u201d State v. Eason, 336 N.C. 730, 745, 445 S.E.2d 917, 926 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1096, 130 L. Ed. 2d 661 (1995). The trial court\u2019s conclusions of law must be supported by its findings and legally correct, \u201creflecting a correct application of applicable legal principles to the facts found.\u201d State v. Fernandez, 346 N.C. 1, 11, 484 S.E.2d 350, 357 (1997).\nAt a suppression hearing, \u201cconflicts in the evidence are to be resolved by the trial court\u201d and the court \u201cmust make findings of fact resolving any material conflict in the evidence.\u201d State v. McArn, 159 N.C. App. 209, 212, 582 S.E.2d 371, 374 (2003). Where, however, there is no material conflict in the evidence presented at the suppression hearing, specific findings of fact are not required. State v. Parks, 77 N.C. App. 778, 781, 336 S.E.2d 424, 426 (1985), appeal dismissed and disc. review denied, 316 N.C. 384, 342 S.E.2d 904-05 (1986). \u201cIn that event, the necessary findings are implied from the admission of the challenged evidence.\u201d State v. Phillips, 300 N.C. 678, 685, 268 S.E.2d 452, 457 (1980).\nThe Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees that \u201c[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.\u201d U.S. Const, amend. V. In Miranda, the United States Supreme Court held that the Fifth Amendment requires that, prior to custodial interrogation, a person must be advised\nthat he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.\n384 U.S. at 479, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 726.\nIn addition to the warnings mandated by Miranda, the General Assembly has established statutory protections for juveniles. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-2101. Prior to questioning a juvenile in custody, the juvenile must be advised that: (1) \u201cthe juvenile has a right to remain silent\u201d; (2) \u201cany statement the juvenile does make can be and may be used against the juvenile\u201d; (3) \u201cthe juvenile has a right to have a parent, guardian, or custodian present during questioning\u201d; and (4) \u201cthe juvenile has a right to consult with an attorney and that one will be appointed for the juvenile if the juvenile is not represented and wants representation.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-2101(a)(l)-(4). However, \u201cMiranda warnings and the protections of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-2101 apply only to custodial interrogations.\u201d In re W.R., 363 N.C. 244, 247, 675 S.E.2d 342, 344 (2009).\nOn appeal, both juvenile and the State predominately focus their arguments on whether juvenile was in custody when she made her statement to Corporal Aleem that the drugs were in her coat pocket. The record indicates, however, that the State, in arguing for the admission of juvenile\u2019s statement at the conclusion of the voir dire, did not contend that juvenile was not in custody at the time of her statement or that its evidence was sufficient to support a finding to that effect. Instead, the State argued that Corporal Aleem\u2019s \u201ctestimony shows that [juvenile] made statements to the officer at this point voluntarily. She decided that she did not want to be charged with taking drugs in a detention facility.\u201d Similarly, the trial court determined that, irrespective of whether juvenile was in custody at the time she made the statement, she made the statement voluntarily:\nTHE COURT: As far as \u2014 as it concerns the statement, the court will find that the juvenile initiated contact with the officer by asking him to come back over that the juvenile wanted to talk to him and therefore was not custodial interrogation, but rather a voluntary statement given by the juvenile at that time.\nAlthough the trial court did not make a finding regarding whether juvenile was in custody at the time of her statement, our Supreme Court has held that \u201c[t]he absence of such a finding . . . does not prevent [an appellate court] from examining the record and determining whether [the] defendant was in custody.\u201d State v. Torres, 330 N.C. 517, 525, 412 S.E.2d 20, 24 (1992); accord State v. Hall, 131 N.C. App. 427, 431, 508 S.E.2d 8, 12 (1998) (reviewing whether defendant was in custody for Miranda purposes despite absence of finding on issue), aff'd per curiam, 350 N.C. 303, 513 S.E.2d 561 (1999).\nIn determining whether a person is in custody for purposes of Miranda and N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-2101, the \u201cultimate inquiry\u201d is whether, based on the totality of the circumstances, there was a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest. State v. Buchanan, 353 N.C. 332, 338, 543 S.E.2d 823, 827 (2001); W.R., 363 N.C. at 248, 675 S.E.2d at 344. This \u201cultimate inquiry\u201d is \u201can objective test, based upon a reasonable person standard, and is \u2018to be applied on a case-by-case basis considering all the facts and circumstances.\u2019 \u2019\u2022\u2019 Hall, 131 N.C. App. at 432, 508 S.E.2d at 12 (quoting State v. Medlin, 333 N.C. 280, 291, 426 S.E.2d 402, 407 (1993)).\nCorporal Aleem\u2019s uncontradicted testimony indicates that, at the time of juvenile\u2019s statements, he had \u201cplaced her in investigative detention,\u201d had handcuffed her, and had placed her in the backseat of his patrol car. Considering the totality of the circumstances, juvenile was in custody at the time of her statement. See State v. Johnston, 154 N.C. App. 500, 503, 572 S.E.2d 438, 441 (2002) (concluding defendant was in custody where defendant was ordered out of vehicle, handcuffed, placed in backseat of patrol car, and told that he was in \u201csecure custody\u201d), appeal dismissed, 356 N.C. 687, 578 S.E.2d 320 (2003).\nWith respect to whether juvenile\u2019s statement was the product of custodial interrogation, the trial court determined that it was a \u201cvoluntary,\u201d spontaneous statement, unsolicited by Corporal Aleem. The \u201cdetermination of whether an interrogation is conducted while a person is in custody\u201d is a question of law, \u201cfully reviewable on appeal.\u201d Buchanan, 353 N.C. at 336, 543 S.E.2d at 826.\nUnder Miranda, \u201cinterrogation\u201d includes both \u201cexpress questioning\u201d by police and its \u201cfunctional equivalent\u201d \u2014 \u201cany words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.\u201d Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301, 64 L. Ed. 2d 297, 308 (1980). However, \u201cbecause \u2018the police surely cannot be held accountable for the unforeseeable results of their words or actions, the definition of interrogation can extend only to words or actions on the part of police officers that they should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.\u2019 \u201d State v. Golphin, 352 N.C. 364, 406, 533 S.E.2d 168, 199 (2000) (quoting Innis, 446 U.S. at 301-02, 64 L. Ed. 2d at 308), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 931, 149 L. Ed. 2d 305 (2001). Relevant factors for determining whether police \u201cshould have known\u201d that their conduct was likely to elicit an incriminating response include: \u201c(1) \u2018the intent of the police\u2019; (2) whether the \u2018practice is designed to elicit an incriminating response from the accused\u2019; and (3) \u2018[a]ny knowledge the police may have had concerning the unusual susceptibility of a defendant to a particular form of persuasion State v. Fisher, 158 N.C. App. 133, 142-43, 580 S.E.2d 405, 413 (2003) (quoting Innis, 446 U.S. at 302 nn. 7-8, 64 L. Ed. 2d at 308 nn. 7-8), aff\u2019d per curiam, 358 N.C. 215, 593 S.E.2d 583-84 (2004).\nOn appeal, juvenile contends that Officer Aleem\u2019s statements to her, while she was alone and handcuffed in the backseat of the patrol car, that he was \u201ctaking her downtown\u201d and that it was an \u201cadditional charge\u201d to take drugs into a detention facility \u201cwere clearly made to \u2018elicit an incriminating response\u2019 from the juvenile.\u201d We agree.\nIn State v. Phelps, 156 N.C. App. 119, 121, 575 S.E.2d 818, 820 (2003), rev\u2019d per curiam for reasons stated in the dissent, 358 N.C. 142, 592 S.E.2d 687-88 (2004), the police officer explained to the defendant, while transporting him to jail and without providing any Miranda warnings, that \u201che needed to let me know right now before we went past the jail doors if he had any kind of illegal substances or weapons on him, that it was an automatic felony no matter what it was, so he better let me know right now.\u201d The defendant told the police officer that he had crack cocaine in his coat pocket and the officer retrieved the drugs. Id. On appeal from the denial of his motion to suppress the cocaine, the defendant argued, as juvenile contends here, that \u201chis statement regarding the location of the crack cocaine was inadmissible because he was not read his Miranda warnings prior to the statement being made and the statement was obtained during custodial interrogation.\u201d Id. at 122, 575 S.E.2d at 821. In holding that the trial court should have granted the defendant\u2019s motion to suppress, this Court explained:\n[The officer] knew or should have known that his statement was reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating response. [The officer] \u2019s objective purpose was to obtain defendant\u2019s admission or denial of the possession of contraband. Therefore, we conclude the trial court erred in admitting defendant\u2019s incriminating statement because the officer failed to advise defendant of his Miranda warnings prior to the custodial interrogation.\nId. at 123, 575 S.E.2d at 821.\nThis case is factually indistinguishable from Phelps. When Corporal Aleem first ordered juvenile to get out of the SUV, he asked her directly: \u201c[Where is] the marijuana I know you have[?]\u201d After handcuffing and placing juvenile in the back of the patrol car, Corporal Aleem told her that he was going to \u201ctake her downtown\u201d and that \u201cif [she] t[ook] drugs into the jail it[] [would be] an additional charge.\u201d In \u201cresponse\u201d to Corporal Aleem\u2019s statements, juvenile told him that she had marijuana and that it was in her coat pocket.\nBased on Phelps, we conclude that Corporal Aleem \u201cknew or should have known that his statement was reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating response.\u201d Id. Corporal Aleem\u2019s testimony indicates that it was his \u201cobjective purpose\u201d to obtain juvenile\u2019s admission that she possessed the marijuana that Corporal Aleem \u201cknew she had.\u201d Id. The trial court, therefore, erred in denying juvenile\u2019s motion to suppress her statement made during a custodial interrogation without being advised of her rights under Miranda and N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-2101(a).\nAlthough we conclude that the trial court erred in denying juvenile\u2019s motion to suppress her statement, \u201cnot all errors involving incriminating statements obtained in violation of Miranda require new trials.\u201d State v. Washington, 102 N.C. App. 535, 540, 402 S.E.2d 851, 854 (Greene, J., dissenting), rev\u2019dper curiam for reasons stated in the dissent, 330 N.C. 188, 410 S.E.2d 55 (1991). Pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1443(b) (2009), \u201c[a] violation of the defendant\u2019s rights under the Constitution of the United States is prejudicial unless the appellate court finds that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.\u201d Under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1443(b), the State bears the burden of demonstrating that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Turner, 330 N.C. 249, 266, 410 S.E.2d 847, 857 (1991). Here, however, the State fails to make any argument on appeal that the erroneous admission of juvenile\u2019s statement was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Consequently, the State has failed to meet its burden of proof under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1443(b). See State v. Pinchback, 140 N.C. App. 512, 520-21, 521 n.4, 537 S.E.2d 222, 227, 227 n.4 (2000) (holding that State did not meet its burden of demonstrating that constitutional violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where State did not address issue in its brief).\nII\nJuvenile also contends that \u201c[t]he contraband was discovered as a direct result of the illegal and unconstitutional interrogation.\u201d Thus, juvenile argues, the marijuana \u201cwas \u2018fruit of the poisonous tree,\u2019 \u201d and should have been suppressed along with her statement. We note that, in violation of Rule 28(b)(6) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure, juvenile does not cite any authority in support of this contention.\nWe nonetheless conclude that the trial court did not err in admitting the evidence of the marijuana. With respect to Miranda violations, our Supreme Court has held, based on Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 41 L. Ed. 2d 182 (1974), and Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 84 L. Ed. 2d 222 (1985), that although a \u201cstatement which is obtained by the violation of the Miranda rule must be excluded,\u201d evidence \u201cobtained as a result of the violation does not have to be excluded.\u201d State v. May, 334 N.C. 609, 612, 434 S.E.2d 180, 182 (1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1198, 127 L. Ed. 2d 661 (1994). The exclusionary rule does not preclude the admission of physical evidence obtained as a result of a Miranda violation where \u201cthe record shows there was no actual coercion but only a violation of the Miranda warning requirement . . . .\u201d Id.; accord State v. Hardy, 339 N.C. 207, 224, 451 S.E.2d 600, 610 (1994) (\u201cPhysical evidence obtained as a result of a failure to give required Miranda warnings . . . need not be excluded.\u201d); State v. Harris, 157 N.C. App. 647, 653, 580 S.E.2d 63, 67 (2003) (\u201c[Physical evidence obtained in violation of Miranda is admissible unless obtained as a result of actual coercion.\u201d).\nAlthough the trial court did not address actual coercion in its order, an appellate court \u201cmake[s] an independent determination of the ultimate issue of voluntariness based upon [its] examination and consideration of the entire record on appeal.\u201d State v. Davis, 305 N.C. 400, 419-20, 290 S.E.2d 574, 586 (1982); accord State v. White, 291 N.C. 118, 122, 229 S.E.2d 152, 155 (1976) (explaining that determination of whether statement is coerced must be based on \u201cconsideration of the entire record\u201d). In determining whether a statement is voluntary, an appellate court \u201creviews the totality of the surrounding circumstances in which the statement was made.\u201d State v. Brewington, 352 N.C. 489, 499, 532 S.E.2d 496, 502 (2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1165, 148 L. Ed. 2d 992 (2001). \u201cA statement is involuntary or coerced if it is the result of government tactics so oppressive that the will of the interrogated party \u2018has been overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired ....\u2019\u201d Phelps, 156 N.C. App. at 125, 575 S.E.2d at 823 (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854, 862 (1973)); accord Elstad, 470 U.S. at 309, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 232 (equating \u201cactual coercion\u201d with \u201ccircumstances calculated to undermine the suspect\u2019s ability to exercise his free will\u201d). Our Supreme Court has set out several factors to be considered in assessing whether a statement is coerced:\nwhether defendant was in custody, whether he was deceived, whether his Miranda rights were honored, whether he was held incommunicado, the length of the interrogation, whether there were physical threats or shows of violence, whether promises were made to obtain the confession, the familiarity of the declarant with the criminal justice system, and the mental condition of the declarant.\nHardy, 339 N.C. at 222, 451 S.E.2d at 608. \u201cThe presence or absence of any one of these factors is not determinative.\u201d State v. Kemmerlin, 356 N.C. 446, 458, 573 S.E.2d 870, 881 (2002).\nHere, \u201cthe record shows,\u201d May, 334 N.C. at 612, 434 S.E.2d at 182, that juvenile was not subjected to actual coercion. While we have concluded that juvenile was in custody at the time of her statement and that her Miranda rights were violated, there is no evidence suggesting that juvenile was deceived, that she was held incommunicado, that she was threatened or intimidated, that she was promised anything, or that she was interrogated for an unreasonable period of time. Nor is there any evidence that juvenile was under the influence of drugs or alcohol or that her mental condition was such that she was vulnerable to manipulation. See State v. Nguyen, 178 N.C. App. 447, 453, 632 S.E.2d 197, 202 (finding no coercion where \u201c[n]o evidence appear[ed] in the record that tends to show that defendant was deceived; that defendant was held incommunicado; that defendant was interrogated for an unreasonable length of time; or that any promises, physical threats, or shows of violence were made\u201d), appeal dismissed and disc. review denied, 360 N.C. 653, 637 S.E.2d 189 (2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1291, 167 L. Ed. 2d 339 (2007); State v. Campbell, 133 N.C. App. 531, 538, 515 S.E.2d 732, 737 (concluding confession was voluntary where defendant was not deceived, held incommunicado, or threatened, and \u201c[t]here was no indication that defendant was under the influence of impairing substances or that his mental capacity was debilitated\u201d), disc. review denied, 351 N.C. 111, 540 S.E.2d 370 (1999). Considering the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that juvenile\u2019s statement is not the product of actual coercion and that the trial court properly admitted the evidence of the marijuana.\nIn sum, we conclude that the trial court erred in denying juvenile\u2019s motion to suppress her statement. As for the contraband, we hold that the trial court properly admitted the evidence. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court\u2019s order denying juvenile\u2019s motion to suppress with respect to her statement, vacate the trial court\u2019s order adjudicating juvenile delinquent, and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Due to our disposition on appeal, we do not address juvenile\u2019s other arguments.\nReversed and remanded.\nJudge CALABRIA concurs.\nJudge HUNTER, Robert N., Jr. concurs in result only.\n. Although Judge R.C. Hunter concurred that a Miranda violation occurred in Phelps, he dissented on the grounds that the majority was incorrect in concluding that the trial court\u2019s erroneous admission of the defendant\u2019s incriminating statement was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and that the evidence was also admissible under the inevitable discovery doctrine. Phelps, 156 N.C. App. at 127-28, 575 S.E.2d at 823-25 (Hunter, R.C., J., dissenting). On review, the Supreme Court reversed per curiam the majority\u2019s decision \u201c[f]or the reasons stated in the dissenting opinion[.]\u201d Phelps, 358 N.C. at 142, 592 S.E.2d at 687-88. Phelps is thus controlling with respect to the holdings reached by the entire panel as well as those conclusions in Judge Hunter\u2019s dissent.\n. Juvenile makes no argument that N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-2101 requires the exclusion of the evidence as a consequence of Corporal Aleem\u2019s failure to advise her of her statutory rights as a juvenile. We, therefore, do not address the issue.", "type": "majority", "author": "HUNTER, Robert C., Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General Mabel Y Bullock, for the State.", "James N. Freeman, Jr. for juvenile-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "IN THE MATTER OF: L.I.\nNo. COA09-1306\n(Filed 6 July 2010)\n1. Confessions and Incriminating Statements\u2014 juvenile proceeding \u2014 Miranda warning \u2014 custodial interrogation\u2014 motion to suppress \u2014 improperly denied\nThe trial court in a juvenile proceeding erred in denying the juvenile\u2019s motion to suppress a statement made to a police officer during a traffic stop. The juvenile was in custody when she made the statement, the statement was in response to the officer\u2019s interrogation, and the juvenile had not been advised of her rights under Miranda and N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-2101(a). Furthermore, the State failed to argue that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.\n2. Search and Seizure\u2014 exclusionary rule \u2014 Miranda violation \u2014 no coercion \u2014 motion to suppress \u2014 properly denied\nThe trial court in a juvenile proceeding did not err in denying the juvenile\u2019s motion to suppress contraband seized during a traffic stop. The exclusionary rule did not preclude the admission of the physical evidence obtained as a result of a Miranda violation where the juvenile made no argument that she was subjected to actual coercion.\nAppeal by juvenile from orders entered 24 March 2009 by Judge Brian C. Wilks in Durham County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 24 March 2010.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General Mabel Y Bullock, for the State.\nJames N. Freeman, Jr. for juvenile-appellant." }, "file_name": "0155-01", "first_page_order": 183, "last_page_order": 193 }