{ "id": 3734582, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. WADDELL JOHNSON HOPPER, JR., Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Hopper", "decision_date": "2010-07-06", "docket_number": "No. COA09-1211", "first_page": "175", "last_page": "183", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "205 N.C. App. 175" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "663 S.E.2d 433", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12641529, 12641530 ], "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/663/0433-01", "/se2d/663/0433-02" ] }, { "cite": "362 N.C. 368", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 12641530 ], "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/663/0433-02" ] }, { "cite": "649 S.E.2d 902", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12639301 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "904", "parenthetical": "concluding that where deputy stopped defendant based on mistaken belief that defendant was speeding, \"the legal justification for th[e] traffic stop was not objectively reasonable\" and \"the stop violated defendant's Fourth Amendment rights\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/649/0902-01" ] }, { "cite": "633 S.E.2d 459", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12636416 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "461-62", "parenthetical": "holding that where defendant's failure to use turn signal did not constitute a traffic violation, police officer's stop was unreasonable" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/633/0459-01" ] }, { "cite": "640 S.E.2d 56", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12637741, 12637742 ], "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/640/0056-01", "/se2d/640/0056-02" ] }, { "cite": "629 S.E.2d 857", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12635817 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "858" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/629/0857-01" ] }, { "cite": "641 S.E.2d 404", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12637854 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "409" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/641/0404-01" ] }, { "cite": "531 U.S. 1167", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9788992, 9787808, 9789122, 9788188, 9788430, 9788718, 9787538, 9789235, 9788053, 9788309, 9787422, 9788565, 9788860, 9787676, 9787934 ], "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/531/1167-13", "/us/531/1167-04", "/us/531/1167-14", "/us/531/1167-07", "/us/531/1167-09", "/us/531/1167-11", "/us/531/1167-02", "/us/531/1167-15", "/us/531/1167-06", "/us/531/1167-08", "/us/531/1167-01", "/us/531/1167-10", "/us/531/1167-12", "/us/531/1167-03", "/us/531/1167-05" ] }, { "cite": "658 S.E.2d 643", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12640657 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "645" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/658/0643-01" ] }, { "cite": "186 N.C. App. 124", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8155044 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "127", "parenthetical": "concluding that where deputy stopped defendant based on mistaken belief that defendant was speeding, \"the legal justification for th[e] traffic stop was not objectively reasonable\" and \"the stop violated defendant's Fourth Amendment rights\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/186/0124-01" ] }, { "cite": "360 N.C. 562", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3794266 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "565", "parenthetical": "holding that where defendant's failure to use turn signal did not constitute a traffic violation, police officer's stop was unreasonable" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/360/0562-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-10", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "241 S.E.2d 324", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "329", "parenthetical": "\"In construing statutes courts normally adopt an interpretation which will avoid absurd or bizarre consequences, the presumption being that the legislature acted in accordance with reason and common sense and did not intend untoward results.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "294 N.C. 60", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8570860 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "68", "parenthetical": "\"In construing statutes courts normally adopt an interpretation which will avoid absurd or bizarre consequences, the presumption being that the legislature acted in accordance with reason and common sense and did not intend untoward results.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/294/0060-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-28", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" }, { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "114 S.E.2d 688", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1960, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "698", "parenthetical": "\"It is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that sections and acts in pari materia, and all parts thereof, should be construed together and compared with each other.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "252 N.C. 595", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8624853 ], "year": 1960, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "610", "parenthetical": "\"It is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that sections and acts in pari materia, and all parts thereof, should be construed together and compared with each other.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/252/0595-01" ] }, { "cite": "238 S.E.2d 137", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "140", "parenthetical": "holding that \"[t]he definition of 'highway' in G.S. 20-4.01(13)\" should be given its \"plain and ordinary meaning\" and \"given the same connotation\" to all provisions in Chapter 20 of the General Statutes \"unless the context requires otherwise\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "293 N.C. 342", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564105 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "346", "parenthetical": "holding that \"[t]he definition of 'highway' in G.S. 20-4.01(13)\" should be given its \"plain and ordinary meaning\" and \"given the same connotation\" to all provisions in Chapter 20 of the General Statutes \"unless the context requires otherwise\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/293/0342-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 136-66.1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(1)" }, { "page": "(2)", "parenthetical": "\"In each municipality the municipal street system shall consist of those streets and highways accepted by the municipality which are not a part of the State highway system.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "144 S.E.2d 241", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "244-45" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "265 N.C. 404", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8575524 ], "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "409" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/265/0404-01" ] }, { "cite": "367 S.E.2d 660", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "663" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "322 N.C. 288", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2516208 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "293" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/322/0288-01" ] }, { "cite": "297 S.E.2d 540", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "548" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 N.C. 130", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561131 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "143" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/307/0130-01" ] }, { "cite": "484 S.E.2d 350", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "357", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Chamberlain, 307 N.C. 130, 143, 297 S.E.2d 540, 548 (1982)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "346 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 139403 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "11", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Chamberlain, 307 N.C. 130, 143, 297 S.E.2d 540, 548 (1982)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/346/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 N.C. 172", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3746977, 3737001, 3738571, 3742734, 3740822, 3745852 ], "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/361/0172-06", "/nc/361/0172-01", "/nc/361/0172-04", "/nc/361/0172-02", "/nc/361/0172-03", "/nc/361/0172-05" ] }, { "cite": "177 N.C. App. 452", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8301569 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "454-55" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/177/0452-01" ] }, { "cite": "182 N.C. App. 52", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8168382 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "60" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/182/0052-01" ] }, { "cite": "491 S.E.2d 672", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "675", "parenthetical": "defining conclusions of law as \"any determination requiring the exercise of judgment or the application of legal principles\" and findings of fact as \"[a]ny determination reached through logical reasoning from the evidentiary facts\" (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "127 N.C. App. 505", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11798267 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "510" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/127/0505-01" ] }, { "cite": "61 Or. App. 205", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Or. App.", "case_ids": [ 2337397 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "208", "parenthetical": "holding that issue of whether streets in privately-owned condominium complex were open to the public was a question of fact" }, { "page": "1095", "parenthetical": "holding that issue of whether streets in privately-owned condominium complex were open to the public was a question of fact" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/or-app/61/0205-01" ] }, { "cite": "215 A.2d 685", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "687", "parenthetical": "\"Whether the defendant was operating a motor vehicle on a public highway, as the [DWI] statute requires, is a question of fact. . . .\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 380", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Conn. Cir. Ct.", "case_ids": [ 1740742 ], "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "382", "parenthetical": "\"Whether the defendant was operating a motor vehicle on a public highway, as the [DWI] statute requires, is a question of fact. . . .\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/conn-cir-ct/3/0380-01" ] }, { "cite": "775 A.2d 274", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "256 Conn. 543", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Conn.", "case_ids": [ 967013 ], "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/conn/256/0543-01" ] }, { "cite": "742 A.2d 1264", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1270", "parenthetical": "\"The question of whether a roadway is a public highway is a question of fact.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "56 Conn. App. 252", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Conn. App.", "case_ids": [ 444039 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "261", "parenthetical": "\"The question of whether a roadway is a public highway is a question of fact.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/conn-app/56/0252-01" ] }, { "cite": "320 S.E.2d 405", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 N.C. 79", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4755749 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/312/0079-01" ] }, { "cite": "313 S.E.2d 196", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "197-98" }, { "page": "197-98" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "67 N.C. App. 512", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526757 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "514-15" }, { "page": "515" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/67/0512-01" ] }, { "cite": "580 S.E.2d 693", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "357 N.C. 242", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 491737 ], "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/357/0242-01" ] }, { "cite": "571 S.E.2d 867", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "870", "parenthetical": "addressing whether evidence was sufficient to support \"reasonable inference\" that road on which defendant was driving was public or private road" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "154 N.C. App. 341", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9250020 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "345-46", "parenthetical": "addressing whether evidence was sufficient to support \"reasonable inference\" that road on which defendant was driving was public or private road" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/154/0341-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-4.01", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 7, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(13)" }, { "page": "(13)" }, { "page": "(13)" }, { "page": "(13)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-129", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 10, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)(4)" }, { "page": "(a)(4)" }, { "page": "(a)(4)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "449 U.S. 411", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11716341 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "417" }, { "page": "629" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/449/0411-01" ] }, { "cite": "148 L. Ed. 2d 997", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "490 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 605100 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "7" }, { "page": "10" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/490/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "536 S.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "8", "parenthetical": "quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 104 L. Ed. 2d 1, 10 (1989)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "352 N.C. 227", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 685065 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "239", "parenthetical": "quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 104 L. Ed. 2d 1, 10 (1989)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/352/0227-01" ] }, { "cite": "172 L. Ed. 2d 198", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "362 N.C. 244", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4149866 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "247" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/362/0244-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6167798 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "21-22" }, { "page": "906" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/392/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "446 S.E.2d 67", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "70", "parenthetical": "citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 906 (1968)" }, { "page": "70" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "337 N.C. 437", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2549311 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "441", "parenthetical": "citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 906 (1968)" }, { "page": "441" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/337/0437-01" ] }, { "cite": "464 F.3d 392", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 3730906 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "396" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/464/0392-01" ] }, { "cite": "665 S.E.2d 438", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "440", "parenthetical": "quoting United States v. Delfin-Colina, 464 F.3d 392, 396 (3d Cir. 2006)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "362 N.C. 412", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4150881 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "415", "parenthetical": "quoting United States v. Delfin-Colina, 464 F.3d 392, 396 (3d Cir. 2006)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/362/0412-01" ] }, { "cite": "539 S.E.2d 625", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "631" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "353 N.C. 200", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 135935 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "208" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/353/0200-01" ] }, { "cite": "543 S.E.2d 823", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "826" }, { "page": "826" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "353 N.C. 332", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 135584 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "336" }, { "page": "336" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/353/0332-01" ] }, { "cite": "291 S.E.2d 618", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "619" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "306 N.C. 132", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567694 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "134" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/306/0132-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 968, "char_count": 21303, "ocr_confidence": 0.767, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.2915910952106618e-07, "percentile": 0.6199392319783895 }, "sha256": "e042d31cdae30c03ce638fab1e0bef3a3e6b1a347cf1202ffc4bcc8960919c14", "simhash": "1:0829946a973f3ed0", "word_count": 3469 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:30:55.510002+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges CALABRIA and HUNTER, Robert N., Jr. concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. WADDELL JOHNSON HOPPER, JR., Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "HUNTER, Robert C., Judge.\nDefendant Waddell Johnson Hopper, Jr. appeals from the trial court\u2019s order denying his motion to suppress evidence seized during a traffic stop. Defendant contends that the police officer that stopped him lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct the stop, and thus the evidence seized was the product of an unconstitutional search and should have been suppressed. We conclude, however, that the officer had reasonable suspicion to believe that defendant committed a traffic violation supporting the traffic stop. We, therefore, affirm.\nFacts\nOn 28 April 2008, Officer T.S. Mabe of the Winston-Salem Police Department was on routine patrol in Piedmont Circle, an apartment complex in Winston-Salem, North Carolina. Piedmont Circle, also the name of a street in the complex, \u201cgoes around some inner apartments, and then there\u2019s some outer apartments on the other side of the circle[.]\u201d Corporal Mabe was contacted by investigators in the police department\u2019s narcotics unit and was told that defendant, who was driving in front of him in a white Chevrolet SUV, was driving with a revoked license.\nAt the time of the call from the narcotics officers, it was \u201craining excessively heavy\u201d and Corporal Mabe needed his windshield wipers on their highest setting to see out of his front windshield. Corporal Mabe saw defendant\u2019s white SUV in front of him and noticed that defendant did not have his taillights on despite the heavy rain. Corporal Mabe activated his blue lights and siren and stopped defendant\u2019s car. The narcotics officers arrived at the scene and defendant was cited for failing to have his vehicle\u2019s taillights in proper working order. During the traffic stop, defendant\u2019s vehicle was searched and the police found approximately 10 grams of marijuana, drug paraphernalia, and a 9mm handgun. Defendant was arrested and charged with possession of marijuana with the intent to sell or deliver, possession of drug paraphernalia, carrying a concealed weapon, and possession of a firearm by a felon.\nDefendant filed a pre-trial motion to suppress the evidence seized pursuant to the traffic stop on the ground that Corporal Mabe did not have reasonable suspicion to stop defendant\u2019s vehicle. After conducting a hearing on 4 May 2009, the trial court entered an order on 7 May 2009, in which it concluded that Corporal Mabe had reasonable suspicion to conduct the traffic stop based on defendant\u2019s failure to have his taillights on while driving with his windshield wipers operating. Consequently, the trial court denied defendant\u2019s motion to suppress and defendant pled guilty to all charges, expressly reserving his right to appeal from the denial of his motion to suppress. The court consolidated the offenses into one judgment and sentenced defendant to a presumptive-range term of 16 to 20 months imprisonment. Defendant timely appealed to this Court.\nDiscussion\nDefendant\u2019s only argument on appeal is that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, the appellate court determines whether the trial court\u2019s findings of fact are supported by competent evidence and whether those findings, in turn, support the court\u2019s conclusions of law. State v. Cooke, 306 N.C. 132, 134, 291 S.E.2d 618, 619 (1982). The court\u2019s findings of fact are binding on appeal if they are supported by competent evidence, even if the evidence is conflicting. State v. Buchanan, 353 N.C. 332, 336, 543 S.E.2d 823, 826 (2001). The trial court\u2019s conclusions of law, however, \u201care fully reviewable on appeal.\u201d State v. Hughes, 353 N.C. 200, 208, 539 S.E.2d 625, 631 (2000).\nThe Fourth Amendment protects individuals \u201cagainst unreasonable searches and seizures.\u201d U.S. Const, amend. IV. Traffic stops are permitted under the Fourth Amendment if the officer has \u201c \u2018reasonable suspicion\u2019 to believe that a traffic law has been broken.\u201d State v. Styles, 362 N.C. 412, 415, 665 S.E.2d 438, 440 (2008) (quoting United States v. Delfin-Colina, 464 F.3d 392, 396 (3d Cir. 2006)). Reasonable suspicion requires that \u201c[t]he stop ... be based on specific and articulable facts, as well as the rational inferences from those facts, as viewed through the eyes of a reasonable, cautious officer, guided'by [the officer\u2019s] experience and training.\u201d State v. Watkins, 337 N.C. 437, 441, 446 S.E.2d 67, 70 (1994) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 906 (1968)).\nReasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause, State v. Barnard, 362 N.C. 244, 247, 658 S.E.2d 643, 645, cert. denied, - U.S. -, 172 L. Ed. 2d 198 (2008), and only requires a \u201cminimal level of objective justification, something more than an \u2018unparticularized suspicion or hunch [,]\u2019 \u201d State v. Steen, 352 N.C. 227, 239, 536 S.E.2d 1, 8 (2000) (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 104 L. Ed. 2d 1, 10 (1989)), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1167, 148 L. Ed. 2d 997 (2001). \u201cA court must consider \u2018the totality of the circumstances \u2014 the whole picture\u2019 in determining whether a reasonable suspicion\u201d exists. Watkins, 337 N.C. at 441, 446 S.E.2d at 70 (quoting United States v. Cortes, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 66 L. Ed. 2d 621, 629 (1981)).\nWith respect to whether Corporal Mabe had reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop of defendant\u2019s SUV on 28 April 2008, the trial court found:\n4) It was raining hard and Corporal Mabe had to put his windshield wipers on the highest setting so that he could see out the front windshield of his patrol car.\n5) When Corporal Mabe pulled behind the defendant\u2019s white SUV on the road known as Piedmont Circle, he observed that the defendant\u2019s vehicle did not have its taillights on as required by G.S. 20-129 at a time when Officer Mabe believed that the defendant\u2019s windshield wipers were operating.\n6)Corporal Mabe believed Piedmont Circle was a public road.\n7) Corporal Mabe issued the defendant a citation for failing to have taillights in proper working order pursuant to G.S. 20-129.\nBased on its findings, the trial court concluded that \u201cPiedmont Circle is a public road or highway within the meaning of G.S. 20-129\u201d; that \u201cCorporal Mabe reasonably believed that the defendant was required to have his taillights operating under the given weather conditions\u201d; and that \u201cCorporal Mabe had reasonable articulable suspicion to stop the defendant\u2019s vehicle for failing to have taillights in proper working order.\u201d Consequently, the court determined that the evidence seized pursuant to the traffic stop was \u201clawfully obtained\u201d and denied defendant\u2019s motion.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-129 (2009) provides in pertinent part that \u201c[e]very vehicle upon a highway within this State\u201d is required to have its headlights and taillights on\n[a]t any . . . time when windshield wipers are in use as a result of smoke, fog, rain, sleet, or snow, or when inclement weather or environmental factors severely reduce the ability to clearly discern persons and vehicles on the street and highway at a distance of 500 feet ahead, provided, however, the provisions of this subdivision shall not apply to instances when windshield wipers are used intermittently in misting rain, sleet, or snow.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-129(a)(4). In turn, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-4.01(13) (2009), provides that \u201c[t]he terms \u2018highway\u2019 and \u2018street\u2019 and their cognates are synonymous[,]\u201d and include \u201c[t]he entire width between property or right-of-way lines of every way or place of whatever nature, when any part thereof is open to the use of the public as a matter of right for the purposes of vehicular traffic.\u201d\nDefendant argues that \u201c[t]he trial court\u2019s conclusion that Piedmont Circle is a public road is not supported by the findings of fact or the evidence of record and is incorrect as a matter of law.\u201d We note, as an initial matter, that the issue regarding whether a street is public or private is a question of fact. See State v. Mark, 154 N.C. App. 341, 345-46, 571 S.E.2d 867, 870 (2002) (addressing whether evidence was sufficient to support \u201creasonable inference\u201d that road on which defendant was driving was public or private road), aff\u2019d per curiam, 357 N.C. 242, 580 S.E.2d 693 (2003); State v. Bowen, 67 N.C. App. 512, 514-15, 313 S.E.2d 196, 197-98 (holding trial court could not determine as a \u201cmatter of law\u201d that driveway into condominium complex was public vehicular area where evidence was conflicting but concluding that evidence was \u201csufficient to take the case to the jury\u201d), appeal dismissed, 312 N.C. 79, 320 S.E.2d 405 (1984); see also State v. Mikolinski, 56 Conn. App. 252, 261, 742 A.2d 1264, 1270 (1999) (\u201cThe question of whether a roadway is a public highway is a question of fact.\u201d), aff\u2019d, 256 Conn. 543, 775 A.2d 274 (2001); State v. Guillet, 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 380, 382, 215 A.2d 685, 687 (1965) (\u201cWhether the defendant was operating a motor vehicle on a public highway, as the [DWI] statute requires, is a question of fact. . . .\u201d); State v. Scott, 61 Or. App. 205, 208, 655 P.2d 1094, 1095 (1982) (holding that issue of whether streets in privately-owned condominium complex were open to the public was a question of fact). The trial court\u2019s determination, labeled as a conclusion of law, that Piedmont Circle is a \u201cpublic road or highway,\u201d is thus more properly considered a finding of fact rather than a conclusion of law. See In re Helms, 127 N.C. App. 505, 510, 491 S.E.2d 672, 675 (1997) (defining conclusions of law as \u201cany determination requiring the exercise of judgment or the application of legal principles\u201d and findings of fact as \u201c[a]ny determination reached through logical reasoning from the evidentiary facts\u201d (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)). A trial court\u2019s \u201cmislabeling\u201d a determination, however, is \u201cinconsequential\u201d as the appellate court may simply re-classify the determination and apply the appropriate standard of review. In re R.A.H., 182 N.C. App. 52, 60, 641 S.E.2d 404, 409 (2007). Accordingly, we review the trial court\u2019s finding that Piedmont Circle is a public street to determine whether it is supported by competent evidence. Buchanan, 353 N.C. at 336, 543 S.E.2d at 826.\nCorporal Mabe testified that the Piedmont Circle apartment complex is property of the City of Winston-Salem and that the street Piedmont Circle, which runs through the apartment complex, is a \u201cpublic road[.]\u201d Corporal Mabe stated that he is assigned to patrol the Piedmont Circle complex and patrols the area every day. He also indicated that parking spots are provided for the apartment complex and that he saw cars parked along Piedmont Circle on 28 April 2008. This evidence is sufficient to support the trial court\u2019s finding that Piedmont Circle is a public street. See State v. Cornett, 177 N.C. App. 452, 454-55, 629 S.E.2d 857, 858 (holding that evidence was sufficient to support inference that road on which defendant was driving was \u201copen[] to vehicular traffic\u201d within meaning of DWI statute where both police officer and defendant testified that they drove on road and \u201cthere were no gates or signs indicating that it was a private road\u201d), appeal dismissed and disc. review denied, 361 N.C. 172, 640 S.E.2d 56 (2006); Bowen, 67 N.C. App. at 515, 313 S.E.2d at 197-98 (concluding that evidence was sufficient to permit jury to reasonably conclude driveway into condominium complex was a \u201cpublic vehicular area\u201d where evidence showed that driveway was accessible from public highway, \u201cappeared to serve a normal apartment complex,\u201d \u201cFor Sale\u201d signs indicated public was permitted in complex, and parking was provided).\nDefendant counters, however, that Piedmont Circle is not a public street, pointing to photographs he presented at the suppression hearing showing \u201cNo [T]respassing\u201d signs posted somewhere in the Piedmont Circle apartment complex. Corporal Mabe, however, testified that he was not familiar with the signs and defendant did not present any evidence indicating that the signs were posted at the time of the stop. Nor did defendant present any evidence indicating to what specific property the no trespassing signs referred. We also note that although defendant presented photographs of street signs of other streets in the Piedmont Circle complex with green backgrounds and white lettering, indicating that they are public streets, defendant did not present a photograph of the street sign for Piedmont Circle itself. In short, the evidence presented at the suppression hearing is conflicting.\nWhere, as here, \u201c \u2018there is a conflict between the [S]tate\u2019s evidence and defendant\u2019s evidence on material facts, it is the duty of the trial court to resolve the conflict and such resolution will not be disturbed on appeal.\u2019 \u201d State v. Fernandez, 346 N.C. 1, 11, 484 S.E.2d 350, 357 (1997) (quoting State v. Chamberlain, 307 N.C. 130, 143, 297 S.E.2d 540, 548 (1982)); accord State v. Johnson, 322 N.C. 288, 293, 367 S.E.2d 660, 663 (1988) (\u201c[M]erely because there is evidence from which a different conclusion could have been reached does not warrant a reversal of the trial court\u2019s finding of fact. It is the trial court\u2019s duty to resolve any conflicts and contradictions that may exist in the evidence.\u201d (internal citations omitted)). As the trial court was entitled \u2014 and, in deed, required \u2014 to resolve the conflict between the State\u2019s evidence and defendant\u2019s evidence regarding whether Piedmont Circle is a public road, its determination, supported by competent evidence, will not be disturbed on appeal.\nDefendant argues on appeal, as he did at the suppression hearing, that even if Piedmont Circle is a public street, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-129 does not apply to Piedmont Circle. In support of his argument, defendant relies on Coleman v. Burris, 265 N.C. 404, 409, 144 S.E.2d 241, 244-45 (1965), where the Supreme Court held that the provisions of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-129 \u201care not applicable\u201d to roads within the municipal street system, but, rather, apply only to those highways or streets that form part of the State highway system. Compare N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 136-66.1(1) (2009) (\u201cThe State highway system inside the corporate limits of municipalities shall consist of a system of major streets and highways necessary to move volumes of traffic efficiently and effectively from points beyond the corporate limits of the municipalities through the municipalities and to major business, industrial, governmental and institutional destinations located inside the municipalities.\u201d) with N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 136-66.1(2) (\u201cIn each municipality the municipal street system shall consist of those streets and highways accepted by the municipality which are not a part of the State highway system.\u201d).\nColeman, however, was decided eight years before the enactment of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-4.01, the statute defining the term \u201chighway\u201d used in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-129. The language in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-4.01(13) is broader than the Court\u2019s holding in Coleman-, the statute defines the term \u201chighway\u201d \u2014 and its synonym \u201cstreet\u201d \u2014 as \u201c[t]he entire width between property or right-of-way lines of every way or place of whatever nature, when any part thereof is open to the use of the public as a matter of right for the purposes of vehicular traffic.\" (Emphasis added.) We interpret N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-129 and N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-4.01 according to the plain meaning of their terms. See Smith v. Powell, 293 N.C. 342, 346, 238 S.E.2d 137, 140 (1977) (holding that \u201c[t]he definition of \u2018highway\u2019 in G.S. 20-4.01(13)\u201d should be given its \u201cplain and ordinary meaning\u201d and \u201cgiven the same connotation\u201d to all provisions in Chapter 20 of the General Statutes \u201cunless the context requires otherwise\u201d). The broad definition of a highway or street in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-4.01(13) does not include a requirement that the highway or street be a part of the State highway system \u2014 only that it be \u201copen to the use of the public as a matter of right for the purposes of vehicular traffic.\u201d Because defendant was \u201cupon a [street] within this State\u201d that is \u201copen to the use of the public as a matter of right for the purposes of vehicular traffic,\u201d defendant was required to comply with N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-129(a)(4).\nOur holding that N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-129 applies to all highways or streets as defined by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-4.01, including Piedmont Circle, is buttressed by examining other motor vehicle laws in Chapter 20 of the General Statutes using similar language. See Redevelopment Commission v. Bank, 252 N.C. 595, 610, 114 S.E.2d 688, 698 (1960) (\u201cIt is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that sections and acts in pari materia, and all parts thereof, should be construed together and compared with each other.\u201d). N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-28(a) (2009), for example, makes it a misdemeanor for \u201cany person whose drivers license has been revoked\u201d to \u201cdrive [] any motor vehicle upon the highways of the State . . . .\u201d (Emphasis added.) Applying defendant\u2019s rationale to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-28(a) would mean that individuals whose licenses have been revoked could drive on public highways and streets without violating the statute so long as they do not drive on highways and streets within the State highway system. We do not believe that the General Assembly intended to expose the general public to such an unreasonable danger. See Comr. of Insurance v. Automobile Rate Office, 294 N.C. 60, 68, 241 S.E.2d 324, 329 (1978) (\u201cIn construing statutes courts normally adopt an interpretation which will avoid absurd or bizarre consequences, the presumption being that the legislature acted in accordance with reason and common sense and did not intend untoward results.\u201d). Likewise, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-10 (2009) prohibits any \u201cperson 14 years of age or under\u201d to \u201coperate any road machine, farm tractor or motor driven implement of husbandry on any highway within this State.\" (Emphasis added.) According to defendant, however, any person under the age of 14 could legally drive a farm tractor on any public highway or street in North Carolina so long as the road was not part of the State highway system. Again, we seriously doubt that the Legislature intended such an untoward result.\nOn appeal, defendant does not contend that his taillights were on while his windshield wipers were operating on 28 April 2008. Nor does he argue that if, as we have concluded, Piedmont Circle is a public street to which N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-129 applies, Corporal Mabe did not have reasonable suspicion to stop him for violating the motor vehicle statute. Since we have held that Piedmont Circle is a public street under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-4.01(13) and that N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-129(a)(4) applies to all public streets, the trial court properly concluded that Corporal Mabe had a reasonable suspicion to believe that defendant was committing\u2019 a traffic violation when he observed defendant driving on Piedmont Circle using his windshield wipers in the inclement weather but not having his taillights on.\nOur conclusion that Corporal Mabe correctly believed that Piedmont Circle is a public street, thus supporting a finding of reasonable suspicion that defendant had committed a traffic violation, distinguishes this case from the line of decisions holding that a law enforcement officer\u2019s mistaken belief that a defendant had committed a traffic violation is constitutionally insufficient to support a traffic stop. See, e.g., State v. Ivey, 360 N.C. 562, 565, 633 S.E.2d 459, 461-62 (2006) (holding that where defendant\u2019s failure to use turn signal did not constitute a traffic violation, police officer\u2019s stop was unreasonable), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Styles, 362 N.C. 412, 665 S.E.2d 438 (2008); State v. McLamb, 186 N.C. App. 124, 127, 649 S.E.2d 902, 904 (2007) (concluding that where deputy stopped defendant based on mistaken belief that defendant was speeding, \u201cthe legal justification for th[e] traffic stop was not objectively reasonable\u201d and \u201cthe stop violated defendant\u2019s Fourth Amendment rights\u201d), disc. review denied, 362 N.C. 368, 663 S.E.2d 433 (2008). As the trial court\u2019s conclusion that Corporal Mabe had reasonable suspicion to believe that defendant had committed a traffic violation is supported by its findings and the evidence, we affirm the trial court\u2019s order denying defendant\u2019s motion to suppress.\nAffirmed.\nJudges CALABRIA and HUNTER, Robert N., Jr. concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "HUNTER, Robert C., Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General J. Joy Strickland, for the State.", "S. Hannah Demerittfor defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. WADDELL JOHNSON HOPPER, JR., Defendant\nNo. COA09-1211\n(Filed 6 July 2010)\nSearch and Seizure\u2014 investigatory stop \u2014 reasonable suspicion of traffic violation \u2014 motion to suppress \u2014 properly denied\nThe trial court in a possession of controlled substances case did not err in denying defendant\u2019s motion to suppress evidence seized from his vehicle during a traffic stop. The police officer that stopped defendant had reasonable suspicion to believe that defendant committed a traffic violation by failing to have his taillights on while driving on a public street with his windshield wipers operating, thus supporting the traffic stop.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 7 May 2009 by Judge William Z. Wood, Jr. in Forsyth County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 24 February 2010.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General J. Joy Strickland, for the State.\nS. Hannah Demerittfor defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0175-01", "first_page_order": 203, "last_page_order": 211 }