{ "id": 4178987, "name": "KEVIN D. BUCHANAN, Executor of the Estate of Kelly Buchanan and Guardian of the property of Tiffany Hope Buchanan, a minor; KEVIN DAVID BUCHANAN, Individually; and CHRISTOPHER BUCHANAN, Individually, Plaintiffs v. TERESA HAGY BUCHANAN, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "Buchanan v. Buchanan", "decision_date": "2010-09-07", "docket_number": "No. COA09-1085", "first_page": "112", "last_page": "120", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "207 N.C. App. 112" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "652 S.E.2d 277", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12639683 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "282", "parenthetical": "citations, quotation marks, brackets, and footnote in original omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/652/0277-01" ] }, { "cite": "672 S.E.2d 687", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12642774, 12642775 ], "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/672/0687-01", "/se2d/672/0687-02" ] }, { "cite": "661 S.E.2d 778", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12641159 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "780", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/661/0778-01" ] }, { "cite": "187 N.C. App. 71", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8371895 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "77-78", "parenthetical": "citations, quotation marks, brackets, and footnote in original omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/187/0071-01" ] }, { "cite": "20 S.E.2d 341", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1942, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "343" }, { "page": "343" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "221 N.C. 422", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8628017 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1942, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "424" }, { "page": "424" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/221/0422-01" ] }, { "cite": "264 S.E.2d 76", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "82", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "82" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "299 N.C. 565", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8575631 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "569", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "569" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/299/0565-01" ] }, { "cite": "97 S.E.2d 672", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1957, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "681" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "246 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8623345 ], "year": 1957, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "15" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/246/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "1 N.C. 576", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "year": 1803, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "579", "parenthetical": "\"every estate by whatever words created, that has a certain commencement and certain ending, is an estate for years\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "91 N.C. 116", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8686080 ], "year": 1884, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "119-20", "parenthetical": "\"an estate for years,\" is defined as, \"an estate for a definite period of time[.]\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/91/0116-01" ] }, { "cite": "197 S.E.2d 584", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "586", "parenthetical": "quoting Webster's Real Estate Law in North Carolina, \u00a7 65, p. 79" }, { "page": "586" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "18 N.C. App. 543", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8552021 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "545", "parenthetical": "quoting Webster's Real Estate Law in North Carolina, \u00a7 65, p. 79" }, { "page": "545" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/18/0543-01" ] }, { "cite": "168 S.E.2d 219", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "223" }, { "page": "223" }, { "page": "223" }, { "page": "223" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "5 N.C. App. 242", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8549342 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "246" }, { "page": "246" }, { "page": "246" }, { "page": "246" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/5/0242-01" ] }, { "cite": "430 S.E.2d 235", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "240" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "333 N.C. 706", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2546855 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "712" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/333/0706-01" ] }, { "cite": "107 S.E. 12", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1921, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "181 N.C. 311", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8655896 ], "year": 1921, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "313" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/181/0311-01" ] }, { "cite": "299 S.E.2d 207", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "211" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 N.C. 485", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8563923 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "492-93" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/307/0485-01" ] }, { "cite": "117 S.E.2d 465", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1960, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "468" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "253 N.C. 515", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8626129 ], "year": 1960, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "520" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/253/0515-01" ] }, { "cite": "91 S.E.2d 246", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1956, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "250", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "250" }, { "page": "250", "parenthetical": "\"the attendant circumstances [of the will] are to be considered where the language is ambiguous, or of doubtful meaning.\" (citation and quotation marks omitted)" }, { "page": "250" }, { "page": "250" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "243 N.C. 469", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8625764 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1956, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "473", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "473" }, { "page": "474" }, { "page": "474" }, { "page": "474" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/243/0469-01" ] }, { "cite": "363 N.C. 124", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "191 N.C. App. 115", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4160136 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "117", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/191/0115-01" ] }, { "cite": "281 S.E.2d 652", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "303 N.C. 315", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573123, 8573162, 8573104, 8573175, 8573144 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/303/0315-02", "/nc/303/0315-04", "/nc/303/0315-01", "/nc/303/0315-05", "/nc/303/0315-03" ] }, { "cite": "277 S.E.2d 473", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "475" }, { "page": "475" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "51 N.C. App. 654", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 2643753 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "657" }, { "page": "657" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/51/0654-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 766, "char_count": 19565, "ocr_confidence": 0.741, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.229531765708317e-08, "percentile": 0.4771838049245342 }, "sha256": "3f9eb0abf24753cb514bfe62415de648a844c421d2a2bdf97b65d1e7f07744d5", "simhash": "1:0bebe4527c051d68", "word_count": 3188 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:56:31.092499+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges BRYANT and ELMORE concur." ], "parties": [ "KEVIN D. BUCHANAN, Executor of the Estate of Kelly Buchanan and Guardian of the property of Tiffany Hope Buchanan, a minor; KEVIN DAVID BUCHANAN, Individually; and CHRISTOPHER BUCHANAN, Individually, Plaintiffs v. TERESA HAGY BUCHANAN, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "STROUD, Judge.\nKevin D. Buchanan, individually, as executor of the estate of Kelly Buchanan, and as guardian of the property of Tiffany Hope Buchanan, a minor, and Christopher Buchanan, individually, (collectively referred to as \u201cplaintiffs\u201d) appeal from a trial court\u2019s order declaring that Teresa Hagy Buchanan (\u201cdefendant\u201d) received an \u201cestate for years\u201d from decedent\u2019s will and an order denying plaintiffs\u2019 motion for a new trial. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court\u2019s orders.\nI. Background\nKelly Buchanan (\u201cdecedent\u201d) died testate on 9 September 2005. Decedent was survived by his wife, defendant Teresa Hagy Buchanan, and his three children, plaintiffs Kevin Buchanan, Christopher Buchanan, and Tiffany Buchanan, a minor. Tiffany Buchanan, born 12 May 1992, is the only child from decedent\u2019s marriage to defendant. Plaintiffs are decedent\u2019s adult children from a prior marriage.\nOn 27 July 2004, decedent executed his \u201cLast Will and Testament[.]\u201d Upon decedent\u2019s death, his \u201cLast Will and Testament\u201d was filed for probate with the Superior Court, Cabarrus County. On 21 November 2005, plaintiffs filed suit in Superior Court, Cabarrus County, seeking a declaratoiy judgment regarding plaintiffs\u2019 and defendant\u2019s rights to decedent\u2019s residence. Plaintiffs alleged that following decedent\u2019s death, defendant moved into his residence at 5750 Flowe Store Road, in Concord, North Carolina, with her adult daughter, despite the terms of decedent\u2019s will and plaintiffs\u2019 objections. Plaintiffs specifically requested the court to determine (1) whether defendant was \u201cbarred from dissenting to the Will of [decedent] pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 31Aetal[;]\u201d (2) whether defendant had \u201cthe right to allow an adult daughter to live on the premises owned by [plaintiffs;]\u201d and (3) defendant\u2019s rights to the residence located at 5750 Flowe Store Road, Concord, Cabarrus County, North Carolina pursuant to Article II of decedent\u2019s \u201cLast Will and Testament.\u201d On 9 January 2006, defendant filed an answer to plaintiffs\u2019 complaint. On 28 December 2006, the trial court entered an order on these matters, finding, inter alia,\n6. That the Defendant Teresa Hagy Buchanan received an Estate for years by the Last Will and Testament of Kelly Buchanan. Such interest runs until May 12, 2012 (Tiffany Buchanan\u2019s 20th birthday). The interest may be terminated earlier provided Tiffany Buchanan is 18 years or older and graduates from high school.\n7. That the Defendant has an exclusive possessory right to the house and lot at 5750 Flowe Store Road, Concord, Cabarrus County, North Carolina. The right to possession includes everything properly appurtenant to, essential or reasonable necessary to the full beneficial use and enjoyment of the property.\n8. That Kelly Christopher Buchanan, Kevin David Buchanan and Tiffany Hope Buchanan hold a vested remainder interest in the property. Their possessory right to the property begins at the termination of the Defendant\u2019s Estate for years.\nThe trial court went on to order that defendant had received an estate for years from decedent\u2019s will; defendant had exclusive possessory right to the subject property during the term of her interest; and plaintiffs held a vested remainder in the subject property.\nOn 8 January 2007, plaintiffs filed a motion for a new trial pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 59(a)(7) and (9), arguing that the verdict entered by the trial court was contrary to law and not supported by the evidence. Plaintiffs\u2019 primary argument was that it was not decedent\u2019s intention in his will to give defendant exclusive possessory rights in the subject property, where decedent\u2019s children \u2014 plaintiffs\u2014 had been residing at the time of decedent\u2019s death, but instead it was decedent\u2019s intention to only to give defendant a \u201cright to five in the home.\u201d By order entered 13 April 2009, the trial court denied plaintiffs\u2019 motion. On 11 May 2009, plaintiffs filed notice of appeal from the trial court\u2019s 28 December 2006 declaratory judgment order and 13 April 2009 order denying their motion for a new trial.\nII. Declaratory Judgment\nPlaintiffs first contend that \u201cthe trial court committed reversible error in finding that defendant received an estate for years under the last will and testament of Kelly Buchanan.\u201d Plaintiffs contend that there is an ambiguity in decedent\u2019s will. Plaintiffs argue that to resolve this ambiguity the court must consider the extrinsic circumstances surrounding the execution of the will \u201cto effectuate [decedent\u2019s] intent and interpret the will according to this intent.\u201d Plaintiffs contend that \u201cthe only result supported by the four corners of the will and the attendant circumstances is that [decedent] desired that defendant be allowed to remain in the home and serve as a mother-figure for the minor daughter until the minor became an adult.\u201d Plaintiffs contend that although defendant may live in the home to \u201cserve as a mother-figure,\u201d she may not allow any person of her choosing other than Tiffany to live in the home, although plaintiffs may also live with defendant in the home if they so desire. Plaintiffs conclude that \u201c[a]ll that was conveyed unto defendant by the will was the simple privilege for defendant to live in the home, not some exclusive possessory interest such as an estate for years.\u201d\nA. Standard of Review\nThis Court has held that under the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act, \u201cthe court\u2019s findings of fact are conclusive if supported by any competent evidence; and a judgment supported by such findings will be affirmed, even though there is evidence which might sustain findings to the contrary[.]\u201d Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Allison, 51 N.C. App. 654, 657, 277 S.E.2d 473, 475, disc. review denied, 303 N.C. 315, 281 S.E.2d 652 (1981). Thus, \u201c[t]he function of our review is, then, to determine whether the record contains competent evidence to support the findings]] and whether the findings support the conclusions.\u201d Id. The trial court\u2019s conclusions of law are reviewable de novo. Cross v. Capital Transaction Grp., Inc., 191 N.C. App. 115, 117, 661 S.E.2d 778, 780 (2008) (citation omitted), disc. review denied, 363 N.C. 124, 672 S.E.2d 687 (2009).\nB. Decedent\u2019s Will\nOur Supreme Court has held that \u201c[t]he authority and responsibility to interpret or construe a will rest solely on the court. Its objective is to ascertain the intent of the testator, as expressed in the will, when he made it.\u201d Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Wolfe, 243 N.C. 469, 473, 91 S.E.2d 246, 250 (1956) (citation omitted). An established rule of will construction is\n\u201cthat the intention of the testator is the polar star which is to guide in the interpretation of all wills, and, when ascertained, effect will be given to it unless it violates some rule of law, or is contrary to public policy.\u201d Clark v. Connor, 253 N.C. 515, 520, 117 S.E.2d 465, 468 (1960). Pittman v. Thomas, 307 N.C. 485, 299 S.E.2d 207 (1983), stated the well established rule:\n\u201cThe will must be construed, \u2018taking it by its four comers\u2019 and according to the intent of the testator as we conceive it to be upon the face thereof and according to the circumstances attendant.\u201d Patterson v. McCormick, 181 N.C. 311, 313, 107 S.E. 12 (1921). In referring to the \u201ccircumstances attendant\u201d we mean \u201cthe relationships between the testator and the beneficiaries named in the will, and the condition, nature and extent of [the testator\u2019s] property.\u201d Trust Co. v. Wolfe, 243 N.C. 469, 473, 91 S.E.2d 246, 250 (1956).\nPittman, 307 N.C. at 492-93, 299 S.E.2d at 211. Hollowell v. Hollowell, 333 N.C. 706, 712, 430 S.E.2d 235, 240 (1993). However, \u201c[i]f the terms of a will are set forth in clear, unequivocal and unambiguous language, judicial construction is unnecessary!.]\u201d Morse v. Zatkiewiez, 5 N.C. App. 242, 246, 168 S.E.2d 219, 223 (1969). (citing 1 Wiggins, Wills and Administration of Estates in N. C., \u00a7 132, pp. 396, 397, and cases therein cited); see Wachovia, 243 N.C. at 474, 91 S.E.2d at 250 (\u201cthe attendant circumstances [of the will] are to be considered where the language is ambiguous, or of doubtful meaning.\u201d (citation and quotation marks omitted)).\nThe relevant portions of decedent\u2019s will state:\nARTICLE II\nAfter complying with the prior provisions of this my LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT, I hereby direct that my wife, TERESA HAGY BUCHANAN, shall have the right to live in my house and lot located at 5750 Flowe Store Road, Concord, Cabarrus County, North Carolina 28025, until such time as my daughter, TIFFANY HOPE BUCHANAN, attains the age of eighteen (18) (not to exceed twenty (20) years of age) and is graduated from high school.\nARTICLE IV\nAfter complying with the prior provisions of this my LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT, I hereby will, devise and bequeath all of my property of every sort, kind and description, both real and personal, equally unto my children, KELLY CHRISTOPHER BUCHANAN, KEVIN DAVID BUCHANAN, and TIFFANY HOPE BUCHANAN, share and share alike, to have and to hold the same, absolutely and forever.\nI specifically and intentionally make no further provisions for my wife, TERESA HAGY BUCHANAN, other than hereinabove provided.\nARTICLE V\nIf my daughter, TIFFANY HOPE BUCHANAN, is a minor as defined by the laws of the State of North Carolina at the time of my death, I hereby appoint KEVIN DAVID BUCHANAN, my son, guardian of the person and property of said minor child, and said guardian shall have exclusive control of the person, custody, care, and property of said minor child. I direct that no bond or other undertaking be required of said guardian for the performance of the duties of such office.\nThis Court has held that \u201c[e]very estate which by the terms of its creation must expire at a period certain and prefixed by whatever words created, is an estate for years.\u201d Gurtis v. Sanford, 18 N.C. App. 543, 545, 197 S.E.2d 584, 586 (1973) (quoting Webster\u2019s Real Estate Law in North Carolina, \u00a7 65, p. 79); King v. Foscue, 91 N.C. 116, 119-20 (1884) (\u201can estate for years,\u201d is defined as, \u201can estate for a definite period of time[.]\u201d); Nokes v. Shaw, 1 N.C. 576, 579 (1803) (\u201cevery estate by whatever words created, that has a certain commencement and certain ending, is an estate for years\u201d). The tenant in an estate for years has the right to possession and enjoyment of the property conveyed \u201cin the absence of anything in the deed indicating a contrary intention, [and] carries with it everything properly appurtenant to, that is, essential or reasonably necessary to the full beneficial use and enjoyment of the property conveyed.\u201d Rickman Mfg. Co. v. Gable, 246 N.C. 1, 15, 97 S.E.2d 672, 681 (1957). \u201cAn estate is vested when there is either an immediate right of present enjoyment or a present fixed right of future enjoyment.\u201d Joyner v. Duncan, 299 N.C. 565, 569, 264 S.E.2d 76, 82 (1980) (citation omitted). \u201cA vested remainder is a present fixed right in the remainderman to take possession upon the natural termination of the preceding estate with no conditions precedent imposed on the time for the remainder to vest in interest.\u201d Id. (citing Chas. W. Priddy & Co. v. Sanderford, 221 N.C. 422, 424, 20 S.E.2d 341, 343 (1942) (stating that a \u201cremainder is vested, when, throughout its continuance, the remainderman and his heirs have the right to the immediate possession whenever and however the preceding estate is determined; or, in other words, a remainder is vested if, so long as it lasts, the only obstacle to the right of immediate possession by the remainderman is the existence of the preceding estate; or, again, a remainder is vested if it is subject to no condition precedent save the determination of the preceding estate.\u201d)).\nHere, Article II of decedent\u2019s will directs that defendant \u201cshall have the right to live in my house . . . until such time as my daughter, TIFFANY HOPE BUCHANAN, attains the age of eighteen (18) (not to exceed twenty (20) years of age) and is graduated from high school.\u201d As the plain language of decedent\u2019s will is \u201cclear, unequivocal, and unambiguous\u201d we need not apply \u201cjudicial construction\u201d or look to \u201cthe attendant circumstances\u201d to determine decedent\u2019s intent. Morse, 5 N.C. App. at 246, 168 S.E.2d at 223; Wachovia, 243 N.C. at 474, 91 S.E.2d at 250. Article II of decedent\u2019s will sets forth a certain period that defendant\u2019s \u201cright to live\u201d in the subject property must expire, which is the date when Tiffany Buchanan has attained the age of 18 and graduated from high school, but not beyond age twenty. Therefore, defendant received an estate for years from decedent\u2019s will in the subject property. See Gurtis, 18 N.C. App. at 545, 197 S.E.2d at 586.\nPlaintiffs argue that the fact that decedent\u2019s will made a \u201ctestamentary recommendation\u201d of plaintiff Kevin Buchanan as guardian of the person and property of Tiffany demonstrates an intent to grant plaintiff Kevin Buchanan the right to live in the home with Tiffany. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 35A-1225 (2005). We note that N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 35A-1225 provides that a parent may make a recommendation for guardianship of a minor child upon a parent\u2019s death, although this recommendation would only become relevant if defendant were to abandon Tiffany or to die while Tiffany is still a minor. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 35A-1220 (2005). However, we see no provision in Chapter 35A, Article 6 which would indicate that a guardianship recommendation also confers a right for the potential guardian to reside in the same home with the minor child, particularly when the child is still in the care of her natural guardian, her mother.\nArticle IV states that decedent devises \u201call of [his] property of every sort, kind and description, both real and personal, equally unto [plaintiffs],\u201d which would include decedent\u2019s house at \u201c5750 Flowe Store Road.\u201d We hold that this portion of decedent\u2019s will is also unambiguous. Morse, 5 N.C. App. at 246, 168 S.E.2d at 223; Wachovia, 243 N.C. at 474, 91 S.E.2d at 250. Decedent could not bequest a present possessory estate to any other person in the subject property, as Article II of his will had already given an estate for years to defendant in the subject property. However, decedent\u2019s will does give a present fixed right to plaintiffs in the subject property as remaindermen. Also, there are no conditions or obstacles to plaintiffs\u2019 immediate possession following the natural termination of defendant\u2019s preceding estate for years. Therefore, by the terms of the decedent\u2019s will, plaintiffs received a vested remainder in the subject property. See Joyner, 299 N.C. at 569, 264 S.E.2d at 82; Chas. W. Priddy & Co., 221 N.C. at 424, 20 S.E.2d at 343. Accordingly, we overrule plaintiffs\u2019 arguments.\nPlaintiffs also contend that the phrase \u201cthe right to live in my home\u201d in Article II of decedent\u2019s will is ambiguous when considered with \u201cthe language in Article IV where [decedent] specifically and intentionally makes no further provisions for defendant.\u201d (Emphasis in original.) However, although decedent\u2019s will says it makes \u201cno further provisions for defendant[,]\u201d the will did previously make \u201cprovision for defendant\u201d by the present possessory interest of'an estate for years in the subject property. Therefore, when Article IV is read in context with Article II, decedent\u2019s will merely specifies that beyond the estate for years in the subject property, decedent \u201cspecifically and intentionally [made] no further provisions\u201d for defendant in his will. Therefore, plaintiffs\u2019 argument is overruled. We hold that the evidence supports the trial court\u2019s findings and those findings support the trial court\u2019s conclusions that defendant received from decedent\u2019s will an estate for years in decedent\u2019s house, defendant has exclusive possession, and plaintiffs received a vested remainer in the same property. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 51 N.C. App. at 657, 277 S.E.2d at 475. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court\u2019s declaratory judgment.\nIII. Motion for a New Trial\nPlaintiffs also contend that the trial court abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs\u2019 motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59(a)(7) and (9). The standard of review for denial of a N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 59 (2005) motion is well-settled:\nAccording to Rule 59, a new trial may be granted for the reasons enumerated in the Rule. By using the word may, Rule 59 expressly grants the trial court the discretion to determine whether a new trial should be granted. Generally, therefore, the trial court\u2019s decision on a motion for a new trial under Rule 59 will not be disturbed on appeal, absent abuse of discretion.\nGreene v. Royster, 187 N.C. App. 71, 77-78, 652 S.E.2d 277, 282 (2007) (citations, quotation marks, brackets, and footnote in original omitted). Plaintiffs argue that the trial court\u2019s findings were insufficient as there was \u201cno evidence, either from the four corners of the will or the attendant circumstances, to support a finding that [decedent] intended for defendant to possess the 5750 Flowe Store Road property to the exclusion of plaintiff Kevin Buchanan[,]\u201d and \u201c[t]he trial court failed to make any finding relating to the intent of [decedent] or the attendant circumstances surrounding the execution of the will.\u201d (Emphasis in original.)\nAs' stated above, the Court need not look to the \u201cthe attendant circumstances\u201d to determine decedent\u2019s intent \u201cif the terms of a will are . . . clear, unequivocal and unambiguous[.]\u201d Morse, 5 N.C. App. at 246, 168 S.E.2d at 223. We have already determined that the trial court properly found that the language of the will was unambiguous. Therefore, plaintiffs\u2019 argument is overruled. Accordingly, we hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiffs\u2019 motion for a new trial.\nIV. Conclusion\nWe affirm the trial court\u2019s declaratory judgment holding that defendant received from decedent\u2019s will an estate for years in the subject property, that her possessory right during the estate for years is exclusive, and plaintiffs received from decedent\u2019s will a vested remainder in the subject property. We also affirm the trial court\u2019s denial of plaintiffs\u2019 motion for a new trial.\nAFFIRMED.\nJudges BRYANT and ELMORE concur.\n. The trial court entered an order on 24 April 2006 holding that defendant was barred from taking an elective share in decedent\u2019s estate, and that order is not a subject of this appeal.", "type": "majority", "author": "STROUD, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Ferguson, Scarbrough, Hayes, Hawkins & DeMay, P.A. by James R. DeMay, for plaintiffs-appellants.", "M. T. Lowder & Associates, by Mark T. Lowder, for defendantappellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "KEVIN D. BUCHANAN, Executor of the Estate of Kelly Buchanan and Guardian of the property of Tiffany Hope Buchanan, a minor; KEVIN DAVID BUCHANAN, Individually; and CHRISTOPHER BUCHANAN, Individually, Plaintiffs v. TERESA HAGY BUCHANAN, Defendant\nNo. COA09-1085\n(Filed 7 September 2010)\n1. Wills\u2014 plain language unambiguous \u2014 no error\nThe trial court did not err in concluding that defendant received from decedent\u2019s will an estate for years in decedent\u2019s house, defendant had exclusive possession of the house, and plaintiffs received a vested remainder in the same property. The plain language of the will was unambiguous.\n2. Wills\u2014 motion for new trial \u2014 properly denied \u2014 plain language unambiguous\nThe trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiffs\u2019 motion for a new trial in a wills case as the trial court properly found that the terms of the will were unambiguous.\nAppeal by plaintiffs from orders entered on 28 December 2006 and 13 April 2009 by Judge W. Erwin Spainhour in Superior Court, Cabarrus County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 10 February 2010.\nFerguson, Scarbrough, Hayes, Hawkins & DeMay, P.A. by James R. DeMay, for plaintiffs-appellants.\nM. T. Lowder & Associates, by Mark T. Lowder, for defendantappellee." }, "file_name": "0112-01", "first_page_order": 136, "last_page_order": 144 }