{ "id": 3734549, "name": "DONALD PRICE, JR., Employee, Plaintiff v. PIGGY PALACE d/b/a HANNAH'S BBQ, Employer, ST. PAUL TRAVELERS, Carrier, Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "Price v. Piggy Palace", "decision_date": "2010-07-20", "docket_number": "No. COA09-981", "first_page": "381", "last_page": "393", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "205 N.C. App. 381" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-88", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 4, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "472 S.E.2d 26", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "343 N.C. 516", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 798760, 798832, 798902, 798938, 798973 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/343/0516-04", "/nc/343/0516-03", "/nc/343/0516-05", "/nc/343/0516-02", "/nc/343/0516-01" ] }, { "cite": "394 S.E.2d 191", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "192" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "99 N.C. App. 767", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525056 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "768" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/99/0767-01" ] }, { "cite": "464 S.E.2d 481", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "485", "parenthetical": "quoting Beam v. Floyd's Creek Baptist Church, 99 N.C. App. 767, 768, 394 S.E.2d 191, 192 (1990)" }, { "page": "485" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "121 N.C. App. 48", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11915261 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "54", "parenthetical": "quoting Beam v. Floyd's Creek Baptist Church, 99 N.C. App. 767, 768, 394 S.E.2d 191, 192 (1990)" }, { "page": "54" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/121/0048-01" ] }, { "cite": "564 S.E.2d 585", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "587" }, { "page": "587" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "150 N.C. App. 653", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9082667 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "656" }, { "page": "656" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/150/0653-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-88.1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 9, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "421 S.E.2d 154", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "332 N.C. 347", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2505255, 2507724, 2504496, 2503514, 2505116 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/332/0347-04", "/nc/332/0347-01", "/nc/332/0347-02", "/nc/332/0347-05", "/nc/332/0347-03" ] }, { "cite": "415 S.E.2d 105", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "107" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "106 N.C. App. 39", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 5313493 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "43" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/106/0039-01" ] }, { "cite": "345 S.E.2d 204", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "209" }, { "page": "214" }, { "page": "209-10" }, { "page": "209-10" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "317 N.C. 206", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4778695 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "213" }, { "page": "214" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/317/0206-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-2", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(19)" }, { "page": "(19)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-25", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "468 S.E.2d 269", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "274" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "122 N.C. App. 143", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11916022 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "149" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/122/0143-01" ] }, { "cite": "509 S.E.2d 411", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "414" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "349 N.C. 676", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 571666 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "681" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/349/0676-01" ] }, { "cite": "500 S.E.2d 86", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "347 N.C. 671", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 551329, 551235, 551326, 551111 ], "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/347/0671-03", "/nc/347/0671-04", "/nc/347/0671-02", "/nc/347/0671-01" ] }, { "cite": "491 S.E.2d 678", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "681" }, { "page": "681" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "127 N.C. App. 529", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11798491 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "534" }, { "page": "534" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/127/0529-01" ] }, { "cite": "493 S.E.2d 305", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "306", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "127 N.C. App. 711", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11800056 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "714", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/127/0711-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-31", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(22)" }, { "page": "(22)" }, { "page": "(22)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1023, "char_count": 27674, "ocr_confidence": 0.772, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.317852702137001e-08, "percentile": 0.4374133395421895 }, "sha256": "ec4a18d9dcbbed1e8e6144599e146fd3c19ed0b2deb5e5e9d2bd76bb3c2c8592", "simhash": "1:18335668ac1b7e74", "word_count": 4445 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:30:55.510002+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges CALABRIA and GEER concur." ], "parties": [ "DONALD PRICE, JR., Employee, Plaintiff v. PIGGY PALACE d/b/a HANNAH\u2019S BBQ, Employer, ST. PAUL TRAVELERS, Carrier, Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "STEPHENS, Judge.\nI. Facts\nPlaintiff Donald Price, Jr. was a 20-year-old male who began working as a cook for Defendant Hannah\u2019s BBQ on 29 December 2004. Plaintiff was working in that capacity on 16 July 2006 when a co-worker slipped and fell, spilling approximately three gallons of hot grease onto Plaintiff. As a result, Plaintiff suffered bums to his head, left arm, and legs.\nPlaintiff was immediately taken to Caldwell Memorial Hospital. Due to the extent of his burns, Plaintiff was transferred to North Carolina Baptist Hospital\u2019s trauma unit for further assessment and treatment. Defendants admitted that the claim was compensable pursuant to a North Carolina Industrial Commission Form 60 filed 19 July 2006.\nOn 27 July 2006, Plaintiff underwent surgery to attach skin grafts to Plaintiff\u2019s right foot. Plaintiff was discharged from Baptist Hospital on 28 July 2006. Dr. James H. Holmes of Baptist Hospital saw Plaintiff for a follow-up evaluation on 7 August 2006 and noted that Plaintiff\u2019s bums had completely healed and that the skin had re-epithelized without evidence of hypertrophic scarring. Dr. Holmes also noted that the skin graft on Plaintiff\u2019s right foot was a \u201c100% graft take.\u201d\nPlaintiff was released to return to work with the restrictions that he limit sun exposure to his healed scars and limit thermal heat exposure. According to Plaintiff, as of 11 December 2006, none of the grafted or healed skin had broken and the hypertrophic scars had healed.\nPlaintiff returned to Baptist Hospital on 2 April 2007 complaining of continued neuropathic pain in his right lower extremity. Dr. Joseph Molnar, a hand and bum specialist at Baptist Hospital, noted that Plaintiff\u2019s pain was resolving \u201csomewhat\u201d and that Plaintiff had begun administering scar massage therapy at home on his own.\nPlaintiff was seen by Dr. Holmes at Baptist Hospital on 9 July 2007. Dr. Holmes noted that Plaintiff had developed hypertrophic scarring in healed as well as grafted areas of his skin and some pigmentation abnormalities in the burned areas. On that date, Plaintiff reported some focal pain on the edge of the skin graft on his lower leg. Plaintiff was scheduled to see Dr. Molnar later that day for the hypertrophic scarring and pigmentation abnormalities. Dr. Holmes indicated that Plaintiff \u201cis not at maxim[um] medical improvement given the hypertrophic scarring and the pigmentation abnormalities.\u201d Although Dr. Holmes was pleased with Plaintiff\u2019s progress, he noted that\nthe hypertrophic scar on the right Achilles and the pigmentation changes need to be addressed by Dr. Molnar and we have come up with a plan. This will extend over the next 6-12 months. Once all options have been exhausted for the hypertrophic scar and the pigmentation changes, then we can address maxim [um] medical improvement.\nAfter evaluating Plaintiff on 9 July 2007, Dr. Molnar recommended that Plaintiff undergo pulse dye laser treatment to help relieve the pain, itching, and appearance of Plaintiff\u2019s scars.\nPlaintiff filed a Form'33 hearing request on 4 September 2007 alleging that Defendants had refused to provide the recommended laser surgery. By letter dated 7 September 2007, Dr. Molnar explained to Defendants the importance of proceeding with the pulse dye laser treatment. However, Defendants continued to refuse to provide the treatment. At Dr. Molnar\u2019s deposition in this case, taken on 14 March 2008, Dr. Molnar again stressed the importance of proceeding with the treatment to help Plaintiff with the pain, itching, and appearance of his scars. Defendants again refused to provide the treatment.\nThe matter came on for hearing on 25 June 2008 before Deputy Commissioner James C. Gillen. Two issues before Deputy Commissioner Gillen were (1) whether the recommended laser treatment was medically necessary and (2) whether Plaintiff was entitled to reimbursement for medical travel expenses incurred by his parents as a result of their visiting Plaintiff in the hospital.\nOn 21 August 2008, Deputy Commissioner Gillen entered an Opinion and Award concluding, inter alia, that Defendants shall pay for Plaintiffs laser surgery and for Plaintiffs parents\u2019 travel expenses to and from the hospital. Additionally, Deputy Commissioner Gillen ordered Defendants to pay $10,000 for serious bodily disfigurement to Plaintiff\u2019s lower extremities, pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-31(22). From this Opinion and Award, Defendants appealed to the Full Commission.\nThe Full Commission reviewed the case on 19 March 2009. By Opinion and Award entered 26 May 2009, the Full Commission affirmed Deputy Commissioner Gillen\u2019s Opinion and Award, ordering Defendants to pay for Plaintiff\u2019s laser treatment and for Plaintiff\u2019s parents\u2019 travel expenses. The Full Commission reversed the portion of the Opinion and Award awarding Plaintiff $10,000 for serious bodily disfigurement. Additionally, the Full Commission awarded Plaintiff attorney\u2019s fees.\nFrom the Opinion and Award of the Full Commission, Defendants appeal.\nII. Discussion\nA. Medical Expenses\nDefendants first contend that the Full Commission erred in awarding Plaintiff medical compensation for travel expenses incurred by Plaintiff\u2019s parents. Upon careful consideration and for the following reasons, we disagree.\nThe standard of appellate review of an opinion and award of the Industrial Commission \u201cis limited to a determination of (1) whether the Commission\u2019s findings of fact are supported by any competent evidence in the record, and (2) whether the Commission\u2019s findings justify its legal conclusions.\u201d Aaron v. New Fortis Homes, Inc., 127 N.C. App. 711, 714, 493 S.E.2d 305, 306 (1997) (citation and quotation marks omitted). \u201cThe findings of fact by the Industrial Commission are conclusive on appeal, if there is any competent evidence to support them, and even if there is evidence that would support contrary findings.\u201d Grantham v. R.G. Barry Corp., 127 N.C. App. 529, 534, 491 S.E.2d 678, 681 (1997), disc. review denied, 347 N.C. 671, 500 S.E.2d 86 (1998). This Court\u2019s duty goes no further than to determine whether the record contains any evidence tending to support the findings of the Commission, and it does not have the authority to weigh the evidence and decide the issue on the basis of its weight. Adams v. AVX Corp., 349 N.C. 676, 681, 509 S.E.2d 411, 414 (1998). This Court reviews the Commission\u2019s conclusions of law de novo. Lewis v. Craven Reg\u2019l Med. Ctr., 122 N.C. App. 143, 149, 468 S.E.2d 269, 274 (1996).\nUnder N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-25, \u201c[mjedical compensation shall be provided by the employer.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-25 (2007). \u201cThe term \u2018medical compensation\u2019 means medical, surgical, hospital, nursing, and rehabilitative services, and medicines, sick travel, and other treatment, including medical and surgical supplies, as may reasonably be required to effect a cure or give relief and for such additional time as, in the judgment of the Commission, will tend to lessen the period of disability . . . .\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. 97-2(19) (2007) (emphasis added).\nDefendants contend that the following findings of fact are not based on competent evidence:\n6. While [P]laintiff was being treated at Baptist Hospital, the medical staff taught [P]laintiff\u2019s mother how to change [Pjlaintiff\u2019s dressings and how to stretch the scars. Plaintiff\u2019s mother also assisted in bathing [Pjlaintiff and helped [Plaintiff through his physical therapy. Plaintiff\u2019s mother was at the hospital assisting every day from July 18 through 28, 2006. For example, [Pjlaintiff had extreme difficulty walking while he was in the hospital due to his injuries. It sometimes took [Pjlaintiff a full hour, with his mother\u2019s assistance, to walk down the hall. Plaintiff\u2019s mother provided necessary services to [P]laintiff through the recuperative and rehabilitative process. Plaintiff\u2019s father brought clothing and completed other tasks every day to enable [P]laintiff\u2019s mother to spend time at the hospital.\n9. Plaintiffs parents incurred 18 round trips to Baptist Hospital at 163.74 miles per round trip. This is a total of 2,947.32 miles. All of these trips were medically necessary. The North Carolina Industrial Commission medical mileage reimbursement rate for that period of 2006 was $0,445 per mile. The mileage therefore has a reimbursement value of $1,311.56. .\n10. Plaintiff was released from the hospital earlier than he otherwise would have been because [Plaintiff\u2019s mother had been trained in how to change dressings and otherwise care for [P]laintiff. Furthermore, subsequent to his release, [Defendants did not have to pay for nurses to be sent to [P]laintiff to provide services that [Plaintiffs mother was able to perform as a result of her attendance during [Pjlaintiff\u2019s hospital stay.\nWe conclude that the following evidence before the Commission provides ample support for the challenged findings:\nPlaintiff was admitted to Baptist Hospital on 18 July 2006 and discharged on 28 July 2006. Plaintiff testified that either his mother, his father, or both of his parents were at the hospital each day. Plaintiff testified that every day he was put into a stainless steel bathtub or on a table where the dead skin was scrubbed off of his bums. It took two people to hold him down while his bums were scrubbed \u201c[b]ecause the pain of it all and the fact that they\u2019re scrubbing nothing but rawness . . . .\u201d He further testified that \u201cwhen I was in the bathtub, [my mother] wasn\u2019t allowed in there, but when they put me on like a table . . . with like a little ledge on it, she got to come in there then and . . . help.\u201d His mother would \u201chold me ... or she would either take a rag and wash and stuff.\u201d\nPlaintiff was asked how often he would \u201chave these baths,\u201d and Plaintiff responded, \u201c[b]efore surgery, it would be once a day, and then they would still have to come out there and clean like all the wounds and everything. They would do that twice a day, and that\u2019s what mom would do.\u201d\nOn 27 July 2006, Plaintiff had skin graft surgery to his right ankle with a donor graft from his right thigh measuring approximately four inches by eight inches. Plaintiff testified that immediately after surgery,\nthey made me start learning how to walk because the skin had growed [sic] and my ankle wasn\u2019t at like a ninety degree [angle] ... so therefore, I couldn\u2019t walk. And say, there\u2019s a lot of stretching and a lot of working of all the muscles and stretching and everything that they taught [my mother] to do, so that once I come home, she could do all that because I left there and still couldn\u2019t walk.\nWhen asked how his mother helped in that process, Plaintiff testified that \u201cshe would have to support me as in \u2014 I mean because I had fell more than once, and, say, she would have to pretty much like \u2014 you know, you wrap my arm around her, and then she just pretty much carrying your weight when you can\u2019t walk.\u201d\nPlaintiff was asked if there were other people in the hospital who could have helped him walk other than his mother. Plaintiff responded:\nThe doctor done it once, but then the doctor tells you that you got to do it two or three times a day and, you know, that\u2019s the reason they have \u2014 say, they showed my mom everything \u2014 how to clean all the wounds, how to, you know, help me stretch. They gave me all this stuff to stretch with and everything, so that when I come home \u2014 because they let me come home early \u2014 and they saying [sic] when I come home, they wouldn\u2019t have to send a doctor out there or nothing. My mom could take care of it all at that point.\nPlaintiff\u2019s mother, Lynn Price, testified that she went to Baptist Hospital every day Plaintiff was in the hospital and cared for him \u201cevery minute of every day.\u201d She learned how to change all his dressings and did so two times a day, every day. She testified that she did this \u201c[s]o I would learn how to do it correctly when we got home because a nurse couldn\u2019t be with him twenty-four/seven....\u201d She further testified that she assisted with \u201c[b]athing, anything and everything he needed . . . .\u201d Plaintiff \u201ccouldn\u2019t walk . . . until they done surgery. That\u2019s when they got him up and started walking him.\u201d Ms. Price would \u201cjust walk with him down the hall and back up, and that would sometimes take an hour....\u201d Sometimes she would assist him by \u201c[hjolding on to [sic] his side, making sure he didn\u2019t fali over with the walker.\u201d\nMs. Price testified that she stayed with Plaintiff in the hospital \u201c[t]wenty-four/seven. . . . What time I wasn\u2019t driving, my husband was driving, bringing me clothes . . . and providing me things to eat.\u201d Ms. Price also testified that she and her husband went \u201cback and forth to get clothes\u201d but that she \u201cdidn\u2019t leave [the hospital] at all from the 26th on.\u201d She said she would not have been able to stay at the hospital had her husband not brought her clothes and other necessities. She further testified that Plaintiff was discharged early from the hospital and a nurse \u201conly had to come one time\u201d to visit Plaintiff after he left the hospital \u201cbecause of me being able to do everything that the nurses did.\u201d Ms. Price and her husband made 18 round trips from their house to the hospital, totaling 2,947.32 miles.\nDr. Molnar was asked whether, in his opinion as a medical doctor, it is important for a patient to have support from his family while he is in the hospital. .Dr. Molnar replied,\nAbsolutely. Anyone who they\u2019re close to and that can give them support and you are dealing with a painful injury that is deforming to people. It\u2019s one of the most painful things that anyone can experience.\nSo with the pain.and with the emotional problems that come with dealing with the pain, the wound care, the need for surgery, . . . [o]ne likes to have the loved ones around. ... I think the emotional support is necessary.\nDr. Molnar then acknowledged that, in his medical opinion, it is important to the process of recovery to have relatives with a patient at the hospital.\nContrary to Defendants\u2019 assertion that \u201cthe evidence in the record contains nothing more than general statements attesting to emotional benefit provided by family members[,]\u201d the above-described evidence establishes that Plaintiff\u2019s mother provided critical physical and psychological care to Plaintiff during his treatment and rehabilitation in the hospital, in addition to emotional support. Furthermore, we disagree with Defendants\u2019 contention that the challenged findings of fact \u201ccontain misreadings of the relevant testimony from the Plaintiff, his mother, and Dr. Joseph A. Molnar,\u201d and conclude that the challenged findings of fact are wholly supported by the record evidence. Accordingly, the findings of fact are conclusive on appeal. Grantham, 127 N.C. App. at 534, 491 S.E.2d at 681.\nDefendants further assert that the findings of fact do not support the conclusion of law that \u201c[a]s part of [Plaintiff\u2019s medical] expenses, [P]laintiff is also entitled to reimbursement for his parents\u2019 medical travel in the amount of $1,311.56.\u201d Specifically, Defendants assert that \u201c[t]he presence of Plaintiffs parents was not medically necessary to the treatment of Plaintiffs conditionf.]\u201d We disagree.\nDefendants do not contest that Plaintiff underwent the following treatment and rehabilitation during his 10-day stay in the hospital: Plaintiff was put into a stainless steel bathtub or placed on a table and the dead skin was scrubbed off of his burns. This took place once a day before surgery and twice a day after surgery. Due to the intense pain, two individuals had to hold Plaintiff down while his burns were scrubbed. The dressings on Plaintiffs wounds were also changed twice a day. On 27 July 2006, Plaintiff underwent skin graft surgery. Immediately after surgery, Plaintiff was required to walk in order to increase the range of motion in his ankle. Plaintiff also had to stretch and work his muscles on a daily basis.\nMoreover, the uncontradicted testimony of Plaintiff and Plaintiffs mother establishes that Plaintiffs mother participated in Plaintiff\u2019s treatment and rehabilitation as follows: When Plaintiff was placed on the ledge for his burns to be scrubbed, his mother would hold him down or take a cloth and wash his wounds. Plaintiff\u2019smother learned how to change the dressings on Plaintiff\u2019s wounds, and did so twice a day. Plaintiff\u2019s mother helped him start walking after his surgery and helped him stretch and work his muscles both in the hospital and after he was released.\nDefendants do not contest that this treatment and rehabilitation effected a cure, gave relief, or tended to lessen the period of Plaintiff\u2019s disability. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-2(19). Instead, Defendants argue that because \u201cthere were doctors, nurses and physical therapists assisting [Plaintiff] during his stay[,]\u201d the care provided by Plaintiff\u2019s mother was not medically necessary since those professionals could have provided the care. Defendants fail to persuade us that Plaintiff\u2019s treatment and rehabilitation would be considered medically necessary had it been provided by a doctor, nurse, or physical therapist, but not when it was provided by Plaintiff\u2019s mother. Accordingly, this argument is rejected.\nDefendants further contend that there was \u201cno medical testimony\u201d to support the conclusion that Plaintiff\u2019s parents\u2019 presence was medically necessary. Furthermore, Defendants argue that any benefit derived from treatment \u201cmust be medical, as opposed to emotional or spiritual, and must be specific to a cure o[r] lessening of a disability.\u201d We disagree.\nThe Workers\u2019 Compensation Act provides three alternate grounds for medical treatment at the employer\u2019s expense: (1) to effect a cure, (2) to give relief, or (3) to lessen the period of disability. Thus, awards for medical expenses for treatment are appropriate \u201ceven if those treatments will not lessen the period of disability as long as they are required to \u2018effect a cure\u2019 or \u2018give relief.\u2019 \u201d Little v. Penn Ventilator Co., 317 N.C. 206, 213, 345 S.E.2d 204, 209 (1986). Moreover, in Little, the North Carolina Supreme Court concluded that the \u201cpsychological and emotional benefits which flow[ed] from monitoring the employee\u2019s [medical] condition constitute[d] \u2018relief as that term is used in the statute.\u201d Id. at 214, 345 S.E.2d at 209-10; see also Simon v. Triangle Materials, Inc., 106 N.C. App. 39, 43, 415 S.E.2d 105, 107 (concluding that \u201crelief from pain constitutes \u2018relief\u2019 as that term is used in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-25\u201d), disc. review denied, 332 N.C. 347, 421 S.E.2d 154 (1992).\nIn this case, Dr. Molnar testified that \u201cwith the pain and with the emotional problems that come with dealing with the pain, the wound care, the need for surgery,\u201d the emotional support of loved ones is necessary and important in the recovery process. Just as the psychological and emotional benefits to an employee that flow from monitoring his condition constitute \u201crelief\u2019 as that term is used in the statute, see Little, 317 N.C. at 214, 345 S.E.2d at 209-10, under the specific circumstances presented here, the psychological and emotional benefits to Plaintiff that flowed from having the support of his parents while he was recovering in the hospital from devastating burns likewise constitutes \u201crelief\u2019 as that term is used in the statute. See id. Defendants\u2019 argument is overruled.\nDefendants finally argue that Rule 407(6) of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Rules of the Industrial Commission is only intended to allow for \u201creimbursement to the employee traveling to receive medical treatment.\u201d We disagree.\nPursuant to Rule 407(6), \u201c[ejmployees shall be entitled to reimbursement for sick travel when the travel is medically necessary ....\u201d While the rule limits the individual entitled to receive reimbursement for travel expenses to the employee, the rule does not limit the party incurring the travel expenses and, instead, requires reimbursement for travel when it is \u201cmedically necessary.\u201d\nAccordingly, we conclude that the Commission\u2019s findings of fact support the Commission\u2019s conclusion that Plaintiff\u2019s mother\u2019s care was \u201cmedically necessary\u201d and, thus, that Plaintiff was entitled to reimbursement for his parents\u2019 \u201cmedical travel\u201d in the amount of $1,311.56.\nDefendants further argue that compensation for \u201csick travel\u201d expenses of family members is not authorized under the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act or Workers\u2019 Compensation Rules. Because we conclude that under the facts of this case, Plaintiff\u2019s mother\u2019s care was \u201creasonably... required to effect a cure or give relief,\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-2(19), we hold that Plaintiff was entitled to reimbursement for his parents\u2019 \u201cmedical travel\u201d as such travel was a necessary medical cost incurred as a result of Plaintiff\u2019s injuries.\nDefendants\u2019 argument is overruled.\nB. Attorney\u2019s Fees\nDefendants next argue that the Commission erred in awarding Plaintiff $5,000 in attorney\u2019s fees pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-88.1.\nThe decision whether to award or deny attorney\u2019s fees rests within the sound discretion of the Commission and will not be overturned absent a showing that the decision was manifestly unsupported by reason. Bryson v. Phil Cline Trucking, 150 N.C. App. 653, 656, 564 S.E.2d 585, 587 (2002). Pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-88.1,\n[i]f the Industrial Commission shall determine that any hearing has been brought, prosecuted, or defended without reasonable ground, it may assess the whole cost of the proceedings including reasonable fees for defendant\u2019s attorney or plaintiff\u2019s attorney upon the party who has brought or defended them.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-88.1 (2007).\nThis statute applies to an original hearing and its purpose \u201cis to prevent \u2018stubborn, unfounded litigiousness which is inharmonious with the primary purpose of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act to provide compensation to injured employees.\u2019 \u201d Troutman v. White & Simpson, Inc., 121 N.C. App. 48, 54, 464 S.E.2d 481, 485 (1995) (quoting Beam v. Floyd\u2019s Creek Baptist Church, 99 N.C. App. 767, 768, 394 S.E.2d 191, 192 (1990)), disc. review denied, 343 N.C. 516, 472 S.E.2d 26 (1996). An award of attorney\u2019s fees under this section requires the Commission to find that the original hearing \u201chas been brought, prosecuted, or defended without reasonable ground.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-88.1.\nPursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-88,\n[i]f the Industrial Commission at a hearing on review[,] or any court before which any proceedings are brought on appeal under this Article, shall find that such hearing or proceedings were brought by the insurer[,] and the Commission or court[,] by its decision[,] orders the insurer to make, or to continue payments of benefits, including compensation for medical expenses, to the injured employee, the Commission or court may further order that the cost to the injured employee of such hearing or proceedings including therein reasonable attorney\u2019s fee to be determined by the Commission shall be paid by the insurer as a part of the bill of costs.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-88 (2007). This section applies to appeals to the Full Commission or appellate courts and allows an injured employee to move that his attorney\u2019s fees be paid whenever an insurer appeals the decision rendered in the original hearing and the insurer is required to make payments to the injured employee. Troutman, 121 N.C. App. at 54, 464 S.E.2d at 485. An award of attorney\u2019s fees under this section does not require the Commission to find that the appeal \u201chas been brought, prosecuted, or defended without reasonable ground.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-88.1.\nIn this case, the Full Commission found that \u201c [Defendants pursued this appeal, in particular the issue of laser treatment, without reasonable ground\u201d and concluded that \u201c [Defendants pursued this appeal, in particular the issue of laser treatment, without reasonable ground, and further conclude [d] an award of $5,000 in attorney\u2019s fees to be proper. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-88.1.\u201d\nThe Commission had the authority to award Plaintiff attorney\u2019s fees under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-88.1 if it determined that Defendants \u201cbrought, prosecuted, or defended\u201d the original hearing \u201cwithout reasonable ground[.]\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-88.1. Moreover, the Commission had the authority to award Plaintiff attorney\u2019s fees under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-88 if Defendants appealed the decision rendered in the original hearing and Defendants were required to make payments to Plaintiff. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-88. However, we are unable to determine from the Commission\u2019s finding of fact and conclusion of law whether the Commission awarded Plaintiff attorney\u2019s fees for the original hearing or for Defendants\u2019 appeal from that hearing. We are thus unable to determine whether the Commission made the proper findings of fact to support its conclusion, and whether the Commission\u2019s decision was manifestly unsupported by reason. Bryson, 150 N.C. App. at 656, 564 S.E.2d at 587. Our inability to determine whether the Commission awarded Plaintiff attorney\u2019s fees for the original hearing or for Defendants\u2019 appeal from that hearing is particularly difficult in light of the fact that the Full Commission agreed with Defendants\u2019 contention that Deputy Commissioner Gillen\u2019s award of disfigurement compensation was preniature given the award of medical compensation for laser surgery and held an award under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-31(22) in abeyance \u201cuntil the laser surgery has been performed and until any applicable healing time has passed.\u201d Accordingly, we remand this matter to the Full Commission for proper findings of fact and conclusions of law resolving Plaintiff\u2019s motion for attorney\u2019s fees.\nAFFIRMED in part and REMANDED in part.\nJudges CALABRIA and GEER concur.\n. Plaintiff was 20 years old at the time of his testimony.\n. The Full Commission concluded that although Plaintiff \u201cmay be entitled to permanent partial disability compensation for his serious bodily disfigurement\u201d in the future, \u201cbecause the Full Commission has found [P]laintiff would benefit from laser surgery to address his scarring, the Commission deems it proper to hold in abeyance an award pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-31(22), until the laser surgery has been performed and until any applicable healing time has passed.\u201d\n. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-88.1 is entitled \u201cAttorney\u2019s fees at original hearing[.]\u201d\n. The issue of Plaintiff\u2019s entitlement to laser treatment is not on appeal to this Court.", "type": "majority", "author": "STEPHENS, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Randy D. Duncan for Plaintiff-Appellee.", "Mullen Holland & Cooper P.A., by J. Reid McGraw and Gerald L. Liska, for Defendants-Appellants." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "DONALD PRICE, JR., Employee, Plaintiff v. PIGGY PALACE d/b/a HANNAH\u2019S BBQ, Employer, ST. PAUL TRAVELERS, Carrier, Defendants\nNo. COA09-981\n(Filed 20 July 2010)\n1. Workers\u2019 Compensation\u2014 medical compensation \u2014 travel expenses incurred by parents\nThe Industrial Commission did not err in a workers\u2019 compensation case by awarding plaintiff medical compensation for travel expenses incurred by his parents. The evidence established that plaintiff\u2019s mother provided critical physical and psychological care to plaintiff during his treatment and rehabilitation in the hospital, in addition to emotional support. Workers\u2019 Compensation Rule 407(6) does not limit the party incurring the travel expenses, but instead requires reimbursement for travel when it is medically necessary.\n2. Findings of fact \u2014 conclusions of law\nThe Industrial Commission\u2019s award of $5,000 in attorney fees under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-88-1 to plaintiff in a workers\u2019 compensation case was remanded to the full Commission for proper findings of fact and conclusions of law.\nAppeal by Defendants from Opinion and Award of the North Carolina Industrial Commission filed 26 May 2009. Heard in the Court of Appeals 28 January 2010.\nRandy D. Duncan for Plaintiff-Appellee.\nMullen Holland & Cooper P.A., by J. Reid McGraw and Gerald L. Liska, for Defendants-Appellants." }, "file_name": "0381-01", "first_page_order": 409, "last_page_order": 421 }