{ "id": 4181188, "name": "LAWYERS TITLE INSURANCE CORPORATION, COMMONWEALTH LAND TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY, CLARK'S CREEK ASSOCIATES, L.L.C., and BRANCH BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, Plaintiffs v. ZOGREO, LLC, FOREST AT SWIFT CREEK, LLC, C.C. MANGUM COMPANY, L.L.C., AND DONNIE HARRISON, in his official capacity as Sheriff of Wake County, Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "Lawyers Title Insurance v. Zogreo, LLC", "decision_date": "2010-11-16", "docket_number": "No. COA09-1304", "first_page": "88", "last_page": "104", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "208 N.C. App. 88" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "640 S.E.2d 415", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12637658 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "418", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/640/0415-01" ] }, { "cite": "615 S.E.2d 867", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633420, 12633421 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/615/0867-01", "/se2d/615/0867-02" ] }, { "cite": "659 S.E.2d 762", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12640826 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "764" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/659/0762-01" ] }, { "cite": "449 S.E.2d 475", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "476-77" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "116 N.C. App. 719", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525538 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "721-22" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/116/0719-01" ] }, { "cite": "518 S.E.2d 786", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "788", "parenthetical": "internal citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "134 N.C. App. 724", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11147227 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "726", "parenthetical": "internal citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/134/0724-01" ] }, { "cite": "597 S.E.2d 674", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "693" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "358 N.C. 440", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2986682 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "470" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/358/0440-01" ] }, { "cite": "181 N.C. App. 573", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8375440 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "576", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/181/0573-01" ] }, { "cite": "372 S.E.2d 711", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "323 N.C. 259", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2564037 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/323/0259-01" ] }, { "cite": "355 S.E.2d 819", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "822" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "85 N.C. App. 610", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12170230 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "613" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/85/0610-01" ] }, { "cite": "28 S.E.2d 240", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1943, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "244" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "223 N.C. 664", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8615781 ], "year": 1943, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "671" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/223/0664-01" ] }, { "cite": "279 U.S. 388", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3906238 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1929, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "391" }, { "page": "754" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/279/0388-01" ] }, { "cite": "773 F.2d 1158", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 19021 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1162" }, { "page": "1163", "parenthetical": "footnote omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/773/1158-01" ] }, { "cite": "447 S.E.2d 418", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "336 N.C. 778", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2536106, 2535373, 2534992, 2534708, 2539257 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/336/0778-04", "/nc/336/0778-02", "/nc/336/0778-01", "/nc/336/0778-05", "/nc/336/0778-03" ] }, { "cite": "442 S.E.2d 86", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "88" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "114 N.C. App. 424", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527660 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "427" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/114/0424-01" ] }, { "cite": "24 S.E. 527", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1896, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "528" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "118 N.C. 700", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8653860 ], "year": 1896, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "706" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/118/0700-01" ] }, { "cite": "60 S.E. 978", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1908, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "979" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "147 N.C. 209", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11269328 ], "year": 1908, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "212" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/147/0209-01" ] }, { "cite": "239 S.E.2d 566", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "572" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "293 N.C. 688", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8566967 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "699" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/293/0688-01" ] }, { "cite": "577 S.E.2d 391", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "392", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "156 N.C. App. 680", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9192134 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "682", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/156/0680-01" ] }, { "cite": "359 N.C. 629", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3794693, 3804106, 3799854, 3797940, 3803604, 3802940, 3797532 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/359/0629-03", "/nc/359/0629-01", "/nc/359/0629-06", "/nc/359/0629-07", "/nc/359/0629-04", "/nc/359/0629-02", "/nc/359/0629-05" ] }, { "cite": "608 S.E.2d 821", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "822" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "168 N.C. App. 717", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8472021 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "718" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/168/0717-01" ] }, { "cite": "129 S.E.2d 256", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1963, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "holder of deed of trust brought declaratory judgment action against lienor-judgment creditor to determine priority of liens after property offered for sale under execution" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "258 N.C. 653", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8562182 ], "year": 1963, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "holder of deed of trust brought declaratory judgment action against lienor-judgment creditor to determine priority of liens after property offered for sale under execution" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/258/0653-01" ] }, { "cite": "444 S.E.2d 231", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "beneficiary of a deed of trust brought an action challenging the priority of the supplier's lien that had been reduced to judgment" }, { "parenthetical": "beneficiary of a deed of trust brought an action challenging the priority of the supplier's lien that had been reduced to judgment" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "115 N.C. App. 152", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12124144 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "beneficiary of a deed of trust brought an action challenging the priority of the supplier's lien that had been reduced to judgment" }, { "parenthetical": "beneficiary of a deed of trust brought an action challenging the priority of the supplier's lien that had been reduced to judgment" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/115/0152-01" ] }, { "cite": "233 S.E.2d 69", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "72" }, { "page": "72" }, { "page": "72" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "32 N.C. App. 524", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8551943 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "527" }, { "page": "527" }, { "page": "527-28" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/32/0524-01" ] }, { "cite": "67 S.E.2d 390", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1951, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "395" }, { "page": "395", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "395", "parenthetical": "\"If a subsequent encumbrancer is not joined, he is not bound by the judgment in the action between the contractor and the owner....\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "234 N.C. 347", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8622047 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1951, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "353" }, { "page": "353" }, { "page": "353" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/234/0347-01" ] }, { "cite": "242 S.E.2d 785", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "789" }, { "page": "789" }, { "page": "789" }, { "page": "789" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "294 N.C. 661", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8574213 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "667" }, { "page": "667" }, { "page": "667" }, { "page": "667" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/294/0661-01" ] }, { "cite": "330 S.E.2d 606", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "313 N.C. 597", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4724929, 4720873, 4726445, 4725392, 4719870 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/313/0597-05", "/nc/313/0597-02", "/nc/313/0597-01", "/nc/313/0597-03", "/nc/313/0597-04" ] }, { "cite": "324 S.E.2d 626", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "632" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "72 N.C. App. 224", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526522 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "233-34" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/72/0224-01" ] }, { "cite": "189 N.C. App. 755", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4156804 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "757" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/189/0755-01" ] }, { "cite": "548 S.E.2d 535", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "540", "parenthetical": "citations and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "144 N.C. App. 79", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11432859 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "87", "parenthetical": "citations and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/144/0079-01" ] }, { "cite": "597 S.E.2d 673", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "357 N.C. 567", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 491579 ], "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/357/0567-01" ] }, { "cite": "580 S.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "4" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "157 N.C. App. 396", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9187002 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "400" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/157/0396-01" ] }, { "cite": "254 S.E.2d 611", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "626" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "297 N.C. 181", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8568312 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "204" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/297/0181-01" ] }, { "cite": "176 S.E.2d 161", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "163" }, { "page": "166", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation marks omitted; emphasis omitted" }, { "page": "166" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "277 N.C. 94", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561932 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "98" }, { "page": "102" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/277/0094-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1285, "char_count": 39253, "ocr_confidence": 0.74, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.13737345304687648 }, "sha256": "8ddb600b6b90300927d0ac25678438b341e2f950c50c40ae531acd0447eea340", "simhash": "1:abdb4e62282bacd4", "word_count": 6531 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:19:36.775795+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges HUNTER and GEER concur." ], "parties": [ "LAWYERS TITLE INSURANCE CORPORATION, COMMONWEALTH LAND TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY, CLARK\u2019S CREEK ASSOCIATES, L.L.C., and BRANCH BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, Plaintiffs v. ZOGREO, LLC, FOREST AT SWIFT CREEK, LLC, C.C. MANGUM COMPANY, L.L.C., AND DONNIE HARRISON, in his official capacity as Sheriff of Wake County, Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "STEPHENS, Judge.\nI. Pertinent Procedural History of Current Lawsuit\nOn 8 December 2008, in Wake County Superior Court, Lawyers Title Insurance Corporation (\u201cLawyers Title\u201d), Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Company (\u201cCommonwealth\u201d), Clark\u2019s Creek Associates, L.L.C. (\u201cClark\u2019s Creek\u201d), and Branch Bank and Trust Company (\u201cBB&T\u201d) (collectively, \u201cPlaintiffs\u201d), filed a complaint for declaratory judgment and motions for a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, and permanent injunction against Zogreo, LLC (\u201cZogreo\u201d), Forest at Swift Creek (\u201cForest\u201d), and C.C. Mangum Company, L.L.C. (\u201cMangum\u201d) (collectively, \u201cDefendants\u201d), as well as Donnie Harrison in his official capacity as Sheriff of Wake County. Plaintiffs sought judgment declaring their security interests in property located in Garner, North Carolina (\u201cProperty\u201d) to have priority over materialmen\u2019s liens perfected by Bunn Construction Company, Inc. (\u201cBunn\u201d) and Mangum, and sought to prevent the sale of the Property by execution sale.\nOn 19 December 2008, the trial court entered a temporary restraining order preventing Defendants and Sheriff Harrison from pursuing an execution sale of the Property. Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on 6 January 2009. The parties served cross-motions for summary disposition on 18 March 2009. Specifically, Plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary judgment; Zogreo and Forest filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, and in the alternative, a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment; and Mangum filed motions for judgment on the pleadings and for summary judgment. While the parties\u2019 cross-motions were pending, Plaintiffs filed a motion to supplement their motion for partial summary judgment to add an argument based on the doctrine of instantaneous seisin.\nThe parties\u2019 motions came on for hearing on 17 April 2009. On 8 June 2009, the trial court entered an Order and Partial Summary Judgment granting Plaintiffs\u2019 motion for partial summary judgment and denying Defendants\u2019 motions. The trial court concluded, inter alia, that \u201cDefendants\u2019 liens and judgments are invalid as to these Plaintiffs[.]\u201d The trial court did not consider the doctrine of instantaneous seisin in its ruling. The trial court\u2019s order further provides that \u201cthere is no just reason for delay\u201d and that \u201cthis matter is Certified for Immediate Appeal pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 54(b)[.]\u201d\nFrom the trial court\u2019s order, Defendants appeal. Plaintiffs cross-assign error to the trial court\u2019s implicit denial of their motion to add an argument based on the doctrine of instantaneous seisin.\nII. Factual Background and Prior Litigation\nThe Property, the site of a residential development project referred to as Parkland Grove (\u201cProject\u201d), is divided into three tracts (\u201cTract 1,\u201d \u201cTract 2,\u201d and \u201cTract 3\u201d) and is encumbered by various security interests held by the parties. Specifically, the entire Property is subject to two claims of lien: one filed by Mangum on or about 5 October 2006, and one filed by Bunn on or about 18 December 2006. Additionally, portions of the Property are subject to deeds of trust: one held by BB&T recorded 22 February 2005 (\u201cBB&T DOT\u201d), and the other originally held by Cardinal State Bank (\u201cCardinal\u201d) recorded 29 April 2005 (\u201cCardinal DOT\u201d). The Cardinal DOT was transferred to Clark\u2019s Creek. When BB&T and Cardinal obtained the deeds of trust, each obtained a lender\u2019s title insurance policy. Lawyer\u2019s Title issued a policy insuring BB&T and Commonwealth issued a policy insuring Cardinal. As Cardinal\u2019s assignee, Clark\u2019s Creek is insured under the Cardinal policy.\nOn 8 April 2004, Old Stage Partners, LLC (\u201cOld Stage\u201d), which owned Tract 1 at the time, entered into a contract with Bunn for clearing, grading, and erosion control services for $268,540. On 19 April 2004, Old Stage entered into another contract with Bunn for sewer main, water main, storm drain, and roadway construction services. After performing some clearing and rough grading, Bunn ceased work on or around 16 June 2004 for non-payment. On 14 October 2004, Bunn filed a claim of lien on Tract 1 in the principal amount of $180,495.24 for \u201cclearing and grading of property[.]\u201d In this claim of lien, Bunn asserted that the date upon which labor or materials were first furnished to the Property (\u201cdate of first furnishing\u201d) was 5 April 2004 and the date upon which labor or materials were last furnished (\u201cdate of final furnishing\u201d) to the Property was 16 June 2004.\nOn 8 December 2004, Bunn filed suit against Old Stage to enforce the claim of lien. In its complaint, Bunn alleged that it had entered. into \u201c \u2018the Grading Contract\u2019 \u201d with Old Stage under which Bunn was to perform \u201cgrading construction services\u201d for a total price of $268,540. The complaint additionally alleged that Bunn had performed approximately $199,235 worth of grading and erosion services, that Bunn had ceased working on 16 June 2004, and that Old Stage owed Bunn the principal amount of $180,495.84 for labor and materials supplied to the Property.\nOn 12 January 2005, Old Stage entered into a third contract with Bunn for silt basin/erosion control services for $27,555. This contract was paid in full in cash when the contract was signed.\nOn 22 February 2005, Trinity Builders, LLC (\u201cTrinity\u201d) purchased a controlling interest in Old Stage, and Old Stage conveyed Tract 1 to Trinity. Also on that date, BB&T loaned $975,000 to Trinity and Trinity executed a promissory note in favor of BB&T. BB&T recorded its deed of trust in Tract 1 as security for Trinity\u2019s promissory note, and Lawyer\u2019s Title issued a lender\u2019s policy insuring BB&T. A portion of the proceeds from the BB&T loan were used to pay the debt on which Bunn\u2019s claim of lien was based. As a result, Bunn cancelled its claim of lien on 28 February 2005 and dismissed with prejudice its action to enforce the lien on 10 March 2005.\nOn 25 April 2005, Bunn submitted a contract proposal to Trinity through Avery Bordeaux, who managed the Project for the various owners of the Property. The proposal was for sewer main, water main, storm drain, roadway, construction road, pump station, and force main construction services for $1,813,631. On 29 April 2005, Trinity borrowed $700,000 from Cardinal to purchase Tracts 2 and 3 from Nantex Corporation, thereby completing the aggregation of the tracts referred to in this case as the Property. As part of the transaction, Trinity gave Cardinal a deed of trust on Tracts 2 and 3. Both the deed from Nantex to Trinity and the Cardinal DOT were recorded simultaneously on 29 April 2005.\nOn 25 May 2005, Avery Bordeaux, acting as Trinity\u2019s agent, signed Bunn\u2019s 25 April 2005 proposal. The contract, drafted by Bunn, states: \u201cThis proposal \u2014 contract replaces any others discussed or written in the past[.]\u201d\nOn 16 September 2005, Mangum and Bunn entered into a written contract whereby Mangum would \u201cfurnish all materials and labor and perform all the work required for . . . Parkland Grove[.]\u201d The total contract price was $1,086,545.80.\nBunn and Mangum ceased work on the Property on 29 September 2006 due to non-payment for their services. On 15 October 2006, Mangum filed a claim of lien on all three tracts. The claim of lien asserted a principal amount of $389,438.41, and listed a date of first furnishing of 15 May 2006 and a date of final furnishing of 22 September 2006. On 18 December 2006, Bunn filed a claim of lien on all three tracts. This claim of lien asserted a principal amount of $895,483.86, listed a date of first furnishing of 5 May 2004, and listed a date of final furnishing of 29 September 2006.\nOn 12 February 2007, Bunn filed suit against Trinity and Old Stage to enforce Bunn\u2019s claim of lien. In its complaint, Bunn alleged that \u201c[i]n or about 2005,\u201d Bunn entered into a contract \u201cto perform grading construction services.\u201d Bunn further alleged that it had \u201cperformed approximately $1,123,869.70 worth of grading and erosion services\u201d and was \u201cowed the principal amount of $895,483.86 for labor and materials supplied to the Property.\u201d On 2 January 2007, Mangum filed suit against Bunn and Trinity to enforce its claim of lien.\nBunn and Mangum filed motions for summary judgment, which were unopposed by Trinity. On 24 March 2008, the trial court, the Honorable Henry W. Hight, Jr. presiding, granted summary judgment in favor of Mangum (\u201cMangum Judgment\u201d). The Mangum Judgment declares a lien on the Property, relates the lien back to 5 May 2004 by right of subrogation to Bunn\u2019s lien, and orders the sale of the Property to satisfy the judgment. On 29 April 2008, the trial court, the Honorable Orlando F. Hudson, Jr. presiding, granted summary judgment in favor of Bunn (\u201cBunn Judgment\u201d). The Bunn Judgment declares a lien on the Property, relates the lien back to 5 May 2004, and orders the sale of the Property to satisfy the judgment. On 30 May 2008, Bunn assigned its judgment to Zogreo.\nOn 8 December 2008, Plaintiffs filed the action which is the subject of the present appeal.\nIII. Discussion\nA. Issue One\nDefendants first argue that the trial court erred in denying Defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss and motion for judgment on the pleadings because Plaintiffs\u2019 civil action represents an impermissible collateral attack against two valid lien judgments. We disagree.\n1. Standards of Review\nA motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Sutton v. Duke, 277 N.C. 94, 98, 176 S.E.2d 161, 163 (1979). \u201c[A] complaint should not be dismissed for insufficiency unless it appears to a certainty that plaintiff[s] [are] entitled to no relief under any state of facts which could be proved in support of the claim.\u201d Id. at 103, 176 S.E.2d at 166 (citation and quotation marks omitted; emphasis omitted). While the concept of notice pleading is liberal in nature, a complaint must nonetheless contain enough information to provide the substantive elements of a legally recognized claim or it may be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6). Stanback v. Stanback, 297 N.C. 181, 204, 254 S.E.2d 611, 626 (1979). Moreover, if a complaint pleads facts which serve to defeat the claim, it should be dismissed. Sutton, 277 N.C. at 102, 176 S.E.2d at 166. \u201cThis Court must conduct a de novo review of the pleadings to determine their legal sufficiency and to determine whether the trial court\u2019s ruling on the motion to dismiss was correct.\u201d Leary v. N.C. Forest Prods., Inc., 157 N.C. App. 396, 400, 580 S.E.2d 1, 4, aff\u2019d per curiam, 357 N.C. 567, 597 S.E.2d 673 (2003).\n\u201cJudgment on the pleadings ... is appropriate when all the material allegations of fact are admitted in the pleadings and only questions of law remain.\u201d Groves v. Community Hous. Corp., 144 N.C. App. 79, 87, 548 S.E.2d 535, 540 (2001) (citations and quotation marks omitted). Any party may move for judgment on the pleadings \u201c[a]fter the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the trial].]\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 12(c) (2009). \u201c[T]he trial court must view the facts and permissible inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.\u201d Id. \u201cThis Court reviews a trial court\u2019s grant of a motion for judgment on the pleadings de novo.\" Carpenter v. Carpenter, 189 N.C. App. 755, 757, 659 S.E.2d 762, 764 (2008).\n2. Materialmen\u2019s Liens\nPursuant to Article 2 of North Carolina\u2019s mechanics\u2019, laborers\u2019, and materialmen\u2019s lien statute,\n[a]ny person who performs or furnishes labor or professional design or surveying services or furnishes materials or furnishes rental equipment pursuant to a contract, either express or implied, with the owner of real property for the making of an improvement thereon shall, upon complying with the provisions of this Article, have a right to file a [\u201c] claim of lien on real property[\u201d] on the real property to secure payment of all debts owing for labor done or professional design or surveying services or material furnished or equipment rented pursuant to the contract.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 44A-8 (2009). The primary purpose of the lien statute is \u201cto protect laborers and materialmen who expend their labor and materials upon the buildings of others.\u201d Carolina Bldrs. Corp. v. Howard-Veasey Homes, Inc., 72 N.C. App. 224, 233-34, 324 S.E.2d 626, 632 (citation and quotation marks omotted), disc. rev. denied, 313 N.C. 597, 330 S.E.2d 606 (1985).\nThe lien created by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 44A-8 is inchoate until perfected by compliance with N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 44A-11 and -12, and is lost if the steps required for its perfection are not taken in the manner and within the time prescribed by law. Frank H. Conner Co. v. Spanish Inns Charlotte, Ltd., 294 N.C. 661, 667, 242 S.E.2d 785, 789 (1978). To perfect a lien on real property, a contractor must file a claim of lien in the office of the clerk of the superior court of the county where the labor has been performed or the materials furnished at any time after the maturity of the obligation secured thereby, but not later than 120 days after the last furnishing of labor or materials at the site of the improvement. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 44A-11 and -12 (2009).\nTo enforce the claim of lien, the contractor must bring a lien enforcement action in the superior court within 180 days of the last furnishing of labor or materials at the site of the improvement. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 44A-13 (2009). When a lien is validly perfected, and is subsequently enforced by bringing an action within the statutory period set forth in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 44A-13, \u201cthe lien will be held to relate back [to] and become effective from the date of the first furnishing of labor or materials under the contract, and will be deemed perfected as of that time.\u201d Frank H. Conner Co., 294 N.C. at 667, 242 S.E.2d at 789.\n3. Lien Enforcement Action\nA lien enforcement action \u201cis designed to enforce the lien by the sale of whatever interest the person who caused the building to be erected or repaired had in the land improved by the labor or materials of the contractor at the time the lien attached.\u201d Equitable Life Assurance Soc. v. Basnight, 234 N.C. 347, 353, 67 S.E.2d 390, 395 (1951).\n[T]he action to enforce the lien is not created to determine the validity or the priority of the adverse claims of third persons in the premises subject to the lien. The contractor can obtain the complete relief sought, i.e., the sale of the interest owned by the person who caused the improvement to be made at the time the lien attached, in his action against the landowner, without having the rights of adverse claimants ascertained and settled.\nId. Thus, \u201c[o]nly the owner of the property subject to the material-men\u2019s lien is required to be a party to an action to enforce the claim of lien.\u201d Miller v. Lemon Tree Inn, Inc., 32 N.C. App. 524, 527, 233 S.E.2d 69, 72 (1977). Although \u201csubsequent encumbrancers and other adverse claimants are proper parties to such action, for they have ascertainable interests in the subject matter of the controversy[,]\u201d Equitable Life Assurance Soc., 234 N.C. at 353, 67 S.E.2d at 395 (emphasis added), \u201csubsequent encumbrancers and other adverse claimants are not necessary parties to an action to enforce a contractor\u2019s lien.\u201d Id. (emphasis added).\n\u201c [I]t is axiomatic that a judgment cannot be binding upon persons who were not party or privy to an action.\u201d Miller, 32 N.C. App. at 527, 233 S.E.2d at 72. Thus, subsequent encumbrancers and other adverse claimants who are not made proper parties to an action to enforce a lien are not bound by the lien judgment. Equitable Life Assurance Soc., 234 N.C. at 353, 67 S.E.2d at 395 (\u201cIf a subsequent encumbrancer is not joined, he is not bound by the judgment in the action between the contractor and the owner....\u201d). Accordingly, an adverse claimant who has not been made a party to a lien enforcement action may bring a subsequent action to determine the priority of its interest in the property. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Rowell, 115 N.C. App. 152, 444 S.E.2d 231 (1994) (beneficiary of a deed of trust brought an action challenging the priority of the supplier\u2019s lien that had been reduced to judgment); Miller, 32 N.C. App. 524, 233 S.E.2d 69 (plaintiff holder and beneficiary of deed of trust brought suit against lienor-judgment creditor to foreclose under a judicial sale and alleged plaintiff\u2019s deed of trust had priority over defendant\u2019s judgment lien in the proceeds from the judicial sale); Priddy v. Kernersville Lumber Co., 258 N.C. 653, 129 S.E.2d 256 (1963) (holder of deed of trust brought declaratory judgment action against lienor-judgment creditor to determine priority of liens after property offered for sale under execution).\nIn this case, Plaintiffs were not parties to Bunn\u2019s or Mangum\u2019s actions to enforce their materialmen\u2019s liens. Therefore, Plaintiffs were not bound by the lien judgments and were free to bring subsequent actions to have the priority of their security interests determined as against the lien judgments. See Miller, 32 N.C. App. at 527-28, 233 S.E.2d at 72 (\u201cPlaintiffs were not parties to the action by defendant [] to enforce its materialmen\u2019s lien. Therefore, they were free to challenge the default judgment purporting to enforce [defendant\u2019s] lien in this action to foreclose their deed of trust in order to have the priority of the liens determined.\u201d). Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying Defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss and motion for judgment on the pleadings.\n4. Collateral Attack\nDefendants argue, however, that Plaintiffs\u2019 action \u201cconstitutes an impermissible collateral attack on the Bunn and Mangum Judgments\u201d since Plaintiffs seek to nullify the judgments. We disagree.\n\u201cA collateral attack is one in which a plaintiff is not entitled to the relief demanded in the complaint unless the judgment in another action is adjudicated invalid.\u201d Clayton v. N. C. State Bar, 168 N.C. App. 717, 718, 608 S.E.2d 821, 822 (citation and quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 359 N.C. 629, 615 S.E.2d 867 (2005). \u201cA collateral attack on a judicial proceeding is \u2018an attempt to avoid, defeat, or evade it, or deny its force and effect, in some incidental proceeding not provided by law for the express purpose of attacking it.\u2019 \u201d Reg\u2019l Acceptance Corp. v. Old Republic Sur. Co., 156 N.C. App. 680, 682, 577 S.E.2d 391, 392 (2003) (citation omitted). Generally, \u201cNorth Carolina does not allow collateral attacks on judgments.\u201d Id. However, \u201c[a] judgment which is void, as opposed to being merely voidable or irregular, may be attacked at any time by anyone whose interests are adversely affected by it.\u201d Ridge Community Investors, Inc. v. Berry, 293 N.C. 688, 699, 239 S.E.2d 566, 572 (1977).\nIn this case, the priority of Plaintiffs\u2019 security interests in the Property can be ascertained with respect to Bunn\u2019s and Mangum\u2019s liens without declaring the Bunn and Mangum Judgments invalid. While the effective date of the Bunn and Mangum liens, as declared by the trial court, is invalid as to Plaintiffs in this action, the Bunn and Mangum Judgments remain valid between the parties to the lien enforcement actions. Moreover, the declaratory judgment action brought by Plaintiffs is specifically established by law for the purpose of having the priority of the security interests of the parties determined. See Rowell, 115 N.C. App. 152, 444 S.E.2d 231 (1994) (beneficiary of a deed of trust brought an action challenging the priority of the supplier\u2019s lien that had been reduced to judgment).\nDefendants nonetheless contend that because Plaintiffs \u201chave failed to plead or prove that the Bunn and Mangum Judgments are void[,]\u201d Plaintiffs\u2019 \u201cattempt to destroy the Bunn and Mangum Judgments falls outside the scope of a permissible collateral attack.\u201d Defendants\u2019 argument is misguided.\nPlaintiffs need not plead or prove that the. Bunn and Mangum Judgments are void in order for the priority of Plaintiffs\u2019 security interests in the Property to be ascertained with respect to Bunn\u2019s and Mangum\u2019s liens. Thus, Plaintiffs\u2019 declaratory judgment action is not a collateral attack on the Judgments but, rather, is a permissible method of having the priority of the security interests of the parties determined while leaving the Judgments intact as between the parties to the lien enforcement actions.\nAccordingly, as Plaintiffs do not seek \u201cnullification\u201d of the Bunn and Mangum Judgments, and Plaintiffs may be entitled to the relief requested without those Judgments being declared void as between the parties to the lien enforcement actions, Plaintiffs\u2019 action in this case does not constitute an impermissible collateral attack on the Bunn and Mangum Judgments. Defendants\u2019 argument is thus overruled.\n5. Action in Rem\nNonetheless, Defendants further argue that because Bunn\u2019s and Mangum\u2019s lien enforcement actions were \u201cactions in rem\" the resulting lien judgments established the validity of the liens, including the date of first furnishing, \u201cas against the entire world.\u201d Again, we disagree.\nOur Supreme Court has noted that a proceeding to enforce a mechanic\u2019s lien is in rem. Vick v. Flournoy, 147 N.C. 209, 212, 60 S.E. 978, 979 (1908); Bernhardt v. Brown, 118 N.C. 700, 706, 24 S.E. 527, 528 (1896). A judgment in rem binds the world to any decision affecting the res involved in the litigation. Cole v. Hughes, 114 N.C. App. 424, 427, 442 S.E.2d 86, 88, disc. review denied, 336 N.C. 778, 447 S.E.2d 418 (1994). In this way, property rights may be determined with great certainty, allowing the owners of the property interests to use the property more efficiently, or to transfer their interests more easily. Branca v. Security Ben. Life Ins. Co., 773 F.2d 1158, 1162 (11th Cir. Fla. 1985). A proceeding to enforce a mechanic\u2019s lien, and the resulting judgment, determines the contractor\u2019s lien on the property at issue and orders the sale of the property.\nIn this case, we do not adjudicate any property rights already determined in the lien enforcement actions or order the sale of the Property to satisfy a judgment, but consider the fact of the date of first furnishing upon which Bunn\u2019s and Mangum\u2019s claims of lien were based to determine the priority of Plaintiffs\u2019 security interests in the Property. \u201cWe see no reason why we should allow a judgment in rem to establish the facts on which that judgment is based in another suit, and we decline to do so.\u201d Id. at 1163 (footnote omitted). In Becher v. Contoure Laboratories, Inc., 279 U.S. 388, 73 L. Ed. 752 (1929), a case concerning the validity of a patent, Justice Holmes enunciated this policy by writing for the United States Supreme Court that \u201c[a] judgment in rem binds all the world, but the facts on which it necessarily proceeds are not established against all the world.\u201d Id. at 391, 73 L. Ed. at 754; accord Cannon v. Cannon, 223 N.C. 664, 671, 28 S.E.2d 240, 244 (1943).\nAccordingly, even if Bunn\u2019s and Mangum\u2019s lien enforcement actions were \u201cactions in rem,\" the resulting lien judgments did not establish the date of first furnishing upon which the Bunn and Mangum Judgments were based as against Plaintiffs. Defendants\u2019 argument is without merit.\nB. Issue Two\nDefendants next argue that even if Plaintiffs\u2019 challenge to the Bunn and Mangum Judgments was permissible, the trial court erred in granting partial summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs because genuine issues of material fact exist with respect to Plaintiffs\u2019 claims for declaratory relief. We disagree.\n1. Standard of Review\nSummary judgment is proper where \u201cthe pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 56(c) (2009). Summary judgment is designed to eliminate the necessity of a formal trial where only questions of law are involved and a fatal weakness in the claim of a party is exposed. Hall v. Post, 85 N.C. App. 610, 613, 355 S.E.2d 819, 822 (1987), rev\u2019d, on other grounds, 323 N.C. 259, 372 S.E.2d 711 (1988). \u201cThe party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of bringing forth a forecast of evidence which tends to establish that there is no triable issue of material fact.\u201d Inland Constr. Co. v. Cameron Park II, Ltd., LLC, 181 N.C. App. 573, 576, 640 S.E.2d 415, 418 (2007) (citation and quotation marks omitted).\nWhen a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in [Rule 56(c)], an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 56(e) (2009). \u201cOn appeal, an order allowing summary judgment is reviewed de novo.\u201d Howerton v. Arai Helmet, Ltd., 358 N.C. 440, 470, 597 S.E.2d 674, 693 (2004).\n2. Date of First Furnishing\nUnder N. C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 44A-8,\n[a]ny person who performs or furnishes labor or professional design or surveying services or furnishes materials or furnishes rental equipment pursuant to a contract, either express or implied, with the owner of real property for the making of an improvement thereon shall, upon complying with the provisions of this Article, have a right to file a [\u201c]claim of lien on real property^\u2019] on the real property to secure payment of all debts owing for labor done or professional design or surveying services or material furnished or equipment rented pursuant to the contract.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 44A-8. \u201c[W]hen a lien is validly perfected, and is subsequently enforced by bringing an action within the statutory period set forth in [N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7] 44A-13(a), the lien will be held to relate back [to] and become effective from the date of the first furnishing of labor or materials under the contract, and will be deemed perfected as of that time.\u201d Frank H. Conner Co., 294 N.C. at 667, 242 S.E.2d at 789; N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 44A-10 (2009). Thus, \u201ca contractor\u2019s lien for all labor and materials furnished pursuant to a contract is deemed prior to any liens or encumbrances attaching to the property subsequent to the date of the contractor\u2019s first furnishing of labor or materials to the construction site.\u201d Id.\nIn this case, Bunn entered into a written contract with Old Stage on 8 April 2004 for clearing, grading, and erosion control services. On 19 April 2004, Bunn entered into another written contract with Old Stage for sewer main, water main, storm drain, and roadway construction services. Bunn performed clearing and rough grading, but ceased work on or around 16 June 2004 for non-payment. On 14 October 2004, Bunn filed a claim of lien in the principal amount of $180,495.24 for \u201cclearing and grading of property[.]\u201d In this claim of lien, Bunn asserted the date of first furnishing to be 5 April 2004.\nOn 8 December 2004, Bunn filed suit against Old Stage to enforce the claim of lien. Bunn alleged that it had entered into \u201c \u2018the Grading Contract\u2019 \u201d with Old Stage under which Bunn was to perform \u201cgrading construction services\u201d for a total price of $268,540, and that Old Stage owed Bunn the principal amount , of $180,495.84 for labor and materials supplied to the Property.\nOn 12 January 2005, Old Stage entered into a third contract with Bunn for silt basin/erosion control services for $27,555. Bunn was paid in full in cash when the contract was signed.\nOn 22 February 2005, Trinity purchased a controlling interest in Old Stage, and Old Stage conveyed Tract 1 to Trinity. Also on that date, BB&T loaned $975,000 to Trinity. A portion of the proceeds of the BB&T loan was used to pay the debt on which Bunn\u2019s 14 October 2004 claim of lien was based, and Bunn then cancelled its claim of lien and dismissed with prejudice its action to enforce the lien.\nOn 25 April 2005, Bunn submitted a contract proposal to Trinity. This proposal for sewer main, water main, storm drain, roadway, construction road, pump station, and force main construction services contained many of the line items from the 19 April 2004 contract, as well as additional items, for a total contract price of $1,813,631. At deposition, Chad D. Bunn, a Project Manager for Bunn, testified that Bunn'was not obligated to do the work it had agreed to do under the first two contracts at the prices stated in those contracts \u201cbecause [Old Stage] had a breach in their contract. They failed to pay us. So much time had lapsed that material prices had increased and we couldn\u2019t do it that cheap. Our prices had to go up.\u201d Thus, Bunn would only agree to continue to work on the Project if Trinity signed the 25 April 2005 proposal reflecting the new prices.\nOn 25 May 2005, Avery Bordeaux signed Bunn\u2019s 25 April 2005 proposal. The contract, drafted by Bunn, states: \u201cThis proposal \u2014 contract replaces any others discussed or written in the past.\u201d Mr. Bunn testified that it was after 25 May 2005 \u201cwhen [Bunn] came back [to the Project] for a second time[.]\u201d\nIn an affidavit, Mr. Bunn stated that Bunn submitted invoices to Old Stage/Trinity for all work performed and .that Defendants were supposed to pay the invoices upon receipt. Attached as exhibits to Mr. Bunn\u2019s affidavit were nine invoices, dated between 8 June 2006 and 27 October 2006 and totaling $1,123,869.70. The first attached invoice, dated 8 June 2006, was for $68,759.85. Mr. Bunn stated that when Trinity began falling behind on invoices, Bunn stopped working on the project on 29 September 2006.\nThese undisputed facts establish that Bunn was paid in full for its clearing and grading work under the 8 April 2004 contract and was also paid in full, in advance, for its silt basin/erosion control services under the 12 January 2005 contract. Moreover, after Bunn was paid under the 8 April 2004 and 12 January 2005 contracts, and after Old Stage was purchased by Trinity, Bunn submitted a contract proposal to Trinity on 25 April 2005 that, in Bunn\u2019s chosen terms, replaced any other contract discussed or written in the past. Trinity executed the contract on 25 May 2005 and Bunn performed the work that is the basis for its second claim of lien under this contract. There was no forecast of evidence that Bunn completed any work pursuant to any contract between 16 June 2004, when it ceased working for non-payment under the grading contract with Old Stage, and 25 May 2005, when it entered into the new contract with Trinity. Accordingly, the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, show that there is no genuine issue that Bunn first furnished labor and materials under the 25 May 2005 contract on or after that date.\nDefendants argue, however, that the dismissal of the Bunn lien enforcement action in 2005 should not have had any effect on Bunn\u2019s first date of performance in this case. We agree. Bunn\u2019s cancellation of its first claim of lien did not \u201cre-set\u201d Bunn\u2019s date of first furnishing for the purposes of this case. Instead, Bunn filed the first claim of lien, cancelled it after receiving payment for the amount asserted in the lien, and thereafter, entered into a new contract, under which it commenced work. It was the commencement of work under a distinctly new contract that effectively \u201cre-set\u201d the date of first furnishing at issue here.\nDefendants argue that Mr. Bunn\u2019s statement in his affidavit that Bunn\u2019s \u201cwork on the Project was a part of one agreement and one contract!,]\u201d and Mr. Bordeaux\u2019s statement in his affidavit that \u201cBunn and the owners of the Project had a single contract to provide services that was confirmed under the four proposals\u201d create a genuine issue of material fact regarding the contractual arrangement between Bunn and the project owners. We disagree.\nThe proposals, drafted by Vick Bunn, were identified as \u201ccontracts!.]\u201d The last of the four contracts states that it \u201creplaces any others discussed or written in the past.\u201d Bunn performed the work that is the subject of its second claim of lien under this fourth contract. Thus, the plain language of the contracts evidences four separate contracts with the final contract replacing all previous contracts. Moreover, Chad Bunn testified that he was not involved with the formation of any of the contracts entered into between Bunn and Old Stage or Trinity and that he only started to get involved in the \u201coffice side of the company . . . probably around 2005.\u201d There is no forecast of evidence that Chad Bunn had a basis of knowledge for his opinion that Bunn\u2019s work on the project was pursuant to one contract. Furthermore, Mr. Bordeaux testified at deposition that he did not write the above-referenced affidavit, had no memory of signing it, and stated,\nas I recall, is that this was a \u2014 would be a series of proposals that I would be receiving, that as we went from one phase of the project to another, I would receive. In other words, I didn\u2019t give him a contract for the overall \u2014 this was simply a contract for grading or a proposal for grading. The next proposal would have been another phase of the project.\nIn other words, it would not have been one contract that covered everything in the project, is what I am saying.\nOne master contract, we didn\u2019t never [sic] contemplate that.\nThus, Defendant\u2019s arguments that there was a material issue concerning the contractual arrangement between Bunn and the owners of the Property are without merit.\nThe BB&T DOT was recorded 22 February 2005. The Cardinal DOT, which was transferred to Clark\u2019s Creek, was recorded 29 April 2005. As these instruments were recorded before 25 May 2005, the BB&T DOT and the Cardinal DOT have priority over Bunn\u2019s and Mangum\u2019s liens as a matter of law. Frank H. Conner Co., 294 N.C. at 667, 242 S.E.2d at 789. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in granting Plaintiffs summary judgment.\nIn light of our conclusions above, we need not reach Defendants\u2019 remaining argument that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Old Stage and Trinity were \u201cowners\u201d of the Property on 5 May 2004 or Plaintiffs\u2019 cross-assignment of error that the trial court improperly denied their motion to add an argument based on the doctrine of instantaneous seisin.\nThe order of the trial court is\nAFFIRMED.\nJudges HUNTER and GEER concur.\n. On 30 May 2008, Bunn assigned its judgment to Zogreo afid Bunn is not a party to this appeal.\n. When an appeal is from an order which disposes of some but not all claims against a party, \u201cthe trial court\u2019s determination that there is \u2018no just reason for delay\u2019 of appeal, while accorded deference, cannot bind the appellate courts[.]\u201d Anderson v. Atlantic Cas. Ins. Co., 134 N.C. App. 724, 726, 518 S.E.2d 786, 788 (1999) (internal citation omitted). However, we determine that a substantial right would be affected absent immediate appeal of the interlocutory order in this case and, thus, we will address the merits of the appeal.\n. Although we question whether a lien enforcement action is in rem or quasi in rem, we need not make such determination as the date of first furnishing stated in the lien judgments at issue is not binding on Plaintiffs regardless of whether such action is in rem or quasi in rem.\n. Had Bunn continued working under one continuous contract, Bunn could have asserted the same date of first furnishing that it asserted in the first claim of lien. However, it could not have asserted the same obligation, i.e., the debt for the work that was the basis for its first claim of lien. Gaston Grading & Landscaping v. Young, 116 N.C. App. 719, 721-22, 449 S.E.2d 475, 476-77 (1994).\n. Vick Bunn, Chad Bunn\u2019s father, was responsible for entering into the contracts with Old Stage and Trinity on behalf of Bunn and for invoicing. Vick Bunn died on 29 \u25a0 December 2006.", "type": "majority", "author": "STEPHENS, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Moore & Van Allen PLLC, by David E. Fox and Michael J. Byrne, for Plaintiffs Lawyers Title Insurance Corporation, Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Company, and Branch Bank and Trust Company.", "No brief for Plaintiff Clark\u2019s Creek Associates, L.L.C.", "Lewis & Roberts, PLLC, by James A. Roberts, III, Matthew C. Bouchard, and Brooke N. Albert, for Defendants Zogreo, LLC and Forest at Swift Creek, LLC.", "Brent E. Wood and Nicholls & Crampton, P.A., by W. Sidney Aldridge, for Defendant C. C. Mangum Company, L.L. C.", "Erwin and Eleazer, P.A., by L. Holmes Eleazer, Jr. and Fenton T. Erwin, Jr., for American Subcontractors Association of America, Amicus Curiae." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "LAWYERS TITLE INSURANCE CORPORATION, COMMONWEALTH LAND TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY, CLARK\u2019S CREEK ASSOCIATES, L.L.C., and BRANCH BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, Plaintiffs v. ZOGREO, LLC, FOREST AT SWIFT CREEK, LLC, C.C. MANGUM COMPANY, L.L.C., AND DONNIE HARRISON, in his official capacity as Sheriff of Wake County, Defendants\nNo. COA09-1304\n(Filed 16 November 2010)\n1. Declaratory Judgments\u2014 security interests in real property \u2014 plaintiffs not bound by lien judgments\nThe trial court did not err in denying defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss and motion for judgment on the pleadings in a declaratory judgment action concerning security interests in certain real property. As plaintiffs were not parties to defendant Bunn\u2019s or Mangum\u2019s actions to enforce their materialmen\u2019s liens, and therefore were not bound by the lien judgments, plaintiffs were free to bring subsequent actions to have the priority of their security interests determined.\n2. Liens\u2014 security interests in real property \u2014 not impermissible collateral attack against lien judgments\nPlaintiffs\u2019 civil action to determine security interests in certain real property did not represent an impermissible collateral attack against valid lien judgments held by defendants Bunn and Mangum because plaintiffs did not seek \u201cnullification\u201d of the Bunn and Mangum judgments, and plaintiffs might have been entitled t\u00f3 the relief requested without those judgments being declared void as between the parties to the lien enforcement actions.\n3. Liens\u2014 security interests in real property \u2014 lien enforcement action \u2014 not determinative of date of first furnishing\nEven if defendant Bunn\u2019s and Mangum\u2019s lien enforcement actions were \u201cactions in rem,\u201d the resulting lien judgments did not establish the date of first furnishing upon which the Bunn and Mangum judgments were based as against plaintiffs.\n4. Liens\u2014 security interests in real property \u2014 date of first furnishing \u2014 no issue of material fact\nThe trial court did not err in granting partial summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs in a declaratory judgment action concerning security interests in certain real property because no genuine issues of material fact existed with respect to plaintiffs\u2019 claims for declaratory relief, including the date of first furnishing.\nAppeal by Defendants from judgment entered 8 June 2009 by Judge Robert H. Hobgood in Wake County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 12 May 2010.\nMoore & Van Allen PLLC, by David E. Fox and Michael J. Byrne, for Plaintiffs Lawyers Title Insurance Corporation, Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Company, and Branch Bank and Trust Company.\nNo brief for Plaintiff Clark\u2019s Creek Associates, L.L.C.\nLewis & Roberts, PLLC, by James A. Roberts, III, Matthew C. Bouchard, and Brooke N. Albert, for Defendants Zogreo, LLC and Forest at Swift Creek, LLC.\nBrent E. Wood and Nicholls & Crampton, P.A., by W. Sidney Aldridge, for Defendant C. C. Mangum Company, L.L. C.\nErwin and Eleazer, P.A., by L. Holmes Eleazer, Jr. and Fenton T. Erwin, Jr., for American Subcontractors Association of America, Amicus Curiae.\n. The order appealed from is captioned \u201cLAWYERS TITLE INSURANCE CORPORATION et al.; Plaintiffs, v. ZOGREO, LLC et al.; Defendants.\u201d However, we elect to include the names of all the parties to the suit in the caption of this opinion.\n. Defendant Donnie Harrison, in his official capacity as Sheriff of Wake County, is not a party to this appeal." }, "file_name": "0088-01", "first_page_order": 112, "last_page_order": 128 }