{ "id": 4177771, "name": "JUDY CARDWELL, Employee, Plaintiff v. JENKINS CLEANERS, INC., Employer, and MIDWEST EMPLOYERS CASUALTY COMPANY, Carrier (KEY RISK INSURANCE COMPANY), Third-Party Administrator, Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "Cardwell v. Jenkins Cleaners, Inc.", "decision_date": "2010-08-03", "docket_number": "No. COA10-136", "first_page": "228", "last_page": "238", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "206 N.C. App. 228" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "622 S.E.2d 492", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12634500, 12634501, 12634502 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "per curiam" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/622/0492-01", "/se2d/622/0492-02", "/se2d/622/0492-03" ] }, { "cite": "613 S.E.2d 715", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633072 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "719", "parenthetical": "per curiam" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/613/0715-01" ] }, { "cite": "657 S.E.2d 361", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12640450 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "365" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/657/0361-01" ] }, { "cite": "623 S.E.2d 582", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12634697, 12634698, 12634699 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/623/0582-01", "/se2d/623/0582-02", "/se2d/623/0582-03" ] }, { "cite": "615 S.E.2d 350", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633266 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "357" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/615/0350-01" ] }, { "cite": "161 S.E. 203", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "weight": 4, "year": 1931, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "204" }, { "page": "205" }, { "page": "205" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "201 N.C. 707", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8627694 ], "year": 1931, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/201/0707-01" ] }, { "cite": "128 S.E.2d 570", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1962, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "574", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "574" }, { "page": "572-73" }, { "page": "575" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "258 N.C. 226", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560169 ], "year": 1962, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "232", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/258/0226-01" ] }, { "cite": "360 N.C. 169", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3792192 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "per curiam" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/360/0169-01" ] }, { "cite": "171 N.C. 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App.", "case_ids": [ 8434364 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "5", "parenthetical": "per curiam" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/171/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "362 N.C. 191", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4149183 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "198" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/362/0191-01" ] }, { "cite": "270 S.E.2d 105", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "300 N.C. 562", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8563992, 8564011, 8563944, 8563965 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/300/0562-03", "/nc/300/0562-04", "/nc/300/0562-01", "/nc/300/0562-02" ] }, { "cite": "266 S.E.2d 676", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "678" }, { "page": "678" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "300 N.C. 329", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561147 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "332" }, { "page": "332" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/300/0329-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-2", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(6)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "360 N.C. 63", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3791718, 3787691, 3792556, 3796278, 3794583, 3787192, 3791705, 3793820 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/360/0063-05", "/nc/360/0063-01", "/nc/360/0063-08", "/nc/360/0063-04", "/nc/360/0063-02", "/nc/360/0063-06", "/nc/360/0063-07", "/nc/360/0063-03" ] }, { "cite": "171 N.C. App. 596", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8438714 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "605" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/171/0596-01" ] }, { "cite": "532 S.E.2d 522", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "350 N.C. 108", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 132282, 131930, 132234, 132199 ], "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/350/0108-02", "/nc/350/0108-04", "/nc/350/0108-03", "/nc/350/0108-01" ] }, { "cite": "349 N.C. 676", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 571666 ], "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/349/0676-01" ] }, { "cite": "528 S.E.2d 397", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "400", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "137 N.C. App. 480", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11094153 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "484", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/137/0480-01" ] }, { "cite": "159 S.E.2d 874", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "882" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "273 N.C. 240", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8575029 ], "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "252" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/273/0240-01" ] }, { "cite": "509 S.E.2d 411", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "413", "parenthetical": "quoting Hollman v. City of Raleigh, 273 N.C. 240, 252, 159 S.E.2d 874, 882 (1968)" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "276 U.S. 154", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3901643 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1928, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "158" }, { "page": "509" }, { "page": "158" }, { "page": "509" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/276/0154-01" ] }, { "cite": "161 S.E. 203", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "weight": 2, "year": 1931, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "205", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "205" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "201 N.C. 707", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8627694 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1931, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "710-11", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "710-11" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/201/0707-01" ] }, { "cite": "128 S.E.2d 570", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1962, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "574" }, { "page": "574" }, { "page": "575", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "575" }, { "page": "575", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "258 N.C. 226", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560169 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1962, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "231-32" }, { "page": "232" }, { "page": "232-33" }, { "page": "233" }, { "page": "233" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/258/0226-01" ] }, { "cite": "270 S.E.2d 105", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "300 N.C. 562", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8563992, 8564011, 8563944, 8563965 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/300/0562-03", "/nc/300/0562-04", "/nc/300/0562-01", "/nc/300/0562-02" ] }, { "cite": "266 S.E.2d 676", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "678" }, { "page": "679" }, { "page": "678" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "300 N.C. 329", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561147 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "332" }, { "page": "332" }, { "page": "332" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/300/0329-01" ] }, { "cite": "532 S.E.2d 522", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "350 N.C. 108", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 132282, 131930, 132234, 132199 ], "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/350/0108-02", "/nc/350/0108-04", "/nc/350/0108-03", "/nc/350/0108-01" ] }, { "cite": "349 N.C. 676", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 571666 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "680", "parenthetical": "quoting Hollman v. City of Raleigh, 273 N.C. 240, 252, 159 S.E.2d 874, 882 (1968)" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/349/0676-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 876, "char_count": 24487, "ocr_confidence": 0.739, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.13710374620296395 }, "sha256": "229564fe1fbf0a0f7baa194b8cd3186807eb1fe127af159c53726464e1071854", "simhash": "1:057600483ceb488e", "word_count": 4059 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:24:03.194595+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judge ELMORE concurs.", "Chief Judge MARTIN dissents in a separate opinion." ], "parties": [ "JUDY CARDWELL, Employee, Plaintiff v. JENKINS CLEANERS, INC., Employer, and MIDWEST EMPLOYERS CASUALTY COMPANY, Carrier (KEY RISK INSURANCE COMPANY), Third-Party Administrator, Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "BRYANT, Judge.\nOn 23 January 2008, plaintiff-employee Judy Cardwell was injured in an accident. Defendant-employer Jenkins Cleaners, Inc., and defendant-carrier Key Risk Insurance Company denied employee\u2019s claim for workers\u2019 compensation benefits via a Form 61. Following a hearing, the deputy commissioner rendered an opinion and award on 16 March 2009 denying plaintiff benefits. Employee appealed to the Full Commission. By an opinion and award filed 17 September 2009, the Full Commission affirmed the opinion of the deputy commissioner with modifications. Employee appealed. As discussed below, we affirm.\nFacts\nOn 23 January 2008, employee arrived at work at approximately 7:15 a.m. and parked her vehicle in the parking lot next to employer\u2019s location. Employee walked across the parking lot toward the back door of the business and slipped on black ice approximately three feet in front of the door. As a result, she fell and broke her wrist.\nThe sole issue before the Full Commission was whether the injury employee sustained was compensable in that it occurred on employer\u2019s premises, thereby rendering it compensable under the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act. Employer leases the building where its business is located. Employer does not control the parking lot adjacent to the building which is shared by a number of businesses. In addition, employer has no obligation for upkeep of the parking lot and is prohibited from reserving any parking spots for its customers\u2019 or employees\u2019 use,\nOn appeal, employee makes four arguments: that the Commission erred in (I) determining that the parties stipulated that the sole issue to be decided by the Commission was whether the injury sustained by employee occurred on employer\u2019s premise; (II) failing to find as fact that opening the shop, including unlocking the rear door before 7:30 a.m. was a requirement of employee\u2019s job; (III) finding that employee was in the parking lot at the time of her injury; and (IV) failing to find that employee\u2019s injury was an \u201cinjury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment.\u201d\nStandard of Review\nOur review of an opinion and award from the Industrial Commission is limited to determining whether competent evidence supports the Commission\u2019s findings of fact and whether those findings support the conclusions of law. Calloway v. Mem\u2019l Mission Hosp., 137 N.C. App. 480, 484, 528 S.E.2d 397, 400 (2000) (citation omitted). Findings supported by competent evidence are conclusive on appeal even if the evidence could support contrary findings. Id. (citing Adams v. AVX Corp., 349 N.C. 676, 509 S.E.2d at 414 (1998), reh\u2019ing denied, 350 N.C. 108, 532 S.E.2d 522 (1999)). We review conelusions of law de novo. Goodson v. P.H. Glatfelter Co., 171 N.C. App. 596, 605, 615 S.E.2d 350, 357, disc. review denied, 360 N.C. 63, 623 S.E.2d 582 (2005).\nI\nPlaintiff first argues the Commission erred in determining that the parties stipulated that the sole issue to be decided was whether the injury sustained by plaintiff occurred on defendant\u2019s premises and was therefore compensable. We disagree.\nThe Commission\u2019s opinion and award includes the following stipulation:\n7. The sole issue to be decided by the Industrial Commission is whether the injury [employee] sustained on January 23, 2008, occurred on the defendant-employer\u2019s premises and is therefore compensable under the North Carolina Workers\u2019 Compensation Act.\nEmployee contends th\u00e1t the Commission mis-characterized the issue to be decided in that the order from the final pre-trial conference stated the issue to be decided as \u201c[w]hether [employee] sustained a compensable on-the-job injury on January 23, 2008.\u201d Employee asserts that narrowing the issue to whether the injury occurred on the premises improperly narrowed the Commission\u2019s focus. Our review of the record suggests that employee\u2019s argument is without merit.\nUnder the Worker\u2019s Compensation Act, an employee is entitled to benefits for injuries sustained in an accident arising out of and in the course of employment. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-2(6) (2009). \u201cThe term \u2018arising out of\u2019 refers to the origin or causal connection of the injury to the employment; the phrase \u2018in the course of\u2019 refers to the time, place and circumstances under which the injury by accident occurs.\u201d Barham v. Food World, 300 N.C. 329, 332, 266 S.E.2d 676, 678, reh\u2019ing denied, 300 N.C. 562, 270 S.E.2d 105 (1980). \u201cAs a general rule, injuries occurring while an employee travels to and from work do not arise in the course of employment and thus are not compensable.\u201d Id. This \u201cgoing and coming\u201d rule has further evolved such that \u201can employee injured while going to and from work on the employer\u2019s premises is generally covered by the Act.\u201d Id.\nHere, the record reveals that the dispute between the parties about compensability of employee\u2019s injury concerned two factual matters: (1) employee\u2019s physical location when she fell (i.e. whether she was in the parking lot or on employer\u2019s premises) and (2) employee\u2019s actions at the time of the fall (i.e. whether she was performing job duties). Issue (1) falls directly under the \u201ccoming and going\u201d rule. In addition, employee\u2019s argument as to issue (2) was that unlocking the back door was one of her job duties and, therefore, if she was in the process of unlocking the back door when she fell, the injury would be compensable. Thus, although issue (2) is not facially an issue of \u201ccoming and going,\u201d the facts here indicate that whether employee was on employer\u2019s premises is dispositive of that matter as well. In finding of fact 2, the Commission specifically found that, at the time employee slipped and fell, she had \u201cnot even reached the back door.\u201d Having not reached the back door, employee cannot have been in the process of unlocking it. Because the Commission resolved both issues raised by employee in its opinion and award and did not improperly limit the scope of its review, we overrule employee\u2019s argument on this point.\nII\nEmployee next argues the Commission erred in failing to find as fact that opening the shop, including unlocking the rear door before 7:30 a.m., was a requirement of plaintiff\u2019s job. We disagree.\nWe first note that employee fails to cite any authority in support of her argument. Our appellate rules require that \u201cthe body of the argument and the statement of applicable standard(s) of review shall contain citations of the authorities upon which the appellant relies.\u201d N.C. R. App. P. 28(6) (2009). However, as this rules violation does not impair our ability to consider the merits of her argument, we address employee\u2019s substantive contention. See Dogwood Dev. & Mgmt. Co., LLC v. White Oak Transp. Co., 362 N.C. 191, 198, 657 S.E.2d 361, 365 (2008).\nThe Commission need not make specific findings of fact on every issue raised by the evidence. Watts v. Borg Warner Auto., Inc., 171 N.C. App. 1, 5, 613 S.E.2d 715, 719, affirmed, 360 N.C. 169, 622 S.E.2d 492 (2005) (per curiam). Rather, it is only \u201crequired to make findings on crucial facts upon which the right to compensation depends.\u201d Id. Whether unlocking the rear door each morning was one of employee\u2019s duties is not crucial to her right to compensation. As noted above, the Commission found as fact that employee had \u201cnot even reached the back door\u201d when the injury occurred. Thus, any finding that unlocking the door was part of her job duties was irrelevant and would have no effect on the Commission\u2019s conclusions as to compensability. The Commission did not err in failing to make the finding sought by employee, and this argument is overruled.\nIll\nEmployee also argues that the Commission erred in finding she was in the parking lot at the time of her injury. We disagree.\nFinding of fact 2 states:\n2. On January 23, 2008, plaintiff arrived at the 825 N. Center Street location sometime between 7:15 and 7:30 a.m. in order to open the location at 7:30 a.m. She parked her vehicle on the west side or the rear of the store, according to her normal routine. As plaintiff was walking through the parking lot to the back door, she slipped on black ice and fell, breaking her right wrist. Plaintiff had not entered the store, or even reached the back door, prior to slipping, falling, and injuring her wrist.\nPlaintiff contends that \u201cuncontroverted evidence in the record reflects the fact that [she] \u2018fell in the doorway\u2019 \u201d and that no competent evidence supports the Commission\u2019s finding that she was in the parking lot at the time of the injury. However, employee\u2019s own brief undercuts her assertion. Employee\u2019s brief acknowledges that she fell on the \u201ccement area extending approximately three feet from the door.\u201d Employee testified that she \u201cfell between the- \u2014 the right before the-the black whatever \u2014 the black pavement and the \u2014 and the cement. I fell right on that, really on that cement area right there.\u201d Similarly, in her responses to defendants\u2019 first set of interrogatories, employee stated that she was \u201cabout three steps from the door\u201d when she slipped and fell.\nEmployee contends that the cement area is not part of the parking lot because \u201cit is graded on a different slope than the parking lot and separated from the parking lot by cement curbing.\u201d However, she cites no authority for this proposition and we have found none. Moreover, even if the cement area where employee fell was designated as something other than \u201cparking lot,\u201d employee does not argue that the cement area was part of employer\u2019s premises.\nCompetent evidence supports finding 2, that \u201c[a]s plaintiff was walking through the parking lot to the back door, she slipped on black ice and fell, breaking her right wrist. Plaintiff had not entered the store, or even reached the back door, prior to slipping, falling, and injuring her wrist.\u201d This argument is overruled.\nIV\nIn her final argument, employee contends that the Commission erred in failing to find that her injury was an \u201cinjury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment.\u201d We disagree.\nEmployee returns to her assertions that her injury was compensable because she fell in the doorway of employer\u2019s premises with the key in her hand as she prepared to unlock the business, a part of her job duties. The Commission\u2019s unchallenged findings 4-10 reflect that employer leased his premises in a shopping center and did not exercise any control or rights over the common areas of the shopping center outside his store. Further, as discussed supra, competent evidence supports finding 2, which is conclusive on appeal:\n2. On January 23, 2008, plaintiff arrived at the 825 N. Center Street location sometime between 7:15 and 7:30 a.m. in order to open the location at 7:30 a.m. She parked her vehicle on the west side or the rear of the store, according to her normal routine. As plaintiff was walking through the parking lot to the back door, she slipped on black ice and fell, breaking her right wrist. Plaintiff had not entered the store, or even reached the back door, prior to slipping, falling, and injuring her wrist.\nThus, the Commission\u2019s findings show that employee was not on her employer\u2019s premises and had not yet reached the back door to unlock it when she slipped and fell. Therefore, the injury was not \u201carising out of and in the course of employment\u201d and was not compensable. Barham, 300 N.C. at 332, 266 S.E.2d at 678.\nThe dissent cites Bass v. Mecklenburg County, for the proposition that \u201cthe great weight of authority holds that injuries sustained by an employee while going to or from his place of work upon premises owned or controlled by his employer are generally deemed to have arisen out of and in the course of the employment.\u201d 258 N.C. 226, 232, 128 S.E.2d 570, 574 (1962) (citations omitted). We agree entirely with this proposition, but find it inapplicable to the facts before us in this case. In Bass, the employee was a practical nurse'at the County Home and lived \u201con the premises\u201d in quarters furnished by the employer \u201c[a]s part of her. salary.\u201d Id. at 231, 128 S.E.2d at 574. The employee slipped and fell on a sidewalk while attempting to avoid overgrown bushes as she walked between her quarters and the main building, where she was to begin her work. Id. at 229-30, 128 S.E.2d at 572-73. Thus, in Bass, unlike the instant case, the employee was on the premises, which were owned, maintained, and controlled by the employer, at the time of her injury, even though she had not yet begun her work. Id. at 233, 128 S.E.2d at 575. Here, in contrast, employee was not on her employer\u2019s premises and the dissent agrees that competent evidence support\u2019s the Commission\u2019s finding that employer had no rights or control over the parking lot. The Commission made no findings about employer\u2019s right to control or duty to maintain the area between \u201cthe black pavement and . . . the cement\u201d area outside back door.\nLikewise, we find the dissent\u2019s reliance on Hunt v. State, 201 N.C. 707, 161 S.E. 203 (1931), misplaced. In Hunt, the employee was a member of the National Guard who died following a car accident on a public highway which occurred as he was on his way to report for duty. Id. at 709, 161 S.E. at 204. The Supreme Court held that\n[w]hen injured the plaintiff had not reached the place where he could do any work for his employer; he was not in a car provided by or under the control of his employer; he was not within the ambit of the camp or the sphere of the proposed service; he would have entered upon his work where he would have left it off. The injury, therefore, did not arise out of and in the course of the employment.\nId. at 711, 161 S.E. at 205. As in Bass, the Court focused on whether the employer owned or controlled the location where the employee was injured, noting that \u201ca reasonable margin must be allowed [the employee] to get to the place of work if he is on the premises of the employer or on some access to the premises which the employer has provided.\u201d Id. at 710-11, 161 S.E. at 205.\nAgain, here, employee was not on employer\u2019s premises when the injury occurred. Further, nothing in the record or Commission\u2019s findings suggests that employer \u201cprovided\u201d the area where employee fell as \u201csome access to the premises.\u201d Thus, the Commission did not err in failing to find that employee\u2019s slip and fall was an \u201cinjury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment.\u201d This assignment of error is overruled.\nAffirmed.\nJudge ELMORE concurs.\nChief Judge MARTIN dissents in a separate opinion.\n. As with the previous issue, plaintiff fails to cite any authority in support of her argument as required by N.C. R. App. R 28(6).", "type": "majority", "author": "BRYANT, Judge." }, { "text": "MARTIN, Chief Judge,\ndissenting.\nThe majority concludes, and I do not disagree, that competent evidence was presented to support the Commission\u2019s findings of fact that defendant-employer \u201cneither had exclusive control of the parking lot nor cleaned or maintained the parking lot. .. and the lease did not otherwise grant defendant-employer any rights or control over the parking lot.\u201d I also agree with the majority that it was based upon these and similar findings that the Commission concluded plaintiff-employee\u2019s injury did not \u201carise out of and in the course of\u2019 her employment. However, I do not agree that there was any competent evidence presented to support the Commission\u2019s finding that plaintiff-employee slipped and fell on black ice as she was \u201cwalking through the parking lot to the back door.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Instead, the evidence presented indicated that plaintiff-employee slipped and fell on black ice in the cement access area in front of the employee-only entrance door of defendant-employer\u2019s business. Accordingly, as plaintiff-employee argues in her brief, since this access area \u2014 which occupies the three feet between the employee-only entrance door and the six-to eight-inch high cement curbs that mark the end of the paved adjoining parking lot \u2014 is \u201cin such proximity and relation\u201d to defendant-employer\u2019s premises so as to be \u201cin practical effect a part of employer\u2019s premises,\u201d I believe the Industrial Commission erred by concluding that plaintiff-employee\u2019s injury did not \u201carise out of and in the course of\u2019 her employment with .defendant-employer. Therefore, I would vote to reverse the Commission\u2019s Opinion and Award denying plaintiff-employee\u2019s claim, and would remand the matter to the Commission for further proceedings.\nAs the majority has recognized, \u201c[i]n order to be compensable under our Workers\u2019 Compensation Act, an injury must arise out of and in the course of employment.\u201d Barham v. Food World, Inc., 300 N.C. 329, 332, 266 S.E.2d 676, 678, reh\u2019g denied, 300 N.C. 562, 270 S.E.2d 105 (1980). While it is a general rule \u201cthat injuries sustained by an employee while going to or from work are not ordinarily compensable,\u201d see Bass v. Mecklenburg Cty., 258 N.C. 226, 231-32, 128 S.E.2d 570, 574 (1962), \u201cthe rule has evolved that an employee injured while going to and from work on the employer\u2019s premises is generally covered by the Act.\u201d Barham, 300 N.C. at 332, 266 S.E.2d at 679; see Bass, 258 N.C. at 232, 128 S.E.2d at 574 (\u201c[T]he great weight of authority holds that injuries sustained by an employee while going to or from his place of work upon premises owned or controlled by his employer are generally deemed to have arisen out of and in the course of the employment within the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Acts and are compensable.\u201d). As our Supreme Court has recognized:\n\u201cIf the employee be injured while passing, with the express or implied consent of the employer, to or from his work by a way over the employer\u2019s premises, or over those of another in such proximity and, relation as to be in practical effect a part of the employer\u2019s premises, the injury is one arising out of and in the course of the employment as much as though it had happened while the employee was engaged in his work at the place of its performance.\u201d\nBass, 258 N.C. at 232-33, 128 S.E.2d at 575 (emphasis added) (quoting Bountiful Brick Co. v. Giles, 276 U.S. 154, 158, 72 L. Ed. 507, 509 (1928)). Thus, \u201cthe moment when [an employee] begins his work is not necessarily the moment when he gets into the employment,\u201d because \u201ca reasonable margin must be allowed him to get to the place of work if he is on the premises of the employer or on some access to the premises which the employer has provided.\u201d Hunt v. State, 201 N.C. 707, 710-11, 161 S.E. 203, 205 (1931) (emphasis added); see also Bass, 258 N.C. at 233, 128 S.E.2d at 575 (\u201c \u2018Probably, as a general rule, employment may be said to begin when the employee reaches the entrance to the employer\u2019s premises where the work is to be done; but it is clear that in some cases the rule extends to include adjacent premises used by the employee as a means of ingress and egress with the express or implied consent of the employer.\u2019 \u201d (quoting Bountiful Brick Co., 276 U.S. at 158, 72 L. Ed. at 509)).\nAccording to the testimony of plaintiff-employee, as well as that of defendant-employer\u2019s owner, at the time plaintiff-employee was injured during the early morning hours of 23 January 2008, she had her key in hand, was within three steps of the rear entrance door marked \u201cAuthorized Personnel Only,\u201d and was within reach of defendant-employer\u2019s premises where she would begin to carry out her job functions, which included unlocking the door, turning on the lights, setting up the cash register, and getting \u201cready for business.\u201d Thus, plaintiff-employee presented uncontroverted evidence that both \u201cthe origin or causal connection of [her] injury to the employment,\u201d as well as \u201cthe time, place and circumstances under which [her] injury by accident occur [red],\u201d rendered her injury compensable. See Barham, 300 N.C. at 332, 266 S.E.2d at 678.\nOur Supreme Court has \u201crepeatedly held \u2018that our Workers\u2019 Compensation Act should be liberally construed to effectuate its purpose to provide compensation for injured employees or their dependents, and its benefits should not be denied by a technical, narrow, and strict construction.\u2019 \u201d Adams v. AVX Corp., 349 N.C. 676, 680, 509 S.E.2d 411, 413 (1998) (quoting Hollman v. City of Raleigh, 273 N.C. 240, 252, 159 S.E.2d 874, 882 (1968)), reh\u2019g denied, 350 N.C. 108, 532 S.E.2d 522 (1999). In the present case, I believe the Commission narrowly construed the evidence presented so as to contravene the purpose of the Act. I agree that there is competent evidence to support the Commission\u2019s finding that plaintiff-employee \u201chad not entered the store, or even reached the back door, prior to slipping, falling, and injuring her wrist.\u201d However, the evidence establishes, without contradiction, that the location of plaintiff-employee\u2019s fall was within three steps of the employee-only entrance door to defendant-employer\u2019s premises and that, after her fall, plaintiff-employee was within close enough proximity of said door to be \u201cable to pull herself up and unlock the door with her left hand\u201d in order to enter the premises to call defendant-employer and seek medical attention. Thus, in light of the evidence presented and in keeping with the purpose of the Act, I believe the Commission erred by failing to conclude that plaintiff-employee\u2019s injury \u201carose out of and in the course of\u201d her employment when she slipped and fell in an area that was within the \u201creasonable margin\u201d allowed to her to access the premises which defendant-employer provided,\u201d Hunt, 201 N.C. at 710-11, 161 S.E. at 205, and was \u201cin such proximity and relation as to be in practical effect a part of the [defendant-]employer\u2019s premises.\u201d Bass, 258 N.C. at 233, 128 S.E.2d at 575 (internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, I respectfully dissent.\n. The majority indicates that plaintiff-employee \u201cdoes not argue that the cement area was part of [defendant-]employer\u2019s premises.\u201d However, as I read plaintiff-employee\u2019s brief, she argues her injury occurred either on defendant-employer\u2019s premises, or in an area that is \u201cin practical effect a part of the employer\u2019s premises,\u201d on pages 13-15, 19-21, and 24-26 of her brief.\n. The majority concludes that Bass is inapplicable to the present case. However, the majority repeatedly cites Barham, which itself relies on Bass. Indeed, one of the majority\u2019s direct quotes from Barham is a principle that Barham recognizes as having been borrowed from Bass.\n. While the majority recognizes, and I do not disagree, that the facts of Hunt are distinguishable from the present case, it is my opinion that the principles of law articulated in Hunt are nevertheless applicable here.", "type": "dissent", "author": "MARTIN, Chief Judge," } ], "attorneys": [ "Pope McMillan Kutteh Privette Edwards & Schieck, PA., by Martha N. Peed and Anthony S. Privette, for plaintiff-employee.", "McAngus, Goudelock & Courie, P.L.L.C., by Jason C. McConnell & Danielle M. Walther, for defendants." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "JUDY CARDWELL, Employee, Plaintiff v. JENKINS CLEANERS, INC., Employer, and MIDWEST EMPLOYERS CASUALTY COMPANY, Carrier (KEY RISK INSURANCE COMPANY), Third-Party Administrator, Defendants\nNo. COA10-136\n(Filed 3 August 2010)\n1. Workers\u2019 Compensation\u2014 stipulation \u2014 scope of review by Industrial Commission\nThe Industrial Commission did not err in a workers\u2019 compensation case by determining that the parties had stipulated that the sole issue was whether plaintiff\u2019s injury occurred on defendant\u2019s premises. The Commission resolved both of the factual issues raised by the employee and did not improperly limit the scope of its review.\n2. Workers\u2019 Compensation\u2014 job duties \u2014 unlocking door \u2014 fall in parking lot\nThe Industrial Commission did not err in a workers\u2019 compensation case by failing to find that unlocking the back door was part of plaintiff\u2019s job where the Commission found that defendant had not reached the back door when the injury occurred.\n3. Workers\u2019 Compensation\u2014 slip and fall \u2014 findings\u2014location of fall\nCompetent evidence supported the Industrial Commission\u2019s findings in a workers\u2019 compensation case that plaintiff was in a parking lot not controlled by defendant when she fell.\n4. Workers\u2019 Compensation\u2014 injury by accident \u2014 fall on ice \u2014 outside defendant\u2019s premises\nThe Industrial Commission did not err by failing to find that plaintiff\u2019s fall on ice was not an injury by accident in the course of her employment where the fall occurred close to defendant\u2019s doorway but in a parking lot over which defendant had no control.\nChief Judge MARTIN dissenting.\nAppeal by plaintiff-employee from opinion and award entered 17 September 2009 by the North Carolina Industrial Commission. Heard in the Court of Appeals 7 June 2010.\nPope McMillan Kutteh Privette Edwards & Schieck, PA., by Martha N. Peed and Anthony S. Privette, for plaintiff-employee.\nMcAngus, Goudelock & Courie, P.L.L.C., by Jason C. McConnell & Danielle M. Walther, for defendants." }, "file_name": "0228-01", "first_page_order": 252, "last_page_order": 262 }