{ "id": 3734754, "name": "JACQUELYN B. REAVES, Widow of RONALD REAVES, Deceased Employee, Plaintiff v. INDUSTRIAL PUMP SERVICE, Employer, AMERICAN INTERSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, Carrier, Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "Reaves v. Industrial Pump Service", "decision_date": "2010-07-20", "docket_number": "No. COA09-1561", "first_page": "417", "last_page": "425", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "205 N.C. App. 417" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "322 N.C. 363", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2514047 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/322/0363-01" ] }, { "cite": "660 S.E.2d 592", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12640931 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "600", "parenthetical": "deeming plaintiff's cross-assignments of error moot after affirming the Commission's award" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/660/0592-01" ] }, { "cite": "671 S.E.2d 14", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12642466 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "19", "parenthetical": "citing Gilbert, 113 N.C. App. at 623, 440 S.E.2d at 118" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/671/0014-01" ] }, { "cite": "632 S.E.2d 525", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12636322 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "528", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "528" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/632/0525-01" ] }, { "cite": "190 N.C. App. 520", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4158131 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "531", "parenthetical": "deeming plaintiff's cross-assignments of error moot after affirming the Commission's award" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/190/0520-01" ] }, { "cite": "436 S.E.2d 589", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "592" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "112 N.C. App. 587", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8522900 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "590" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/112/0587-01" ] }, { "cite": "269 S.E.2d 623", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "300 N.C. 196", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560289, 8560267, 8560333, 8560306, 8560243 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/300/0196-03", "/nc/300/0196-02", "/nc/300/0196-05", "/nc/300/0196-04", "/nc/300/0196-01" ] }, { "cite": "262 S.E.2d 830", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "835" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "45 N.C. App. 197", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8548032 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "205" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/45/0197-01" ] }, { "cite": "519 S.E.2d 550", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "553", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "135 N.C. App. 211", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11239824 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "216", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/135/0211-01" ] }, { "cite": "195 N.C. App. 31", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4164331 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "37", "parenthetical": "citing Gilbert, 113 N.C. App. at 623, 440 S.E.2d at 118" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/195/0031-01" ] }, { "cite": "440 S.E.2d 115", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "118" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "113 N.C. App. 619", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523934 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "623" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/113/0619-01" ] }, { "cite": "655 S.E.2d 405", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "361 N.C. 704", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3747656, 3741864, 3746763, 3742155, 3737745, 3736497, 3746709, 3745531 ], "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/361/0704-05", "/nc/361/0704-02", "/nc/361/0704-08", "/nc/361/0704-01", "/nc/361/0704-03", "/nc/361/0704-06", "/nc/361/0704-04", "/nc/361/0704-07" ] }, { "cite": "178 N.C. App. 698", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8379757 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "701", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "702" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/178/0698-01" ] }, { "cite": "399 S.E.2d 104", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "106", "parenthetical": "quoting N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-2(6)" }, { "page": "106", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "parenthetical": "internal citations and emphasis omitted" }, { "page": "106" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 N.C. 67", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2543161 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "70-71", "parenthetical": "quoting N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-2(6)" }, { "page": "71" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/328/0067-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-2", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(6)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "368 S.E.2d 582", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 7, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "584" }, { "page": "585" }, { "page": "586" }, { "page": "583-86" }, { "page": "586" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "530 S.E.2d 549", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 6, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "553" }, { "page": "200" }, { "page": "553" }, { "page": "200", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "553" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "352 N.C. 109", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 684964 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "116" }, { "page": "115" }, { "page": "116" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/352/0109-01" ] }, { "cite": "598 S.E.2d 196", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "200", "parenthetical": "quoting Deese v. Champion Int'l Corp., 352 N.C. 109, 116, 530 S.E.2d 549, 553 (2000)" }, { "page": "200" }, { "page": "200" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "165 N.C. App. 144", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8995984 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "149", "parenthetical": "quoting Deese v. Champion Int'l Corp., 352 N.C. 109, 116, 530 S.E.2d 549, 553 (2000)" }, { "page": "149" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/165/0144-01" ] }, { "cite": "322 N.C. 363", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2514047 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "367" }, { "page": "364-70" }, { "page": "371" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/322/0363-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 799, "char_count": 20265, "ocr_confidence": 0.772, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.10955156072805788 }, "sha256": "b9bfcdb0d7b518362ee81d018d02c0cce614b96a1cf51d638506ed9032cca781", "simhash": "1:e503ef2b8c57235c", "word_count": 3210 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:30:55.510002+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges ELMORE and ERVIN concur." ], "parties": [ "JACQUELYN B. REAVES, Widow of RONALD REAVES, Deceased Employee, Plaintiff v. INDUSTRIAL PUMP SERVICE, Employer, AMERICAN INTERSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, Carrier, Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "BRYANT, Judge.\nIndustrial Pump Service, Employer, and American Interstate Insurance Company, Carrier, (collectively, defendants) and plaintiff, the widow of deceased employee Ronald Reaves (decedent), appeal from an opinion and award entered 16 July 2009 by the Industrial Commission. We affirm.\nFacts\nOn 1 April 2004, decedent, a welder, was found dead in his work truck which was parked outside the International Paper plant in Franklin, Virginia. Decedent and Robert Templeman, a machinist, had been repairing a pump in a basement room of the plant that day. The temperature in the basement room was in the mid-80s, and the room was humid and poorly ventilated. Decedent spent a total of eight to nine hours inside the room, 45 minutes of which he spent heating up a metal sleeve to 300 degrees with a welding torch and \u201ctack welding,\u201d and about three hours doing other types of physical work.\nAround 7:00 p.m. that day, decedent told Templeman that \u201che wasn\u2019t feeling good\u201d and that he was going out into the hallway to sit down. Around 10:30 p.m., decedent again complained to Templeman that he was \u201chot and fatigued\u201d and that the heat was \u201cgetting to him.\u201d Templeman and decedent walked out to the work truck at that time, and decedent got into the truck while Templeman went back inside the mill to finish his clean up. When Templeman returned to the truck about 45 minutes later, he found decedent lying in a reclined position, unresponsive. Medical staff confirmed his death. An autopsy was performed on 2 April 2004. The autopsy concluded that decedent had evidence of severe atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease and stated \u201cCause of death: Coronary artery disease.\u201d However, at no time prior to 1 April 2004 had decedent complained of heart problems or tightness in his chest, and a prior physical examination from January 2004 revealed that his blood pressure was 120/80, that his resting heart rate was 76 beats per minute, and that he had no history of cardiovascular disease.\nProcedural History\nPlaintiff filed a workers\u2019 compensation claim for death benefits with the Industrial Commission on 22 September 2004, and on 22 September 2006, the deputy commissioner denied the claim. Plaintiff appealed to the Full Commission, and on 22 June 2007, the Full Commission affirmed the denial. Plaintiff appealed to this Court, and on 20 January 2009, this Court entered an opinion vacating the Commission\u2019s opinion and award and remanding to the Commission, directing it to (I) make findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding the applicability of the Pickrell presumption; (II) consider the evidence under the correct legal standard to determine whether decedent\u2019s death was caused by extreme work conditions; and (III) make findings of fact and conclusions of law on whether inadequate safety measures of defendant employer Industrial Pump Service were a significant contributing factor in decedent\u2019s death. On 16 July 2009, the Full Commission entered an opinion and award concluding that the Pickrell presumption applied and that defendants did not rebut it, or, in the alternative, that decedent\u2019s death resulted from extreme work conditions, and that the lack of training in the recognition of health emergencies did not significantly contribute to decedent\u2019s death. Defendants and plaintiff appeal.\nDefendants present two issues on appeal: whether the Commission erred in (I) applying the Pickrell presumption and concluding that defendants failed to rebut the Pickrell presumption; and (II) concluding alternatively that decedent\u2019s employment subjected him to extreme conditions. On cross-appeal, plaintiff alleges the Commission erred in (III) concluding that the lack of training in the recognition of health emergencies did not significantly contribute to decedent\u2019s death. As discussed below, we affirm the Commission\u2019s opinion and award.\nStandard of Review\nOur review of the Commission\u2019s opinion and award is limited to determining \u201c \u2018whether any competent evidence supports the Commission\u2019s findings of fact and whether the findings of fact support the Commission\u2019s conclusions of law.\u2019 \u201d Madison v. Int\u2019l Paper Co., 165 N.C. App. 144, 149, 598 S.E.2d 196, 200 (2004) (quoting Deese v. Champion Int\u2019l Corp., 352 N.C. 109, 116, 530 S.E.2d 549, 553 (2000)). We must view \u201c \u2018[t]he evidence tending to support plaintiff\u2019s claim ... in the light most favorable to plaintiff,\u2019 \u201d granting plaintiff the \u201c \u2018benefit of every reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 149-50, 530 S.E.2d at 200 (quoting Deese, 352 N.C. at 115, 530 S.E.2d at 553). \u201cIn reviewing the Commission\u2019s findings of fact,\u201d we do not \u201cweigh the evidence presented to the Commission or decide the case on the basis of the weight of the evidence.\u201d Id. at 150, 530 S.E.2d at 200 (citation omitted). \u201c[T]he Commission is the \u2018sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence.\u2019 \u201d Id. (quoting Deese, 352 N.C. at 116, 530 S.E.2d at 553).\nI\nDefendants first contend that application of the Pickrell v. Motor Convoy, Inc., 322 N.C. 363, 368 S.E.2d 582 (1988), presumption was inappropriate because the circumstances surrounding decedent\u2019s death were known and because there was \u201cevidence before the Commission that decedent died other than by a compensable cause.\u201d We disagree.\nA workers\u2019 compensation claimant has the burden of proving that the employee suffered an injury (1) by accident (2) arising out of employment (3) in the course of employment, see N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-2(6) (2009); however, \u201c \u2018[w]hen an employee is found dead under circumstances indicating that death took place within the time and space limits of the employment, in the absence of any evidence of what caused the d.eath,\u2019 \u201d courts should \u201c \u2018indulge a presumption or inference that the death arose out of the employment.\u2019 \u201d See Pickrell, 322 N.C. at 367, 368 S.E.2d at 584 (quoting 1 Larson, The Law of Workmen\u2019s Compensation \u00a7 10.32 (1985)). The presumption \u201cmay be used to help a claimant carry his burden of proving that death was caused by accident, or that it arose out of the decedent\u2019s employment, or both.\u201d Id. at 368, 368 S.E.2d at 585. The Pickrell presumption shifts the burden of proof to the defendant so that the \u201cthe defendant must come forward with some evidence that death occurred as a result of a non-compensable cause; otherwise, the claimant prevails.\u201d Id. at 371, 368 S.E.2d at 586. If the defendant introduces \u201cevidence that death was not compensable, the presumption disappears\u201d and the \u201cCommission should find the facts based on all the evidence adduced, taking into account its credibility, and drawing such reasonable inferences from the credible evidence as may be permissible, the burden of persuasion remaining with the claimant.\u201d Id. Because an injury \u201c \u2018shall not include a disease in any form, except where it results naturally and unavoidably from the accident,\u2019 \u201d Cody v. Snider Lumber Co., 328 N.C. 67, 70-71, 399 S.E.2d 104, 106 (1991) (quoting N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-2(6)), \u201c[w]hen an employee is conducting his work in the usual way and suffers a heart attack, the injury does not arise by accident and is not compensable.\u201d Id. at 71, 399 S.E.2d at 106 (citation omitted). \u201cHowever, an injury caused by a heart attack may be compensable if the heart attack is due to an accident, such as when the heart attack is due to unusual or extraordinary exertion... or extreme conditions.\u201d Id. (internal citations and emphasis omitted).\nIn the instant case, the Commission entered the following relevant findings of fact: -\n15. Decedent\u2019s principal job ... was to \u201ctack weld\u201d a metal sleeve to the front face of the pump. Decedent used a welding torch to heat the sleeve to approximately 300 degrees .... Decedent spent a total of approximately 45 minutes heating up the sleeve and tack welding, approximately three hours [sic] of other physical work, and a total of eight to nine hours in the hot, humid and poorly ventilated basement room.\n16. At approximately 7:00 p.m., decedent told Mr. Templeman that \u201che wasn\u2019t feeling good\u201d and was going outside in a hallway to sit down. . . .\n17. At approximately 10:30 p.m., decedent again complained that he was \u201chot and fatigued\u201d and the heat was \u201cgetting to him.\u201d.. .\n18. Mr. Templeman walked with decedent to their work truck . . . and decedent got into the truck while Mr. Templeman went back into the mill to finish his clean up. There were no witnesses as to what occurred during the 45 minutes decedent was alone in the truck.\n20. When Mr. Templeman went back to the truck, he found decedent lying in a reclined position____The medical staff found decedent dead in the truck.\n21. An autopsy... performed on April 2, 2004... noted that: \u201cThe decedent was a 54 year old white man with no known significant past medical history apart from [sic] recent ear ache. WTiile he was at work he complained of feeling hot. He was later found collapsed inside of a vehicle. At autopsy the decedent had evidence of severe atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease. . . . Cause of death: Coronary artery disease.\u201d . . .\n26. According to Dr. Holt, poor ventilation and heat increase the stress on the cardiovascular system, which can lower the blood pressure and create additional stressors on the heart.\n27. The autopsy finding of \u201cno thrombosis\u201d was significant to Dr. Holt, as it meant that decedent did not have a \u201cmyocardial infarction, which is a heart attack in layman\u2019s terms.\u201d Dr. Holt was of the opinion that decedent had a rhythm problem in his heart due to a lack of blood supply to the heart muscle, which was aggravated by the heat and other work conditions to which decedent was exposed on April 1, 2004.\n29. Dr. Holt stated that the work conditions to which decedent was exposed on April 1, 2004 were significant contributing factors in decedent\u2019s death. Although the autopsy and death certificate did not state that decedent had suffered a heat stroke or heat exhaustion, Dr. Holt assumed that decedent was overheated, dehydrated and had low blood pressure.\n30. ... It was [Dr. Davis\u2019] opinion that decedent\u2019s work conditions were not a significant contributing factor to decedent\u2019s death.\n31. Dr. Davis testified that decedent died from a dysrhythmia followed by an arrhythmia, or heart attack. He acknowledged that heat can be a precipitating cause of a cardiac event, including a dysrhythmia. Dr. Davis also acknowledged that the pre-existing coronary artery disease would not, by itself, have caused decedent\u2019s death, but that there had to be a \u201cmalignant dysrhythmia.\u201d\n33. The Full Commission gives greater weight to the expert opinions of Dr. Holt and Ms. Meurs than to the causation opinion of Dr. Davis and holds that the greater weight of the evidence establishes that decedent\u2019s extreme work conditions were a contributing factor to his death. Although the evidence does not establish that decedent suffered from heat exhaustion or heat stroke, the greater weight of the evidence does show that decedent was exposed to heat, a special hazard, in the course of his employment and that the special hazard was a contributing factor to this death.\nAlthough defendants assign error to many of the Commission\u2019s findings of fact, they only argue in brief that the opinions of plaintiff\u2019s expert, Dr. William Holt, as set out in findings 27 and 29, were speculative, and that finding 33 is outside the Commission\u2019s authority on remand. We deem as abandoned the assignments of error not addressed on appeal, N.C. R. App. P 28(b)(6) (2009), and \u201ctreat the unchallenged findings of fact as conclusive on appeal.\u201d Wooten v. Newcon Transp., Inc., 178 N.C. App. 698, 701, 632 S.E.2d 525, 528 (2006) (citation omitted), disc. review denied, 361 N.C. 704, 655 S.E.2d 405 (2007).\nThe Commission\u2019s findings, which indicate that decedent, after being exposed to extreme heat in the course of his employment, was found dead in his work truck and that there was an unknown cause of the dysrhythmia which ultimately resulted in his death, support its conclusion that \u201cthe circumstances regarding the work-relatedness of decedent\u2019s death are unknown and that the death occurred as the result of an injury by accident sustained in the course of decedent\u2019s employment.\u201d Specifically, the Commission concluded that:\n3.. . . [T]he greater weight of the evidence indicates that the circumstances regarding the work-relatedness of decedent\u2019s death are unknown and that the death occurred as the result of an injury by accident sustained in the course of decedent\u2019s employment. It is uncontested that plaintiff was in the course of his employment and was engaged in his employer\u2019s business at the time of death. The fact that the immediate medical cause of decedent\u2019s death is known does not indicate that the Pickrell presumption does not apply.\n4.Therefore, plaintiff is entitled to the Pickrell presumption that decedent\u2019s cause of death was an injury by accident arising out of the employment. . . .\nAs a result, we hold that the Commission did not err by applying the Pickrell presumption. See Pickrell, 322 N.C. at 364-70, 368 S.E.2d at 583-86.\nDefendants also contend, relying on this Court\u2019s holding in Gilbert v. Entenmann\u2019s, Inc., 113 N.C. App. 619, 440 S.E.2d 115 (1994), that the Pickrell presumption was inappropriate because the testimony of their expert witness, Dr. Arthur Davis, that work conditions did not significantly contribute to decedent\u2019s death, was \u201cevidence before the Commission that decedent died other than by a compensable cause.\u201d In Gilbert, we held that a plaintiff is not entitled to the Pickrell presumption when a decedent has died from \u201ca noncompensable cause that is deadly in and of itself without a precipitating event.\u201d Reaves v. Indus. Pump Serv., 195 N.C. App. 31, 37, 671 S.E.2d 14, 19 (2009) (citing Gilbert, 113 N.C. App. at 623, 440 S.E.2d at 118). However, \u201c \u2018an injury caused by a heart attack may be compensable if the heart attack is due to an accident, such as when the heart attack is due to unusual or extraordinary exertion or extreme conditions.\u2019 \u201d Wooten, 178 N.C. App. at 702, 632 S.E.2d at 528 (quoting Cody, 328 N.C. at 71, 399 S.E.2d at 106) (emphasis omitted). In addition, although Dr. Davis opined that \u201cwork conditions were not a significant contributing factor to decedent\u2019s death,\u201d Dr. Davis also opined that \u201cpre-existing coronary artery disease would not, by itself, have caused decedent\u2019s death,\u201d that \u201cdecedent died from a dysrhythmia,\u201d and that exposure to heat can cause dysrhythmia. Further, it was Dr. Holt\u2019s opinion \u201cthat the work conditions to which decedent was exposed on April 1, 2004 were significant contributing factors in decedent\u2019s death.\u201d We therefore overrule defendants\u2019 assignment of error on this point.\nDefendants next contend that, \u201ceven if Pickrell were applicable,\u201d they rebutted it with Dr. Davis\u2019 causation testimony. We disagree.\nA defendant may rebut the Pickrell presumption by \u201ccom[ing] forward with some evidence that death occurred as a result of a noncompensable cause; otherwise, the claimant prevails.\u201d Pickrell, 322 N.C. at 371, 368 S.E.2d at 586. Our review of the Commission\u2019s findings regarding whether defendants have rebutted the Pickrell presumption is limited to determining whether \u201cany competent evidence in the record ... supports] the findings of the Commission!)]\u201d Horton v. Powell Plumbing & Heating of N.C., Inc., 135 N.C. App. 211, 216, 519 S.E.2d 550, 553 (1999) (citation omitted). If competent evidence supports the Commission\u2019s findings, \u201cwe are bound by [the Commission\u2019s] determination.\u201d Id. (citation omitted). Furthermore, \u201c [contradictions in . . . testimony go to its weight, and the Commission may properly refuse to believe particular evidence.\u201d Harrell v. J. P. Stevens & Co., 45 N.C. App. 197, 205, 262 S.E.2d 830, 835, disc. review denied, 300 N.C. 196, 269 S.E.2d 623 (1980).\nThe Commission\u2019s findings that Dr. Davis \u201cacknowledged that heat can be a precipitating cause of a cardiac event\u201d and that Dr. Davis \u201calso acknowledged that the pre-existing coronary artery disease would not, by itself, have caused decedent\u2019s death, but that there had to be a \u2018malignant dysrhythmia\u2019 \u201d support the Commission\u2019s conclusion that \u201can unknown precipitating cause for the dysrhythmia.. . resulted in decedent\u2019s death[,]\u201d \u201c[d]ecedent\u2019s pre-existing coronary artery disease did not by itself cause decedent\u2019s death[,]\u201d and \u201cdefendants have not successfully rebutted the presumption by coming forward with sufficient, credible evidence that death occurred as a result of a non-compensable cause.\u201d Because our review is limited to determining whether any competent evidence supports the Commission\u2019s findings, and whether those findings support the Commission\u2019s conclusions, see Madison, 165 N.C. App. at 149, 598 S.E.2d at 200, we hold that the Commission did not err by concluding that defendants failed to rebut the Pickrell presumption.\nFurthermore, although defendants challenge findings 27 and 29 by arguing that the opinions of plaintiffs expert witness, Dr. Holt, were speculative and were therefore an improper basis for the Commission\u2019s conclusions regarding the Pickrell presumption, we disagree. To the extent Dr. Holt\u2019s opinion \u2014 derived from his review of the autopsy report, decedent\u2019s medical records, and various reports of the incident \u2014 served as a basis for the Commission\u2019s findings and conclusions regarding the Pickrell presumption, we believe it was sufficient \u201cto take the case out of the realm of conjecture and remote possibilityf.]\u201d Id. at 150-51, 598 S.E.2d at 200. We are also unpersuaded by defendants\u2019 argument that finding 33 was outside the scope of the Commission\u2019s authority on remand because we believe the Commission \u201cstrictly followfed] this Court\u2019s mandate without variation,\u201d see Crump v. Independence Nissan, 112 N.C. App. 587, 590, 436 S.E.2d 589, 592 (1993), by making findings and conclusions addressing the Pickrell presumption.\nII & III\nBecause we affirm the Commission\u2019s award of death benefits on the ground that the Commission properly applied the Pickrell presumption, we do not reach defendants\u2019 second issue challenging the Commission\u2019s alternative conclusion that decedent\u2019s death was caused by extreme work conditions. By affirming the Commission\u2019s opinion and award, we also hold that plaintiff\u2019s cross-assignment of error is moot. See Roset-Eredia v. F.W. Dellinger, Inc., 190 N.C. App. 520, 531, 660 S.E.2d 592, 600 (2008) (deeming plaintiff\u2019s cross-assignments of error moot after affirming the Commission\u2019s award).\nAffirmed.\nJudges ELMORE and ERVIN concur.\n. Upon review of the record, we have determined that the Commission\u2019s finding of fact 30 intends to refer to Dr. Davis\u2019 expert opinion, and not Dr. Holt\u2019s. We have therefore omitted \u201cDr. Holt\u2019s\u201d and inserted \u201cDr. Davis\u2019 \u201d in its place.", "type": "majority", "author": "BRYANT, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Shipman & Wright, LLP, by Gary K. Shipman and William G. Wright, for plaintiff-appellee.", "Cranfill Sumner & Hartzog LLP, by Nicole D. Viele and Meredith Taylor Berard, for defendants-appellants." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "JACQUELYN B. REAVES, Widow of RONALD REAVES, Deceased Employee, Plaintiff v. INDUSTRIAL PUMP SERVICE, Employer, AMERICAN INTERSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, Carrier, Defendants\nNo. COA09-1561\n(Filed 20 July 2010)\n1. Workers\u2019 Compensation\u2014 Pickrell presumption \u2014 work-relatedness of death unknown\nThe Industrial Commission did not err in a workers\u2019 compensation case by applying the presumption in Pickrell, 322 N.C. 363, when the findings indicated that decedent, after being exposed to extreme heat in the course of his employment, was found dead in his work truck and there was an unknown cause of dysrhythmia which ultimately resulted in his death.\n2. Appeal and Error\u2014 mootness \u2014 alternative conclusion not reached\nDefendant\u2019s issue challenging the Industrial Commission\u2019s alternative conclusion in a workers\u2019 compensation case that decedent\u2019s death was caused by extreme working conditions was not reached based on the Court of Appeals\u2019 conclusion that the Commission properly applied the Pickrell, 322 N.C. 363, presumption. Further, plaintiff\u2019s cross-assignment of error was deemed moot.\nAppeal by defendants and plaintiff from opinion and award filed 16 July 2009 by the North Carolina Industrial Commission. Heard in the Court of Appeals 29 April 2010.\nShipman & Wright, LLP, by Gary K. Shipman and William G. Wright, for plaintiff-appellee.\nCranfill Sumner & Hartzog LLP, by Nicole D. Viele and Meredith Taylor Berard, for defendants-appellants." }, "file_name": "0417-01", "first_page_order": 445, "last_page_order": 453 }