{ "id": 4181222, "name": "IN RE: K.U.-S.G., D.L.L.G., and P.T.D.G., Minor Children", "name_abbreviation": "In re K.U.-S.G.", "decision_date": "2010-11-16", "docket_number": "No. COA10-695", "first_page": "128", "last_page": "135", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "208 N.C. App. 128" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "653 S.E.2d 143", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12639850, 12639851 ], "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/653/0143-01", "/se2d/653/0143-02" ] }, { "cite": "651 S.E.2d 562", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12639622, 12639623 ], "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/651/0562-01", "/se2d/651/0562-02" ] }, { "cite": "669 S.E.2d 850", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12642339 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "854" }, { "page": "855-56" }, { "page": "856" }, { "page": "856" }, { "page": "856" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/669/0850-01" ] }, { "cite": "672 S.E.2d 19", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12642724 ], "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/672/0019-01" ] }, { "cite": "662 S.E.2d 24", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12641237 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "30", "parenthetical": "noting that, based on N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-1101, UCCJEA \u00a7 204's temporary emergency jurisdiction does not provide basis for terminating parental rights of non-resident" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/662/0024-01" ] }, { "cite": "636 S.E.2d 787", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12637106 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "793" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/636/0787-01" ] }, { "cite": "362 N.C. 84", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4150229 ], "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/362/0084-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 N.C. 568", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3736262, 3737194, 3747498, 3744463, 3742067, 3743956, 3735739, 3737213, 3737439 ], "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/361/0568-05", "/nc/361/0568-04", "/nc/361/0568-07", "/nc/361/0568-02", "/nc/361/0568-03", "/nc/361/0568-06", "/nc/361/0568-09", "/nc/361/0568-01", "/nc/361/0568-08" ] }, { "cite": "642 S.E.2d 471", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "473" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "182 N.C. App. 394", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8172392 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "396-97" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/182/0394-01" ] }, { "cite": "194 N.C. App. 439", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4162787 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "446" }, { "page": "448" }, { "page": "448" }, { "page": "448" }, { "page": "449" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/194/0439-01" ] }, { "cite": "363 N.C. 9", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4150614 ], "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/363/0009-01" ] }, { "cite": "191 N.C. App. 34", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4159726 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "44", "parenthetical": "noting that, based on N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-1101, UCCJEA \u00a7 204's temporary emergency jurisdiction does not provide basis for terminating parental rights of non-resident" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/191/0034-01" ] }, { "cite": "598 S.E.2d 147", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 8, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "149" }, { "page": "150" }, { "page": "150" }, { "page": "150" }, { "page": "150", "parenthetical": "\"[T]he children had been living in New Hanover County since 1 August 2000, and the petition was filed 21 March 2002. Thus, the home state requirement was satisfied.\"" }, { "page": "151" }, { "page": "151" }, { "page": "151", "parenthetical": "\"Because respondent continued to live in Arkansas, subsection (2" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "165 N.C. App. 294", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8997078 ], "weight": 8, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "298" }, { "page": "298" }, { "page": "299" }, { "page": "299" }, { "page": "299" }, { "page": "300" }, { "page": "300" }, { "page": "301" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/165/0294-01" ] }, { "cite": "360 N.C. 588", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3787934 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "595" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/360/0588-01" ] }, { "cite": "174 S.E.2d 103", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "108" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "8 N.C. App. 162", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8549972 ], "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "169" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/8/0162-01" ] }, { "cite": "61 L. Ed. 2d 297", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "442 U.S. 929", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1531938, 1532133, 1531912, 1532170, 1532010, 1532202, 1532021, 1531990, 1532122, 1532092, 1531806 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/442/0929-02", "/us/442/0929-01", "/us/442/0929-10", "/us/442/0929-08", "/us/442/0929-11", "/us/442/0929-03", "/us/442/0929-04", "/us/442/0929-09", "/us/442/0929-05", "/us/442/0929-06", "/us/442/0929-07" ] }, { "cite": "250 S.E.2d 890", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "910" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "296 N.C. 109", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565310 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "144" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/296/0109-01" ] }, { "cite": "554 S.E.2d 338", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "354 N.C. 217", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 138306, 138445, 138481, 138365, 138334 ], "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/354/0217-02", "/nc/354/0217-03", "/nc/354/0217-01", "/nc/354/0217-04", "/nc/354/0217-05" ] }, { "cite": "547 S.E.2d 127", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "130" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "143 N.C. App. 688", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11437004 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "693" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/143/0688-01" ] }, { "cite": "585 S.E.2d 240", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "243" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "160 N.C. App. 209", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8955096 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "213" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/160/0209-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 734, "char_count": 18954, "ocr_confidence": 0.736, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.1199746942060633e-07, "percentile": 0.7644215936913696 }, "sha256": "0e9a696686e76d18091789312ab67eed47443f4d9d6a845e6f04486cfe48e553", "simhash": "1:9b6904427a3b1d55", "word_count": 2986 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:19:36.775795+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges STROUD and Robert N. HUNTER, Jr. concur." ], "parties": [ "IN RE: K.U.-S.G., D.L.L.G., and P.T.D.G., Minor Children" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "HUNTER, Robert C., Judge. '\nRespondent-mother Sylvia G. appeals from the trial court\u2019s order terminating her parental rights with respect to her three children: RT.D.G. (\u201cPaul\u201d) (born June 2000), D.L.L.G. (\u201cDana\u201d) (born January 2002), and K.U.-S.G. (\u201cKatie\u201d) (bom December 2002). We agree with respondent\u2019s threshold contention that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (\u201cUCCJEA\u201d) to terminate her parental rights, and, consequently, we vacate the court\u2019s order.\nFacts\nIn 2002, Paul and Dana were living with respondent in Fayette County, Pennsylvania. On 1 November 2002, Fayette County Children and Youth Services (FCCYS) filed a petition with the Court of Commons Pleas of Fayette County, alleging that Paul and Dana were neglected and dependant juveniles based on \u201clack of supervision issues.\u201d On 5 November 2002, the Pennsylvania court entered an order adjudicating Paul and Dana to be dependent juveniles and placed them in the \u201ccare, custody and supervision of [FCCYS] for foster home placement.\u201d\nShortly after Katie\u2019s birth in December 2002, FCCYS filed a juvenile petition alleging that she was a dependent juvenile. Respondent and her mother entered into a \u201csafety plan\u201d with FCCYS, agreeing to placement of Katie with her grandmother, with the condition that respondent not be allowed to have \u201cunsupervised contact with [Katie].\u201d Based on the safety plan, the Pennsylvania court entered an order on 13 December 2002, adjudicating Katie dependent and granting custody to Katie\u2019s grandmother, \u201cuntil such time that [respondent] has satisfactorily completed her Family Service Plan . ...\u201d On 29 January 2002, however, FCCYS filed a petition for custody of Katie after it discovered that respondent and her mother \u201chad not been abiding by the safety plan.\u201d That same day, the Pennsylvania court granted FCCYS temporary custody of Katie. After conducting a hearing on 24 February 2003, the Pennsylvania Court entered an order the next day continuing custody of Katie with FCCYS.\nFCCYS subsequently placed all three children with respondent\u2019s great aunt and uncle, petitioners Curtis and Sara H., who are licensed foster parents in Pennsylvania. FCCYS worked with respondent on the family services plans established in the juvenile cases, but ultimately filed petitions on 11 May 2004 to terminate her parental rights with respect to all three juveniles. A hearing was held on 22 July 2004 regarding the petitions, but was continued pending completion of a \u201cbonding assessment,\u201d and the goal for the juveniles remained reunification. At the second hearing on the termination petitions, held on 6 December 2004, FCCYS consented to giving respondent an additional six months to complete her service plan, and the hearing was rescheduled for June 2005.\nOn 31 May 2005, FCCYS filed a \u201cPetition to Discharge\u201d with respect to each juvenile, indicating that petitioners intended to move within the next month to North Carolina for work, but that FCCYS would be unable to permit the juveniles to move out of state while in the legal custody of FCCYS without obtaining \u201cprior interstate approval,\u201d which could take several months to complete. FCCYS requested that the court change the goal of the juveniles to \u201cPlacement with a Permanent Legal Custodian\u201d and discharge the juveniles to the \u201cpermanent legal custody\u201d of petitioners. Attached to the petitions were statements signed by respondent, the attorneys representing the juveniles, and petitioners, indicating that they all \u201cjoin[ed] in and consented] to the relief sought in the foregoing petition[s].\u201d In orders entered 1 June 2005, the Pennsylvania court changed the juveniles\u2019 goal to placement with a permanent legal custodian and \u201cdischarged [the juveniles] to the custody of [petitioners].\u201d The court also ordered that respondent continue to have supervised visitation with her children.\nWhile petitioners and the juveniles moved to North Carolina, respondent remained in Pennsylvania. The juveniles lived in North Carolina until August 2006, when petitioners agreed that the juveniles should return to Pennsylvania to live with respondent. On 21 August 2006, petitioners and respondent entered a \u201cConsent Order for Child Custody\u201d in the District Court of Guilford County, North Carolina. In the order, the parties agreed that the North Carolina court had jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of the action and purported to \u201cwaive any further requirements of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act.\u201d The consent order gave custody of the three children to respondent and \u201cawarded visitation privileges\u201d to petitioners.\nThe juveniles lived in Pennsylvania with respondent until April 2007, when respondent asked petitioners to take the juveniles back to North Carolina, stating that she would move to North Carolina in June 2007 after she finished nursing school. In June 2007, however, respondent was arrested in Pennsylvania on drug possession charges and remained in Pennsylvania pending resolution of the criminal charges. In January 2008, respondent signed a voluntary support order, agreeing to pay petitioners $105.00 a month in child support. Respondent also provided petitioners with a \u201cnotarized . . . paper\u201d giving petitioners guardianship of her children. In October 2008, respondent was convicted of the drug charges and incarcerated in Pennsylvania, with a projected release date of 17 October 2010.\nOn 10 June 2009, petitioners filed petitions to terminate respondent\u2019s parental rights with respect to all three juveniles, alleging that respondent had failed to provide financial support for the juveniles as agreed in the voluntary support order, had abandoned the juveniles, and had not provided any emotional support for the juveniles. Respondent filed a reply on 15 October 2009, generally denying the allegations regarding the existence of grounds to terminate her parental rights. After hearings were held on 8 January and 7 February 2010, the trial court entered an order on 4 March 2010, terminating respondent\u2019s parental rights with respect to Paul, Dana, and Katie. Respondent timely appealed to this Court.\nDiscussion\nRespondent\u2019s threshold argument on appeal is that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction under the UCCJEA, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 50A-101 through -317 (2009), to terminate her parental rights. Whether a trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law, reviewed de novo on appeal. Harper v. City of Asheville, 160 N.C. App. 209, 213, 585 S.E.2d 240, 243 (2003). Subject-matter jurisdiction \u201cinvolves the authority of a court to adjudicate the type of controversy presented by the action before it.\u201d Haker-Volkening v. Haker, 143 N.C. App. 688, 693, 547 S.E.2d 127, 130, disc. review denied, 354 N.C. 217, 554 S.E.2d 338 (2001). Subject-matter jurisdiction derives from the law that organizes a court and cannot be conferred on a court by action of the parties or assumed by a court except as provided by that law. In re Peoples, 296 N.C. 109, 144, 250 S.E.2d 890, 910 (1978), cert. denied sub nom. Peoples v. Judicial Standards Comm\u2019n of N.C., 442 U.S. 929, 61 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1979). \u201cWhen a court decides a matter without the court\u2019s having jurisdiction, then the whole proceeding is null and void, i.e., as if it had never happened.\u201d Hopkins v. Hopkins, 8 N.C. App. 162, 169, 174 S.E.2d 103, 108 (1970). Thus the trial court\u2019s subject-matter jurisdiction may be challenged at any stage of the proceedings, even for the first time on appeal. In re T.R.P, 360 N.C. 588, 595, 636 S.E.2d 787, 793 (2006).\nOur Juvenile Code grants district courts\nexclusive original jurisdiction to hear and determine any petition or motion relating to termination of parental rights to any juvenile who resides in, is found in, or is in the legal or actual custody of a county department of social services or licensed child-placing agency in the district at the time of filing of the petition or motion.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-1101 (2009). Nevertheless, the jurisdictional requirements of the UCCJEA also must be satisfied for the district court to have authority to adjudicate termination actions. In re N.R.M., 165 N.C. App. 294, 298, 598 S.E.2d 147, 149 (2004). As is the case here, in order to terminate the parental rights of a non-resident parent, the court must \u201cfind that it has jurisdiction to make a child-custody determination under the provisions of G.S. 50A-201 or G.S. 50A-203, without regard to G.S. 50A-204 . . . .\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-1101; see also In re E.X.J., 191 N.C. App. 34, 44, 662 S.E.2d 24, 30 (2008) (noting that, based on N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-1101, UCCJEA \u00a7 204\u2019s temporary emergency jurisdiction does not provide basis for terminating parental rights of non-resident), aff\u2019d per curiam, 363 N.C. 9, 672 S.E.2d 19 (2009).\nI. Jurisdiction under UCCJEA Section 201\nThe first provision of the UCCJEA, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50A-201, \u201caddresses the jurisdictional requirements for initial child-custody determinations.\u201d In re J.W.S., 194 N.C. App. 439, 446, 669 S.E.2d 850, 854 (2008). The UCCJEA defines an \u201cinitial determination\u201d as \u201cthe first child-custody determination concerning a particular child.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50A-102(8). Here, the record establishes that the initial custody determinations with respect to all three juveniles were made by the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas in Fayette County. Consequently, the North Carolina court lacked jurisdiction under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50A-201 to enter an order terminating respondent\u2019s parental rights. See N.R.M., 165 N.C. App. at 298, 598 S.E.2d at 150 (holding trial court lacked jurisdiction under UCCJEA \u00a7 201 to enter termination order where initial \u201ccustody issues have already been addressed by an Arkansas court\u201d).\nII. Jurisdiction under UCCJEA Section 203\nThe UCCJEA\u2019s remaining jurisdictional provision pertinent here, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50A-203, \u201coutlines the requirements for a North Carolina court to have jurisdiction to modify a child-custody determination.\u201d N.R.M., 165 N.C. App. at 299, 598 S.E.2d at 150. \u201cModification\u201d is defined as \u201ca child-custody determination that changes, replaces, supersedes, or is otherwise made after a previous determination concerning the same child, whether or not it is made by the court that made the previous determination.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50A-102(11).\nIn this case, the Pennsylvania court entered orders on 1 June 2005 granting legal custody of the juveniles to petitioners and allowing respondent supervised visitation. Thus, at the time the North Carolina termination petitions were filed, there was an existing order from another state pertaining to the juveniles. Consequently, \u201cany change to th[ose] [Pennsylvania] order[s] qualif[y] as a modification under the UCCJEA.\u201d N.R.M., 165 N.C. App. at 299, 598 S.E.2d at 150.\nUnder the UCCJEA, a North Carolina court may not modify a child-custody determination made by another state unless two requirements are satisfied: (1) the North Carolina court \u201chas jurisdiction to make an initial determination under G.S. 50A-201(a)(l) or G.S. 50A-201(a)(2)\u201d; and (2)(a) a court of the issuing state determines either that it \u201cno longer has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction\u201d under UCCJEA \u00a7 202 or that the North Carolina court would be a \u201cmore convenient forum\u201d under UCCJEA \u00a7 207; or (b) a North Carolina court or a court of the issuing state \u201cdetermines that the child, the child\u2019s parents, and any person acting as a parent do not presently reside in the [issuing] state.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50A-203; see also In re T.J.D.W., 182 N.C. App. 394, 396-97, 642 S.E.2d 471, 473 (explaining that only when UCCJEA \u00a7 203\u2019s \u201ctwo conditions are fulfilled\u201d may a North Carolina court modify another state\u2019s custody determination), disc. review denied in part, 361 N.C. 568, 651 S.E.2d 562, aff\u2019d per curiam in part, 362 N.C. 84, 653 S.E.2d 143 (2007).\nII. A Jurisdiction to Make Initial Custody Determination\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50A-203\u2019s first requirement for modification is that the North Carolina court must have \u201cjurisdiction to make an initial determination under G.S. 50A-201(a)(l) or G.S. 50A-201(a)(2) ....\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50A-203. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50A-201(a)(l), in turn, provides for jurisdiction if North Carolina is the \u201chome state of the child on the date of the commencement of the proceeding . . . .\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50A-201(a)(l). A child\u2019s \u201chome state\u201d is defined as \u201cthe state in which a child lived with a parent or a person acting as a parent for at least six consecutive months immediately before the commencement of a child-custody proceeding.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50A-102(7).\nHere, the record indicates that Paul, Dana, and Katie have been living with petitioners in North Carolina at least since April 2007 and that the termination petitions were filed in June 2009. Consequently, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50A-201(a)(l)\u2019s \u201chome state\u201d requirement is satisfied in this case. See N.R.M., 165 N.C. App. at 299, 598 S.E.2d at 150 (\u201c[T]he children had been living in New Hanover County since 1 August 2000, and the petition was filed 21 March 2002. Thus, the home state requirement was satisfied.\u201d).\nII.B.l Exclusive. Continuing Jurisdiction\nThe UCCJEA provides three options for satisfying its second requirement for jurisdiction to modify another state\u2019s custody determination. First, a North Carolina court may enter an order modifying another state\u2019s custody determination if a court of the issuing state concludes that it no longer has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction under the UCCJEA. The court of the issuing state loses \u201cexclusive, continuing jurisdiction\u201d under the UCCJEA if:\n(1) [it] determines that. . . the child, the child\u2019s parents, and any person acting as a parent [no longer] have a significant connection with th[at] State and that substantial evidence is no longer available in th[at] State concerning the child\u2019s care, protection, training, and personal relationships; or\n(2) [it] or a court of another state determines that the child, the child\u2019s parents, and any person acting as a parent do not presently reside in th[e] [issuing] State.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50A-202(a). The official comment to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50A-202(a)(l) \u201cclarifies that \u2018the original decree State is the sole determinant of whether jurisdiction continues. A party seeking to modify a custody determination must obtain an order from the original decree State stating that it no longer has jurisdiction.\u2019 \u201d N.R.M., 165 N.C. App. at 300, 598 S.E.2d at 151 (quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50A-202 official cmt.).\nHere, although the North Carolina court stated that it had contacted \u201cthe Court of Common Pleas, Fayette County, Juvenile Division and determined that Fayette County no longer wished to retain jurisdiction,\u201d the record does not include an order from a Pennsylvania court indicating that Pennsylvania no longer has jurisdiction. Consequently, the Pennsylvania court did not lose jurisdiction under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50A-202(a)(l). See J.W.S., 194 N.C. App. at 448, 669 S.E.2d at 855-56 (\u201cIn the case before this Court, although the trial court found that \u2018the State of New York has not opted to exercise jurisdiction [,]\u2019 there is no order from the New York court in the record before us stating that New York no longer has jurisdiction. . . . Accordingly, the New York court did not lose jurisdiction under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50A-202(a)(l).\u201d). Respondent, moreover, was incarcerated in Pennsylvania when this termination action was initiated in North Carolina. Pennsylvania, therefore, did not lose jurisdiction based on N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50A-202(a)(2). See N.R.M., 165 N.C. App. at 300, 598 S.E.2d at 151 (\u201c [A]t the time of the petition, respondent resided in Arkansas[,] so Arkansas did not lose continuing jurisdiction based on N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50A-202(a)(2).\u201d).\nII.B.2 More Convenient Forum Jurisdiction\nPursuant to UCCJEA \u00a7 203(1), Pennsylvania may relinquish jurisdiction to North Carolina if the Pennsylvania court determines that a North Carolina court would be a more convenient forum under UCCJEA \u00a7 207. J.W.S., 194 N.C. App. at 448, 669 S.E.2d at 856. Again, however, nothing in the record suggests that a Pennsylvania court made such a determination. Consequently, \u201cneither method of obtaining jurisdiction under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50A-203(1) is satisfied.\u201d J.W.S., 194 N.C. App. at 448, 669 S.E.2d at 856.\nII.B.3 Jurisdiction under UCCJEA Section 20312)\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50A-203(2) \u201cprovides for jurisdiction if either the issuing state or the state attempting to modify the order determines that the child, the child\u2019s parents, and any person acting as a parent have left the issuing state.\u201d J.W.S., 194 N.C. App. at 449, 669 S.E.2d at 856; see also N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50A-203 official cmt. (explaining that the \u201conly exception\u201d to general prohibition against \u201c[t]he modification State . . . determin[ing] that the original decree State has lost its jurisdiction\u201d is when \u201call parties have moved away from the original State\u201d). The record in this case indicates that respondent, being incarcerated in state prison, continues to reside in Pennsylvania. Thus, despite petitioners\u2019 moving to North Carolina with the juveniles, jurisdiction under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50A-203(2) is not established. See N.R.M., 165 N.C. App. at 301, 598 S.E.2d at 151 (\u201cBecause respondent continued to live in Arkansas, subsection (2) [of UCCJEA \u00a7 203] was not satisfied even though petitioner and the children had left Arkansas and moved to North Carolina.\u201d). The trial court, therefore, lacked subject-matter jurisdiction under the UCCJEA to enter an order terminating respondent\u2019s parental rights. Accordingly, the trial court\u2019s order is vacated.\nVacated.\nJudges STROUD and Robert N. HUNTER, Jr. concur.\n. Pseudonyms are used throughout this opinion for the protection of the juveniles\u2019 privacy and ease of reading.", "type": "majority", "author": "HUNTER, Robert C., Judge. '" } ], "attorneys": [ "E. Danielle Caldwell and Kathryn S. Lindley for petitionersappellees.", "Mary McCullers Reece for respondent-appellant mother." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "IN RE: K.U.-S.G., D.L.L.G., and P.T.D.G., Minor Children\nNo. COA10-695\n(Filed 16 November 2010)\nTermination of Parental Rights\u2014 Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act \u2014 modification of custody order \u2014 no subject matter jurisdiction\nThe trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act to terminate respondent\u2019s parental rights. The order for termination modified an existing custody order entered by a Pennsylvania court and although the trial court satisfied the \u201chome state\u201d requirement, Pennsylvania had not lost continuing jurisdiction, Pennsylvania had not determined that North Carolina was a more convenient forum, and respondent continued to reside in Pennsylvania.\nAppeal by respondent from order entered 4 March 2010 by Judge Sherry F. Alloway in Guilford County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 18 October 2010.\nE. Danielle Caldwell and Kathryn S. Lindley for petitionersappellees.\nMary McCullers Reece for respondent-appellant mother." }, "file_name": "0128-01", "first_page_order": 152, "last_page_order": 159 }