{ "id": 3734103, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CURTIS HAIRE", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Haire", "decision_date": "2010-07-20", "docket_number": "No. COA10-37", "first_page": "436", "last_page": "444", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "205 N.C. App. 436" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "651 S.E.2d 256", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12639560 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "381" }, { "page": "261" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/651/0256-01" ] }, { "cite": "614 S.E.2d 313", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633129 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "315" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/614/0313-01" ] }, { "cite": "432 S.E.2d 171", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "111 N.C. App. 110", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8520621 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/111/0110-01" ] }, { "cite": "331 S.E.2d 652", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "314 N.C. 28", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4689817 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/314/0028-01" ] }, { "cite": "484 S.E.2d 372", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "346 N.C. 119", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 139354 ], "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/346/0119-01" ] }, { "cite": "194 S.E.2d 839", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "846" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "283 N.C. 33", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8557615 ], "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "43" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/283/0033-01" ] }, { "cite": "186 N.C. App. 373", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8156879 ], "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/186/0373-01" ] }, { "cite": "230 S.E.2d 213", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "31 N.C. App. 575", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8551171 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/31/0575-01" ] }, { "cite": "295 S.E.2d 391", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "393" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "306 N.C. 724", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573657 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "728" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/306/0724-01" ] }, { "cite": "604 S.E.2d 886", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "909" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "359 N.C. 131", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3803286 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "169" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/359/0131-01" ] }, { "cite": "300 S.E.2d 375", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "378", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 N.C. 655", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565416 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "661", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/307/0655-01" ] }, { "cite": "431 S.E.2d 188", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "193" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "334 N.C. 54", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2529763 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "62" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/334/0054-01" ] }, { "cite": "548 S.E.2d 712", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "723" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "353 N.C. 568", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 135574 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "584" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/353/0568-01" ] }, { "cite": "170 N.C. App. 584", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9006213 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "587" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/170/0584-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 819, "char_count": 18564, "ocr_confidence": 0.767, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.12982294956584e-08, "percentile": 0.3227373487797937 }, "sha256": "d39b08e60d3f04e395b446d159b5db5247d956ecd6a74cffcaf620cf0fc5d905", "simhash": "1:9f3ee269660759a2", "word_count": 3056 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:30:55.510002+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges STEELMAN and STEPHENS concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CURTIS HAIRE" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "HUNTER, JR., Robert N., Judge.\nCurtis Haire (\u201cdefendant\u201d) appeals his conviction of assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury. On appeal, defendant asserts that the trial court (1) committed plain error by giving the jury an erroneous self-defense instruction and (2) abused its discretion by declining to tender a written copy of the jury instructions to jurors when asked by the jury to do so. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court and conclude that the court did not commit plain error or abuse its discretion.\nI. Factual Background\nOn 9 March 2008, defendant was involved in a physical altercation with Vinh Michael Gazoo (\u201cGazoo\u201d). During the altercation, Gazoo was stabbed numerous times, causing significant bodily injury.\nOn 21 April 2008, defendant was indicted for assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury and assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury. Defendant entered a plea of not guilty and was tried before a jury on 14 August 2009.\nAt trial, the State\u2019s evidence tended to show the following: Gazoo testified that he was spending the night at the residence of Shannon Lentz (\u201cLentz\u201d) located on Loch Haven Road, Rockingham, North Carolina. Lentz is defendant\u2019s former girlfriend.\nOn the morning of 9 March 2008, Gazoo, Lentz, and her children were playing softball in the front yard at Lentz\u2019s home. Gazoo was hitting softballs to the children and had a bat in his hand. As they were playing, defendant drove up to the house. Gazoo heard tires squeal and saw doughnut configurations in the road. Gazoo told Lentz to take, the children into the house in case a problem arose.\nAs defendant got out of the car, Gazoo walked toward defendant and tossed the bat about twenty-five feet to his left across the driveway. At this time, Gazoo noticed that defendant was holding a knife with a black blade. The two men exchanged words and Gazoo told defendant that Lentz did not want him at her house, and if defendant had a problem, he could come see Gazoo at his house. Gazoo also told defendant to leave the car he had driven to the scene because it belonged to Lentz. Defendant responded by saying he would not leave the car, but instead would contact the Sheriffs Department to help him recover his belongings which were still at Lentz\u2019s house. Defendant then muttered something that was inaudible to Gazoo and started walking back towards the vehicle. Then defendant said, \u201cI\u2019ll be seeing you.\u201d At this point, Gazoo grabbed the bat from the yard and walked toward defendant. Gazoo then heard the sound of defendant\u2019s car door and turned his back to defendant. Gazoo took several steps towards the house. An altercation ensued and lasted several seconds.\nLentz testified that Gazoo grabbed the bat from the yard and approached defendant. Lentz testified further that as the men were fighting, Gazoo swung and hit defendant with the bat in his head and left arm and that the bat bounced off defendant\u2019s head and flew away.\nGazoo refutes this contention and said that he felt \u201cthree punches\u201d to his left shoulder. Gazoo stumbled and leaned forward where he felt another large blow to the middle of his back. This blow dislodged the bat from Gazoo\u2019s hand, whereupon Gazoo swung his fist at defendant. Gazoo, then saw defendant pull the knife from Gazoo\u2019s rib cage. Gazoo grabbed defendant and pulled him to the ground where they wrestled for control of the knife. This struggle caused two additional cuts to Gazoo\u2019s ear that nearly severed the ear. At this time, Gazoo wrapped his legs around defendant\u2019s arm, rolled his body around, and kicked defendant to free himself. Defendant returned to the vehicle and left the scene. Gazoo stood up and saw that blood was spraying from his body. Lentz\u2019s neighbor ran over and told Gazoo to lie down beside the road.\nEMS arrived and paramedic Michael Sharpe (\u201cSharpe\u201d) observed Gazoo lying face down on the ground with several stab wounds to his back and left side. Gazoo told Sharpe he had been stabbed from behind. Gazoo was transported to the emergency room at Richmond Memorial Hospital. At the hospital, Gazoo was alert and conscious as x-rays and a CAT scan were performed. Gazoo was then airlifted to Charlotte to receive treatment at Carolinas Medical Center where he was admitted for four days. There, Gazoo told a nurse, Joy Austin, that he had been stabbed from behind. Gazoo\u2019s injuries included two punctured lungs, a spleen that was cut in half, as well as a punctured trachea. Gazoo also suffered nerve damage throughout his body that causes him to tremble. While at the hospital, Gazoo was also diagnosed with post traumatic stress disorder, paranoid schizophrenia, and bipolar disorder. In addition, his thyroid is not functioning properly and he requires daily medication to manage his injuries.\nAfter leaving the scene, defendant surrendered himself to the Sheriffs office. Defendant was interviewed by Detective Jay Childers (\u201cChilders\u201d) and was advised of his Miranda rights. Defendant signed a waiver and gave a written statement to Childers detailing his recollection of the fight. Defendant subsequently provided consent for a search of his vehicle. The knife was recovered from defendant.\nAt trial, defendant took the stand and asserted that he acted in self-defense. Defendant testified that the physical altercation started when Gazoo came at him with the bat. Furthermore, defendant testified that he put his hands up and told Gazoo he did not want to fight.\nAt the conclusion of trial, the judge instructed the jury on all of the substantive elements of the case and thoroughly explained the law. The judge also gave the pattern jury instruction on self-defense pursuant to N.C.P.I., Crim. 308.45 (2008). The judge instructed the jury as follows:\nIf you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant assaulted the victim, but not with a deadly weapon or other deadly force, and the circumstances would create a reasonable belief in the mind of ordinary firmness that the action was necessary or appeared to be necessary to protect that person from bodily injury or offensive physical contact, and the circumstances did create such a belief in the defendant\u2019s mind at the time the defendant acted, the assault would be justified by self defense even though the defendant was not thereby put in actual danger of death or great bodily harm.\nAfter being instructed by the judge, the jury found defendant guilty of the lesser included charge of assault \"with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury, and the judge sentenced defendant to 20-33 months\u2019 imprisonment. Defendant gave oral notice of appeal in open court.\nDefendant asserts the following assignments of error on appeal: First, he argues that the trial court committed plain error in its jury instructions regarding self-defense. With regard to his first assignment of error, defendant specifically contends that the trial court\u2019s jury instructions erroneously suggested that defendant must prove self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the jury could only find that defendant acted in perfect self-defense if he did not use a deadly weapon. Second, defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it declined the jury\u2019s request for a written copy of the jury instructions.\nII. Jury Instructions Regarding Self-Defense\nDefendant contends that the jury instructions given by the trial court were misleading and suggested that defendant had to prove self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. After reviewing the evidence and the specific jury instruction, we conclude that there was no plain error that would warrant a new trial.\nIn the case at the bar, defense counsel failed to request a modified jury instruction at trial and lodged no objection to the pattern instruction. Therefore, as requested by defendant on appeal, this Court must review the issue for plain error. See State v. Goforth, 170 N.C. App. 584, 587, 614 S.E.2d 313, 315 (2005). Under the plain error standard, defendant must show that the instructions were erroneous and that absent the erroneous instructions, a jury probably would have returned a different verdict. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1443(a) (2009); State v. Lucas, 353 N.C. 568, 584, 548 S.E.2d 712, 723 (2001). The error in the instructions must be \u201c \u2018so fundamental that it denied the defendant a fair trial and quite probably tilted the scales against him.\u2019 \u201d Id. (quoting State v. Collins, 334 N.C. 54, 62, 431 S.E.2d 188, 193 (1993)). \u201c \u2018[I]t is the rare case in which an improper instruction will justify reversal of a criminal conviction when no objection has been made in the trial court.\u2019 \u201d State v. Odom, 307 N.C. 655, 661, 300 S.E.2d 375, 378 (1983) (citation omitted). In deciding whether a defect in the jury instruction constitutes \u201cplain error,\u201d the appellate court must examine the entire record and determine if the instructional error had a probable impact on the jury\u2019s finding of guilt. Id.\nIn this case, defendant was charged with assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury. The jury was instructed on this charge and its lesser included offense, assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury. In addition, during the charge conference, the trial court reviewed the instruction on self-defense with both attorneys and instructed the jury accordingly. The court used the pattern jury instructions for self-defense that accompany an assault using deadly force. N.C.P.I., Crim. 308.45. Based on the court\u2019s instructions, defendant was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury.\nDefendant asserts that the pattern jury instructions should have been modified to accommodate the specific facts of his case. Defendant further contends that absent that specific modification, the pattern instructions misled the jury. After review, we hold that defendant\u2019s contention is not supported by the evidence in the record.\nThe court instructed the jury as follows:\nIf you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant assaulted the victim, but not with a deadly weapon or other deadly force, and the circumstances would create a reasonable belief in the mind of ordinary firmness that the action was necessary or appeared to be necessary to protect that person from bodily injury or offensive physical contact, and the circumstances did create such a belief in the defendant\u2019s mind at the time the defendant acted, the assault would be justified by self defense even though the defendant was not thereby put in actual danger of death or great bodily harm.\nDefendant admits that the specific language in the pattern instruction was given pursuant to N.C.P.I., Crim. 308.45. (2003). It is also important to note that a trial court\u2019s use of pattern jury instructions is encouraged, but not required. State v. Morgan, 359 N.C. 131, 169, 604 S.E.2d 886, 909 (2004).\nThe trial judge has wide discretion in the manner of which issues are presented to the jury. State v. Harris, 306 N.C. 724, 728, 295 S.E.2d 391, 393 (1982). If clarification of the instructions was an issue, defendant could have submitted a request that the trial court give the jury a special instruction pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1231(a) (2009). The record clearly shows that defendant did not submit special jury instructions on self-defense nor did defendant object and request any changes to the charge after the court instructed the jury.\nDefendant also argues that the self-defense instructions given by the trial court were misleading. Long-standing precedent in this Court explains that the charge to the jury will be construed contextually, and segregated portions will not be viewed as error when the charge as a whole is free from objection. State v. Reese, 31 N.C. App. 575, 230 S.E.2d 213 (1976). In the present case, the trial judge fully instructed the jury first on the issue of self-defense and then on all of the elements of the crime and its lesser included offenses.\nAfter the elements of each count were described by the judge an admonition regarding self-defense properly allocating the burden of proof was given to the jury. For example, the judge instructed the jury on the following issues:\nAgain, if you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed an assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury, you may return a verdict of guilty only if the State has satisfied you beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not reasonably believe that the assault was necessary, or appeared to be necessary to protect the defendant from bodily injury or offensive contact; or that the defendant used excessive force or was the aggressor.\nDefendant contends that the following portion of the jury charge given by the judge contained in the final section of the charge taken from the pattern jury instructions would have been misleading to the jury.\nIf you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant assaulted the victim, but not with a deadly weapon or other deadly force, and the circumstances would create a reasonable belief in the mind of ordinary firmness that the action was necessary or appeared to be necessary to protect that person from bodily injury or offensive physical contact, and the circumstances did create such a belief in the defendant\u2019s mind at the time the defendant acted, the assault would be justified by self defense even though the defendant was not thereby put in actual danger of death or great bodily harm.\nDefendant relies upon State v. McArthur, 186 N.C. App. 373, 651 S.E.2d 256 (2007), for the proposition that the above-quoted language literally read incorrectly shifts the burden of proving self-defense to defendant. McArthur does caution judges as follows: \u201cWe urge trial judges to take care in using the pattern self-defense instruction and edit it in order to ensure that the burden of proof is correctly placed on the State throughout the instructions\u201d Id. at 381, 651 S.E.2d at 261.\nWhile we agree with this dicta in McArthur that the wording of this instruction is confusing, the trial court properly edited the pattern instructions by repeatedly expressing to the jury, that the State had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant\u2019s actions were not in self-defense. When the trial court\u2019s instructions to the jury are considered in context as a whole, \u201cwe think the jury clearly understood that the burden was upon the State to satisfy it beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant did not act in self-defense and clearly understood the circumstances under which it should return a verdict of not guilty by reason of self-defense.\u201d State v. Gaines, 283 N.C. 33, 43, 194 S.E.2d 839, 846 (1973). Consequently, we conclude that the trial court committed no error, much less no plain error, in its jury instructions on self-defense.\nIII. Jurors\u2019 Request to Review Jury Instructions\nDefendant also contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it declined to tender a written copy of the jury instructions after being asked by the jury to do so. We disagree.\nThis issue is subject to the abuse of discretion standard of review. In order to show that the trial court abused its discretion, defendant must demonstrate that the court\u2019s finding could not have been the result of a reasoned decision. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 346 N.C. 119, 484 S.E.2d 372 (1997); State v. Ashe, 314 N.C. 28, 331 S.E.2d 652 (1985).\nHere, there is no evidence in the record that specifically demonstrates that the court did not come to this decision after reasoned thought and careful consideration. During its deliberations, the jury verbally requested a copy of the jury instructions. Regarding this request, the trial judge informed both attorneys outside the presence of the jury: \u201cI do not have a copy of the instructions and I don\u2019t know if that\u2019s really a good idea.\u201d In response, both attorneys stated that they believed the court was not authorized to give a copy of instructions to the jury.\nMoreover, as a precaution, the trial judge requested that the jury put their requests and questions in writing, at which point the jury sent the trial judge a note asking for the written instructions. The trial court then informed the attorneys outside the presence of the jury that \u201c[t]he Court does not have a copy [of the jury instructions], and will be unable to deliver a copy of the instructions.\u201d When the jury returned to the courtroom, the trial judge stated, \u201c[i]n my discretion, I am not supplying a copy of the instructions.\u201d\nA trial court has inherent authority, in its discretion to submit its instructions on the law to the jury in writing. State v. Hester, 111 N.C. App. 110, 432 S.E.2d 171 (1993). Because no party requested the instructions be provided, we conclude that the trial court properly exercised its inherent authority and did not abuse its discretion.\nIV. Conclusion\nFor the reasons stated herein, we hold that the trial court did not err in its jury instructions regarding self-defense. Moreover, the trial court properly exercised its discretion in declining to produce a copy of the jury instructions when requested by the jury. For the reasons stated herein, we conclude that defendant received a fair trial free of error.\nNo error.\nJudges STEELMAN and STEPHENS concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "HUNTER, JR., Robert N., Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Allison A. Angel\u00ed, for plaintiff appellee.", "Leslie C. Rawls for defendant appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CURTIS HAIRE\nNo. COA10-37\n(Filed 20 July 2010)\n1. Criminal Law\u2014 instructions \u2014 self-defense\u2014plain error analysis\nThe trial court did not commit plain error, or error, in an assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury case by its instruction on self-defense. The instruction, considered in context, revealed that the burden was upon the State to satisfy the jury beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant did not act in self-defense and the circumstances under which the jury could return a verdict of not guilty by reason of self-defense.\n2. Jury\u2014 request for production of written copy of instructions \u2014 trial court discretion to deny request\nThe trial court properly exercised its discretion in declining to produce a written copy of the jury instructions when requested by the jury. Further, no party requested the instructions be provided.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 14 August 2009 by Judge Tanya Wallace in Richmond County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 9 June 2010.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Allison A. Angel\u00ed, for plaintiff appellee.\nLeslie C. Rawls for defendant appellant." }, "file_name": "0436-01", "first_page_order": 464, "last_page_order": 472 }