{
  "id": 4177744,
  "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. DANIEL LEE KING",
  "name_abbreviation": "State v. King",
  "decision_date": "2010-08-17",
  "docket_number": "No. COA09-1659",
  "first_page": "585",
  "last_page": "591",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "206 N.C. App. 585"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.",
    "id": 14983,
    "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 5,
    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "617 S.E.2d 1",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "case_ids": [
        12633690
      ],
      "year": 2005,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "13"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/se2d/617/0001-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "573 S.E.2d 214",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 2002,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "219"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "154 N.C. App. 624",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C. App.",
      "case_ids": [
        9251401
      ],
      "year": 2002,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "630"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc-app/154/0624-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "559 S.E.2d 814",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 2002,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "819",
          "parenthetical": "considering the officer's testimony that \"defendant's unusual behavior caused him to 'heighten [his] sense of safety' \""
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "148 N.C. App. 462",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C. App.",
      "case_ids": [
        9366580
      ],
      "year": 2002,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "468",
          "parenthetical": "considering the officer's testimony that \"defendant's unusual behavior caused him to 'heighten [his] sense of safety' \""
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc-app/148/0462-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "594 F.3d 14",
      "category": "reporters:federal",
      "reporter": "F.3d",
      "case_ids": [
        3547940,
        3521639
      ],
      "year": 2010,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "20"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/us-app-dc/389/0199-01",
        "/f3d/594/0014-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "463 U.S. 1032",
      "category": "reporters:federal",
      "reporter": "U.S.",
      "case_ids": [
        6203160
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1983,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/us/463/1032-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "449 U.S. 411",
      "category": "reporters:federal",
      "reporter": "U.S.",
      "case_ids": [
        11716341
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1981,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "418"
        },
        {
          "page": "629"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/us/449/0411-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "415 S.E.2d 719",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1992,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "723",
          "parenthetical": "quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418, 66 L. Ed. 2d 621, 629 (1981)"
        },
        {
          "page": "722"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "331 N.C. 227",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        2500771
      ],
      "year": 1992,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "234",
          "parenthetical": "quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418, 66 L. Ed. 2d 621, 629 (1981)"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/331/0227-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "291 S.E.2d 637",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1982,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "305 N.C. 734",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8573152
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1982,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "742"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/305/0734-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "536 S.E.2d 858",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 2000,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "860"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "140 N.C. App. 484",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C. App.",
      "case_ids": [
        12129481
      ],
      "year": 2000,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "488"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc-app/140/0484-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "435 S.E.2d 842",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1993,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "844",
          "parenthetical": "citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 24, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 908"
        },
        {
          "page": "844-45"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "112 N.C. App. 477",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C. App.",
      "case_ids": [
        8522147
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1993,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "480",
          "parenthetical": "citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 24, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 908"
        },
        {
          "page": "481"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc-app/112/0477-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "446 S.E.2d 67",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1994,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "69",
          "parenthetical": "\"[The Fourth Amendment] is applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.\""
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "337 N.C. 437",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        2549311
      ],
      "year": 1994,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "441",
          "parenthetical": "\"[The Fourth Amendment] is applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.\""
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/337/0437-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "392 U.S. 1",
      "category": "reporters:federal",
      "reporter": "U.S.",
      "case_ids": [
        6167798
      ],
      "weight": 6,
      "year": 1968,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "24"
        },
        {
          "page": "908"
        },
        {
          "page": "27"
        },
        {
          "page": "909"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/us/392/0001-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "359 N.C. 644",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        3801139
      ],
      "year": 2005,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "662"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/359/0644-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "592 S.E.2d 733",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 2004,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "735-36"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "163 N.C. App. 129",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C. App.",
      "case_ids": [
        8915624
      ],
      "year": 2004,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "132"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc-app/163/0129-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "291 S.E.2d 618",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1982,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "619"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "306 N.C. 132",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8567694
      ],
      "year": 1982,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "134"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/306/0132-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "173 L. Ed. 2d 485",
      "category": "reporters:federal",
      "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d",
      "case_ids": [
        3653882
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 2009,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/us/556/0332-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 774,
    "char_count": 14620,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.756,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 4.7492960360752035e-08,
      "percentile": 0.29834693065116924
    },
    "sha256": "9e458cf6207456396b4e5f9d45b3b14a7e4db361510193e359490b7d9f1cf840",
    "simhash": "1:258d787f3e3b5d42",
    "word_count": 2355
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:24:03.194595+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Judges GEER and JACKSON concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. DANIEL LEE KING"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "BEASLEY, Judge.\nDaniel Lee King (Defendant) appeals pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-979(b) from an order denying his motion to suppress any and all evidence obtained as a result of the traffic stop that preceded his arrest. For the reasons stated below, we affirm.\nOn 14 November 2008, Defendant was arrested for various offenses arising out of a traffic stop which was initiated by Officer James Wade Cecil of the Asheville Police Department. On 5 January 2009, Defendant was indicted for carrying a concealed weapon, displaying a fictitious tag, possession of drug paraphernalia, along with the aggravated felonies of maintaining a vehicle for keeping and selling a controlled substance and possession with intent to sell or deliver methamphetamine, marijuana, oxycodone, and cocaine. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence underlying the charges filed against him, and his motion came on for pretrial hearing on 5 August 2009.\nOfficer Cecil testified for the State at the suppression hearing. Cecil\u2019s recitation of the facts indicates that while conducting routine patrol around midnight on 14 November 2008, he observed Defendant driving a gold Chrysler Sebring. Cecil noticed that Defendant and his passenger were looking at the officer oddly and continued to look at him as they passed. Cecil entered the Sebring\u2019s plate information in his computer to compare the tag with the DMV records, which revealed that the tag was registered to a two-door Nissan, not a Sebring. Cecil initiated a traffic stop. He noticed the driver holding both of his hands out of the window as he approached the vehicle, and without any question or inquiry, Defendant immediately told Cecil that he had a gun sitting on the dashboard. The small caliber handgun was retrieved by Cecil and disarmed by another officer who had arrived for assistance. Cecil then asked Defendant to exit the vehicle. Defendant complied but first removed the large, puffy coat he was wearing and left it inside the car. This raised the officer\u2019s suspicions because that particular day was \u201cquite chilly.\u201d Leaving the passenger in the vehicle, Cecil led Defendant twenty-five to thirty feet back to his patrol car and conducted a pat-down search for safety purposes. The officer felt what he immediately recognized as a pill bottle in Defendant\u2019s pants pocket and asked him what it was. Defendant answered that it was \u201cmeth.\u201d Cecil then retrieved the bottle and, observing a substance therein that appeared to be crystal methamphetamine, they performed a full search of Defendant\u2019s person. The officer located a small plastic bag containing what he believed to be cocaine. Defendant was arrested for possession of methamphetamine and cocaine, handcuffed, and placed in the back of Cecil\u2019s patrol car. At that time, Cecil and other officers searched Defendant\u2019s vehicle, including his coat and a bag lying in the rear passenger area, and discovered more narcotics, drug paraphernalia, and another weapon.\nThe trial court issued oral findings consistent with the above-articulated facts and conclusions of law that the stop of the vehicle was based on reasonable suspicion and therefore lawful; the pat-down search of Defendant was lawful as a proper Terry frisk; and that the vehicle search was proper under Arizona v. Gant, 566 U.S. -, 173 L. Ed. 2d 485 (2009), because it was reasonable for the officer to believe Defendant\u2019s car contained evidence of the offense of arrest. Further concluding that none of Defendant\u2019s Fourth Amendment rights had been violated, the trial court denied the suppression motion. Defendant then pled guilty to the offenses as charged but reserved his right to appeal the court\u2019s ruling on his motion to suppress the evidence. Defendant now appeals.\nIn addressing the denial of Defendant\u2019s suppression motion, we must limit our review to a determination of whether the trial court\u2019s findings of fact are supported by competent evidence and whether those findings support its conclusions of law. State v. Cooke, 306 N.C. 132, 134, 291 S.E.2d 618, 619 (1982). Here, Defendant poses no challenge to the trial court\u2019s findings of fact, which are therefore \u201cdeemed to be supported by competent evidence and are binding on appeal.\u201d State v. Roberson, 163 N.C. App. 129, 132, 592 S.E.2d 733, 735-36 (2004). Accordingly, our review is confined to the correctness of the trial court\u2019s ultimate legal conclusions, a question of law which is fully reviewable de novo. State v. Campbell, 359 N.C. 644, 662, 617 S.E.2d 1, 13 (2005).\nAlthough Defendant assigned error to the conclusion that the initial seizure of his vehicle was lawful, he does not address the constitutionality of the stop in his brief and accordingly abandons this argument. See N.C.R. App. P. 28(a) (\u201cQuestions raised by assignments of error in appeals from trial tribunals but not then presented and discussed in a party\u2019s brief, are deemed abandoned.\u201d). Rather, his sole challenge is that the pat-down search, or \u201cweapons frisk\u201d by Cecil was not supported by a reasonable suspicion that Defendant was presently armed and dangerous, such that the evidence discovered during the subsequent search of Defendant\u2019s person and vehicle constituted fruits of the poisonous tree and should have been suppressed as such. We disagree.\nWhile warrantless searches are generally per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, the United States Supreme Court recognized a limited exception in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968). See U.S. Const. amend. IV (protecting \u201c[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable searches\u201d); State v. Watkins, 337 N.C. 437, 441, 446 S.E.2d 67, 69 (1994) (\u201c[The Fourth Amendment] is applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.\u201d). It is now well established that during a lawful stop, \u201can officer may conduct a pat down search, for the purpose of determining whether the person is carrying a weapon, when the officer is justified in believing that the individual is armed and presently dangerous.\u201d State v. Sanders, 112 N.C. App. 477, 480, 435 S.E.2d 842, 844 (1993) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 24, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 908). Thus, this Court has held:\nAlthough a routine traffic stop does not justify a protective search for weapons in every instance, once the defendant is outside the automobile, an officer is permitted to conduct a limited pat down search for weapons if he has a reasonable suspicion based on articulable facts under the circumstances that defendant may be armed and dangerous.\nState v. Briggs, 140 N.C. App. 484, 488, 536 S.E.2d 858, 860 (2000). In determining the reasonableness of a weapons frisk, we are guided by the Terry standard, adopted by our Supreme Court in State v. Peck, 305 N.C. 734, 291 S.E.2d 637 (1982), and must resolve \u201c \u2018whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger.\u2019 \u201d Sanders, 112 N.C. App. at 481, 435 S.E.2d at 844-45 (quoting Peck, 305 N.C. at 742, 291 S.E.2d at 642). Accordingly, \u201c[t]he officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed[.]\u201d Terry, 392 U.S. at 27, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 909. Rather, the officer is \u201centitled to formulate \u2018common-sense conclusions\u2019 about \u2018the modes or patterns of operation of certain kinds of lawbreakers\u2019 \u201d in reasoning that an individual may be armed. State v. Butler, 331 N.C. 227, 234, 415 S.E.2d 719, 723 (1992) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418, 66 L. Ed. 2d 621, 629 (1981)). Ultimately, the determination of whether an officer was justified in conducting a pat-down frisk as a matter of self-protection hinges on the totality of the circumstances. See id. at 233, 415 S.E.2d at 722.\nHere, Cecil approached Defendant\u2019s vehicle following a lawful traffic stop and initially became \u201ckind of on guard\u201d when he observed the driver, subsequently identified as Defendant, holding both of his hands out of the window. Unprompted by the officer, Defendant immediately notified Cecil that he had a gun sitting on the dashboard of the car. Cecil testified that the gun, thereafter determined to be a loaded .25-caliber handgun, raised his concerns \u201cfor officer\u2019s safety purposes.\u201d The fact that Defendant removed his coat before exiting the vehicle further aroused Cecil\u2019s suspicions, leading the trial court to find \u201cthat with the knowledge of the gun in the car and with the suspicious nature of taking the coat off, the officer told the defendant he was going to pat him down for officer\u2019s safety and proceeded to do a Terry pat-down.\u201d However, Defendant argues that it is these precise facts which rendered unreasonable Cecil\u2019s suspicion that Defendant was presently armed and dangerous because his actions demonstrate that \u201c[h]e immediately took steps to show the officer that he did not want to pose any threat.\u201d Defendant maintains that his cooperative conduct exhibited nothing dangerous or potentially so and that the pat-down search was accordingly unwarranted. Attempting to minimize the impact that the loaded handgun could have had on a prudent officer\u2019s safety concerns, Defendant suggests that the discovery of an admittedly unconcealed weapon \u2014 which was then located and retrieved by law enforcement \u2014 could not support a reasonable suspicion that he may still be presently armed and dangerous, i.e. that Defendant may have been in possession of another weapon. To the contrary, Cecil testified that he has been trained to treat situations in which there is one weapon with the awareness \u201cthat there could possibly be other weapons.\u201d Moreover, Defendant cites no authority in support of the proposition that the discovery of one weapon would not justify a reasonable suspicion that a suspect may remain dangerous.\nWhile it does not appear that our courts have addressed this exact argument, the United States Supreme Court and other jurisdictions have found the confirmed presence of a weapon to be a compelling factor. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1050-51 & n.15, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1201, 1220-21 & n.15 (1983) (concluding a car frisk was supported by reasonable suspicion because one weapon had already been found and, noting the same analysis would apply to justify the frisk of the defendant\u2019s person conducted only after the knife was discovered, \u201cthe officers did not act unreasonably in taking preventive measures to ensure that there were no other weapons within [his] immediate grasp\u201d); United States v. Vinton, 594 F.3d 14, 20 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (stating \u201c \u2018[t]he presence of one weapon may justifiably arouse concern that there may be more in the vicinity\u2019 \u201d and thus concluding that \u201c[although [the officer] removed this knife and placed it out of arm\u2019s reach on the roof of [the defendant\u2019s] car, he was justifiably concerned that additional weapons might be hidden elsewhere in the vicinity\u201d).\nWe agree that an already discovered weapon is a crucial factor supporting reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry frisk, even where that weapon is secured and out of the defendant\u2019s reach. Moreover, Cecil was entitled to formulate \u201ccommon-sense conclusions,\u201d based upon an observed pattern that one weapon often signals the presence other weapons, in believing that Defendant, who had already called the officer\u2019s attention to one readily visible weapon, might be armed. The combination of this loaded handgun, the late hour, the odd manner by which Defendant and his passenger continued to look at Cecil as they passed the officer, and the unusual gesture of Defendant placing his hands out of his window, gave rise to far more than a hunch that Defendant might have been armed. Cf. State v. Young, 148 N.C. App. 462, 468, 559 S.E.2d 814, 819. (2002) (considering the officer\u2019s testimony that \u201cdefendant\u2019s unusual behavior caused him to \u2018heighten [his] sense of safety\u2019 \u201d). The totality of the circumstances \u201cviewed from the common-sense perspective of a law enforcement officer,\u201d supports the conclusion that Cecil had reasonable grounds to believe that his safety was in danger, \u201ceven in the face of an otherwise cooperative defendant.\u201d State v. McRae, 154 N.C. App. 624, 630, 573 S.E.2d 214, 219 (2002). As such, we hold that the specific, articulable facts,' as found by the trial court, are sufficient to support Cecil\u2019s reasonable suspicion that Defendant was armed and presently dangerous after exiting his vehicle and the conclusion that the pat-down frisk was constitutional.\nDefendant contends that the bottle containing methamphetamine and the evidence uncovered in the resulting vehicle search should be suppressed, but he premises this challenge solely on the notion that the pat-down search of his person was unreasonable. Our conclusion that the frisk of Defendant was lawful disposes of this argument because the fruits therefrom were not poisoned by any constitutional violation under Terry and its progeny. Defendant does not address the trial court\u2019s conclusion that the vehicle search for evidence of the offense of arrest was proper under Gant, 566 U.S. \u2014, 173 L. Ed. 2d 485, and, therefore, we do not revisit that issue on appeal.\nAccordingly, we affirm the trial court\u2019s denial of Defendant\u2019s motion to suppress.\nAffirmed.\nJudges GEER and JACKSON concur.\n. In fact, another weapon \u2014 a throwing knife \u2014 was indeed discovered on the floorboard in the rear of the vehicle.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "BEASLEY, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Derrick C. Mertz, for the State.",
      "Cheshire, Parker, Schneider, Bryan & Vitale, by John Keating Wiles, for Defendant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. DANIEL LEE KING\nNo. COA09-1659\n(Filed 17 August 2010)\nSearch and Seizure\u2014 pat-down \u2014 defendant\u2019s cooperative behavior\nA frisk of defendant that revealed methamphetamine, and subsequently cocaine and paraphernalia, was constitutional where defendant and his passenger looked at an officer in an odd manner as the officer passed their car, the officer stopped the car and defendant placed his hands outside his window as the officer approached his car, defendant told the officer that there was a gun on the dashboard, and defendant removed his coat before leaving the vehicle despite chilly weather. Despite defendant\u2019s argument that his cooperative conduct exhibited nothing dangerous, the totality of the circumstances from the perspective of a law enforcement officer supported the conclusion that this officer had reasonable grounds to believe that his safety was in danger.\nAppeal by Defendant from judgments entered 5 August 2009 by Judge Richard L. Doughton in Buncombe County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 27 May 2010.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Derrick C. Mertz, for the State.\nCheshire, Parker, Schneider, Bryan & Vitale, by John Keating Wiles, for Defendant."
  },
  "file_name": "0585-01",
  "first_page_order": 609,
  "last_page_order": 615
}
