{
  "id": 4179160,
  "name": "DARE COUNTY, TOWN OF NAGS HEAD, TOWN OF SOUTHERN SHORES, STARCO REALTY & CONSTRUCTION, INC., JOSEPH M. GERAGHTY, WASHINGTON COUNTY, CURRITUCK COUNTY, HYDE COUNTY, THE TOWN OF DUCK, THE TOWN OF SOUTHERN SHORES, CARTERET COUNTY, THE TOWN OF PINE KNOLL SHORES, THE TOWN OF INDIAN BEACH, and THE TOWN OF KILL DEVIL HILLS, Petitioners v. THE NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE, COMMISSIONER OF INSURANCE WAYNE GOODWIN and NORTH CAROLINA RATE BUREAU, Respondents; and DARE COUNTY, WASHINGTON COUNTY, CURRITUCK COUNTY, HYDE COUNTY, CARTERET COUNTY, NEW HANOVER COUNTY, BRUNSWICK COUNTY, CHOWAN COUNTY, PERQUIMANS COUNTY, TYRREL[L] COUNTY, PAMLICO COUNTY, PASQUOTANK COUNTY, TOWN OF NAGS HEAD, TOWN OF DUCK, TOWN OF SOUTHERN SHORES, TOWN OF INDIAN BEACH, TOWN OF PINE KNOLL SHORES, TOWN OF EMERALD ISLE, TOWN OF KILL DEVIL HILLS, TOWN OF KURE BEACH, TOWN OF CEDAR POINT, TOWN OF HERTFORD, STARCO REALTY & CONSTRUCTION, INC., [and] JOSEPH M. GERAGHTY, Petitionees v. THE NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE, COMMISSIONER OF INSURANCE WAYNE GOODWIN and NORTH CAROLINA RATE BUREAU, Respondents",
  "name_abbreviation": "Dare County v. North Carolina Department of Insurance",
  "decision_date": "2010-11-02",
  "docket_number": "No. COA09-1171 and 1172",
  "first_page": "600",
  "last_page": "617",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "207 N.C. App. 600"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.",
    "id": 14983,
    "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 5,
    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 58",
      "category": "laws:leg_statute",
      "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 58-36-25",
      "category": "laws:leg_statute",
      "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.",
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 2009,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "(a)"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "390 S.E.2d 176",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1990,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "179"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "98 N.C. App. 41",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C. App.",
      "case_ids": [
        8522439
      ],
      "year": 1990,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "46"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc-app/98/0041-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 58-2-75",
      "category": "laws:leg_statute",
      "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.",
      "weight": 14,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "421 S.E.2d 812",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1992,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "814"
        },
        {
          "page": "814",
          "parenthetical": "stating that \"before a party may ask a court to rule on an adverse administrative determination . . . there must be a final agency decision.\""
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "107 N.C. App. 710",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C. App.",
      "case_ids": [
        8527932
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1992,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "713"
        },
        {
          "page": "713"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc-app/107/0710-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "277 S.E.2d 403",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1981,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "406",
          "parenthetical": "citing N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 150A-43 (1978) [replaced by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 150B-43]"
        },
        {
          "page": "406"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "303 N.C. 102",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8571514
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1981,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "104-05",
          "parenthetical": "citing N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 150A-43 (1978) [replaced by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 150B-43]"
        },
        {
          "page": "104-05"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/303/0102-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "435 S.E.2d 359",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "weight": 3,
      "year": 1993,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "362"
        },
        {
          "page": "362"
        },
        {
          "page": "362"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "112 N.C. App. 161",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C. App.",
      "case_ids": [
        8520617
      ],
      "weight": 3,
      "year": 1993,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "164"
        },
        {
          "page": "164"
        },
        {
          "page": "164"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc-app/112/0161-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "588 S.E.2d 880",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 2003,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "883"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "357 N.C. 640",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        491640
      ],
      "year": 2003,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "644"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/357/0640-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "284 S.E.2d 457",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1981,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "parenthetical": "other citations omitted"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "304 N.C. 427",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8569012
      ],
      "year": 1981,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "parenthetical": "other citations omitted"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/304/0427-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "314 S.E.2d 739",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1984,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "742",
          "parenthetical": "citing Media, Inc. v. McDowell County, 304 N.C. 427, 284 S.E.2d 457 (1981) (other citations omitted)"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "310 N.C. 669",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        2392835
      ],
      "year": 1984,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "674",
          "parenthetical": "citing Media, Inc. v. McDowell County, 304 N.C. 427, 284 S.E.2d 457 (1981) (other citations omitted)"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/310/0669-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "529 S.E.2d 676",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 2000,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "681"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "352 N.C. 61",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        685063
      ],
      "year": 2000,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "68"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/352/0061-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "90 S.E. 1013",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.",
      "year": 1916,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "parenthetical": "other citations omitted"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "172 N.C. 818",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        11255633
      ],
      "year": 1916,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "parenthetical": "other citations omitted"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/172/0818-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "144 N.C. 472",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8660759
      ],
      "year": 1907,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/144/0472-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "178 S.E. 248",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.",
      "year": 1935,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "207 N.C. 722",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8628205
      ],
      "year": 1935,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/207/0722-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "74 S.E. 98",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.",
      "year": 1912,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "158 N.C. 594",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8656025
      ],
      "year": 1912,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/158/0594-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "8 S.E.2d 252",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1940,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "217 N.C. 391",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8608383
      ],
      "year": 1940,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/217/0391-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "68 S.E.2d 311",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1951,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "parenthetical": "citing Cox v. Kinston, 217 N.C. 391, 8 S.E.2d 252 (1940); Caudle v. Morris, 158 N.C. 594, 74 S.E. 98 (1912); Brown v. Kress & Co., 207 N.C. 722, 178 S.E. 248 (1935); Vivian v. Mitchell, 144 N.C. 472 (1907); Lindsey v. Knights of Honor, 172 N.C. 818, 90 S.E. 1013 (1916"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "234 N.C. 651",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8625437
      ],
      "year": 1951,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "parenthetical": "citing Cox v. Kinston, 217 N.C. 391, 8 S.E.2d 252 (1940); Caudle v. Morris, 158 N.C. 594, 74 S.E. 98 (1912); Brown v. Kress & Co., 207 N.C. 722, 178 S.E. 248 (1935); Vivian v. Mitchell, 144 N.C. 472 (1907); Lindsey v. Knights of Honor, 172 N.C. 818, 90 S.E. 1013 (1916"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/234/0651-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "572 S.E.2d 429",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 2002,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "356 N.C. 434",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        1511169,
        1511387,
        1511370,
        1511183,
        1511131
      ],
      "year": 2002,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/356/0434-04",
        "/nc/356/0434-05",
        "/nc/356/0434-02",
        "/nc/356/0434-03",
        "/nc/356/0434-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "556 S.E.2d 609",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 2001,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "617"
        },
        {
          "page": "618"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "147 N.C. App. 596",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C. App.",
      "case_ids": [
        9380765
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 2001,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "603"
        },
        {
          "page": "605"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc-app/147/0596-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "610 S.E.2d 210",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 2005,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "212"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "169 N.C. App. 151",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C. App.",
      "case_ids": [
        8468804
      ],
      "year": 2005,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "155"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc-app/169/0151-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "676 S.E.2d 579",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 2009,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "583",
          "parenthetical": "quoting Hatcher v. Harrah's N.C. Casino Co., LLC, 169 N.C. App. 151, 155, 610 S.E.2d 210, 212 (2005)"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "197 N.C. App. 176",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C. App.",
      "case_ids": [
        4167979
      ],
      "year": 2009,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "181",
          "parenthetical": "quoting Hatcher v. Harrah's N.C. Casino Co., LLC, 169 N.C. App. 151, 155, 610 S.E.2d 210, 212 (2005)"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc-app/197/0176-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "353 S.E.2d 673",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1987,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "675"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "84 N.C. App. 666",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C. App.",
      "case_ids": [
        12169132
      ],
      "year": 1987,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "667"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc-app/84/0666-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 58-2-53",
      "category": "laws:leg_statute",
      "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.",
      "weight": 9,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 58-2-80",
      "category": "laws:leg_statute",
      "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.",
      "weight": 8,
      "year": 2009,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "11 N.C. Admin. Code 1",
      "category": "laws:admin_compilation",
      "reporter": "N.C. Admin. Code",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "692 S.E.2d 155",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "weight": 4,
      "year": 2010,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "156-57",
          "parenthetical": "Dare County I"
        },
        {
          "page": "158"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 58-36-15",
      "category": "laws:leg_statute",
      "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.",
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 2007,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "(a)"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 58-2-1",
      "category": "laws:leg_statute",
      "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.",
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 2001,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "597 S.E.2d 128",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 2004,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "parenthetical": "citing N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 58-2-1 (2001)"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "358 N.C. 539",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        2986386
      ],
      "year": 2004,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "parenthetical": "citing N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 58-2-1 (2001)"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/358/0539-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "586 S.E.2d 470",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 2003,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "471"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "160 N.C. App. 416",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C. App.",
      "case_ids": [
        8956547
      ],
      "year": 2003,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "418"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc-app/160/0416-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 58-2-5",
      "category": "laws:leg_statute",
      "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.",
      "year": 2009,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 58-36-5",
      "category": "laws:leg_statute",
      "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.",
      "year": 2009,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "(a)"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 58-36-1",
      "category": "laws:leg_statute",
      "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.",
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 2009,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "(1)"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 1284,
    "char_count": 44990,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.725,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 5.3430235726826605e-08,
      "percentile": 0.33604758424139786
    },
    "sha256": "46deab3702d830e786a7b71cd84bcf99f724699cff6cc3d5d90df95c81ab75d7",
    "simhash": "1:398b11709af36e50",
    "word_count": 7200
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:56:31.092499+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Judges BRYANT and ELMORE concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "DARE COUNTY, TOWN OF NAGS HEAD, TOWN OF SOUTHERN SHORES, STARCO REALTY & CONSTRUCTION, INC., JOSEPH M. GERAGHTY, WASHINGTON COUNTY, CURRITUCK COUNTY, HYDE COUNTY, THE TOWN OF DUCK, THE TOWN OF SOUTHERN SHORES, CARTERET COUNTY, THE TOWN OF PINE KNOLL SHORES, THE TOWN OF INDIAN BEACH, and THE TOWN OF KILL DEVIL HILLS, Petitioners v. THE NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE, COMMISSIONER OF INSURANCE WAYNE GOODWIN and NORTH CAROLINA RATE BUREAU, Respondents and DARE COUNTY, WASHINGTON COUNTY, CURRITUCK COUNTY, HYDE COUNTY, CARTERET COUNTY, NEW HANOVER COUNTY, BRUNSWICK COUNTY, CHOWAN COUNTY, PERQUIMANS COUNTY, TYRREL[L] COUNTY, PAMLICO COUNTY, PASQUOTANK COUNTY, TOWN OF NAGS HEAD, TOWN OF DUCK, TOWN OF SOUTHERN SHORES, TOWN OF INDIAN BEACH, TOWN OF PINE KNOLL SHORES, TOWN OF EMERALD ISLE, TOWN OF KILL DEVIL HILLS, TOWN OF KURE BEACH, TOWN OF CEDAR POINT, TOWN OF HERTFORD, STARCO REALTY & CONSTRUCTION, INC., [and] JOSEPH M. GERAGHTY, Petitionees v. THE NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE, COMMISSIONER OF INSURANCE WAYNE GOODWIN and NORTH CAROLINA RATE BUREAU, Respondents"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "ERVIN, Judge.\nPetitioners appeal from an order dismissing their petitions ultimately intended to result in judicial review of a consent order entered by the Commissioner of Insurance. After careful consideration of Petitioners\u2019 arguments in light of the record and the applicable law, we conclude that the trial court\u2019s order should be affirmed.\nI. Factual Background\nA. Substantive Facts\n1. Insurance Ratemaking Procedures\nThe North Carolina Rate Bureau was created by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 58-36-1 (2009) for the purpose of representing companies that sell insurance, including \u201cinsurance against loss to residential real property ... and any contents thereoff.]\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 58-36-1(1). An insurance company must be a member of the Rate Bureau before it may write insurance in North Carolina. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 58-36-5(a) (2009). The Commissioner is an elected State official, see N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 58-2-5 (2009), whose \u201cduties as chief officer of the Department of Insurance are broadly described as \u2018the execution of laws relating to insurance.\u2019 \u201d State ex rel. Comm\u2019r of Ins. v. N.C. Rate Bureau, 160 N.C. App. 416, 418, 586 S.E.2d 470, 471 (2003), aff\u2019d, 358 N.C. 539, 597 S.E.2d 128 (2004) (citing N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 58-2-1 (2001)). Similarly, the Department of Insurance is an agency of the State of North Carolina that is responsible, among other things, for \u201cexecution of the laws relating to insurance.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 58-2-1 (2009).\nIn seeking a change in homeowners\u2019 insurance rates:\nThe [Rate] Bureau must submit proposed rate changes ... to the Commissioner. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 58-36-15(a) (2007). . . . Once the Bureau has completed a rate filing with the required information, it is submitted to the Commissioner for consideration. The rate filing may be approved in one of two ways: (1) the Commissioner may formally approve the filing; or (2) if the Commissioner does not issue a notice of hearing within 50 days of the rate filing, the rate filing is deemed approved by operation of law. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 58-36-15 and 58-36-20 (2007). . . .\nIf . . . the Commissioner determines that the rates requested are \u201cexcessive, inadequate or unfairly discriminatory,\u201d the Commissioner must.. . fix[] a date for hearing[.] ... If a hearing is ordered, the Bureau and the Department both participate in the hearing as opposing parties, with the Commissioner serving as the hearing officer to adjudicate the dispute.\nState ex rel. Comm\u2019r of Ins. v. Dare County, \u2014 N.C. App. \u2014, 692 S.E.2d 155, 156-57 (2010) (Dare County I). During the consideration of an application for increased homeowners\u2019 insurance rates, the Rate Bureau and the Department may, subject to the Commissioner\u2019s approval, reach a settlement concerning the appropriate level of homeowners\u2019 insurance rates:\nPursuant to the North Carolina Administrative Code, \u201c[i]nformal disposition may be made of a contested case or an issue in a contested case by stipulation, agreement, or consent order at any time during the proceedings. Parties may enter into such agreements on their own or may ask for a settlement conference with the hearing officer to promote consensual disposition of the case.\u201d\nId., \u2014 N.C. App. at \u2014, 692 S.E.2d at 157 (citing 11 N.C. Admin. Code 1.0417 (2008)). The consent order at issue in this case resulted from the use of such a settlement process.\n2. Consent Order\nOn 8 December 2008, the Rate Bureau filed a request with the Commissioner seeking \u201crevised premium rates for homeowners\u2019 insurance subject to the jurisdiction of the Rate Bureau.\u201d In its filing, the Rate Bureau requested a statewide average increase in homeowners\u2019 insurance rates of 19.5%, with the proposed increases in coastal territories ranging from 32.1% to 69.8%. The Rate Bureau\u2019s filing was assigned Docket No. 1434 by the Department. On 11 December 2008, the Rate Bureau submitted a second filing seeking approval for certain alterations in the territories used to establish homeowners\u2019 insurance rates. On 18 December 2008, the Commissioner, the Department, and the Rate Bureau executed a \u201cConsolidated Settlement Agreement and Consent Order,\u201d in which the parties agreed to and the Commissioner approved changes in existing homeowners\u2019 insurance rates and territories. According to the consent order:\nThe Rate Bureau and the Department have agreed to settle the 2008 Rate Filing and the 2008 Territory Filing. The proposed settlement would approve the revised territorial definitions and would provide for an overall statewide rate increase of 3.9%, with changes varying by form and territory[.] . . .\nIt appearing to the Commissioner that the Rate Bureau and the Department have, after consultation . . . and subject to approval by the Commissioner ... entered into a settlement of all matters and things in dispute in connection with the 2008 Rate Filing and the 2008 Territory Filing; . . . and it appearing to the Commissioner that settlement under the circumstances set forth above is fair and reasonable and should be approved:\nNOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED AND AGREED as follows:\n1. The 2008 Rate Filing is approved subject to the modification set forth . . . below.\n2. The revised territorial definitions . . . are approved.\n3. The approved overall rate level increase is 3.9%. The approved territory rate level changes . . . are set forth on . . . Exhibit A.. . . The resulting approved territory base class premiums . . . are set forth on . . . Exhibit B. Exhibits A and B are incorporated herein by reference.\n4. The revised rates are to become effective ... on or after May 1, 2009.\n5. The parties acknowledge that by entering into this Consent Order neither is condoning ... or agreeing to the other\u2019s theories, methodologies or calculations regarding . . . profit, . . . territory risk load, and/or any other theory, methodology or calculation . . . [and that] by entering into this Consent Order neither is bound or limited in . . . any future rate filings . . . subject to the Bureau\u2019s jurisdiction by the theories, methodologies or calculations . . . [in] the 2008 Rate Filing.\n6. The Bureau acknowledges the Department\u2019s position that by entering into this Consent Order the Department is not validating or accepting the computer model used in the 2008 Rate Filing . . . [or] committing to use computer modeling in future rate filings. The parties agree that they will diligently meet and consult with each other to analyze data with respect to areas of the state with chronically high loss costs, will review computer models of North Carolina\u2019s vulnerability to hurricanes and other wind losses and will generally analyze the data as to this line of insurance in an effort to resolve their remaining differences, all to the end that rates be set and maintained both statewide and by territory that are neither excessive, inadequate nor unfairly discriminatory, and that the availability of insurance at actuarially appropriate rate levels is enhanced.\nThe basic effect of the Commissioner\u2019s decision to approve the settlement embodied in the consent order was to raise statewide average homeowners\u2019 insurance rates by 3.89%, to raise rates for property owners in coastal territories by 6.5% to 29.8%, and to reduce rates for condominium owners and tenants in coastal territories by 2% to 25%. The consent order also divided one of the territories used to establish rates for homeowners\u2019 insurance located in the coastal area into two separate territories.\nAfter the issuance of the consent order, Petitioners initiated three different proceedings for the purpose of obtaining review of the consent order and of the proceedings that led to its adoption, two of which are involved in the present appeal. We will discuss the history of each of those proceedings in turn.\n3. Petitioners\u2019 Direct Anneal\nPetitioners noted an appeal from the consent order to this Court on 20 January 2009. The basis for Petitioner\u2019s attempt to directly appeal the consent order to this Court hinged on N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 58-2-80 (2009), which provides that:\nAny order or decision of the Commissioner that the premium rates charged or filed on all or any class of risks are excessive, inadequate, unreasonable, unfairly discriminatory or are otherwise not in the public interest or that a classification or classification assignment is unwarranted, unreasonable, improper, unfairly discriminatory or not in the public interest may be appealed to the North Carolina Court of Appeals by any party aggrieved thereby. . . .\nOn 20 April 2010, we filed an opinion holding that Petitioners were not entitled to directly appeal the consent order to this Court pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 58-2-80, which reasoned that:\nThe plain language of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 58-2-80 limits direct appeals of rate changes to this Court to \u201c[a]ny order or decision of the Commissioner that the premium rates charged or filed on all or any class of risks are excessive, inadequate,... or are otherwise not in the public interest[.]\u201d ... [T]he Commissioner would only issue an order -with the requisite findings after presiding over a contested hearing on a rate filing. This Court cannot assume jurisdiction over any order of the Commissioner that does not include those requisite findings without acting contrary to the plain language of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 58-2-80.\nDare County I, \u2014 N.C. App. at \u2014, 692 S.E.2d at 158. As a result, since the consent order lacked the findings required to trigger application of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 58-2-80, this Court held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Petitioners\u2019 direct appeal from the consent order and dismissed it.\n4. Petitioners\u2019 Request for Relief from the Commissioner\nOn 16 January 2009, Petitioners Dare County, Town of Nags Head, Starco Realty & Construction, Inc., Joseph M. Geraghty, Washington County, Currituck County, Hyde County, the Town of Duck, the Town of Southern Shores, and the Town of Indian Beach filed a motion to \u201cintervene in the proceedings resulting in the 18 December 2008 [consent order].\u201d Petitioners asserted that they were \u201centitled to intervention as [a matter] of right pursuant to [N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1,] Rule 24(a)(2),\u201d and that they were \u201c \u2018persons aggrieved\u2019 within the meaning of [N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7] 150B-2(6).\u201d In addition, Petitioners requested a hearing \u201cin the event that any party oppose [d] their intervention\u201d and moved that, in the event that Respondents contended that the proceedings were closed, \u201cthese proceedings be re-opened[.]\u201d Petitioners also sought a \u201chearing with the Department [of Insurance]\u201d on \u201call issues arising in connection with\u201d the consent order, a hearing pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 60, and reconsideration of the consent order. Petitioners\u2019 motion was assigned File No. 09 CvS 7841 in the Wake County Superior Court and Case No. COA09-1171 on appeal before this Court. On 19 March 2009, Petitioners moved for the entry of an order staying the implementation of the consent order.\nOn 19 March 2009, Petitioners Brunswick County, Carteret County, Chowan County, Kure Beach, New Hanover County, Perquimans County, Tyrrell County, Town of Carolina Beach, Town of Cedar Point, Town of Emerald Isle, Town of Kill Devil Hills, and Town of Pine Knoll Shores moved to intervene in the proceedings before the Commissioner in reliance on the arguments advanced in the motions previously filed by the other Petitioners. The record does not indicate that a hearing was held on the motion filed by the second group of Petitioners; however, the petition for judicial review filed in connection with this proceeding indicates that it was filed by all Petitioners.\nThe Rate Bureau and the Department moved to dismiss Petitioners\u2019 petition on 26 January 2009 and 16 February 2009, respectively. In seeking dismissal of Petitioners\u2019 filings, the Rate Bureau and the Department argued that there was no longer an ongoing proceeding in which Petitioners could intervene, that Petitioners were not \u201caggrieved\u201d parties, and that the filed rate doctrine barred further review by the Commissioner.\nOn 7 April 2009, a hearing was conducted before Department of Insurance Hearing Officer William K. Hale. On 16 April 2009, Hearing Officer Hale issued an order denying and dismissing Petitioners\u2019 request to intervene, request for a hearing, request for reconsideration, and motion to stay the implementation of the consent order. On 20 April 2009, Petitioners filed a petition seeking judicial review of Hearing Officer Hale\u2019s order in the Wake County Superior Court.\n5. Petitioners\u2019 Petitions for Judicial Review in Superior Court\nOn 20 January 2009, Petitioners filed a petition in the Wake County Superior Court seeking judicial review of the consent order, the entry of a judgment declaring that the Commissioner erred, the issuance of a writ directing the Commissioner to hold a public hearing, and the entry of an order staying implementation of the rates approved by the consent order. This petition was assigned Case No. 09-CVS-1073 in the trial court and Case No. COA09-1172 before this Court.\nOn 16 February 2009, the Department and the Commissioner filed a motion to dismiss Petitioners\u2019 judicial review petitions pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) (2009), for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim for relief. The Rate Bureau filed a similar dismissal motion on 20 March 2009.\nOn 20 April 2009, Petitioners filed a petition in Wake County Superior Court seeking judicial review of Hearing Officer Hale\u2019s order. On 22 April 2009, the Department, the Commissioner, and the Rate Bureau moved to dismiss this petition for several reasons, including a contention that N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 58-2-53 \u201celiminates Petitioners from the categories of persons who may seek judicial review of rate-making decisions\u201d of the Commissioner.\nOn 23 April 2009, the trial court conducted a hearing on the dismissal motions and on Petitioners\u2019 motion to stay implementation of the consent order. On 29 April 2009, the trial court entered an order dismissing Petitioners\u2019 petitions and denying their stay motions on the grounds that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and that Petitioners lacked standing to seek review of the consent order. The trial court\u2019s order stated, in pertinentpart, that:\nTHE ABOVE-CAPTIONED MATTERS (09 CVS 1073 and 09 CVS 7841) HAVING COME ON FOR HEARING ... on Motions to Dismiss filed by the North Carolina Rate Bureau . . . and the [Commissioner] . . . through which Motions to Dismiss the Rate Bureau, Department and Commissioner assert the following:\n(1) That Petitioners lack standing to pursue the relief sought through Petitioners\u2019 Petition for Judicial Review, Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, Writ, and Motion for Stay of Administrative Decision in File 09 CVS 1073;\n(2) That Petitioners lack standing to pursue the relief sought through Petitioners\u2019 Verified Petition for Judicial Review, Motion for Stay, and Request for Declaratory Judgment and Writ in File 09 CVS 7841; and\n(3) That this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider the Petitioners\u2019 claims in Files 09 CVS 1073 and 09 CVS 7841.\nTHE PETITIONERS also brought on for hearing . . . their Motions to Stay in Files 09 CVS 1073 and 09 CVS 7841.\nAND THE COURT having fully considered the record and all the pleadings, memoranda, exhibits, and affidavits of the parties, ... in each File 09 CVS 1073 and 09 CVS 7841, and having further considered the arguments of counsel. . .;\nTHE COURT is of the opinion that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider the claims asserted by the Petitioners in Files 09 CVS 1073 and 09 CVS 7841, and is of the further opinion that Petitioners [] lack standing to pursue the claims and seek the relief asserted by them in Files 09 CVS 1073 and 09 CVS 7841, and that Respondents\u2019 Motions to Dismiss should therefore be allowed.\nWHEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWED:\n1. Respondents\u2019 Motions to Dismiss are hereby allowed on the grounds set forth within this Order;\n2. Petitioners\u2019 Petition for Judicial Review, Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, Writ, and Motion for Stay of Administrative Decision in File 09 CVS 1073 is hereby dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and lack of standing on the part of Petitioners to pursue the claims and seek the relief asserted in that action;\n3. Petitioners\u2019 Verified Petition for Judicial Review, Motion for Stay, and Request for Declaratory Judgment and Writ in File 09 CVS 7841 is hereby dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and lack of standing on the part of Petitioners to pursue the claims and seek the relief asserted in that action.\n4. Petitioners\u2019 Motions to Stay in Files 09 CVS 1073 and 09 CVS 7841 cannot be considered by this Court due to the Court\u2019s lack of subject matter jurisdiction and the Petitioners\u2019 lack of standing, and those Motions to Stay are rendered moot by the Court\u2019s dismissal through this Order of the Petition and Verified Petition in Files 09 CVS 1073 and 09 CVS 7841, respectively.\nPetitioners noted two separate appeals to this Court from the trial court\u2019s order, which were assigned Case Nos. COA09-1171 (the appeal from the trial court\u2019s order dismissing Petitioners\u2019 request for review of Hearing Officer Hale\u2019s order) and COA09-1172 (the appeal from the trial court\u2019s order dismissing Petitioner\u2019s request for review of the consent order). As a result of the fact that these two appeals arose from a common set of facts and involved common issues of law, this Court consolidated the two appeals for purposes of briefing, argument, and decision on 19 November 2009. See N.C.R. App. P. 40 (2009) (stating that \u201c[t]wo or more actions that involve common issues of law may be consolidated for hearing . . . upon the initiative of [the appellate] court\u201d).\nII. Legal Analysis\nA. Standard of Review\nThe trial court dismissed Petitioners\u2019 review petitions for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. \u201cSubject matter jurisdiction refers to the power of the court to deal with the kind of action in question\u201d and is \u201cconferred upon the courts by either the North Carolina Constitution or by statute.\u2019 \u201d Harris v. Pembaur, 84 N.C. App. 666, 667, 353 S.E.2d 673, 675 (1987)). \u201c \u2018[T]he standard of review on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of jurisdiction is de novo.\u2019 \u201d State ex rel. Cooper v. Seneca-Cayuga Tobacco Co., 197 N.C. App. 176, 181, 676 S.E.2d 579, 583 (2009) (quoting Hatcher v. Harrah\u2019s N.C. Casino Co., LLC, 169 N.C. App. 151, 155, 610 S.E.2d 210, 212 (2005)). \u201cWhen reviewing a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to [N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1,] Rule 12(b)(1), a trial court may consider and weigh matters outside the pleadings.\u201d Department of Trans. v. Blue, 147 N.C. App. 596, 603, 556 S.E.2d 609, 617 (2001), disc. review denied, 356 N.C. 434, 572 S.E.2d 429 (2002).\nB. Right to Judicial Review\nThe initial issue that we must address in evaluating Petitioners\u2019 challenges to the trial court\u2019s order is whether the trial court \u201chad jurisdiction to hear and determine [Petitioners\u2019] petitions for judicial review.\u201d According to well-established provisions of North Carolina law:\nThere is no inherent or inalienable right of appeal from an inferior court to a superior court or from a superior court to the Supreme Court. A fortiori, no appeal lies from an order or decision of an administrative agency of the State . . . unless the right is granted by statute.... [T]he appeal must conform to the statute granting the right and regulating the procedure. The statutory requirements are mandatory and not directory. They are conditions precedent to obtaining a review by the courts and must be observed. Noncompliance therewith requires dismissal.\nIn re Employment Security Com., 234 N.C. 651, 68 S.E.2d 311 (1951) (citing Cox v. Kinston, 217 N.C. 391, 8 S.E.2d 252 (1940); Caudle v. Morris, 158 N.C. 594, 74 S.E. 98 (1912); Brown v. Kress & Co., 207 N.C. 722, 178 S.E. 248 (1935); Vivian v. Mitchell, 144 N.C. 472 (1907); Lindsey v. Knights of Honor, 172 N.C. 818, 90 S.E. 1013 (1916) (other citations omitted). Although Petitioners\u2019 argue that the \u201clegal principles governing administrative agencies . .. require that there be some avenue by which persons aggrieved can challenge an administrative decision,\u201d that assumption is simply not consistent with the applicable law. Instead, judicial review of the consent order is only available to Petitioners in the event that the General Assembly has enacted legislation that authorizes Petitioners to seek and obtain such review. Thus, the extent to which the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over Petitioners\u2019 request for judicial review of the consent order depends upon whether the General Assembly has enacted any statutory provisions authorizing Petitioners to seek and obtain judicial review of the consent order.\n\u201cInsurance law in this state is governed by chapter 58 of the North Carolina General Statutes.\u201d Gray v. North Carolina Ins. Underwriting Ass\u2019n, 352 N.C. 61, 68, 529 S.E.2d 676, 681 (2000). Several provisions of Chapter 58 address the extent of a person\u2019s right to obtain judicial review of an order or decision by the Commissioner. The Administrative Procedure Act includes provisions relating to the issue of judicial review of agency action as well. \u201c[It is] a fundamental canon of statutory construction that statutes which are in pari materia, i.e., which relate or are applicable to the same matter or subject, although enacted at different times must be construed together in order to ascertain legislative intent.\u201d Carver v. Carver, 310 N.C. 669, 674, 314 S.E.2d 739, 742 (1984) (citing Media, Inc. v. McDowell County, 304 N.C. 427, 284 S.E.2d 457 (1981) (other citations omitted)). Since the issue of whether the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over Petitioners\u2019 challenges to the consent order implicates statutes found in both Chapter 58 of the North Carolina General Statutes and the Administrative Procedure Act, we must, therefore, consider the relevant statutory provisions in pari materia.\nThe Administrative Procedure Act sets out \u201ca uniform system of administrative rule making and adjudicatory procedures for agencies.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 150B-l(a) (2009). \u201cIn North Carolina, disputes between a state government agency and another person may be formally resolved with the filing of an administrative proceeding referred to as a \u2018contested case.\u2019 \u201d N.C. Forestry Ass\u2019n v. N.C. Dep\u2019t of Env\u2019t & Natural Res., 357 N.C. 640, 644, 588 S.E.2d 880, 883 (2003). \u201cThe contested case provisions of [the Administrative Procedure Act] apply to all agencies and all proceedings not expressly exempted[.]\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 150B-l(e). The \u201cDepartment of Insurance is a state agency and as such is subject to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), [N.C. Gen. Stat.] \u00a7\u00a7 150B-1 to -52 (1991).\u201d In re Appeal by McCrary, 112 N.C. App. 161, 164, 435 S.E.2d 359, 362 (1993). As a result, \u201c[w]hen faced with an appeal from a decision of an administrative agency [subject to the Administrative Procedure Act], courts should first turn to the\u201d relevant provisions of that legislation. In re Kapoor, 303 N.C. 102, 104-05, 277 S.E.2d 403, 406 (1981) (citing N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 150A-43 (1978) [replaced by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 150B-43]).\nThe principal statutory provision concerning the extent of the right of a person to obtain judicial review of an administrative decision contained in the Administrative Procedure Act is N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 150B-43 (2009), which provides that:\nAny person who is aggrieved by the final decision in a contested case, and who has exhausted all administrative remedies made available to him by statute or agency rule, is entitled to judicial review of the decision under this Article, unless adequate procedure for judicial review is provided by another statute[.]\nAs a result, under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 150B-43:\na party must satisfy five requirements [in order to seek and obtain judicial review of an adverse administrative action]: \u2018(1) the person must be aggrieved; (2) there must be a contested case; (3) there must be a final agency decision; (4) administrative remedies must be exhausted; and (5) no other adequate procedure for judicial review can be provided by another statute.\u2019\nDepartment of Transp. v. Blue, 147 N.C. App. at 605, 556 S.E.2d at 618 (quoting Huang v. N.C. State University, 107 N.C. App. 710, 713, 421 S.E.2d 812, 814 (1992)). Thus, the \u201c[Administrative Procedure Act] allows judicial review of a final agency decision in a contested case when all relevant administrative remedies have been exhausted and there is no adequate judicial review provided under any other statute.\u201d In re Kapoor, 303 N.C. at 104-05, 277 S.E.2d at 406. In light of the clear statutory requirement that persons seeking judicial review of an adverse administrative action utilize the relevant provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act \u201cunless adequate procedure for judicial review is provided by another statute,\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 150B-43, we must first determine whether the requirements set out in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 150B-43 are adequately addressed in the judicial review provisions contained in Chapter 58 of the North Carolina General Statutes.\nPetitioners contend that their right to judicial review stems from N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 58-2-75, which provides that:\nAny order or decision made ... by the Commissioner .... except an order or decision that the premium rates charged or filed on all or any class of risks are excessive, inadequate, unreasonable, unfairly discriminatory or are otherwise not in the public interest . . . shall be subject to review in the Superior Court of Wake County on petition by any person aggrieved filed within 30 days from the date of the delivery of a copy of the order or decision made by the Commissioner upon such person. . ..\nIn essence, Petitioners argue that, since they are \u201caggrieved\u201d persons and since the Commissioner did not find that the existing homeowners\u2019 insurance rates were \u201cexcessive, inadequate, unreasonable, unfairly discriminatory or [were] otherwise not in the public interest,\u201d they are entitled to obtain review of the consent order in the Wake County Superior Court pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 58-2-75. We do not, however, believe that Petitioners\u2019 analysis addresses all of the issues that must be considered in determining whether they are entitled to judicial review of the consent order pursuant to N.C. Gen. 'Stat. \u00a7 58-2-75.\nAccording to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 58-2-53 (2009):\nWhenever any provision of this Chapter requires a person to file rates, forms, classification plans, rating plans,... or any other item with the Commissioner or Department for approval, the approval or disapproval of the filing is an agency decision under Chapter 150B of the General Statutes only with respect to the person making the filing or any person that intervenes in the filing.\nIn other words, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 58-2-53 states that an order providing for the filing of \u201crates, forms, classification plans, rating plans, ... or any other item with the Commissioner or Department for approval\u201d is not a final order with respect to any person or entity that did not make the filing under consideration in that proceeding or \u201cintervenef] in the filing.\u201d In this case, the record clearly reflects that the Rate Bureau submitted a filing seeking to obtain the Commissioner\u2019s approval for altered homeowners\u2019 insurance rates and that the consent order entered by the Commissioner expressly provided that \u201c[t]he 2008 Rate Filing is approved subject to the modification set forth... below.\u201d Thus, the Rate Bureau was the \u201cperson making the filing\u201d for purposes of this proceeding, so the consent order was \u201can agency decision under Chapter 150B\u201d with respect to that entity. The record also reflects that no party, including Petitioners, intervened or attempted to intervene in the proceeding resulting from the Rate Bureau\u2019s filing prior to the entry of the consent order. As a result, in light of the plain language of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 58-2-53, the consent order was \u201can agency decision ... only with respect to\u201d the Rate Bureau and not with respect to Petitioners.\nAs we have already noted, the existence of a \u201cfinal agency decision\u201d is one of the prerequisites for obtaining judicial review of an administrative order. Huang, 107 N.C. App. at 713, 421 S.E.2d at 814 (stating that \u201cbefore a party may ask a court to rule on an adverse administrative determination . . . there must be a final agency decision.\u201d) Although N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 58-2-75 does not explicitly refer to the necessity for such an \u201cagency decision\u201d in order for an aggrieved party to seek review of a decision by the Commissioner, that fact, standing alone, does not mean that orders entered by the Commissioner are exempt from the \u201cagency decision\u201d requirement. On the contrary, this Court has held that, \u201c[wjhile [N.C. Gen. Stat.] \u00a7 58-2-75 (1991) also provides for judicial review of a decision of the Commissioner, this Court has determined [N.C. Gen. Stat.] \u00a7 150B-51 of the [Administrative Procedure Act] to be controlling\u201d and has stated that, \u201c[t]o the extent that [N.C. Gen. Stat.] \u00a7 58-2-75 adds to and is consistent with [the Administrative Procedure Act], we will proceed by applying the review standards articulated in both statutes.\u201d McCrary, 112 N.C. App. at 164, 435 S.E.2d at 362 (quoting N.C. Reinsurance Facility v. Long, 98 N.C. App. 41, 46, 390 S.E.2d 176, 179 (1990)). Thus, a determination of the extent to which a decision by the Commissioner must be an \u201cagency decision\u201d for purposes of the Administrative Procedure Act in order for that decision to be subject to judicial review requires \u201capplying the review standards articulated in both N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 58-2-75 and N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 150B-43.\nThe language of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 58-2-75, which purports to allow review of \u201c[a]ny order or decision\u201d of the Commissioner, would, if construed literally, eliminate any necessity for the order or decision subject to judicial review to constitute an \u201cagency decision\u201d or a \u201cfinal agency decision.\u201d Any such interpretation of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 58-2-75 would contradict the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act governing judicial review and be inconsistent with the rules requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies as a precondition for obtaining judicial review and precluding review of interlocutory orders. For that reason, construing N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 58-2-75 to allow appeals from orders that did not constitute an \u201cagency decision\u201d or a \u201cfinal agency decision\u201d would conflict with the requirement that appeals taken from orders entered by the Commissioner be governed by the standards set forth in both N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 58-2-75 and the relevant provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act. Thus, we conclude that a request for judicial review pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 58-2-75 may only be taken from an \u201cagency decision\u201d or a \u201cfinal agency decision.\u201d We further conclude that, because Petitioners were neither the \u201cperson making the filing\u201d nor \u201cany person that intervenes in the filing,\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 58-2-53 explicitly makes the consent order not an \u201cagency decision\u201d with respect to Petitioners, a fact that precludes them from seeking judicial review of the consent order under either N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 150B-43 or N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 58-2-75. As a result, the trial court correctly concluded that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over Petitioners\u2019 request for judicial review of the consent order and dismissed Petitioners\u2019 petitions.\nWe have considered and rejected Petitioners\u2019 other arguments pertaining to their right to obtain judicial review of the consent order in the Wake County Superior Court. For example, Petitioners argue that an order by Judge William R. Pittman in a case involving the BEACH and FAIR Plans lends \u201c[fjurther support for [their] interpretation\u201d of certain relevant statutes. However, Judge Pittman\u2019s order was entered in a different proceeding involving a separate set of statutory provisions, so that it has no direct bearing on this case. In addition, we are not persuaded by Petitioners\u2019 argument that the only purpose of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 58-2-53 is to preclude collateral attacks on orders entered by the Commissioner, since nothing in the language of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 58-2-53 limits the application of that statutory provision to the collateral attack context. As a result, none of Petitioners\u2019 additional arguments in support of their contention that they have a right to judicial review of the consent order are persuasive given the procedural posture of this case.\nWe understand that the combination of our decision in this case and our decision in Dare County I results in a situation in which Petitioners are unable to challenge the lawfulness of the consent order by either direct appeal to this Court or by seeking judicial review in the Superior Court of Wake County. We believe, however, that balancing the appropriateness of allowing expeditious, informal, negotiated dispositions of matters before the Commissioner and requiring that judicial review of administrative orders be limited to entities that actually participated in the proceeding before the Commissioner with providing individuals, businesses, and other entities concerned about the level of insurance rates they are required to pay with a right to obtain judicial review of rate orders with which they are dissatisfied is a matter for the General Assembly and not for the judicial branch. As we read the relevant statutory provisions, Petitioners simply do not, given the fact that they did not participate in the proceedings before the Commissioner during the pendency of the rate filing, have the right to seek judicial review of the consent order in the Wake County Superior Court, so that the trial court correctly dismissed their review petitions for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.\nIII. Conclusion\nThus, for the reasons discussed above, we conclude that the trial court correctly determined that Petitioners did not have the right, under the relevant statutory provisions, to seek judicial review of the consent order in the Wake County Superior Court. In light of that determination, we need not determine whether Petitioners were \u201caggrieved\u201d by the consent order, what impact the filed rate doctrine has on Petitioners\u2019 ability to obtain relief from any errors that the Commissioner may have committed, or whether Petitioners\u2019 other challenges to the lawfulness of the consent order have merit. As a result, the trial court\u2019s order should be, and hereby is, affirmed.\nAFFIRMED.\nJudges BRYANT and ELMORE concur.\n. Petitioners include twelve North Carolina counties, ten North Carolina towns, and two private parties. All Petitioners joined in the petition and appeal in Case No. COA09-1171; the petition and appeal in Case No. COA09-1172 was filed by five counties, seven towns, and the two private parties. Since our holding is equally applicable to any and all Petitioners and to the parties in both cases, we shall simply refer to the persons and entities challenging the trial court\u2019s orders as \u201cPetitioners\u201d regardless of whether they are parties to Case No. COA09-1172, Case No. COA09-1172, or both.\n. The information in the record suggests that the Rate Bureau and the Department, with the knowledge of the Commissioner, had been in negotiations for some time prior to the 8 and 11 December 2008 filings and that the Rate Bureau and the Department had reached agreement on a negotiated disposition of the filings in question prior to 8 December 2008.\n. According to N.C. Gen. Stat \u00a7 58-2-55, the Commissioner is authorized to \u201cdesignate a member of his staff to serve as a hearing officer.\u201d According to 11 N.C.A.C. \u00a7 01.0416, a hearing officer has the authority to hear and rule on motions. As a result, the order entered by Hearing Officer Hale constitutes the Commissioner\u2019s final decision concerning Petitioners\u2019 motions.\n. This petition was filed by Petitioners Dare County, Washington County, Currituck County, Hyde County, Carteret County, Town of Nags Head, Town of Southern Shores, Town of Duck, Town of Pine Knoll Shores, Town of Indian Beach, Town of Kill Devil Hills, Starco Realty & Construction, Inc., and Joseph M. Geraghty.\n. This petition was filed by all Petitioners.\n. In examining Petitioners\u2019 arguments on appeal, we note that they are addressed exclusively to issues relating to the validity of the decisions contained in the consent order and do not challenge the lawfulness of Hearing Officer Hale\u2019s decision denying their request to intervene in and reopen the proceedings before the Commissioner. For that reason, Petitioners did not preserve any issues pertaining to Hearing Officer Hale\u2019s order for-purposes of appellate review. See N.C.R. App. P. 28(a) (2009) (stating that \u201c[ijssues not-presented and discussed in a party\u2019s brief are deemed abandoned\u201d). As a result, the only issue before the Court at the present time is the extent to which the trial court properly dismissed Petitioners\u2019 request for judicial review of the consent order on the merits.\n. Petitioners emphasize the caveat set forth in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 150B-43 referring to \u201cadequate provisions for judicial review [being] provide[d] by another statute.\u201d In making this argument, Petitioners appear to be contending that any construction of the relevant statutory provisions that does not afford all aggrieved persons with a right to seek and obtain judicial review of the consent order renders those statutory provisions \u201cinadequate\u201d for purposes of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 150B-43. However, given that N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 58-2-80 provides that a \u201cparty aggrieved\u201d has a right to appeal a rate order entered by the Commissioner to this Court and given that no one appears to contend that the right of review granted by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 58-2-80 is inadequate, we do not believe that allowing all persons aggrieved, regardless of whether they sought and obtained party status before the Commissioner, is necessary for a review procedure to be \u201cadequate.\u201d\n. In their brief, Petitioners note that N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 58-36-25(a) (2009) provides that \u201c[a]ny order or decision of the Commissioner shall be subject to judicial review as provided in Article 2 of this Chapter.\u201d Although Petitioners concede that this statute is found in the portion of Chapter 58 of the General Statutes governing the operation of the Rate Bureau, they nonetheless assert that their own right to review can be located by \u201cfollowing this express statutory cross-reference[.]\u201d However, since N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 58-36-25 applies to the Rate Bureau and expressly indicates that it is subject to the provisions of Article 2 of Chapter 58, this particular statutory provision does not add anything to the analysis that must be conducted in order to determine the extent of Petitioners\u2019 rights to obtain judicial review of the consent order.\n. Petitioners argue that the reference in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 58-2-53 to a \u2019\u2019person that intervenes in the filing\u201d should be understood to refer to persons that sought leave to intervene, rather than to persons actually granted intervenor status. However, we do not find this construction of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 58-2-53 persuasive for purposes of deciding this case, since it would have the effect of granting the right to seek judicial review to a party that did not seek leave to participate in the proceedings before the Commissioner prior to the entry of the consent order and since we do not believe that the relevant statutory language supports such an interpretation. Although we tend to agree that a person who unsuccessfully sought leave to intervene prior to the entry of the Commissioner\u2019s order should be afforded a right to seek judicial review of the decision to deny that party\u2019s request for leave to intervene, we need not decide that issue at this time given that no request for leave to intervene was submitted to the Commissioner prior to the entry of the consent order and since Petitioners have not challenged Hearing Officer Hale\u2019s decision to deny their intervention petitions before this Court.\n. Admittedly, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 150B-51 deals with the standard of review to be applied in connection with the judicial review of administrative action, while N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 150B-43 addresses the availability of judicial review. However, an examination of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 150B-51 also indicates that a final agency decision is a prerequisite for judicial review of an administrative order. In addition, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 150B-51 is only one of a number of statutory provisions dealing with judicial review that address subjects ranging from the right to review, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 150B-43, to the procedures to be utilized during the judicial review process, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 150B-45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, to the scope of the review to be conducted by the reviewing court. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 150B-51. As a result, we have no hesitation in saying that, under the logic of McCrary, we must apply the standards set out in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 150B-51 in addition to those set out in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 58-2-75 in determining whether Petitioners have a right to seek judicial review of the consent order.\n. The necessity for interpreting N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 58-2-75 and the relevant provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act consistently is highlighted by the fact that N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 58- 2-70 explicitly provides that, \u201c[u]nless otherwise specifically provided for, all administrative proceedings conducted pursuant to this Chapter are governed by Chapter 150B of the General Statues\u201d and the fact that, in judicial review proceedings conducted pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 58-2-75, the reviewing court is required to conduct its review of the Commissioner\u2019s order using the scope of review provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act. McCrary, 112 N.C. App. at 164, 435 S.E.2d at 362.\n. The result we reach here, which makes judicial review pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 58-2-75 available to those persons or entities that participated in proceedings before the Commissioner, is consistent with the approach adopted in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 58-2-80, which provides that judicial review of certain rate-related orders is available to a \u201cparly aggrieved thereby.\u201d",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "ERVIN, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Williams Mullen, by M. Keith Kapp, Kevin Benedict, and Jennifer A. Morgan, for petitioner-appellants.",
      "Young Moore and Henderson, P.A., by R: Michael Strickland, WilliamM. Trott, MarvinM. Spivey, Jr., and Glenn C. Raynor, for respondent-appellee North Carolina Rate Bureau.",
      "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Daniel S. Johnson, Special Deputy Attorney General, and David W. Boone, Assistant Attorney General, for the respondent-appellees North Carolina Department of Insurance and Commissioner of Insurance."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "DARE COUNTY, TOWN OF NAGS HEAD, TOWN OF SOUTHERN SHORES, STARCO REALTY & CONSTRUCTION, INC., JOSEPH M. GERAGHTY, WASHINGTON COUNTY, CURRITUCK COUNTY, HYDE COUNTY, THE TOWN OF DUCK, THE TOWN OF SOUTHERN SHORES, CARTERET COUNTY, THE TOWN OF PINE KNOLL SHORES, THE TOWN OF INDIAN BEACH, and THE TOWN OF KILL DEVIL HILLS, Petitioners v. THE NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE, COMMISSIONER OF INSURANCE WAYNE GOODWIN and NORTH CAROLINA RATE BUREAU, Respondents and DARE COUNTY, WASHINGTON COUNTY, CURRITUCK COUNTY, HYDE COUNTY, CARTERET COUNTY, NEW HANOVER COUNTY, BRUNSWICK COUNTY, CHOWAN COUNTY, PERQUIMANS COUNTY, TYRREL[L] COUNTY, PAMLICO COUNTY, PASQUOTANK COUNTY, TOWN OF NAGS HEAD, TOWN OF DUCK, TOWN OF SOUTHERN SHORES, TOWN OF INDIAN BEACH, TOWN OF PINE KNOLL SHORES, TOWN OF EMERALD ISLE, TOWN OF KILL DEVIL HILLS, TOWN OF KURE BEACH, TOWN OF CEDAR POINT, TOWN OF HERTFORD, STARCO REALTY & CONSTRUCTION, INC., [and] JOSEPH M. GERAGHTY, Petitionees v. THE NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE, COMMISSIONER OF INSURANCE WAYNE GOODWIN and NORTH CAROLINA RATE BUREAU, Respondents\nNo. COA09-1171 and 1172\n(Filed 2 November 2010)\n1. Administrative \u2014 judicial review of consent order \u2014 not a final agency decision\nThe trial court correctly concluded that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over petitioners\u2019 request for judicial review of a consent order concerning coastal residential insurance rates. The relevant statutory provisions of Chapter 58 of the North Carolina General Statutes and the Administrative Procedure Act are construed in pari materia, so that a request for judicial review pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 58-2-75 may only be taken from an agency decision or final agency decision. The consent order here was not an agency decision with respect to petitioners because they were not \u201cthe person making the filing\u201d or \u201ca person intervening in the filing.\u201d\nAppeal by Petitioners from order entered 29 April 2009 by Judge Ronald L. Stephens in Wake County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 15 April 2010.\nWilliams Mullen, by M. Keith Kapp, Kevin Benedict, and Jennifer A. Morgan, for petitioner-appellants.\nYoung Moore and Henderson, P.A., by R: Michael Strickland, WilliamM. Trott, MarvinM. Spivey, Jr., and Glenn C. Raynor, for respondent-appellee North Carolina Rate Bureau.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Daniel S. Johnson, Special Deputy Attorney General, and David W. Boone, Assistant Attorney General, for the respondent-appellees North Carolina Department of Insurance and Commissioner of Insurance."
  },
  "file_name": "0600-01",
  "first_page_order": 624,
  "last_page_order": 641
}