{ "id": 4177929, "name": "IN THE MATTER OF J.A.G.", "name_abbreviation": "In re J.A.G.", "decision_date": "2010-08-03", "docket_number": "No. COA09-462-2", "first_page": "318", "last_page": "324", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "206 N.C. App. 318" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "614 S.E.2d 296", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633109 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "298" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/614/0296-01" ] }, { "cite": "615 S.E.2d 704", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633351 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "707-08", "parenthetical": "referring to General Statute sections 7B-906(a) (scheduling of the initial post-disposition custody review hearing), 7B-907(c) (filing of permanency planning petition), and 7B-907(e) (filing of petition to terminate parental rights)" }, { "page": "707" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/615/0704-01" ] }, { "cite": "359 N.C. 570", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3803150 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "574" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/359/0570-01" ] }, { "cite": "347 S.E.2d 824", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "828" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 N.C. 76", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4737744 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "82" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/318/0076-01" ] }, { "cite": "171 N.C. App. 438", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8437736 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "443-45", "parenthetical": "referring to General Statute sections 7B-906(a) (scheduling of the initial post-disposition custody review hearing), 7B-907(c) (filing of permanency planning petition), and 7B-907(e) (filing of petition to terminate parental rights)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/171/0438-01" ] }, { "cite": "682 S.E.2d 709", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "D.S. II" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 614, "char_count": 12331, "ocr_confidence": 0.741, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.1371186119345182 }, "sha256": "1855670676c313cf54130dc29b08d747ba2f3ad794c6b59e16c066efcc5eb138", "simhash": "1:07c8bc2a674e1e54", "word_count": 1988 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:24:03.194595+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges STEELMAN and HUNTER, JR., Robert N., concur." ], "parties": [ "IN THE MATTER OF J.A.G." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "ELMORE, Judge.\nThis Court initially heard J.A.G.\u2019s appeal from an order entered 2 December 2008 denying J.A.G.\u2019s motion to dismiss and an order entered 2 December 2008 adjudicating J.A.G. delinquent. See In re J.A.G., 2010 N.C. App. Lexis 158 (2010) (unpublished). A unanimous panel of this Court vacated the orders based upon the trial court\u2019s lack of jurisdiction to consider the delinquency petition filed by the Orange County Department of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (DJJDP). We based our decision on this Court\u2019s decision in In re D.S., - N.C. App. -, 682 S.E.2d 709 (2009) (D.S. II).\nAfter we rendered our decision in In re J.A.G., the Supreme Court reversed In re D.S. DJJDP petitioned our Supreme Court for discretionary review pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-31. The Supreme Court entered the following order, certifying it to this Court:\nThe Court allows the State\u2019s petition for discretionary review for the limited purpose of remanding to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration in light of our decision in In re D.S. No. 273PA09 (June 17, 2010). By order of the Court in conference, this 16th of June 2010.\nUpon remand and after further review, we affirm the trial court\u2019s order denying J.A.G.\u2019s motion to dismiss on the basis of subject matter jurisdiction, but we vacate the adjudication order.\nBackground\nThis Court previously outlined the background leading to this appeal:\nOn 15 August 2008, juvenile J.A.G. took and used without permission a golf cart that was the personal property of an apartment complex in Carrboro. On 12 September 2008, the Orange County Department of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (DJJDP) filed juvenile delinquency petitions alleging that J.A.G. had committed the acts of felony larceny, misdemeanor injury to personal property, and misdemeanor resist, delay, and obstruct an officer.\nOn 15 October 2008, J.A.G. moved to dismiss the juvenile petitions, arguing that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the petitions because the juvenile court counselor had missed the fifteen-day deadline for filing the petitions. The district court granted J.A.G.\u2019s motion. However, apparently at the DJJDP\u2019s behest, the sheriffs office submitted a new complaint on 30 October 2008, alleging that J.A.G. had committed the same criminal acts on 15 August 2008 as the original complaint. This time, the juvenile court counselor filed the petition the next day, on 31 October 2008. J.A.G. again moved to dismiss based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. However, the trial court denied the motion, explaining that it was proper for the State to \u201ccome back again after a dismissal and do it right[.]\u201d J.A.G. countered that allowing the State to ask complainants for new complaints after the statutory deadline on the original complaint had passed would \u201crender that statute meaningless because anybody could just. . . miss the window and refile it.\u201d The following colloquy ensued:\nTHE COURT: That point is well taken, but it seems to me that there might be certain kinds of cases that had larger, longer time, more unsatisfactory time, untenable time between when they would get something and act on it. What I\u2019m trying to say is there might be some cases that when it\u2019s dismissed it really is gone because of time\u2019s passage. In this case, it seems to me it was a rather narrow window in the first place. In other words, how many \u2014 I don\u2019t remember the first time\u2014\n[J.A.G.\u2019s COUNSEL]: Well, there\u2019s a statutory window for everything no matter what the\u2014\nTHE COURT: Yes, sir, but the facts of this case were that they missed the deadline by how many days? Do you remember?\n[J.A.G.\u2019s COUNSEL]: Several.\nTHE COURT: Within a week. My point is not months or \u2014 I think in some areas it\u2019s \u2014 that's been known to happen. In any event, this is an interesting question of law, and so let\u2019s see about that; but, I\u2019m \u2014 I\u2019m not willing to allow your motion to dismiss when my perception is the State did what \u2014 did the right thing in coming back to do it right.\nIn re J.A.G. at *1-*3.\nJ.A.G. first argues that the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate him delinquent and subsequently to enter a disposition order. He argues that, pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-1703, the juvenile court counselor had only fifteen days from the time she received the initial complaints to file the juvenile delinquency petition. Section 7B-1703 states, in relevant part, the following:\n(a) The juvenile court counselor shall complete evaluation of a complaint within 15 days of receipt of the complaint, with an extension for a maximum of 15 additional days at the discretion of the chief court counselor. The juvenile court counselor shall decide within this time period whether a complaint shall be filed as a juvenile petition.\n(b) Except as provided in G.S. 7B-1706, if the juvenile court counselor determines that a complaint should be filed as a petition, the counselor shall file the petition as soon as practicable, but in any event within 15 days after the complaint is received, with an extension for a maximum of 15 additional days at the discretion of the chief court counselor. The juvenile court counselor shall assist the complainant when necessary with the preparation and filing of the petition, shall include on it the date and the words \u201cApproved for Filing\u201d, shall sign it, and shall transmit it to the clerk of superior court.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-1703(a)-(b) (2009).\nWhen we first heard the case, we followed this Court\u2019s opinion in D.S., which held that \u00a7 7B-1703 was jurisdictional in nature and any failure to comply with the time limits set out in \u00a7 7B-1703 deprived the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction over the delinquency petition. In re D.S., - N.C. App. -, -, - S.E.2d -, - (2010) (D.S. I). In its opinion reversing our decision in D.S., the Supreme Court clearly stated that \u00a7 7B-1703\u2019s timing requirements are not \u201cprerequisites for the district court to obtain subject matter jurisdiction in a juvenile delinquency case.\u201d D.S. II at -, - S.E.2d at -. The Supreme Court suggested that, like other Chapter 7B timeline requirements, the \u00a7 7B-1703 timelines are \u201cdirectory, rather than mandatory.\u201d Id. at -, - S.E.2d at - (citing In re C.L.C., 171 N.C. App. 438, 443-45, 615 S.E.2d 704, 707-08 (2005) (referring to General Statute sections 7B-906(a) (scheduling of the initial post-disposition custody review hearing), 7B-907(c) (filing of permanency planning petition), and 7B-907(e) (filing of petition to terminate parental rights))).\nD.S. II does not directly address what should happen when, as here, the State first fails to meet the \u00a7 7B-1703 deadline for filing a petition after receiving the complaint, but later receives a second complaint that is identical in substance to the first complaint, and timely files a juvenile petition based on the second complaint. This strategy runs counter to two of the purposes underlying the juvenile delinquency statutes: \u201cproviding swift, effective dispositions\u201d and \u201cencouraging] the court and others involved with juvenile offenders to proceed with all possible speed in making and implementing determinations required by this Subchapter.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-1500 (2007). However, in D.S. II, the Supreme Court explained that \u201c[n]othing in these statutory provisions indicates our legislature\u2019s intent to elevate the expediency of the [juvenile court counselor]^ intake obligations over these other articulated purposesf.]\u201d D.S. II at -, - S.E.2d at -. It strikes us that permitting juvenile court counselors to refile a petition when they miss the statutory deadline discourages them from \u201cproceeding with speed in making and implementing determinations\u201d of juvenile delinquency. Regardless, the Supreme Court\nconclude [d] that the natural and ordinary meaning of the phrase, \u201cwhen the complaint is received,\u201d is the date on which the [juvenile court counselor]\u2019s office receives a document alleging that a juvenile is delinquent, and we further conclude that nothing about \u201cthe context requires [this phrase] to be construed differently.\u201d\nD.S. II at -, - S.E.2d at - (quoting Shelton v. Morehead Mem\u2019l Hosp., 318 N.C. 76, 82, 347 S.E.2d 824, 828 (1986)) (emphasis added). Here, the juvenile court counselor received \u201ca document\u201d alleging that J.A.G. was delinquent, which meets the Supreme Court\u2019s definition of a complaint. The juvenile court counselor then filed a juvenile petition based on that document within the fifteen-day deadline. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court complied with the requirements of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-1703. \u201cWe continue, however, to caution courts and parties that by failing to comply with the legislature\u2019s mandates, they are disregarding the best interests of the children involved.\u201d C.L.C. at 444, 615 S.E.2d at 707.\nBecause we held that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter the adjudication and disposition orders, we did not address the merits of J.A.G.\u2019s case. He argues that the trial court failed to fully comply with the requirements of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-2407(a) before accepting J.A.G.\u2019s admission. We agree, and we reverse and remand on that ground.\n\u201c[T]he determination as to whether a juvenile\u2019s admission is a product of an informed choice as required by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-2407(b), at a very minimum, is predicated upon the six mandatory requirements specifically listed in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-2407(a).\u201d In re T.E.F., 359 N.C. 570, 574, 614 S.E.2d 296, 298 (2005). Section 7B-2407(a) allows a court to\naccept an admission from a juvenile only after first addressing the juvenile personally and:\n(1) Informing the juvenile that the juvenile has a right to remain silent and that any statement the juvenile makes may be used against the juvenile;\n(2) Determining that the juvenile understands the nature of the charge;\n(3) Informing the juvenile that the juvenile has a right to deny the allegations;\n(4) Informing the juvenile that by the juvenile\u2019s admissions the juvenile waives the juvenile\u2019s right to be confronted by the' witnesses against the juvenile;\n(5) Determining that the juvenile is satisfied with the juvenile\u2019s representation; and\n(6) Informing the juvenile of the most restrictive disposition on the charge.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-2407(a) (2009).\nHere, the trial court failed to inform J.A.G. of the most restrictive disposition on the charge, or that his admission waived his right to confront the witnesses against him, or that he had a right to remain silent and that anything he said could be used against him. The State concedes that the trial judge omitted three of the six mandatory requirements listed in \u00a7 7B-2407(a). Accordingly, we reverse the adjudication and disposition orders and remand to the trial court.\nReversed and remanded.\nJudges STEELMAN and HUNTER, JR., Robert N., concur.\n. It does not appear that the State appealed the trial court\u2019s initial dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.\n. We note that J.A.G. did not argue that he was prejudiced by the trial court\u2019s action.", "type": "majority", "author": "ELMORE, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Richard, Croutharmel for appellant-juvenile.", "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Barbara A. Shaw and Assistant Attorney General LaToya B. Powell, for the State." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "IN THE MATTER OF J.A.G.\nNo. COA09-462-2\n(Filed 3 August 2010)\n1. Juveniles\u2014 delinquency \u2014 subject matter jurisdiction\nThe trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over a delinquency proceeding where the juvenile court counselor did not file a juvenile delinquency petition within fifteen days of receiving the original complaint, but a second complaint identical in substance to the first was received and a delinquency petition was timely filed.\n2. Juveniles\u2014 delinquency \u2014 adjudication\u2014requirements not met\nAn adjudication of delinquency was reversed and remanded where the trial court did not comply with the requirements of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-2407(a) before accepting an admission by the juvenile.\nAppeal by juvenile from orders entered 2 December 2008 by Judge M. Patricia DeVine in Orange County District Court. This case was originally heard in the Court of Appeals 14 October 2009. See In re J.A.G., 2010 N.C. App. Lexis 228 (2010) (unpublished). Upon remand by order from the North Carolina Supreme Court, filed 16 June 2010. See In re J.A.G., - N.C. -, - S.E.2d - (2010).\nRichard, Croutharmel for appellant-juvenile.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Barbara A. Shaw and Assistant Attorney General LaToya B. Powell, for the State." }, "file_name": "0318-01", "first_page_order": 342, "last_page_order": 348 }