{ "id": 3734737, "name": "THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. EDWARD JASON STANLEY, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Stanley", "decision_date": "2010-07-20", "docket_number": "No. COA09-1263", "first_page": "707", "last_page": "712", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "205 N.C. App. 707" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "627 S.E.2d 462", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12635366, 12635367 ], "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/627/0462-01", "/se2d/627/0462-02" ] }, { "cite": "619 S.E.2d 862", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12634057 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "865", "parenthetical": "citations, quotation marks, ellipses, and brackets omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/619/0862-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 51-2.2", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 3, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "As used in this Article, the terms \" 'parent,' 'father,' or 'mother' includes one who has become a parent, father, or mother, respectively, by adoption.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "360 N.C. 396", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3787206 ], "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/360/0396-01" ] }, { "cite": "174 N.C. App. 118", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8350640 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "123", "parenthetical": "citations, quotation marks, ellipses, and brackets omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/174/0118-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.6", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 16, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(4)(a)" }, { "page": "(li)", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "(li)" }, { "page": "(li)" }, { "page": "(li)" }, { "page": "(li)" }, { "page": "(li)" }, { "page": "(ld)" }, { "page": "(ld)" }, { "page": "(ld)" }, { "page": "(ld)" }, { "page": "(ld)" }, { "page": "(ld)" }, { "page": "(li)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.7", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" }, { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "692 S.E.2d 409", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "418", "parenthetical": "citations, quotation marks, ellipses, and brackets omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "593 S.E.2d 763", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "358 N.C. 213", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2986427 ], "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/358/0213-01" ] }, { "cite": "582 S.E.2d 638", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "639" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "159 N.C. App. 220", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8955268 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "222" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/159/0220-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-41", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 600, "char_count": 12753, "ocr_confidence": 0.776, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.138363859351185e-08, "percentile": 0.47165761401533446 }, "sha256": "dcb3f36f0f5a4ac371befd644c7c21e4afcb7a653090d4faf3e71c879c86d94a", "simhash": "1:af2b4a42f2ab4471", "word_count": 2087 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:30:55.510002+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges ELMORE and JACKSON concur." ], "parties": [ "THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. EDWARD JASON STANLEY, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "STROUD, Judge.\nDefendant was convicted of three counts of abduction of children. Due to defendant\u2019s convictions, he was required to register on the Sexual Offender and Public Protection Registry. The trial court concluded that defendant did not have to register. As the trial court\u2019s order is in plain contravention of the law, we reverse and remand.\nI. Background\nOn 30 April 2002, defendant was convicted for three counts of abduction of children pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-41; these convictions are not the subject of this appeal. However, the facts which led to defendant\u2019s abduction convictions are relevant to an understanding of the issues raised in this appeal. According to the attorneys\u2019 arguments before the trial court in the case before us, it was undisputed that defendant and his wife took her three children on a trip out of North Carolina in contravention of a custody order which granted custody to the children\u2019s maternal grandmother. Defendant considered all three children to be his, but was technically only the father of two of the children; defendant was not the biological or adoptive father of one of the children, though he was her stepparent at the time of the abduction. It appears that there was no allegation of any sexual misconduct by defendant against any of the three children during the abduction or at any other time. Despite his convictions for abduction, defendant failed to register on the Sexual Offender and Public Protection Registry (\u201cregistry\u201d).\nOn or about 1 October 2007, defendant was indicted for failing to register. On 10 December 2008, defendant filed a petition for removal from the registry and a motion to dismiss the criminal charge against him. On or about 20 May 2009, in response to defendant\u2019s petition and motion, the trial court dismissed the criminal charge against defendant and ordered that defendant\u2019s name be removed from the registry. The trial court based its order on its conclusion that two of the convictions for abduction of children stemmed from defendant\u2019s own children and defendant had \u201cacted as\u201d a parent to the third child, so defendant was not required to register. The State appeals.\nII. Registration\nThe State first contends that defendant \u201cis subject to the requirements of the North Carolina Sex Offender and Public Protection Registration Programs.\u201d (Original in all caps.) The State argues that the fact that defendant \u201cacted as\u201d a parent to a child, as the trial court found, is not enough to exempt him from registration; the State contends defendant could only be exempt if he was actually a parent to his stepchild.\nWe review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. See Downs v. State, 159 N.C. App. 220, 222, 582 S.E.2d 638, 639 (2003), aff\u2019d per curiam, 358 N.C. 213, 593 S.E.2d 763 (2004). \u2022\nStatutory interpretation begins with the cardinal principle of statutory construction that the intent of the legislature is controlling. In ascertaining the legislative intent, courts should consider the language of the statute, the spirit of the statute, and what it seeks to accomplish. Where the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, the Court does not engage in judicial construction but must apply the statute to give effect to the plain and definite meaning of the language.\nState v. McCravey, - N.C. App. -, -, 692 S.E.2d 409, 418 (2010) (citations, quotation marks, ellipses, and brackets omitted). N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.7 provides that \u201c[a] person who is a State resident and who has a reportable conviction shah be required to maintain registration with the sheriff of the county where the person resides.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.7(a) (2007). A \u201c[r]eportable conviction\u201d includes \u201c[a] final conviction for an offense against a minor[.]\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.6(4)(a) (2007). An \u201c[o]ffense against a minor\u201d includes abduction of children pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-41, \u201cif the offense is committed against a minor, and the person committing the offense is not the minor\u2019s parent[.]\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.6(li) (2007) (emphasis added).\nAlthough the term \u201cparent\u201d is not necessarily ambiguous or unclear, it is true that \u201cparent\u201d is not defined in Chapter 14 of our General Statutes and that there are varying definitions of \u201cparent\u201d for various purposes within the General Statutes, some of which even include \u201cparent\u201d as part of the definition of a person who may be considered as a \u201cparent.\u201d Thus, we must seek the definition of \u201cparent\u201d which is in accord with the General Assembly\u2019s intent and purpose for N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.6(li).\nIf the language is ambiguous or unclear, the reviewing court must construe the statute in an attempt not to defeat or impair the object of the statute if that can reasonably be done \"without doing violence to the legislative language. In so doing,\na court may look to other indicia of legislative will, including: the purposes appearing from the statute taken as a whole, the phraseology, the words ordinary or technical, the law as it prevailed before the statute, the mischief to be remedied, the remedy, the end to be accomplished, statutes in pari materia, the preamble, the title, and other like means. Statutory provisions must be read in context, and those dealing with the same subject matter must be construed in pari materia, as together constituting one law, and harmonized to give effect to each.\nTrayford v. N.C. Psychology Bd., 174 N.C. App. 118, 123, 619 S.E.2d 862, 865 (2005) (citations, quotation marks, ellipses, and brackets omitted), aff\u2019d per curiam, 360 N.C. 396, 627 S.E.2d 462 (2006).\nBlack\u2019s Law Dictionary defines a \u201cparent\u201d as \u201c[t]he lawful father or mother of someone.\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 1222 (9th ed. 2004). \u201cParent\u201d has also been defined in essentially the same way in various statutes. See, e.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 51-2.2 (2007) (As used in this Article, the terms \u201c \u2018parent,\u2019 \u2018father,\u2019 or \u2018mother\u2019 includes one who has become a parent, father, or mother, respectively, by adoption.\u201d); 108A-24(4b) (2007) (\u201c \u2018Parent\u2019 means biological parent or adoptive parent[.]\u201d). Thus, a \u201cparent\u201d pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 51-2.2 and 108A-24(4b) is a biological or adoptive parent, mother or father, of a child. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 51-2.2; 108A-24(4b); see also Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 1222. We believe that the definition of a parent as a biological or adoptive parent best fits the intent and purposes of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.6(li) (2007). Defendant was not a \u201cparent\u201d of the child at issue because he was not the biological father or the adoptive father of the child.\nAlthough we fully appreciate the logic and common sense of defendant\u2019s argument, that taking his stepchild, along with his wife, the stepchild\u2019s mother, should not be considered as a \u201creportable offense\u201d leading to registration, we are unable to interpret N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.6(li) in any other way based upon the plain language of the statute and its history. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.6(li). The legislative history of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.6(li) indicates an intent to limit the exemption from registration strictly to a parent only and not to permit the exemption even for one who has legal custody of a child. Compare N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 14-208.6(ld) (1997), (1999). Although N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.6 once permitted an exception from registration for the \u201clegal custodian\u201d of a child, the General Assembly later eliminated this exception. See id. In 1997, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.6(ld) provided that an \u201c[o]ffense against a minor\u201d included an \u201coffense . . . committed against a minor, and the person committing the offense is not the minor\u2019s parent or legal custodian[.]\u201d See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.6(ld) (1997). However, by 1999, the General Assembly had amended N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.6(ld), removing the words \u201cor legal custodian\u201d and leaving status as a \u201cparent\u201d as the only basis for exception under this statute. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.6(ld) (1999). As noted above, we also are aware that throughout our General Statutes, the term \u201cparent\u201d has been defined in different ways for various purposes, and the definition is often limited to the purpose of the particular statute, see, e.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 115C-391(d5) (2009); -106.3(14) (2007); 130A-440.1(h) (2007); however, due to the Legislature\u2019s decision to remove \u201clegal custodian\u201d from the language of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.6(ld), currently N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.6(li), which narrowed the exception to only a \u201cparentf,]\u201d we cannot adopt a broad interpretation of the term \u201cparent\u201d which could include legal custodians such as guardians or foster parents. If we cannot include a person with legally sanctioned custody of a child within the definition of \u201cparent,\u201d we certainly cannot include a person with an informal status such as caregiver or one standing in loco parentis.\nAs defendant was not a \u201cparent\u201d of the child at issue and has been convicted of a reportable conviction, the trial court erred in concluding defendant\u2019s name should be removed from the registry and that defendant is not subject to the registry requirements. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.7(a). Although we understand the trial court\u2019s rationale and agree that the plain reading of the statute creates a result in this case which we would hope was probably not intended by the General Assembly, we are constrained to reverse the trial court\u2019s order.\nIII. Conclusion\nIn conclusion, we reverse the trial court order removing defendant\u2019s name from the registry, declaring that defendant is not subject to registry requirements, and dismissing the criminal charge against defendant for failure to register. We remand this case for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.\nREVERSED AND REMANDED.\nJudges ELMORE and JACKSON concur.\n. See, e.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 115C-391(d5) (2009) (identifying the persons who must receive notice of a student\u2019s recommended suspension or expulsion from school: \u201cFor the purposes of this subsection, the word \u2018parent\u2019 shall mean parent, guardian, caregiver, or other person legally responsible for the student\u201d); 1150-106.3(14) (2007) (regarding education of children with disabilities: \u201cThe following definitions apply in this Article . . . \u2018Parent\u2019 means: a. A natural, adoptive, or foster parent; b. A guardian, but not the State if the child is a ward of the State; c. An individual acting in the place of a natural or adoptive parent, including a grandparent, stepparent, or other relative, and with whom the child lives; d. An individual who is legally responsible for the child\u2019s welfare; or e. A surrogate if one is appointed under G.S. 115C-109.2\u201d); 130A-440.1(h) (2007) (dealing with early childhood vision care: \u201cAs used in this section, the term \u2018parent\u2019 means the parent, guardian, or person standing in loco parentis\u201d).\n. \u201cLegal custodian\u201d also has no definition within Chapter 14. The only statutory definition of \u201clegal custodian\u201d we are aware of is in Chapter 115C of the General Statutes, dealing with admission and assignment of elementary and secondary students, where \u201clegal custodian\u201d means \u201c[t]he person or agency that has been awarded legal custody of the student by a court.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-366(h)(6) (2007). A \u201clegal custodian\u201d of a child would almost certainly be \u201cact[ing] as\u201d a parent to a child, with legal sanction of the court\u2019s authority.", "type": "majority", "author": "STROUD, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy A. Cooper, III by Special Deputy Attorney General John J. Aldridge, III and Assistant Attorney General Ernest Michael Heavner, for the State.", "Appellate Defender Staples S. Hughes, by Assistant Appellate Defender Barbara S. Blackman, for defendant-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. EDWARD JASON STANLEY, Defendant\nNo. COA09-1263\n(Filed 20 July 2010)\nSexual Offenders\u2014 registry \u2014 parental exemption \u2014 stepfather\nThe trial court erred by ordering that defendant\u2019s name be removed from the Sexual Offender and Public Protection Registry where defendant had been convicted of three counts of abducting children after taking an out-of-state trip with his wife and her three children in contravention of a custody order. Defendant was the father of two of the children and the stepparent but not the adoptive parent of the third. There was no allegation of sexual misconduct, but the definition of parent as a biological or adoptive parent best fits the intent of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-208.6(li). As defendant was not a \u201cparent\u201d of the child at issue and has been convicted of a reportable conviction, the trial court erred by concluding that defendant was not subject to registry requirements.\nAppeal by plaintiff from order entered on or about 20 May 2009 by Judge William R. Pittman in Superior Court, Guilford County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 25 February 2010.\nAttorney General Roy A. Cooper, III by Special Deputy Attorney General John J. Aldridge, III and Assistant Attorney General Ernest Michael Heavner, for the State.\nAppellate Defender Staples S. Hughes, by Assistant Appellate Defender Barbara S. Blackman, for defendant-appellee." }, "file_name": "0707-01", "first_page_order": 735, "last_page_order": 740 }