{ "id": 4178191, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CHERRON WOOTEN", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Wooten", "decision_date": "2010-08-17", "docket_number": "No. COA09-1551", "first_page": "494", "last_page": "503", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "206 N.C. App. 494" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "628 S.E.2d 787", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12635626 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "794", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Bell, 285 N.C. 746, 750, 208 S.E.2d 506, 508 (1974)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/628/0787-01" ] }, { "cite": "662 S.E.2d 389", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12641261, 12641262 ], "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/662/0389-01", "/se2d/662/0389-02" ] }, { "cite": "362 N.C. 370", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 12641260, 12641261, 12641262, 12641553, 12641554, 12641556 ], "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/662/0388-01", "/se2d/662/0389-01", "/se2d/662/0389-02", "/se2d/663/0858-02", "/se2d/663/0859-01", "/se2d/663/0859-03" ] }, { "cite": "655 S.E.2d 435", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12640215 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/655/0435-01" ] }, { "cite": "617 S.E.2d 341", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633716 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "343" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/617/0341-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-277", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "529 S.E.2d 686", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "690" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "137 N.C. App. 710", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11095784 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "717" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/137/0710-01" ] }, { "cite": "208 S.E.2d 506", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "508" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "285 N.C. 746", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569924 ], "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "750" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/285/0746-01" ] }, { "cite": "177 N.C. App. 177", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8301072 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "188", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Bell, 285 N.C. 746, 750, 208 S.E.2d 506, 508 (1974)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/177/0177-01" ] }, { "cite": "188 N.C. App. 286", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4155930 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/188/0286-01" ] }, { "cite": "610 S.E.2d 472", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "477", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks omitted" }, { "parenthetical": "conviction for felony stalking found constitutional and upheld when defendant had been leaving notes, calling, and driving by victim for approximately five years" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "169 N.C. App. 331", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8469886 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "337", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks omitted" }, { "parenthetical": "conviction for felony stalking found constitutional and upheld when defendant had been leaving notes, calling, and driving by victim for approximately five years" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/169/0331-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14.277.3", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)(1)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-277.3", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 8, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" }, { "page": "(c)" }, { "page": "(c)" }, { "page": "(a)(l)" }, { "page": "(c)" }, { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "430 S.E.2d 914", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "918-19", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "334 N.C. 67", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2529175 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "75-76", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/334/0067-01" ] }, { "cite": "265 S.E.2d 164", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "169" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "300 N.C. 71", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559773 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "78-79" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/300/0071-01" ] }, { "cite": "528 S.E.2d 893", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "899", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Smith, 300 N.C. 71, 78-79, 265 S.E.2d 164, 169 (1980)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "351 N.C. 576", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1155854 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "584", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Smith, 300 N.C. 71, 78-79, 265 S.E.2d 164, 169 (1980)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/351/0576-01" ] }, { "cite": "261 S.E.2d 114", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "117" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "299 N.C. 95", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573434 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "98" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/299/0095-01" ] }, { "cite": "173 N.C. App. 162", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8353087 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "165" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/173/0162-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1008, "char_count": 23933, "ocr_confidence": 0.747, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.719567370958748e-08, "percentile": 0.2963508683324781 }, "sha256": "69fb9b0378e4032e05e0513746eac232c0da3e8f00009d5ede73ab420fb552e6", "simhash": "1:8747590bb9b2fe58", "word_count": 3890 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:24:03.194595+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Chief Judge MARTIN and Judge JACKSON concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CHERRON WOOTEN" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "BEASLEY, Judge.\nCherron Wooten (Defendant) appeals from judgment entered on his conviction of misdemeanor stalking and argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss on the ground of insufficient evidence. Because we conclude that, in the light most favorable to the State, there was substantial evidence presented on each essential element of the offense, we hold the trial court did not err in denying Defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss.\nOn 17 January 2007, Defendant was charged with misdemeanor stalking for harassing Danny Keel on specific occasions between 1 November 2006 and 16 January 2007. The Wayne County District Court found Defendant guilty, and he appealed to Superior Court. Keel had become the building inspector for the Town of Mt. Olive at the time Defendant was constructing a building on property he owned in the town. Keel had never met Defendant before receiving a call from him in the spring of 2006. During that conversation, Defendant revealed his desire to operate a florist, whereupon Keel told him that the property was located in a residential area and did not have the zoning necessary for a commercial building. Keel did not hear from Defendant for a few months thereafter, but beginning 1 November 2006, Defendant sent the first of several faxes to the town offices, complaining generally about discriminatory treatment he was receiving, with primary emphasis on Keel.\nThe first fax was addressed to the Town of Mt. Olive (town), and not to Keel specifically, but refered to Keel\u2019s secretary by name and mentioned \u201cthe inspector.\u201d The letter indicated that Defendant, \u201cwith the permission of the Ku Klux KLan Members of Mt. Olive\u201d wanted to change the classification of his building. Keel replied by letter two days later, informing Defendant that changing his building\u2019s classification should not be a problem and apprised him of the steps Defendant needed to take to comply with the North Carolina Building Code. Keel testified that the conditions placed on Defendant in order to proceed were not Keel\u2019s own rules but those imposed by the town zoning ordinance and state building code.\nThe second fax sent by Defendant, while addressed to the NAACP, was faxed to the town offices on 7 .December 2006 and refered almost exclusively to Keel. Defendant wrote that \u201cDanny Kill [sic] holds a public position only because he\u2019s a white man\u201d and that he \u201chas stirred up problems in the black community with his Keel-a-Niger [sic] attitude.\u201d This fax used the moniker \u201cMr. Kill-a-Niger,\u201d or similar variant thereof, multiple times, and Keel believed that the \u201cugly name\u201d was addressed to him. Keel testified that he \u201cwas really, really becoming concerned about [Defendant\u2019s] attitude and the names he was calling [him].\u201d Defendant sent a third fax to town hall after Keel and Wayne County inspector, Joe Nassef, conducted an electrical inspection of Defendant\u2019s building and noted three problems that needed to be cured. This fax, received from Defendant on 19 December 2006, stated that Keel had a personal problem with Defendant and \u201chas persuaded Joe Nasive [sic] to join forces with him.\u201d Defendant further indicated that he had to buy a shotgun to protect himself from them. Although the fax listed no addressee, Keel believed it was directed to him because the first line in the body of the fax addressed him and Mr. Nassef. Keel testified that he was \u201cvery threatened\u201d by Defendant\u2019s reference to a shotgun and that he and his family were frightened by the continuous faxes with Keel\u2019s name in them.\nDefendant\u2019s fourth fax was received at town hall on 11 January 2007 but addressed to \u201cDanny E. Keel,\u201d listing Keel\u2019s home address and home phone number at the top. This fax was also copied to \u201cMr. Keel-a-Nigger\u201d and referenced both that name and \u201cDanny Keel\u201d in the body of the letter, much of which was written in bold and enlarged type and repeatedly accused Keel of lies and discrimination. Keel testified that this fax led him to be fearful, not only for himself, but also for other town employees that had been involved in the situation because it referenced several of them therein. At that point, all of the county inspectors were informed not to go to Defendant\u2019s building anymore \u201cbecause of the threatening letters that were being received.\u201d Keel testified that in Defendant\u2019s final fax before charges were brought, Defendant\u2019s name and phone number appeared at the top, but Defendant also used the pseudonym, \u201cThe Gay-Ku-Klux-KlanFax-Man,\u201d to indicate from whom the fax was sent. The first two addressees are \u201cMr. Keel-a-Nigger\u201d and Danielle, Keel\u2019s daughter who was living in Greenville while attending East Carolina University (ECU) at the time. Although Defendant wrote \u201c[t]his is no threat to you,\u201d his lettef specifically referenced Keel\u2019s mother and father and frightened Keel and his wife regarding their daughter\u2019s safety. The language also alluded to Defendant\u2019s family being joined with Keel\u2019s by mentioning Keel\u2019s widowed mother and stated that allowing his building to sit would give him time \u201cto learn you, your family and your Mama.\u201d Defendant wrote that this attitude was his response to Keel having \u201cpissed in [his] cornflakes.\u201d Keel filed charges that day.\nDefendant represented himself but did not testify, and made motions to dismiss the charge for lack of evidence at the close of the State\u2019s evidence and again at the close of all the evidence, both of which were denied by the trial court. The jury found Defendant guilty of stalking, and he timely appealed to this Court.\nDefendant\u2019s sole argument on appeal is that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss, claiming that the State presented insufficient evidence that he committed the offense of stalking. Defendant contends that the State failed to present sufficient evidence that Defendant harassed Keel \u201con more than one occasion,\u201d acted \u201cwithout legal purpose,\u201d and intended to place Keel in reasonable fear. We disagree.\nIn reviewing a motion to dismiss which challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, \u201cthe question for this Court is whether there is substantial evidence of each essential element of the offense charged.\u201d State v. Borkar, 173 N.C. App. 162, 165, 617 S.E.2d 341, 343 (2005). \u201cIf so, the motion is properly denied.\u201d State v. Powell, 299 N.C. 95, 98, 261 S.E.2d 114, 117 (1980). \u201c \u2018Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.\u2019 \u201d State v. Frogge, 351 N.C. 576, 584, 528 S.E.2d 893, 899 (2000) (quoting State v. Smith, 300 N.C. 71, 78-79, 265 S.E.2d 164, 169 (1980)).\nIn reviewing challenges to the sufficiency of evidence, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, giving the State the benefit of all reasonable inferences. Contradictions and discrepancies do not warrant dismissal of the case but are for the jury to resolve. . . . Once the court decides that a reasonable inference of defendant\u2019s guilt may be drawn from the circumstances, then it is for the jury to decide whether the facts, taken singly or in combination, satisfy [it] beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is actually guilty.\nState v. Barnes, 334 N.C. 67, 75-76, 430 S.E.2d 914, 918-19 (1993) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).\nDefendant was charged and convicted for stalking under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-277.3, which provides that the offense of misdemeanor stalking occurs when a person\nwillfully on more than one occasion follows or is in the presence of, or otherwise harasses, another person without legal purpose and with the intent to do any of the following:\n(1) Place that person in reasonable fear either for the person\u2019s safety or the safety of the person\u2019s immediate family or close personal associates.\n(2) Cause that person to suffer substantial emotional distress by placing that person in fear of death, bodily injury, or continued harassment, and that in fact causes that person substantial emotional distress.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-277.3(a) (2007). The warrant for Defendant\u2019s arrest alleged that he acted for the purpose of causing Keel to reasonably fear the safety of himself, his immediate family, and his close personal associates. Therefore, where there was no allegation that Defendant followed or was in the presence of Keel, the State was required to prove that Defendant (i) acted willfully; (ii) harassed Keel on more than one occasion; (iii) without legal purpose; and (iv) intended to place Keel in reasonable fear, as set forth in subsection (1). See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14.277.3(a)(1).\nDefendant first argues that the State presented insufficient evidence that Defendant harassed Keel on more than one occasion.\nThe applicable statute defines \u201charasses\u201d or \u201charassment\u201d to mean \u201cknowing conduct, including . . . facsimile transmission . . . directed at a specific person that torments, terrorizes, or terrifies that person and that serves no legitimate purpose.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-277.3(c). Our Court has further defined several of the terms used in the statutory definition, including \u201ctorment,\u201d as \u201c[t]o annoy, pester, or harass,\u201d and \u201cterrorize,\u201d as \u201c[t]o fill or overpower with terror; terrify.\u201d State v. Watson, 169 N.C. App. 331, 337, 610 S.E.2d 472, 477 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting The American Heritage College Dictionary 1428, 1401 (3d ed. 1997)).\nDefendant contends that none of his first four faxes could constitute harassment in this case because they were not directed specifically at Keel. Defendant argues that only the final fax of 16 January 2007 was actually addressed to Keel, presenting just a single occasion of potential harassment, and thus, falls outside the scope of \u00a7 14-277.3. The penultimate fax, however, was clearly \u201cdirected\u201d at Keel as well. Although this fax was purportedly \u201cTo: W. Carrol Turner,\u201d the town attorney, it is Keel\u2019s mailing information and telephone number that appears at the top in the inside address, which is commonly used to identify the recipient to whom a letter should be routed. Moreover, the fax was copied to \u201cMr. Keel-a-Nigger\u201d and focuses on Keel throughout. While these two faxes alone constitute the \u201cmore than one occasion\u201d necessary to come within the confines of the statute, the second and third faxes \u2014 although respectively addressed to the NAACP and an unnamed person \u2014 were also transmitted to town hall and refer mostly to Keel. Notwithstanding the fact that the first fax merely mentions \u201cthe inspector\u201d and, instead, focuses on Keel\u2019s secretary, each fax refers to Keel in some unfavorable way. When the address lines are considered in context with the body of these faxes, it is clear that the State presented substantial evidence for a reasonable juror to conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Defendant directed most, if not all, of these communications to Keel.\nThe text of section 14-277.3 requires that the communication at issue \u201ctorment]], terrorize]], or terrif[y]\u201d the person to whom the communication is directed. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-277.3(c). This section, as applied by our courts in the criminal context, generally has involved some type of habitual stalking with numerous instances of contact over a period of time. See State v. Stephens, 188 N.C. App. 286, 655 S.E.2d 435 (defendant convicted of felony stalking after following and otherwise harassing victim), disc. rev. denied, 362 N.C. 370, 662 S.E.2d 389 (2008); Borkar, supra (defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss charge of misdemeanor stalking properly denied when there was evidence defendant had, inter alia, watched the victim and her family and recorded their license tag numbers); State v. Watson, 169 N.C. App. 331, 610 S.E.2d 472 (2005) (conviction for felony stalking found constitutional and upheld when defendant had been leaving notes, calling, and driving by victim for approximately five years).\nDefendant next argues that none of these first four faxes tormented, terrorized, or terrified Keel and thus could not be deemed \u201charassment.\u201d After testifying to having been \u201ccaught by surprise\u201d by the first fax, Keel said that the second fax, when Defendant began to call Keel \u201can ugly name,\u201d caused him to become very concerned about Defendant\u2019s attitude. As to the third fax, which included Defendant\u2019s reference to purchasing a shotgun, Keel testified that he felt very threatened for himself, Mr. Nassef, and his family. He stated:\nWell, if you have someone that says they\u2019re going to buy a shotgun, you don\u2019t know what they\u2019re going to do. You don\u2019t know whether they\u2019re going to be waiting in an alley for you or something ... it just really put me in a bad position, and it also put my family in a bad position . .. and we became somewhat frightened because of this [sic] continuous faxes that were, you know, coming with my name on it, you know; it just really concerned me.\nKeel described his concerns generated by the fourth fax, addressed to Keel\u2019s home, where he lived with his wife and children:\nWell, once again, it just has a lot of \u2014 a lot of reference in there directed to me that led me to be threatened, and led to me to be fearful, not only myself, but other town employees that have been involved in the situation. It references the town manager, the mayor, the county inspectors, the city inspector, Kenny Tait\u00f3n, and, you know, it just really \u2014 made me feel at \u2014 you know, I mean I was upset about it; I mean that was really \u2014 it was really getting bad, I thought, at this point. It was really um . .. causing me to stress.\nAlthough Defendant does not contest that the fifth fax did not torment, terrorize, or terrify Keel, the evidence shows that this last communication clearly falls within the definition of \u201charassment.\u201d Keel testified that the town secretary was nearly crying when she delivered the fax to him, and after reading it Keel \u201cwas just so frightened.\u201d He said, \u201cI just immediately was frightened for my \u2014 for my family, because the letter directly, directly addresses my family, and names my family in it. And it was just very threatening to me and it was obvious where it came from.\u201d Frightened for his daughter\u2019s safety, Keel even called ECU police and the Greenville Police Department because he \u201ccouldn\u2019t get in contact with her quick enough to find out if she was okay\u201d and called his mother to check on her as well.\nAlthough Defendant makes much of the fact that Keel, when cross-examined about the first four faxes individually, agreed that most did not contain a direct threat, nothing in the statutory definition of \u201charassment\u201d or our Court\u2019s interpretation thereof limits the offense of stalking to direct threats. However, Keel testified that he felt that the fourth message was \u201can indirect threat from the overall content of the letter.\u201d In addition, Keel testified that the fourth facsimile \u201cled [him] to be threatened, and led [him] to be fearfulf.]\u201d As to the fifth and final message, Keel said that he \u201cwas just so frightened[,]\u201d that he \u201cimmediately was frightened for [his] \u2014 for [his] family,\u201d and that this last communication \u201cwas just very threatening to [him.]\u201d Any discrepancy in Keel\u2019s testimony was for the jury to resolve. The State presented an abundance of evidence from which a rational juror could easily find that these last four faxes alarmed, intimidated, or terrified Keel. Keel\u2019s actions also manifest a fear provoked by the threatening facsimiles. Based upon the fourth message, Keel and his coworkers were advised no longer to visit defendant\u2019s property for inspections. Following receipt of the fifth transmission, Keel called his wife and his mother to ensure that they were safe; he also contacted the Greenville police and the ECU police because he was unable to reach his daughter, who was a student at ECU. Keel\u2019s testimony demonstrates that, on a minimum of two occasions, Keel was placed in reasonable fear for his personal safety as well as that of his immediate family members or coworkers. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-277.3(a)(l). Furthermore, the racially-charged language of the final faxes, in addition to the references to Keel\u2019s home address and family members, served \u201cno legitimate purpose.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-277.3(c).\nEven though Keel admitted during cross-examination that the first four facsimile transmissions did not contain direct threats, his testimony nonetheless supported the threatening and harassing nature of the last two messages. Therefore, we conclude that, in the light most favorable to the State, Defendant, through this series of facsimile transmissions directed specifically at Keel, tormented, terrorized, or terrified Keel on more than one occasion.\nDefendant next contends that the State failed to offer sufficient evidence that these allegedly harassing faxes were sent \u201cwithout legal purpose,\u201d as each fax \u201chad the legitimate purpose of responding to some action or correspondence directed to [Defendant].\u201d We disagree.\nDefendant claims that the legitimate purpose of each fax was related to the ongoing permitting and inspection process in which he was engaged with the town and, specifically, aimed to communicate the frustrations and perceived racial bias he experienced throughout. However, Defendant\u2019s contention that he intended only to report his problems with Keel or respond directly to correspondence he had received from various public officials is undermined by the fact that two of the faxes were also addressed to Keel himself and a third specified no recipient at all. Even if the communications purported to apprise other individuals of Defendant\u2019s complaints, the profane language, references to the Ku Klux Klan and impending shotgun purchase, and involvement of Keel\u2019s family, as directed at Keel in these faxes, served no legitimate purpose. Given the language used by Defendant and the haphazard manner by which these letters were sent or copied to various individuals through the town hall fax machine, a reasonable juror could find that Defendant did not truly have the legitimate purpose of raising a grievance or responding directly to correspondence he had received. Accordingly, we conclude that the State presented substantial evidence that Defendant acted without legal purpose, and the matter was appropriately left for resolution by the jury.\nFinally, Defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence that Defendant intended to place Keel in reasonable fear. We disagree.\n\u201cIt is well-established that \u201c \u2018[i]ntent is a mental attitude seldom provable by direct evidence. It must ordinarily be proved by circumstances from which it may be inferred.\u2019 \u201d State v. Brown, 177 N.C. App. 177, 188, 628 S.E.2d 787, 794 (2006) (quoting State v. Bell, 285 N.C. 746, 750, 208 S.E.2d 506, 508 (1974)). In the context of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-277.3, this Court has advised that the trial courts should \u201cinstruct the jury as to the definition of \u2018reasonable fear\u2019 to ensure that an objective standard, based on what frightens an ordinary, prudent person under the same or similar circumstances, is applied rather than a subjective standard which focuses on the individual victim\u2019s fears and apprehensions.\u201d State v. Ferebee, 137 N.C. App. 710, 717, 529 S.E.2d 686, 690 (2000).\nAs mentioned above, Defendant\u2019s second letter was addressed to the NAACP but also sent by fax to town hall without specifying to whom it should be distributed but focusing its contents entirely on Keel. Defendant\u2019s third fax was also transmitted to town hall without specifying an addressee but referring to Keel several times and discussing his intention to purchase a shotgun. Defendant\u2019s failure to specify any specific town hall recipient for these faxes could have led a reasonable juror to believe that Defendant\u2019s intent was not that the appropriate person learn of his grievances but that the faxes end up in Keel\u2019s hands and place him in reasonable fear. The fourth fax, responding to the town attorney\u2019s letter to Defendant but copied to Keel and addressed to his home, appears to speak to Mr. Turner. The jury, however, could have rationally concluded that Defendant would not have copied Keel on that fax or included his home address at the top unless he intended to intimidate Keel through the constant references to \u201cMr. Keel-a-Nigger,\u201d strong language, and use of bold, italic, underlined, and enlarged type. Finally, there is no dispute the State presented sufficient evidence that the fifth fax was intended to place Keel in reasonable fear for his safety, the safety of his immediate family, or the safety of his close personal associates.\nDefendant argues that the necessary element was not Keel\u2019s potential subjective fear but, rather, Defendant\u2019s intent to cause objective reasonable fear. The State, however, presented not only Keel\u2019s own testimony as to the effect of Defendant\u2019s faxes upon him but also the testimony of Keel\u2019s wife and evidence that the town secretary was near tears as she handed Keel the last fax. Moreover, all county inspectors were informed not to go to Defendant\u2019s building after the fourth fax was received. Thus, the evidence shows that these faxes concerned individuals other than Keel and supports a finding that it was accordingly reasonable for Keel to fear for the safety of himself, his family, and close personal associates. Additionally, the State offered each fax into evidence, and they were published to the jury as exhibits, from which the jurors could objectively deduce from the communications themselves whether Keel\u2019s fear was reasonable. Finally, the trial court did indeed instruct the jury that the definition of \u201creasonable fear\u201d is \u201cthat which frightens an ordinary prudent person under the same or similar circumstances.\u201d\nViewed in the light most favorable to the State, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to allow the jury to find Defendant had the intent to place Keel in reasonable fear for his safety or the safety of his immediate family or colleagues on multiple occasions. We note that the instant case is unique in that it presents only five points of contact, all by facsimile directed to the victim\u2019s workplace, with the accuser agreeing that the first four did not contain a direct threat. This situation diverges from those instances in which our courts historically have applied the stalking statute.\nAccordingly, we hold that the State presented sufficient evidence of each element of the crime of stalking pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-277.3(a), in that the fourth and fifth faxes were indeed threatening, notwithstanding Keel\u2019s admission that the first four messages were not direct threats, and it was appropriate for the trial court to present the charge against Defendant to the jury. Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying Defendant\u2019s motions to dismiss.\nNo Error.\nChief Judge MARTIN and Judge JACKSON concur.\n. This statute was repealed by 2008 N.C. Sess. Law 167, \u00a7 1, effective 1 December 2008. A new statute, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-277.3A, applies to offenses occurring on or after 1 December 2008, 2008 N.C. Sess. Law 167, \u00a7 3, but the version in effect in 2006 and thus relevant to this appeal is cited here.", "type": "majority", "author": "BEASLEY, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Diane Martin Pomper, for the State.", "Kimberley P. Hoppin, for Defendant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CHERRON WOOTEN\nNo. COA09-1551\n(Filed 17 August 2010)\nStalking\u2014 misdemeanor stalking \u2014 sufficient evidence\u2014 motion to dismiss properly denied\nThe trial court did not err in denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the charge of misdemeanor stalking as there was substantial evidence presented on each essential element of the offense, including that defendant harassed the victim \u201con more than one occasion,\u201d acted \u201cwithout legal purpose,\u201d and intended to place the victim in reasonable fear.\nAppeal by Defendant from judgment entered 19 February 2009 by Judge Arnold O. Jones, II in Wayne County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 12 April 2010.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Diane Martin Pomper, for the State.\nKimberley P. Hoppin, for Defendant." }, "file_name": "0494-01", "first_page_order": 518, "last_page_order": 527 }