{ "id": 4179002, "name": "PAULA DANCE, Plaintiff v. MAC MANNING, individually and in his capacity as Sheriff of Pitt County; LEE MOORE; and TRAVELERS COMPANIES, INC., as Surety for the Pitt County Sheriff, Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "Dance v. Manning", "decision_date": "2010-10-19", "docket_number": "No. COA09-1402", "first_page": "520", "last_page": "524", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "207 N.C. App. 520" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "144 S.E.2d 393", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "398" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "265 N.C. 459", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8575720 ], "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "464" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/265/0459-01" ] }, { "cite": "389 S.E.2d 819", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 N.C. 366", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 5308673, 5304354, 5305838, 5307792, 5307378 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/326/0366-01", "/nc/326/0366-02", "/nc/326/0366-05", "/nc/326/0366-04", "/nc/326/0366-03" ] }, { "cite": "385 S.E.2d 545", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "547" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "96 N.C. App. 333", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521995 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "335" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/96/0333-01" ] }, { "cite": "600 S.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "8", "parenthetical": "quoting Tompkins v. Log Systems, Inc., 96 N.C. App. 333, 335, 385 S.E.2d 545, 547 (1989), disc. review denied, 326 N.C. 366, 389 S.E.2d 819 (1990)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "165 N.C. App. 708", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8999846 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "719", "parenthetical": "quoting Tompkins v. Log Systems, Inc., 96 N.C. App. 333, 335, 385 S.E.2d 545, 547 (1989), disc. review denied, 326 N.C. 366, 389 S.E.2d 819 (1990)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/165/0708-01" ] }, { "cite": "552 S.E.2d 139", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "354 N.C. 212", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 138288 ], "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/354/0212-01" ] }, { "cite": "540 S.E.2d 775", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "783" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "141 N.C. App. 203", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9440648 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "216" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/141/0203-01" ] }, { "cite": "294 S.E.2d 371", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "306 N.C. 558", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572362, 8572333, 8572399, 8572305, 8572253 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/306/0558-04", "/nc/306/0558-03", "/nc/306/0558-05", "/nc/306/0558-02", "/nc/306/0558-01" ] }, { "cite": "291 S.E.2d 828", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "829" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "57 N.C. App. 553", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525203 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "555" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/57/0553-01" ] }, { "cite": "676 S.E.2d 96", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "103", "parenthetical": "citations and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "165 S.E.2d 490", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "275 N.C. 90", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8557826 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/275/0090-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 S.E.2d 735", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 6, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "736" }, { "page": "737" }, { "page": "737" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 N.C. 723", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 5307026 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "726" }, { "page": "727" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/326/0723-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 506, "char_count": 10763, "ocr_confidence": 0.739, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.13721494959744757 }, "sha256": "c0ffd7952d5f3e90410d6e689b145331350d182d12259529a2ba5fa6cf09e301", "simhash": "1:03e91eaf0c6fd6e6", "word_count": 1751 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:56:31.092499+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges McGEE and HUNTER, JR., Robert N. concur." ], "parties": [ "PAULA DANCE, Plaintiff v. MAC MANNING, individually and in his capacity as Sheriff of Pitt County; LEE MOORE; and TRAVELERS COMPANIES, INC., as Surety for the Pitt County Sheriff, Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "STROUD, Judge.\nPaula Dance (\u201cplaintiff\u2019) appeals from a trial court\u2019s denial of her motion for admission of an out-of-state attorney to practice pro hoc vice. For the following reasons, we dismiss plaintiff\u2019s interlocutoiy appeal.\nPlaintiff, a former deputy sheriff in Pitt County, initially filed a complaint on 17 March 2008 against Pitt County; Mac Manning, individually and in his capacity as the Sheriff of Pitt County; and Lee Moore, individually and in his capacity as Chief Deputy Sheriff of Pitt County, alleging negligent infliction of emotional distress and \u201cconstructive discharge in violation of public policy[.]\u201d On the same date, plaintiff also filed a motion seeking the admission of attorney Kimberly Tarver, from Baltimore, Maryland, to practice pro hac vice. After defendants filed motions to dismiss her complaint, plaintiff filed a voluntary dismissal without prejudice on 16 June 2008.\nOn 26 January 2009, plaintiff filed a new' complaint against Mac Manning, individually and in his capacity as Sheriff of Pitt County; Lee Moore; and Travelers Companies, Inc., as surety for the Pitt County Sheriff, alleging negligent infliction of emotional distress, \u201ccommon law obstruction of justice and civil conspiracy[,]\u201d and \u201cconstructive discharge in violation of public policy!.]\u201d Plaintiff again filed a motion for admission of out-of-state Attorney Tarver to practice pro hac vice on 26 January 2009. After defendants filed an objection to plaintiff\u2019s motion for admission of an out-of-state attorney and a motion to dismiss in part, plaintiff filed a second motion for admission of an out-of-state attorney on 11 March 2009. By order dated 13 March 2009, the trial court denied plaintiff\u2019s first motion for admission of an out-of-state attorney to practice pro hac vice. Plaintiff filed a motion for \u201cRecusal of Pitt County Resident Judges[.]\u201d Defendants Mac Manning and Lee Moore filed their answer on 31 March 2009. By order dated 5 May 2009, the trial court denied plaintiff\u2019s second motion for admission of out-of-state attorney to practice pro hac vice and granted plaintiff\u2019s motion for recusal, but only as to Judge Duke, the presiding judge. Plaintiff filed notice of appeal from the trial court\u2019s 5 May 2009 order. On 1 February 2009, defendants filed a motion with this Court to dismiss plaintiff\u2019s appeal as interlocutory.\nWe first address defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss the appeal and plaintiff\u2019s grounds for appellate review. Plaintiff concedes that this appeal is not a final judgment but interlocutory. However, plaintiff, citing Goldston v. American Motors Corp., 326 N.C. 723, 392 S.E.2d 735 (1990) and Hagins v. Redevelopment Com. of Greensboro, 275 N.C. 90, 165 S.E.2d 490 (1969), argues that her appeal is immediately appealable because it affects a \u201csubstantial right to select the attorney of her choice.\u201d We have held that\n[a] final judgment is one which disposes of the cause as to all the parties, leaving nothing to be judicially determined between them in the trial court. An interlocutory order is one made during the pendency of an action, which does not dispose of the case, but leaves it for further action by the trial court in order to settle and determine the entire controversy. An interlocutory order is generally not immediately appealable. Nonetheless, in two instances a party is permitted to appeal interlocutory orders. First, a party is permitted to appeal from an interlocutory order when the trial court enters a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties and the trial court certifies in the judgment that there is no just reason to delay the appeal. Second, a party is permitted to appeal from an interlocutory order when the order deprives the appellant of a substantial right which would be jeopardized absent a review prior to a final determination on the merits. Under either of these two circumstances, it is the appellant\u2019s burden to present appropriate grounds for this Court\u2019s acceptance of an interlocutory appeal and our Court\u2019s responsibility to review those grounds.\nBullard, v. Tall House Bldg. Co., \u2014 N.C. App. \u2014, \u2014, 676 S.E.2d 96, 103 (2009) (citations and quotation marks omitted).\nHere, plaintiffs appeal is not a final judgment as the denial of her motion only addressed the issue of counsel for plaintiff but not the substantive claims made by plaintiff in her complaint. Therefore, plaintiff\u2019s appeal is interlocutory. The trial court made no certification in its judgment that there was no just reason for delay. Plaintiff simply asserts that she has a substantial right to be represented by out-of-state counsel, but our Courts have never held that this is true in all circumstances. In addressing the plaintiff\u2019s appeal from a trial court\u2019s denial of the plaintiff\u2019s motion for admission of counsel pro hac vice, this Court held that\nsuch order does not involve a substantial right and is not appealable as a matter of right. This is so because parties do not have a right to be represented in the courts of North Carolina by counsel who are not duly licensed to practice in this state. Admission of counsel in North Carolina pro hac vice is not a right but a discretionary privilege. It is permissive and subject to the sound discretion of the Court.\nLeonard v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 57 N.C. App. 553, 555, 291 S.E.2d 828, 829 (citations and quotation marks omitted), disc. review denied, 306 N.C. 558, 294 S.E.2d 371 (1982).\nPlaintiff argues that in Goldston v. American Motors Corp., the Supreme Court held that the plaintiff\u2019s interlocutory appeal should be considered as she had a substantial right to have her out-of-state attorney represent her in her lawsuit. 326 N.C. at 726, 392 S.E.2d at 736. However, in Goldston, the plaintiff\u2019s attorney \u201chad been properly admitted pro hac vice under the statute and was actively involved in plaintiff\u2019s lawsuit\u201d from 1986 until 1989, when he was removed as a result of a defendant\u2019s motion based upon allegations related to receipt of confidential information from a former employee of AMC. Id. at 727, 392 S.E.2d at 737. In addition, the plaintiff\u2019s attorney was an \u201calleged expert in cases of\u2019 the type brought by the plaintiff in Goldston, who had \u201cyears of experience and know-how\u201d in lawsuits against \u201cmajor manufacturers of jeeps and related vehicles for tort liability[.]\u201d Id. The Court explained that \u201conce the attorney was admitted under the statute, plaintiff acquired a substantial right to the continuation of representation by that attorney \u2014 just as with any other attorney duly admitted to practice law in the State of North Carolina.\u201d Id. However, this Court has recognized that Goldston \u201cinvolved litigation that had been ongoing for several years and an attorney who had a national reputation in handling products liability cases against a particular defendant,\u201d distinguishing Goldston from a case in which the \u201clitigation is still in its infancy, and plaintiffs\u2019 counsel does not hold any unique expertise that cannot be found elsewhere in our state bar.\u201d Smith v. Beaufort County Hosp. Ass\u2019n, Inc., 141 N.C. App. 203, 216, 540 S.E.2d 775, 783 (2000), aff\u2019d per curiam, 354 N.C. 212, 552 S.E.2d 139 (2001).\nIn her brief, plaintiff argues further that the trial court\u2019s denial of the admission of Attorney Tarver \u201cis in effect a revocation of her admission\u201d since she had previously filed another lawsuit arising from the same events and in which Attorney Tarver was admitted to practice pro hac vice. However, here plaintiff had filed a voluntary dismissal of her first lawsuit; Goldston dealt with the removal of counsel in ongoing litigation where the counsel was properly admitted at the inception of his representation in that same lawsuit. 326 N.C. at 727, 392 S.E.2d at 737. When a plaintiff files a voluntary dismissal, \u201c \u2018it [is] as if the suit had never been filed.\u2019 \u201d Barham v. Hawk, 165 N.C. App. 708, 719, 600 S.E.2d 1, 8 (2004) (quoting Tompkins v. Log Systems, Inc., 96 N.C. App. 333, 335, 385 S.E.2d 545, 547 (1989), disc. review denied, 326 N.C. 366, 389 S.E.2d 819 (1990)). Any orders entered in the first lawsuit have no relevance to the newly filed lawsuit, as the dismissal \u201c \u2018carries down with it previous rulings and orders in the case.\u2019 \u201d Id. (quoting Gibbs v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 265 N.C. 459, 464, 144 S.E.2d 393, 398 (1965)).\nHere, Attorney Tarver was never admitted pro hac vice in the current lawsuit and plaintiff has not demonstrated that she was actively involved in ongoing litigation on plaintiff\u2019s behalf for several years or that she has any special expertise required for plaintiff\u2019s representation in this case, so we hold that Goldston is inapplicable to the case before us. We also find Hagins v. Redevelopment Com. of Greensboro, 275 N.C. 90, 165 S.E.2d 490 (1969), inapplicable as it does not address an interlocutory appeal or the issue of admission of an out-of-state counsel to practice in this State pro hac vice.\nAs plaintiff\u2019s interlocutory appeal does not affect a substantial right, we grant defendant\u2019s motion and dismiss plaintiff\u2019s appeal.\nDISMISSED.\nJudges McGEE and HUNTER, JR., Robert N. concur.\n. In their brief, defendants state that \u201c[a]t the time of this appeal, Travelers Companies, Inc. had not been served with [this] Summons and Complaint, and therefore, is not a party to this appeal.\u201d The record contains civil summons issued to defendants Manning and Moore but no summons issued to Travelers Companies, Inc. Plaintiff makes no argument that Travelers Companies, Inc. is a party to this appeal. As it appears that Travelers Companies, Inc. was not a party to the proceeding before the trial court, Travelers Companies, Inc. is not a party to this appeal.", "type": "majority", "author": "STROUD, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Willie S. Darby, for plaintiff-appellant.", "Cranfill Sumner & Hartzog, LLP, by Katie Weaver Hartzog, for defendants-appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "PAULA DANCE, Plaintiff v. MAC MANNING, individually and in his capacity as Sheriff of Pitt County; LEE MOORE; and TRAVELERS COMPANIES, INC., as Surety for the Pitt County Sheriff, Defendants\nNo. COA09-1402\n(Filed 19 October 2010)\nAppeal and Error\u2014 interlocutory order \u2014 denial of motion to admit pro hac vice attorney \u2014 no substantial right\nPlaintiff\u2019s appeal from the trial court\u2019s denial of her motion for admission of an out-of-state attorney to practice pro hac vice was dismissed as interlocutory. The trial court\u2019s order did not involve a substantial right and was not appealable as a matter of right because parties do not have a right to be represented in the courts of North Carolina by counsel who are not duly licensed to practice in this state.\nAppeal by plaintiff from order entered 8 May 2009 by Judge W. Russell Duke, Jr. in Superior Court, Pitt County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 14 April 2010.\nWillie S. Darby, for plaintiff-appellant.\nCranfill Sumner & Hartzog, LLP, by Katie Weaver Hartzog, for defendants-appellees." }, "file_name": "0520-01", "first_page_order": 544, "last_page_order": 548 }