{ "id": 4179678, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CURTIS C. COWAN", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Cowan", "decision_date": "2010-09-21", "docket_number": "No. COA09-1415", "first_page": "192", "last_page": "205", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "207 N.C. App. 192" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "664 S.E.2d 313", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12641587, 12641588, 12641589 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Coble, 351 N.C. 448, 449, 527 S.E.2d 45, 46 (2000) (citations and quotations omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/664/0313-01", "/se2d/664/0313-02", "/se2d/664/0313-03" ] }, { "cite": "362 N.C. 365", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 12641517, 12641206, 12641591 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Coble, 351 N.C. 448, 449, 527 S.E.2d 45, 46 (2000) (citations and quotations omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/663/0428-03", "/se2d/661/0883-02", "/se2d/664/0314-02" ] }, { "cite": "657 S.E.2d 51", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12640547 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "54", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Coble, 351 N.C. 448, 449, 527 S.E.2d 45, 46 (2000) (citations and quotations omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/657/0051-01" ] }, { "cite": "434 U.S. 924", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6427200, 6428259, 6427109, 6427463, 6427687, 6427816, 6427563, 6428013, 6427929, 6428122, 6427293 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/434/0924-02", "/us/434/0924-11", "/us/434/0924-01", "/us/434/0924-04", "/us/434/0924-06", "/us/434/0924-07", "/us/434/0924-05", "/us/434/0924-09", "/us/434/0924-08", "/us/434/0924-10", "/us/434/0924-03" ] }, { "cite": "616 S.E.2d 496", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633572 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "498" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/616/0496-01" ] }, { "cite": "635 S.E.2d 58", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12636861 ], "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/635/0058-01" ] }, { "cite": "628 S.E.2d 442", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12635592 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "443" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/628/0442-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.41", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "(b" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "268 S.E.2d 468", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "471" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "300 N.C. 715", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564683 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "718" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/300/0715-01" ] }, { "cite": "436 S.E.2d 374", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "335 N.C. 172", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2531301, 2526631, 2526354, 2527220, 2531354 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/335/0172-02", "/nc/335/0172-01", "/nc/335/0172-05", "/nc/335/0172-03", "/nc/335/0172-04" ] }, { "cite": "274 S.E.2d 348", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "350" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "50 N.C. App. 498", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 2673087 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "500" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/50/0498-01" ] }, { "cite": "431 S.E.2d 849", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citing Lee v. Penland-Bailey Co., 50 N.C. App. 498, 500, 274 S.E.2d 348, 350 (1981)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "111 N.C. App. 228", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521342 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citing Lee v. Penland-Bailey Co., 50 N.C. App. 498, 500, 274 S.E.2d 348, 350 (1981)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/111/0228-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-27", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "683 S.E.2d 411", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "418" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "527 S.E.2d 45", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "46", "parenthetical": "citations and quotations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "351 N.C. 448", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1155934 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "449", "parenthetical": "citations and quotations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/351/0448-01" ] }, { "cite": "188 N.C. App. 820", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4155567 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "825", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Coble, 351 N.C. 448, 449, 527 S.E.2d 45, 46 (2000) (citations and quotations omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/188/0820-01" ] }, { "cite": "689 S.E.2d 510", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "517" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "399 S.E.2d 332", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "372 N.C. 641", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "345 S.E.2d 365", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "368" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "317 N.C. 164", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4778022 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "169" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/317/0164-01" ] }, { "cite": "54 L. Ed. 2d 281", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "98 S. Ct. 402", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "235 S.E.2d 193", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "199" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "292 N.C. 711", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572704 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "720" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/292/0711-01" ] }, { "cite": "395 S.E.2d 143", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "147-48", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Furr, 292 N.C. 711, 720, 235 S.E.2d 193, 199, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 924, 98 S. Ct. 402, 54 L. Ed. 2d 281 (1977), and State v. Mann, 317 N.C. 164, 169, 345 S.E.2d 365, 368 (1986)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "100 N.C. App. 240", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526601 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "247", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Furr, 292 N.C. 711, 720, 235 S.E.2d 193, 199, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 924, 98 S. Ct. 402, 54 L. Ed. 2d 281 (1977), and State v. Mann, 317 N.C. 164, 169, 345 S.E.2d 365, 368 (1986)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/100/0240-01" ] }, { "cite": "399 S.E.2d 806", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "79 N.C. App. 599", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8522298 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/79/0599-01" ] }, { "cite": "321 N.C. 102", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2566911 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "104-05", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Hicks, 79 N.C. App. 599, 399 S.E.2d 806 (1986)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/321/0102-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-202.1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "379 S.E.2d 30", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "37", "parenthetical": "stating that, \"[w]here a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided the same issue, albeit in a different case, a subsequent panel of the same court is bound by that precedent, unless it has been overturned by a higher court\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "324 N.C. 373", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2483734 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "384", "parenthetical": "stating that, \"[w]here a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided the same issue, albeit in a different case, a subsequent panel of the same court is bound by that precedent, unless it has been overturned by a higher court\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/324/0373-01" ] }, { "cite": "683 S.E.2d 391", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "399" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "689 S.E.2d 372", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "363 N.C. 747", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "683 S.E.2d 754", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "758" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "685 S.E.2d 23", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "27" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "540 S.E.2d 351", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "172 S.E.2d 489", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "495" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "276 N.C. 329", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561328 ], "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "338" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/276/0329-01" ] }, { "cite": "514 S.E.2d 724", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "727", "parenthetical": "citing Smith v. Mercer, 276 N.C. 329, 338, 172 S.E.2d 489, 495 (1970), cert. denied, 540 S.E.2d 351 (1999" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "350 N.C. 400", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 132119 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "404-05", "parenthetical": "citing Smith v. Mercer, 276 N.C. 329, 338, 172 S.E.2d 489, 495 (1970), cert. denied, 540 S.E.2d 351 (1999" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/350/0400-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.33", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "359 N.C. 832", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3793573 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "836" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/359/0832-01" ] }, { "cite": "495 S.E.2d 406", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "408" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "128 N.C. App. 599", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11656152 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "603" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/128/0599-01" ] }, { "cite": "188 S.E.2d 281", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "281 N.C. 300", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8574896 ], "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/281/0300-01" ] }, { "cite": "265 S.E.2d 379", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "385", "parenthetical": "citing Stevenson v. City of Durham, 281 N.C. 300, 188 S.E.2d 281 (1972)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "299 N.C. 620", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8575681 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "629", "parenthetical": "citing Stevenson v. City of Durham, 281 N.C. 300, 188 S.E.2d 281 (1972)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/299/0620-01" ] }, { "cite": "507 S.E.2d 284", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "290" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "349 N.C. 290", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 571505 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "297" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/349/0290-01" ] }, { "cite": "548 S.E.2d 513", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "517", "parenthetical": "citing Polaroid Corp. v Offerman, 349 N.C. 290, 297, 507 S.E.2d 284, 290 (1998)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "353 N.C. 659", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 135857 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "664", "parenthetical": "citing Polaroid Corp. v Offerman, 349 N.C. 290, 297, 507 S.E.2d 284, 290 (1998)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/353/0659-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 18, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)(2)" }, { "page": "(a)(l)" }, { "page": "(a)(l)" }, { "page": "(a)(2)" }, { "page": "(a)(2)" }, { "page": "(a)(2)" }, { "page": "(a)(2)" }, { "page": "(a)" }, { "page": "(a)" }, { "page": "(a)(3)" }, { "page": "(a)(2)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 34, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "364 N.C. 131", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "weight": 2, "year": 2010, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "689 S.E.2d 562", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "565-66" }, { "page": "568-69" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "677 S.E.2d 518", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "524" }, { "page": "523" }, { "page": "531" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "360 N.C. 544", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3791432, 3793804, 3794065, 3788665, 3796661, 3788377, 3792863 ], "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/360/0544-06", "/nc/360/0544-02", "/nc/360/0544-07", "/nc/360/0544-05", "/nc/360/0544-03", "/nc/360/0544-04", "/nc/360/0544-01" ] }, { "cite": "394 S.E.2d 683", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "100 N.C. App. 188", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526524 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "189" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/100/0188-01" ] }, { "cite": "486 S.E.2d 735", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "737" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "126 N.C. App. 800", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11713506 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "802" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/126/0800-01" ] }, { "cite": "177 N.C. App. 239", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8301144 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "241" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/177/0239-01" ] }, { "cite": "693 S.E.2d 204", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "206" }, { "parenthetical": "quoting N.C.R. App. P. 3(a). N.C.R. App. P. 3(a) (2010" }, { "page": "206" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1171, "char_count": 33624, "ocr_confidence": 0.731, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.719567370958748e-08, "percentile": 0.2963522197626194 }, "sha256": "dbc010e9c8f49c5feed6932d2790b633aee24cd0a0466a028696c82e55590585", "simhash": "1:81e96460d63bcc60", "word_count": 5585 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:56:31.092499+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judge BRYANT concurs.", "Judge ELMORE concurs in result only." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CURTIS C. COWAN" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "ERVIN, Judge.\nDefendant Curtis C. Cowan appeals from a trial court order requiring him to enroll in lifetime satellite-based monitoring (SBM). After careful consideration of Defendant\u2019s challenges to the trial court\u2019s order in light of the record and the applicable law, we conclude that the trial court\u2019s order should be vacated and that this case should be remanded to the trial court for a new SBM hearing to be held only after proper notice is given to Defendant.\nL Factual Background\nOn 6 June 2005, a warrant for arrest charging Defendant with taking indecent liberties with a child was issued. On 11 July 2005, the Cabarrus County grand jury returned a bill of indictment charging Defendant with taking indecent liberties with a child. On 29 August 2007, the prosecutor, with Defendant\u2019s consent, signed an information charging Defendant with solicitation to take indecent liberties with a child. On the following day, Defendant entered pleas of guilty to one count of attempted second degree kidnapping and one count of solicitation to commit indecent liberties with a child. In return for Defendant\u2019s guilty pleas, the State voluntarily dismissed a statutory sexual offense charge, an intimidating a witness charge, a breaking or entering charge, and an habitual felon allegation. Based upon Defendant\u2019s guilty pleas, Judge W. Robert Bell entered judgments sentencing Defendant to a minimum term of 15 months and a maximum term of 20 months imprisonment in the custody of the North Carolina Department of Correction for attempted second degree kidnapping and sentencing Defendant to a consecutive minimum term of 9 months and a maximum term of 11 months in the custody of the Department of Correction for solicitation to take indecent liberties with a child. Judge Bell suspended Defendant\u2019s sentence for solicitation to take indecent liberties with a child and placed Defendant on supervised probation for a period of 36 months, subject to a number of terms and conditions. On 15 February 2008, Defendant elected to serve his suspended sentence rather than remain on supervised probation.\nOn 5 January 2009, the State scheduled a hearing to determine whether Defendant should be required to enroll in SBM. By means of a letter dated 8 January 2009, the Department of Correction notified Defendant of its initial determination that he was subject to SBM. The issue of whether Defendant should be required to enroll in SBM came on for hearing before the trial court on 6 March 2009 and 17 April 2009.\nAt the 6 March 2009 hearing, Probation Officer Lisa Foust stated that the' results of Defendant\u2019s Static-99 risk assessment indicated that he had a \u201chigh risk for reoffending.\u201d In addition, Ms. Foust stated that she had obtained the \u201cofficial crime version of what happened that Cabarrus County constructed after he was sentenced\u201d and that this report indicated that Defendant had penetrated the four-year-old victim. On 17 April 2009, the trial court found that Defendant had committed a reportable offense \u201cinvolv[ing] the physical, mental or sexual abuse of a minor\u201d and ordered him to enroll in SBM for \u201cthe remainder of [his] natural life.\u201d Defendant noted an appeal to this Court from the trial court\u2019s order.\nII. Legal Analysis\nA. Appropriateness of Defendant\u2019s Notice of Anneal\nThe first issue that we must address is the extent, if any, to which Defendant\u2019s appeal is properly before this Court. Defendant\u2019s appeal from the trial court\u2019s order requiring him to enroll in lifetime SBM was noted orally in open court. According to State v. Brooks, \u2014 N.C. App. \u2014, \u2014, 693 S.E.2d 204, 206 (2010), \u201coral notice pursuant to N.C.RApp. P. 4(a)(1) is insufficient to confer jurisdiction on this Court\u201d in a case arising from a trial court order requiring a litigant to enroll in SBM. \u201cInstead, a defendant must give notice of appeal pursuant to N.C.R.App. P. 3(a) as is proper \u2018in a civil action or special proceeding.\u2019 \u201d Id. (quoting N.C.R. App. P. 3(a). N.C.R. App. P. 3(a) (2010) provides that appeals to the appellate courts in civil actions and special proceedings are required to be in writing, filed with the Clerk of Superior Court, and served upon all other parties. As a result of the fact that Defendant noted his appeal orally, rather than in writing, and the fact that \u201c \u2018[t]he provisions of [N.C.R. App. 3] axe jurisdictional,\u2019 \u201d Stephenson v. Bartlett, 177 N.C. App. 239, 241, 628 S.E.2d 442, 443 (quoting Abels v. Renfro Corp., 126 N.C. App. 800, 802, 486 S.E.2d 735, 737 (1997); (citing Currin-Dillehay Bldg. Supply Inc. v. Frazier, 100 N.C. App. 188, 189, 394 S.E.2d 683 (1990), disc. review denied, 360 N.C. 544, 635 S.E.2d 58 (2006), we axe xequixed to dismiss Defendant\u2019s appeal.\nIn addition to attempting to use his oxal notice as a means of invoking this Court\u2019s jurisdiction, Defendant has xequested that we treat his brief as a petition for certiorari in the event that we found his oral notice of appeal to be ineffective. According to N.C.R. App. P 21(a)(1) (2010), \u201c[t]he writ of certiorari may be issued by either appellate court to permit review of the judgments and orders of trial tribunals when the right to prosecute on appeal has been lost by failure to take timely action.\u201d The effect of this Court\u2019s decision in Brooks is that Defendant was required to note an appeal from the trial court\u2019s SBM order in writing was that Defendant failed to note an appeal from the trial court\u2019s order in a timely manner, which is one of the reasons for which this Court is authorized to issue a writ of certiorari. We note that this Court\u2019s decision in State v. Bare, \u2014 N.C. App. \u2014, \u2014, 677 S.E.2d 518, 524 (2009), which held that North Carolina\u2019s SBM statutes constituted a civil and regulatory regime rather than a criminal punishment, was decided on 16 June 2009. This Court further explained in State v. Singleton, \u2014 N.C. App. \u2014, \u2014, 689 S.E.2d 562, 565-66, disc. review allowed, 364 N.C. 131, \u2014 S.E.2d (2010), which was decided on 5 January 2010, that, \u201cfor purposes of appeal, a[n] SBM hearing is not a \u2018criminal trial or proceeding\u2019 for which a right of appeal is based upon N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1442 or N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1444,\u201d so that jurisdiction to hear appeals from SBM hearings stems from N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-27. Finally, our decision in Brooks was issued on 18 May 2010. Defendant\u2019s appeal was noted on 17 April 2009, approximately two months before Bare, nine months before Singleton, and thirteen months prior to Brooks. As a result, at the time of his SBM hearing, Defendant would have needed a considerable degree of foresight in order to understand that an oral notice of appeal pursuant to N.C.R. App. R 4(a)(1) was ineffective. Accordingly, \u201c[i]n the interest of justice, and to expedite the decision in the public interest,\u201d Brooks, \u2014 N.C. App. at \u2014, 693 S.E.2d at 206, we grant defendant\u2019s request that we consider his brief as a petition for the issuance of a writ of certiorari, issue the writ, and consider his challenges to the trial court\u2019s SBM order on the merits. See also State v. Clayton, \u2014 N.C. App. \u2014, \u2014, \u2014 S.E.2d \u2014, \u2014, 2010 N.C. App. Lexis 1451 *7 (2010).\nB. Effective Date of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40B\nFirst, Defendant contends that the provisions of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40B do not apply to cases involving offenses committed prior to the effective date of that statutory subsection. In essence, Defendant argues that, since N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40B is the only statutory vehicle under which individuals whose eligibility for SBM was not determined at the time that judgment was imposed can be ordered to enroll in SBM and since the offense upon which Defendant\u2019s eligibility for SBM was predicated was committed before the effective date of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40B, the trial court lacked the authority to require individuals, such as Defendant, who committed crimes prior to the effective date of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40B and whose eligibility for SBM was not determined at the time that judgment was imposed, to enroll in SBM. We disagree.\nThe original SBM statutes became effective on 16 August 2006 and applied (1) to any offenses \u201ccommitted on or after that date\u201d and (2) to \u201cany person sentenced to intermediate punishment on or after that date and to any person released from prison by parole or post-release supervision on or after that date.\u201d 2006 N.C. Sess. L., c. 247, s. 15(1). On 11 July 2007, the Governor signed legislation enacting N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40A and N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40B, which established the procedures that were to be utilized in determining whether particular offenders would be required to enroll in SBM, among other SBM-related provisions. According to 2007 N.C. Sess. L., c. 213, s. 15:\nSection 2 of this act [N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40A] becomes effective December 1, 2007, and applies to sentences entered on or after that date. Section 6 of this act [failure to enroll a felony] becomes effective December 1, 2007, and applies to offenses committed on or after that date. Sections 7 [conditions of probation], 8 [conditions of parole] and 9 of this act [other post-release conditions] become effective on December 1, 2007 and apply to persons placed on probation, parole, or post-release supervision on or after that date. Section 9A [reporting requirements amended] becomes effective December 1, 2007. The remainder of this act [including Section 3, which contained N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40] is effective when it becomes law.\nThus, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40B initially became effective 11 July 2007. However, 2007 N.C. Sess. L., c. 484, s. 42, a technical corrections bill enacted on 2 August 2007, changed the effective date of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40B from 11 July 2007 to 1 December 2007. Thus, except for its applicability during the brief period of time between 11 July 2007 and 2 August 2007, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a714-208.40B took effect on 1 December 2007.\nJudge Bell entered judgment against Defendant in the solicitation to take indecent liberties with a minor case on 30 August 2007, with his crime allegedly having been committed on 1 April 2005. The issue of Defendant\u2019s eligibility for SBM was not addressed at the time that judgment was entered. As of 1 December 2007, no hearing had been held for the purpose of determining whether Defendant should be required to enroll in SBM. According to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40B, \u201c[w]hen an offender is convicted of a reportable conviction as defined by [N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7] 14-208.6(4), and there has been no determination by a court on whether the offender shall be required to enroll in satellite-based monitoring ...,\u201d the Department of Correction is authorized to institute a proceeding to determine Defendant\u2019s eligibility for SBM. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40B(a). As a result, since Defendant had a reportable conviction and since his eligibility for SBM had not yet been determined, the procedures set out in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40B provide an appropriate vehicle for use in determining whether Defendant should be required to enroll in SBM, as long as they are applicable in cases involving offenders convicted prior to 1 December 2007.\nThe issue of whether the State was entitled to seek to have Defendant enrolled in SBM pursuant to the procedures outlined in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40B is, at least in the first instance, a matter of statutory construction. \u201cThe principal goal of statutory construction is to accomplish the legislative intent.\u201d Lenox, Inc. v. Tolson, 353 N.C. 659, 664, 548 S.E.2d 513, 517 (2001) (citing Polaroid Corp. v Offerman, 349 N.C. 290, 297, 507 S.E.2d 284, 290 (1998)). \u201cThe best indicia of that intent are the language of the statute . . ., the spirit of the act and what the act seeks to accomplish.\u201d Concrete Co. v. Board of Commissioners, 299 N.C. 620, 629, 265 S.E.2d 379, 385 (1980) (citing Stevenson v. City of Durham, 281 N.C. 300, 188 S.E.2d 281 (1972)). \u201c[Statutes dealing with the same subject matter must be construed in pari materia, as together constituting one law.\u201d Bare, \u2014 N.C. App. at \u2014, 677 S.E.2d at 523 (quoting Williams v. Alexander County Bd. of Educ., 128 N.C. App. 599, 603, 495 S.E.2d 406, 408 (1988)) (citation and quotation marks omitted). \u201c \u2018In discerning the intent of the General Assembly, statutes in pari materia should be construed together and harmonized whenever possible.\u2019 \u201d Id. (quoting State v. Jones, 359 N.C. 832, 836, 616 S.E.2d 496, 498 (2005)).\nThe basic legal principles underlying the SBM program are set out in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40, which is essentially identical to former N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.33. 2006 N.C. Sess. L., c. 247, s. 15. In essence, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40 and its predecessor required the Department of Correction to create the SBM program and set out various substantive provisions identifying the individuals who should be required to enroll in that program. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40A, which applies to SBM-related determinations made at the time of sentencing, and N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40B, which, as we have previously noted, applies to SBM-related determinations made after sentencing, were enacted for the purpose of establishing the procedures to be utilized in determining whether specific individuals were required to enroll in SBM. As a result, we conclude that N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40A and N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40B were intended to augment, and not to supersede, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40 and its predecessor and must be interpreted in pari materia with each other and with N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40 so as to avoid the creation of conflicts among and gaps in the relevant statutory provisions. The most appropriate way to accomplish that goal is to construe N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40 as setting out the substantive law concerning SBM eligibility and to construe N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40A and N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40B as governing the procedures to be utilized in applying the substantive rules set out in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40. The adoption of any other approach would create a risk that conflicting substantive SBM-related rules would exist.\nIn view of the fact that the original SBM legislation, which was effective at the time that judgment was imposed upon Defendant, applied to any offenders \u201csentenced to intermediate punishment on or after\u201d 16 August 2006, 2006 N.C. Sess. L., c. 247, s. 15(1), and the fact that Defendant received a probationary sentence on 30 August 2007, it is clear that Defendant was subject to the possibility of an SBM enrollment requirement as a matter of substantive law from and after the date upon which he pled guilty to solicitation to take indecent liberties with a minor. Since, as we have already established, the provisions of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40B are essentially procedural in nature and since \u201cstatutes relating to modes of procedure are generally held to operate retroactively,\u201d State v. Green, 350 N.C. 400, 404-05, 514 S.E.2d 724, 727 (1999) (citing Smith v. Mercer, 276 N.C. 329, 338, 172 S.E.2d 489, 495 (1970), cert. denied, 540 S.E.2d 351 (1999), we conclude that N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40B applies to SBM proceedings initiated after 1 December 2007, even if those proceedings involved offenders who had been sentenced or had committed the offenses that resulted in their eligibility for SBM before that date. Acceptance of Defendant\u2019s argument to the contrary would create an anomalous situation under which offenders whose SBM eligibility was evaluated at the time of sentencing could be required to enroll in SBM, while those whose eligibility for SBM was not evaluated at that time could not be ordered to enroll solely because SBM-related issues were not addressed at sentencing. We do not believe that the General Assembly intended such a result. Thus, the trial court did not err by utilizing N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40B as the procedural vehicle for determining whether Defendant should be required to enroll in SBM.\nG. Constitutionality of the SBM Program\nSecondly, Defendant contends that the statutory scheme providing for an offender\u2019s enrollment in SBM is punitive in nature and that, for that reason, the trial court\u2019s order subjecting him to enrollment in lifetime SBM despite the fact that the SBM regime did not exist as of the date upon which he committed the acts that led to his conviction for solicitation to take indecent liberties with a child violates the state and federal constitutional provisions against ex post facto laws. This Court has repeatedly held that the statutoiy provisions requiring that certain offenders enroll in SBM constitute a civil, regulatory scheme rather than a criminal punishment and that a trial court order requiring a defendant similarly-situated to Defendant to enroll in SBM does not result in a violation of the constitutional prohibitions against expost facto laws, State v. Vogt, \u2014 N.C. App. \u2014, \u2014, 685 S.E.2d 23, 27 (2009); State v. Morrow, \u2014 N.C. App. \u2014, \u2014, 683 S.E.2d 754, 758, disc. review as to additional issues denied, 363 N.C. 747, 689 S.E.2d 372 (2009); State v. Wagoner, \u2014 N.C. App. \u2014, \u2014, 683 S.E.2d 391, 399 (2009); Bare, \u2014N.C. App. at \u2014, 677 S.E.2d at 531, and we are bound by those prior holdings. In re Appeal from Civil Penalty, 324 N.C. 373, 384, 379 S.E.2d 30, 37 (1989) (stating that, \u201c[w]here a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided the same issue, albeit in a different case, a subsequent panel of the same court is bound by that precedent, unless it has been overturned by a higher court\u201d). As a result, Defendant\u2019s contention that requiring a person in his position to enroll in lifetime SBM violates the constitutional prohibition against the enactment of ex post facto laws lacks merit.\nD. Sufficiency of the Evidence to Support the Imposition of SBM Upon Defendant\nNext, Defendant argues that the trial court erred by finding that he should be required to enroll in SBM on the grounds that \u201cthe offense of which the defendant was convicted involved the physical, mental, or sexual abuse of a minor . ...\u201d We disagree.\nAccording to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40(a)(2), \u201c[a]ny offender who satisfies all of the following criteria: (i) is convicted of a reportable conviction as defined by [N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7] 14-208.6(4), (ii) is required to register under Part 2 of Article 27A of Chapter 14 of the General Statutes, (iii) has committed an offense involving the physical, mental, or sexual abuse of a minor, and (iv) based on the Department\u2019s risk assessment program requires the highest possible level of supervision and monitoring\u201d may be required to enroll in SBM. In challenging the trial court\u2019s order, Defendant argues that the determination of whether he had committed an offense involving \u201cthe physical, mental, or sexual abuse of a minor\u201d should be based upon an examination of the elements of the offense for which he had been convicted and that an analysis of the elements of solicitation to take indecent liberties with a minor demonstrates that guilt of that offense does not necessarily \u201cinvolv[e] the physical, mental, or sexual abuse of a minor.\u201d Assuming, without deciding, that an elements-based approach rather than a event-based approach should be utilized in determining Defendant\u2019s eligibility for SBM under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40(a)(l) and N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40B(c), we conclude that the trial court correctly found that Defendant was eligible for SBM.\nThe elements of taking indecent liberties with a child in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-202.1 are that \u201c(1) the defendant was at least 16 years of age, (2) he was five years older than his victim, (3) he willfully took or attempted to take an indecent liberty with the victim, (4) the victim was under 16 years of age at the time the alleged act or attempted act occurred, and (5) the action by the defendant was for the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual desire.\u201d State v. Rhodes, 321 N.C. 102, 104-05, 361 S.E.2d578, 580 (1987) (citing State v. Hicks, 79 N.C. App. 599, 399 S.E.2d 806 (1986)). The \u201cgravamen of the crime of solicitation\u201d to commit a felony is \u201c[counseling, enticing or inducing another to commit a crime,\u201d with such unlawful \u201c[s]olicitation being complete when the request to commit a crime is made, regardless of whether the crime solicited is ever committed or attempted.\u201d State v. Richardson, 100 N.C. App. 240, 247, 395 S.E.2d 143, 147-48 (1990) (citing State v. Furr, 292 N.C. 711, 720, 235 S.E.2d 193, 199, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 924, 98 S. Ct. 402, 54 L. Ed. 2d 281 (1977), and State v. Mann, 317 N.C. 164, 169, 345 S.E.2d 365, 368 (1986)), disc. review denied and appeal dismissed, 372 N.C. 641, 399 S.E.2d 332 (1990). Therefore, the elements of the crime of solicitation to take indecent liberties with a minor are that the defendant (1) requests another person, (2) who is at least 16 years old and (3) five years older than the victim to (4) willfully take or attempt to take an indecent liberty with the victim (5) at a time when the victim was under sixteen years of age (6) for the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual desire. Thus, the ultimate issue before the trial court, assuming that an elements-based approach of the type required in connection with the \u201caggravated offense\u201d provision of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40(a)(l), State v. Singleton, \u2014 N.C. App. \u2014, \u2014, 689 S.E.2d 562, 568-69, disc. review allowed, 364 N.C. 131, \u2014 S.E.2d (2010); State v. Davison, \u2014 N.C. App. \u2014, \u2014, 689 S.E.2d 510, 517 (2009), must be used in applying the \u201cphysical, mental or sexual abuse\u201d provision of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40(a)(2), was whether an individual whose conduct is encompassed within the elements of solicitation to take indecent liberties with a child has \u201ccommitted an offense involving the physical, mental, or sexual abuse of a minor.\u201d In order to properly resolve that question, we must focus on the statutory language requiring the Defendant\u2019s conduct to \u201cinvolve\u201d the \u201cphysical, mental, or sexual abuse of a minor.\u201d\n\u201cInvolving\u201d is defined as \u201cto have within or as part of itself\u2019 or \u201cto require as a necessary accompaniment\u201d Webster\u2019s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (1991). The fundamental deficiency in Defendant\u2019s challenge to the trial court\u2019s finding is its assumption that, in order for an offense to \u201cinvolve\u201d the \u201cphysical, mental, or sexual abuse of a minor,\u201d actual \u201cphysical, mental, or sexual abuse\u201d of the victim must occur. Instead, given the fact that the word \u201cinvolve\u201d encompasses an act that would have the \u201cphysical, mental, or sexual abuse of a minor\u201d as a \u201cnecessary feature or consequence\u201d as well as \u201cincluding or containing\u201d such abuse, we believe that eligibility for SBM under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40(a)(2) includes both completed acts and acts that create a substantial risk that such abuse will occur. Thus, an act which rises to the level of a completed taking indecent liberties with a minor inevitably has \u201cwithin or as part of itself\u2019 the '\u201cphysical, mental, or sexual abuse of a minor.\u201d Similarly, in view of the fact that an unlawful attempt to take indecent liberties with a child requires proof of \u201c \u2018(1) the intent to commit the substantive offense, and (2) an overt act done for that purpose which goes beyond mere preparation, but (3) falls short of the completed offense,\u2019 \u201d State v. Ellis, 188 N.C. App. 820, 825, 657 S.E.2d 51, 54, disc. review denied, 362 N.C. 365, 664 S.E.2d 313 (2008) (quoting State v. Coble, 351 N.C. 448, 449, 527 S.E.2d 45, 46 (2000) (citations and quotations omitted)), and the fact that an overt act of the type necessary to permit a finding of liability for attempt may constitute such abuse itself and, at a minimum, inherently encompasses a substantial risk that the sexual abuse of a minor will occur, we conclude that an attempt to take an indecent liberty with a child has \u201cwithin or as part of itself\u2019 \u201cthe physical, mental, or sexual abuse of a minor\u201d for purposes of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40(a)(2) as well. Finally, although guilt of unlawful solicitation to take an indecent liberty with a minor need not involve the commission of the completed crime, we believe that an effort to \u201ccounsel, entice, or induce\u201d another to commit an indecent liberty with a minor also creates a substantial risk that the \u201cphysical, mental, or sexual abuse of a minor\u201d will occur, so that such a solicitation has the sexual abuse of a minor \u201cas a \u201cnecessary accompaniment.\u201d Thus, since the offense of solicitation to take an indecent liberty with a minor inherently \u201cinvolves\u201d the \u201cphysical, mental, or sexual abuse of a minor,\u201d we conclude that the trial court did not err by concluding that Defendant was subject to enrollment in SBM pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40(a)(2).\nE. Notice\nFinally, Defendant argues that he did not receive adequate notice of the basis for the Department of Correction\u2019s preliminary determination that he should be required to enroll in SBM. We agree.\nThe version of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40B(b) in effect at the time of Defendant\u2019s SBM proceeding provided that, \u201c [i]f the Department determines that the offender falls into one of the categories described in [N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7] 14-208.40(a), the Department shall schedule a hearing in the court of the county in which the offender resides\u201d and \u201cnotify the offender of the Department\u2019s determination and the date of the scheduled hearing. . . .\u201d 2007 N.C. Sess. L., c. 213, s. 3. In State v. Stines, \u2014 N.C. App. \u2014, \u2014, 683 S.E.2d 411, 418 (2009), this Court held that the Department\u2019s notice obligation under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40B(b) \u201cmandates that the Department, in its notice, specify the category set out in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40(a) into which the Department has determined the offender falls and briefly state the factual basis for that conclusion.\u201d As a result, at the time that an SBM hearing is scheduled for an offender pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40B, the version of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40B(b) applicable to this proceeding required the Department to provide notice to the offender of the reason that the Department believed that he or she should be required to enroll in SBM and the basis for that determination.\nThe initial notice that the Department sent to Defendant on 8 January 2009 stated, among other things, that:\nThe Department of Correction has made the initial determination that you meet the criteria set out in General Statute 14-208.40(a), which requires your enrollment in Satellite Based Monitoring. Therefore, a Determination Hearing has been scheduled in Rowen [sic] County Superior Court on Friday, January 30,2009 at 9:30 [a.m]. The Court will review your case to make a determination concerning your eligibility for Satellite Based Monitoring. At this hearing, you will have the opportunity to contest evidence presented by the State that you are subject to the Satellite Based Monitoring program.\nAlthough the notice sent to Defendant adequately informed him of \u2022the date, time, and location of his SBM hearing, it failed to \u201cspecify the category set out in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40(a) into which the Department ha[d] determined\u201d that Defendant fell or to \u201cbriefly state the factual basis for that conclusion.\u201d Stine, \u2014 N.C. App. at \u2014, 683 S.E.2d at 418. For that reason, we conclude that Defendant did not receive adequate notice of the Department\u2019s preliminary determination in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40B(b) and that the trial court\u2019s order should be reversed and this case remanded to the Rowan County Superior Court for a new SBM hearing, prior to which Defendant must be provided with adequate notice.\nIII. Conclusion\nThus, for the reasons set forth above, we conclude that Defendant did not receive adequate notice as required by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40B(b) prior to his SBM hearing and that this deficiency in the proceedings leading to the trial court\u2019s order necessitates an award of appellate relief. As a result, the trial court\u2019s order is reversed and this case is remanded to the Rowan County Superior Court for a new SBM hearing, prior to which adequate notice must be provided to Defendant.\nREVERSED AND REMANDED.\nJudge BRYANT concurs.\nJudge ELMORE concurs in result only.\n. In his brief, Defendant contends that he did not have a reportable conviction of the type necessary for SBM eligibility. However, the validity of Defendant\u2019s contention hinges on acceptance of his claim that N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40B has no application to his situation. Given our disagreement with Defendant\u2019s position on that issue, we are unable to accept his contention that he lacked the necessary reportable conviction as well.\n. The only difference between the two statutory provisions is that N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40(a)(3) provides that \u201coffenders . . . convicted of [violating N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-27.2A or N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-27.4A] shall be enrolled in [SBM] for the offender\u2019s natural life\u201d while there is no equivalent provision in former N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.33.\n. In light of our conclusion that N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14- 208.40B is a procedural, rather than a substantive statute, we disagree with Defendant\u2019s reliance on the principle that \u201cstatutes are presumed to act prospectively only,\u201d Fogleman v. D & J Equipment Rentals, Inc., 111 N.C. App. 228, 431 S.E.2d 849 (1993) (citing Lee v. Penland-Bailey Co., 50 N.C. App. 498, 500, 274 S.E.2d 348, 350 (1981)) disc. review denied, 335 N.C. 172, 436 S.E.2d 374 (1993), since it is clear from the context of our decision in Fogleman that the principle upon which Defendant relies applies to statutory provisions that \u201c \u2018alter the legal consequences of conduct or transactions completed prior to its enactment.\u2019 \u201d Id. (quoting Gardner v. Gardner, 300 N.C. 715, 718, 268 S.E.2d 468, 471 (1980). Since Defendant was potentially subject to a requirement that he enroll in SBM for reasons completely unrelated to the enactment of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40B, the principle upon which Defendant relies has no application to the present situation.\n. Although Defendant also urges us to adopt his preferred resolution of the effective date issue in order to avoid constitutional issues arising under the provisions of the state and federal constitutions prohibiting the enactment of ex post facto laws, we find this principle of little relevance to our analysis given that, for the reasons set forth below, North Carolina\u2019s SBM statutes do not contravene the ex post facto provisions of either constitution.\n. We note, however, that an individual required to enroll in SBM pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40(a)(2) is only subject to mandatory participation in the SBM program for a term of years rather than for life. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40B(c); N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.41((b). As a result, the trial court erred by ordering that Defendant enroll in lifetime SBM as compared to subjecting him to SBM for a term of years. However, given that we are reversing the trial court\u2019s order and remanding this case to the trial court for a new SBM hearing for notice-related reasons, we need not afford any direct relief based upon this error given that it is not likely to recur as a result of the proceedings on remand.", "type": "majority", "author": "ERVIN, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Catherine M. (Katie) Kay ser, for State.", "Robert W. Ewing, for defendant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CURTIS C. COWAN\nNo. COA09-1415\n(Filed 21 September 2010)\n1. Appeal and Error\u2014 appeal noted orally \u2014 treated as motion for certiorari\nAn appeal from an order requiring defendant to enroll in lifetime satellite-based monitoring that was noted orally in open court was not sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the Court of Appeals, but was considered as a petition for certiorari and was granted in the interests of justice.\n2. Satellite-Based Monitoring\u2014 applicable date of statute\nThe trial court did not err by using N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-208.40B as the procedural vehicle for determining whether defendant should be required to enroll in satellite-based monitoring (SBM). That statute applies to SBM proceedings initiated after 1 December 2007 even if those proceedings involved offenders who had been sentenced or had committed their offenses before that date.\n3. Constitutional Law\u2014 ex post facto \u2014 satellite-based monitoring\nThere was no merit to defendant\u2019s contention that state and federal constitutional prohibitions of ex post facto laws were violated by an order subjecting him to lifetime enrollment in satellite-based monitoring (SBM) despite the fact that the SBM regime did not exist when he committed the acts which led to his conviction.\n4. Satellite-Based Monitoring\u2014 eligibility \u2014 solicitation to take indecent liberties\nAssuming that eligibility for satellite-based monitoring (SBM) should be determined based on the elements of the offense rather than on the event, solicitation to take an indecent liberty with a minor (the offense of which defendant was convicted) inherently involves the physical, mental, or sexual abuse of a minor as required for SBM.\n5. Satellite-Based Monitoring\u2014 notice \u2014 inadequate\nDefendant did not receive adequate notice of the Department of Correction\u2019s preliminary determination that he should be required to enroll in satellite-based monitoring where the notice did not specify the category of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-208.40(a) into which the Department had determined that defendant fell, nor did it briefly state the factual basis for the conclusion.\nJudge ELMORE concurs in the result only.\nAppeal by defendant from order entered 17 April 2009 by Judge John L. Holshouser, Jr., in Rowan County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 15 April 2010.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Catherine M. (Katie) Kay ser, for State.\nRobert W. Ewing, for defendant." }, "file_name": "0192-01", "first_page_order": 216, "last_page_order": 229 }