{ "id": 4180887, "name": "ROGER P. EDWARDS, JR. and AMANDA M. EDWARDS, Plaintiffs v. TERRENCE G. HILL and LINDA LEE HILL, Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "Edwards v. Hill", "decision_date": "2010-12-07", "docket_number": "No. COA09-1661", "first_page": "178", "last_page": "193", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "208 N.C. App. 178" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "614 S.E.2d 396", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633142 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "404" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/614/0396-01" ] }, { "cite": "657 S.E.2d 361", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12640450 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "362" }, { "page": "363" }, { "page": "366-67", "parenthetical": "explaining that N.C.R. App. P. 25(b" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/657/0361-01" ] }, { "cite": "635 S.E.2d 485", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12636801 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "488" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/635/0485-01" ] }, { "cite": "171 N.C. App. 187", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8436029 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "192" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/171/0187-01" ] }, { "cite": "312 U.S. 552", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 359248 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1941, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "557" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/312/0552-01" ] }, { "cite": "362 N.C. 191", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4149183 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "194" }, { "page": "199-200" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/362/0191-01" ] }, { "cite": "178 S.E.2d 393", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "277 N.C. 591", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8566921 ], "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/277/0591-01" ] }, { "cite": "416 S.E.2d 177", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "186" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "331 N.C. 293", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2500912 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "305" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/331/0293-01" ] }, { "cite": "461 S.E.2d 17", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "22", "parenthetical": "\"It is axiomatic in property law that one may not have an easement in his or her own land. . . . Ordinarily the doctrine of merger would apply and extinguish the easement[.]\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "120 N.C. App. 136", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11914347 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "143", "parenthetical": "\"It is axiomatic in property law that one may not have an easement in his or her own land. . . . Ordinarily the doctrine of merger would apply and extinguish the easement[.]\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/120/0136-01" ] }, { "cite": "352 S.E.2d 458", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "462" }, { "page": "463" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "84 N.C. App. 205", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12168043 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "211" }, { "page": "212" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/84/0205-01" ] }, { "cite": "413 S.E.2d 296", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "298" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "105 N.C. App. 432", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523703 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "435" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/105/0432-01" ] }, { "cite": "326 S.E.2d 261", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "264", "parenthetical": "internal citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "313 N.C. 143", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4724054 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "146-47", "parenthetical": "internal citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/313/0143-01" ] }, { "cite": "232 S.E.2d 286", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "288" }, { "page": "288", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citations omitted" }, { "page": "288" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "32 N.C. App. 379", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8550726 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "382" }, { "page": "382" }, { "page": "383" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/32/0379-01" ] }, { "cite": "19 S.E.2d 484", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1942, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "485" }, { "page": "485" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "221 N.C. 178", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8626799 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1942, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "180" }, { "page": "180" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/221/0178-01" ] }, { "cite": "388 S.E.2d 538", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "551", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 N.C. 100", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 5305276 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "123", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/326/0100-01" ] }, { "cite": "136 S.E.2d 269", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1964, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "273" }, { "page": "273" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "262 N.C. 8", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565101 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1964, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "13" }, { "page": "13" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/262/0008-01" ] }, { "cite": "552 S.E.2d 262", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "264-65", "parenthetical": "quoting Lane v. Coe, 262 N.C. 8, 13, 136 S.E.2d 269, 273 (1964)" }, { "page": "265" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "146 N.C. App. 442", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11359246 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "445", "parenthetical": "quoting Lane v. Coe, 262 N.C. 8, 13, 136 S.E.2d 269, 273 (1964)" }, { "page": "445" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/146/0442-01" ] }, { "cite": "133 S.E.2d 464", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1963, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "260 N.C. 587", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8575708 ], "year": 1963, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/260/0587-01" ] }, { "cite": "316 S.E.2d 267", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "270", "parenthetical": "internal citations omitted" }, { "page": "271", "parenthetical": "\"The law endeavors to give effect to the intention of the parties, whenever [it] can be done consistently with rational construction.\"" }, { "page": "271" }, { "page": "270", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citation omitted" }, { "page": "271", "parenthetical": "\"The use of the roads in question by plaintiffs' predecessors in title, acquiesced in by defendants' predecessors in title of the servient estate, sufficiently locates the roads on the ground, which is deemed to be that which was intended by the reservation of the easements.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "311 N.C. 245", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4683743 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "249", "parenthetical": "internal citations omitted" }, { "page": "251" }, { "page": "251" }, { "page": "249" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/311/0245-01" ] }, { "cite": "469 S.E.2d 571", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "575", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "122 N.C. App. 322", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11917001 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "327", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/122/0322-01" ] }, { "cite": "505 S.E.2d 322", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "324", "parenthetical": "\"Deeds of easement are construed according to the rules for construction of contracts so as to ascertain the intention of the parties as gathered from the entire instrument at the time it was made.\"" }, { "page": "324" }, { "page": "324" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "131 N.C. App. 120", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11197639 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "122", "parenthetical": "\"Deeds of easement are construed according to the rules for construction of contracts so as to ascertain the intention of the parties as gathered from the entire instrument at the time it was made.\"" }, { "page": "122" }, { "page": "122" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/131/0120-01" ] }, { "cite": "379 S.E.2d 59", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "63" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "93 N.C. App. 665", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8528482 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "671" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/93/0665-01" ] }, { "cite": "179 N.C. App. 721", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8239187 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "725" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/179/0721-01" ] }, { "cite": "567 S.E.2d 174", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "176", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "151 N.C. App. 697", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9082078 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "699", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/151/0697-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1301, "char_count": 38875, "ocr_confidence": 0.737, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.1166298202599844e-08, "percentile": 0.3209907218528957 }, "sha256": "7be0d017136c89568aeb046b3b8e47f938a153f5fd551721929dd51f1236b65a", "simhash": "1:e14507aa6c0e280c", "word_count": 6482 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:19:36.775795+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges GEER and JACKSON concur." ], "parties": [ "ROGER P. EDWARDS, JR. and AMANDA M. EDWARDS, Plaintiffs v. TERRENCE G. HILL and LINDA LEE HILL, Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "BEASLEY, Judge.\nRoger P. Edwards, Jr. and Amanda M. Edwards (Plaintiffs) appeal from the trial court\u2019s order denying their claim for trespass and ruling that Terrence G. Hill and Linda Lee Hill (Defendants) have an easement over that portion of Plaintiffs\u2019 property where the contested use was taking place. For the following reasons, we affirm.\nThe parties to this action own adjacent properties, both conveyed out of a larger tract, in Cleveland County, North Carolina. Plaintiffs\u2019 property consists of 20 acres located on the west side of Carpenters Grove Church Road, and Defendants\u2019 18.39 acre tract adjoins the western boundary of Plaintiffs\u2019 parcel. Plaintiffs and Defendants access their properties from Carpenters Grove Church Road by way of a 60 foot easement, which is not in dispute. Abutting the 60 foot easement is a soil road, along which both parties travel to get to and from their respective parcels. Plaintiffs admit that Defendants\u2019 have the right, pursuant to a 45 foot easement, to use the road where it meets the 60 foot easement and for a certain distance therefrom. Plaintiffs contend, however, that the 45 foot easement turns west at the northeastern comer of Defendants\u2019 property line and proceeds along Defendants\u2019 northern border, leaving the portion of the soil road south of that point unencumbered along Plaintiffs\u2019 western border. As such, Plaintiffs requested that Defendants \u201ccease their use of that soil drive beyond the point where Defendants have access to their own property\u201d argue that Defendants\u2019 continued use of the road alongside their eastern boundary to and from their driveway and residence constitutes a trespass. Thus arose this dispute: Plaintiffs claim Defendants are making use of a portion of the road that is not subject to any pre-existing or granted right-of-way and Defendants respond that the 45 foot easement tracks the entire length of the soil road such that their right of use persists past the point-at which Plaintiffs allege it terminates and extends to the point at which the road meets Defendants\u2019 driveway. We first review the chain of title.\nThe common tract from which the parties\u2019 parcels were conveyed was acquired by Native Land Homesites, LLC (NLH), which was owned by Eugene Grigg and Lewis Harrelson. NLH purchased approximately 61 acres to subdivide the parcel and convey several lots therefrom. The first conveyance was a 20 acre parcel granted to Brian Gaddy, Plaintiffs\u2019 predecessor in title, on 21 April 2003, by deed recorded in Deed Book 1370, Page 725 in Cleveland County (the \u201cPrimary Deed\u201d). The deed was also made subject to an \u201cexisting Right-of-Way and Easement (45 feet in width) which crosses the most northwesterly portion of [the 20 acre tract]\u201d and to the above-referenced 60 foot easement. Additionally, NLH \u201creserve[d] unto itself, its successors and assigns, the right to the use of the aforesaid [rights-of-way].\u201d\nPlaintiffs acquired Gaddy\u2019s 20 acre tract through two separate conveyances. On 6 October 2003, Gaddy deeded to Plaintiffs a 10 acre tract carved out of the southern half of his parcel (the \u201csouthernmost 10 acre tract\u201d). Gaddy included in the conveyance a 45 foot easement along the northern and western boundaries of his upper parcel, allowing Plaintiffs\u2019 to cross his property \u201cfor ingress, egress and regress\u201d between the 60 foot easement off of Carpenters Grove Church Road and the southernmost 10 acre tract. The second 10 acre conveyance was made by deed dated 23 September 2004, whereby Gaddy sold to Plaintiffs the remainder of his original parcel (the northernmost 10 acre tract). This deed was made \u201csubject to . . . [t]hat certain 45-foot easement and right-of-way... running along the westerly and northerly side as shown on the survey referenced [in the Primary Deed].\u201d\nDefendants acquired their property from NLH by deed on 14 June 2005, which conveyed the 18.39 acre tract \u201ctogether with a non-exclusive perpetual Right-of-Way and Easement (45 feet in width) which runs in a generally northeasterly direction to Carpenter\u2019s Grove Church Road as described in [several deeds listed therein].\u201d The course of the soil road that Defendants use to access their residence from the 60 foot easement to their driveway is identified on the various surveys by calls L23 through LI. Only the area between the northern side of L5 and the southern end of LI (hereinafter referred to interchangeably as \u201cLI to L6\u201d or \u201cL6 to LI\u201d) is contested. While Plaintiffs claim Defendants\u2019 right to use the road ends at the unmarked point between lines L5 and L6 on the surveys (hereinafter referred to as \u201cL5/L6\u201d), Defendants maintain that their easement extends to LI and have continued to use the soil road past that point to LI, where it turns onto their property.\nOn 24 July 2007, Plaintiffs filed a complaint for compensatory damages and an injunction based on allegations that Defendants committed trespass and damage to personal property. A bench trial was held on 19 March 2009, and after taking the matter under consideration, the trial court ruled that Defendants did not commit trespass across Plaintiffs\u2019 property or damage Plaintiffs\u2019 personal property. The trial court further decreed that Defendants have a 45-foot wide right-of-way and easement- over the centerline of the existing soil road, including the contested portion from LI to L6. Plaintiffs appeal.\nWe review a judgment entered after a non-jury trial to determine \u201cwhether there is competent evidence to support the trial court\u2019s findings of fact and whether the findings support the conclusions of law and ensuing judgment.\u201d Cartin v. Harrison, 151 N.C. App. 697, 699, 567 S.E.2d 174, 176 (2002) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Additionally, the findings of fact are like jury verdicts in that they are conclusive on appeal if there is evidence to support them. Stonecreek Sewer Ass\u2019n v. Gary D. Morgan Developer, Inc., 179 N.C. App. 721, 725, 635 S.E.2d 485, 488 (2006). We review the record evidence to conduct our review pursuant to this standard.\nNLH expressly reserved a 45 foot easement for itself, its successors, and assigns in its first conveyance to Gaddy. \u201cAn express easement in a deed, as in the instant case, is, of course, a contract.\u201d Williams v. Skinner, 93 N.C. App. 665, 671, 379 S.E.2d 59, 63 (1989); see also Brown v. Weaver-Rogers Assoc., 131 N.C. App. 120, 122, 505 S.E.2d 322, 324 (1998) (\u201cDeeds of easement are construed according to the rules for construction of contracts so as to ascertain the intention of the parties as gathered from the entire instrument at the time it was made.\u201d). Like the specificity required for contract terms, \u201can express easement must be sufficiently certain to permit the identification and location of the easement with reasonable certainty.\u201d Wiggins v. Short, 122 N.C. App. 322, 327, 469 S.E.2d 571, 575 (1996) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).\nWhen an easement is created by deed, either by express grant or by reservation, the description thereof \u201cmust either be certain in itself or capable of being reduced to a certainty by a recurrence to something extrinsic to which it refers. . . . There must be language in the deed sufficient to serve as a pointer or a guide to the ascertainment of the location of the land.\u201d\nIt is to be stressed that an alleged grant or reservation of an easement will be void and ineffectual only when there is such an uncertainty appearing on the face of the instrument itself that the court \u2014 reading the language in the light of all the facts and circumstances referred to in the instrument \u2014 is yet unable to derive there from the intention of the parties as to what land was to be conveyed.\nAllen v. Duvall, 311 N.C. 245, 249, 316 S.E.2d 267, 270 (1984) (internal citations omitted). A survey referenced in a deed becomes a part thereof and need not be recorded. Kaperonis v. Highway Commission, 260 N.C. 587, 133 S.E.2d 464 (1963).\nAn ambiguity in the grant or reservation of an easement does not necessarily make the conveyance void and ineffectual. Indeed, \u201c[i]f the description of an easement is \u2018in a state of absolute uncertainty, and refer[s] to nothing extrinsic by which it might possibly be identified with certainty,\u2019 the agreement is patently ambiguous and therefore unenforceable.\u201d King v. King, 146 N.C. App. 442, 445, 552 S.E.2d 262, 264-65 (2001) (quoting Lane v. Coe, 262 N.C. 8, 13, 136 S.E.2d 269, 273 (1964)). However, \u201c[a] description is latently ambiguous if it is insufficient in itself to identify the property but refers to something extrinsic by which identification might possibly be made.\u201d River Birch Associates v. City of Raleigh, 326 N.C. 100, 123, 388 S.E.2d 538, 551 (1990) (internal quotation marks omitted). If there is a latent ambiguity in an easement description, \u201cparol evidence will be admitted to fit the description to the thing intended.\u201d Thompson v. Umberger, 221 N.C. 178, 180, 19 S.E.2d 484, 485 (1942). For, while \u201c[a] patent ambiguity raises a question of construction^] a latent ambiguity raises a question of identity.\u201d Prentice v. Roberts, 32 N.C. App. 379, 382, 232 S.E.2d 286, 288 (1977).\nThe determination that an ambiguity is latent opens the door for a party seeking establishment of an easement to \u201c \u2018offer evidence, parol and other, with reference to such extrinsic matter tending to identify the property,\u2019 and the other party \u2018may offer such evidence with reference thereto tending to show impossibility of identification.\u2019 \u201d King, 146 N.C. App. at 445, 552 S.E.2d at 265 (quoting Lane, 262 N.C. at 13, 136 S.E.2d at 273).\nAlthough extrinsic evidence is not permitted in order to add to, detract from, or vary the terms of an integrated written agreement, extrinsic evidence is admissible in order to explain what those terms are. Therefore, extrinsic evidence as to the circumstances under which a written instrument was made has been held to be admissible in ascertaining the parties\u2019 expressed intentions, subject to the limitation that extrinsic evidence is not admissible in order to give the terms of a written instrument a meaning of which they are not reasonably susceptible.\nCentury Communications v. Housing Authority of City of Wilson, 313 N.C. 143, 146-47, 326 S.E.2d 261, 264 (1985) (internal citations omitted). Moreover, where doubt arises as to the parties\u2019 true intentions, \u201cthe court should construe the deed of easement with \u2018reason and common sense\u2019 and adopt the interpretation which produces the usual and just result.\u201d Brown, 131 N.C. App. at 122, 505 S.E.2d at 324 (quoting Hundley v. Michael, 105 N.C. App. 432, 435, 413 S.E.2d 296, 298 (1992)); see also Allen, 311 N.C. at 251, 316 S.E.2d at 271 (\u201cThe law endeavors to give effect to the intention of the parties, whenever [it] can be done consistently with rational construction.\u201d).\nWhile construction of a plain and unambiguous contract is a question of law for the courts, Cochran v. Keller, 84 N.C. App. 205, 211, 352 S.E.2d 458, 462 (1987), here, the easement deed from NLH to Defendants (the \u201cDefendants\u2019 Deed\u201d) is not plain and unambiguous. Specifically, NLH conveyed to Defendants 18.39 acres\n[tjogether with a non-exclusive perpetual Right-of-Way and Easement (45 feet in width) which runs in a generally northeasterly direction to Carpenter\u2019s Grove Church road as described in Deed Book 1391 at Page 1653; Deed Book 1370 at Page 725; Deed Book 1387 at Page 954; and Deed Book 1412 at Page 709 which Easement is incorporated by reference as if fully set out herein.\nThus, although the Defendants\u2019 Deed leaves the parties\u2019 agreement as to the location of the 45 foot easement undisclosed, the easement description does expressly incorporate the description thereof provided in these four deeds. Accordingly, the Defendants\u2019 Deed does point to extrinsic evidence by which identification of the easement might possibly be made, and we treat the surveys referenced therein as having become part of the respective deeds.\nOne extrinsic document referenced therein is the Primary Deed in this action, appearing in Deed Book 1370 at Page 725, which made the conveyance to Gaddy subject to the rights of others to use the existing 45 foot easement crossing the northwesterly portion of the 20 acre parcel. The Primary Deed also indicated that the property was \u201cmore particularly described in accordance with an unrecorded plat and survey made thereof by T. Scott Bankhead, Registered Surveyor, dated April 07, 2003.\u201d NLH also reserved for itself, as Grantor, and its successors and assigns \u201cthe right to the use of the portion of the Right-of-Way and Easement (45 feet in width) which crosses the northwesterly boundary line\u201d of the 20 acre parcel (the \u201cReserved Easement\u201d) as shown upon the 7 April 2003 survey. This survey depicts a \u201c45' Easement to 10 Acre Tract\u201d over a \u201cline with soil road\u201d traversing the northern boundary line of the 20 acre parcel from the 60' easement off of Carpenters Grove Church Road, curving along with then-Gaddy\u2019s western boundary, and deviating in a westerly direction at L5/L6 on the survey. The westerly deviation crosses what would ultimately become Defendants\u2019 northern boundary, and that portion was marked \u201cProposed 45' Easement\u201d on the 7 April 2003 survey.\nEugene Grigg was qualified as an expert and testified at trial that the proposed right of way arose in connection with discussions between NLH and Bob Blaire regarding the latter\u2019s purchase of 10 acres west of the parcel that later became Defendants\u2019. Although the deal fell through, the 7 April 2003 survey indeed identifies the area reached by the \u201cProposed 45' Easement\u201d as \u201c10 Acre Tract to be Deeded to Bob Blaire.\u201d Mr. Grigg continued that the purpose of that easement was to give Blaire a right of way from the 45' easement that crossed the 20 acre parcel up to the 10 acres he planned to buy. He said that easement had \u201cnothing to do\u201d with the Primary Deed or Defendants\u2019 easement, nor did it limit Defendants\u2019 rights to use the soil road from L6 to LI. Mr. Grigg further explained that the 7 April 2003 survey should have reflected the existing 45' right of way by continuing the dashes to illustrate that the easement extended to the point at which the soil road begins to run wholly within the boundary lines of the 18.39 acre parcel. He stated: \u201cSo even though Mr. Bankhead did not dot that off on \u2014 down there, that should have been dotted off and it should have been shown a right of way all the way up to LI.\u201d In fact, the legal description of the Primary Deed defines part of the western boundary of the 20 acre parcel going from a \u201cnew line\u201d therein identified \u201cto a point located in the centerline of an existing Right-of-Way and Easement (45 feet in width).\u201d The description provides that \u201cthe following calls and distances\u201d run \u201cthence with the centerline of said Right-of-Way and Easement.\u201d The call for that point located in the center of the existing 45' right of way is marked as LI on the survey, and the calls and distances listed in the deed as running with the existing easement are referred to as LI through L23. Thus, the Primary Deed describes this existing right of way separately from the paragraph in which NLH reserves a 45' easement, and the former is unidentified on the survey referenced therein. Whether the easement at issue stops at L5/L6 or at LI, both alternatives could be said to \u201ccross[] the northwesterly boundary line of the [20 acre] tract of property,\u201d as the Reserved Easement describes, leaving the precise identification of Defendants\u2019 right of way ambiguous. However, we may turn to the other extrinsic evidence, parol and other, referred to in the deeds.\nThe easement description in Defendants\u2019 Deed also references Deed Book 1931, Page 1653 (\u201cPlaintiffs\u2019 First Deed\u201d). The 45 foot easement described in Plaintiffs\u2019 First Deed actually defines an easement granted by Gaddy to Plaintiffs when they purchased the southernmost 10 acre tract (the \u201cGaddy Easement\u201d). Plaintiffs\u2019 First Deed provides that the Gaddy Easement consists of \u201cthe 45 foot strip lying east and south of the western and northern boundaries of Grantor\u2019s adjacent property (that portion acquired by Grantor by deed recorded in Book 1370 at page 725 which is not being conveyed in this transaction)\u201d and then describes the path of the easement with calls and distances. This separate and distinct easement, however, was extinguished by the doctrine of merger when Plaintiffs purchased the northernmost 10 acre tract from Gaddy, as there is no evidence of a pre-existing easement lying wholly within the 20 acre parcel at that location. See Tower Development Partners v. Zell, 120 N.C. App. 136, 143, 461 S.E.2d 17, 22 (1995) (\u201cIt is axiomatic in property law that one may not have an easement in his or her own land. . . . Ordinarily the doctrine of merger would apply and extinguish the easement[.]\u201d). Thus, the Gaddy Easement is not at issue\u201d. Plaintiffs\u2019 First Deed also references a survey by Bankhead dated 14 August 2003 as more particularly depicting the 10 acre tract and the 45 foot and above-described 60 foot easements. While Plaintiffs\u2019 First Deed makes no mention of the 45 foot easement reserved by NLH in its earlier 20 acre conveyance to Gaddy, the 14 August 2003 survey depicts both an \u201cExisting 45' Easement/Righ[t] of Way,\u201d referencing \u201cDB 1370 Pg 725,\u201d and a \u201cProposed 45' Easement/Right of Way (to 10 Ac. Tract).\u201d The third extrinsic document referred to in the easement description of Defendants\u2019 Deed is a second deed from NLH to Gaddy (the \u201cSecond NLH-Gaddy Deed\u201d) recorded at Deed Book 1387, Page 954, which predated Gaddy\u2019s first conveyance to Plaintiffs and conveyed a 10 acre parcel situated west of Gaddy\u2019s original 20 acre tract and north of what would become Defendants\u2019 property. The Second NLH-Gaddy Deed was made subject to the rights of others to use the existing 45 foot easement crossing \u201cthe most southeasterly portion\u201d of the subject premises as shown on a survey by Bankhead dated 6 August 2003. In this deed, NLH also reserved for itself, its successors, and assigns the right to use the portion of the 45 foot easement over the \u201csoutheasterly boundary line\u201d of Gaddy\u2019s new 10 acre tract and referenced the 7 April 2003 survey for the description thereof.\nFinally, Defendants\u2019 Deed also references Deed Book 1412 at Page 709, where a deed dated 19 April 2004 from NLH to Ruth M. Riegler (the \u201cRiegler Deed\u201d) is recorded. The Reigler Deed conveyed a 13 acre parcel situated to the west of Defendants\u2019 tract and the property Gaddy acquired through the Second NLH-Gaddy Deed. The Riegler parcel consists of the 10 acres that were the subject of negotiations between NLH and Blaire and an additional 3 acres and is described in the Riegler Deed through reference to a survey by Bankhead dated 19 March 2004. The \u201cProposed 45' Easement\u201d appearing on the 7 April 2003 from the unmarked point between L5 and L6 to the 10 acre tract to be deeded to Blaire is located in the same place as a \u201cNew 45' Easement \u2014 R/W\u201d on the 19 March 2004 survey. The Riegler survey also draws the \u201cExisting 45' Easement\u201d over the \u201ccenterline of [the] existing soil road,\u201d with reference to the Primary Deed and the Second NLH-Gaddy Deed. Interestingly, the 19 March 2004 survey depicts this existing easement as extending past the point identified by L5/L6 on the other surveys. In fact, the dashes marking this easement across the existing soil road continue to the point where LI would be had those calls and distances been reproduced on the Riegler survey.\nThe trial court also admitted as exhibits the surveys incorporated into the general property description sections of the parties\u2019 respective deeds. Although Defendants\u2019 Deed was made after the Riegler Deed, the survey referenced in the boundary description of Defendants\u2019 parcel was initially prepared on 21 October 2003. While it does not depict the continuation of the easement along the soil road past L5/L6, it does show an existing iron rebar at the southwestern end of LI. This survey was revised on 27 May 2004 to illustrate that the existing soil road, which connected the subdivision to the 60' easement and Carpenters Grove Church Road, continued past L5/L6 to the rebar at LI before crossing into and proceeding wholly within Defendants\u2019 parcel. Plaintiff\u2019s deed from Gaddy for the northernmost 10 acre tract also makes the conveyance subject to \u201c[t]hat certain 45-foot easement and right-of-way for ingress, egress and regress running along the westerly and northerly side as shown on the survey ... dated April 7, 2003.\u201d This deed references no other extrinsic document in the easement description and thus raises the same questions regarding the potential inaccuracies of the 7 April 2003 survey and the ambiguities presented by the Primary Deed, which was relied upon in the preparation of that survey.\nWhile the above-described extrinsic documents reveal some inconsistencies between the relevant deeds and the surveys they reference, additional evidence before the trial court tended to remove any latent ambiguity that lingered after consulting the parties\u2019 deeds. For the following reasons, we conclude that the deeds, together with parol evidence emanating from both extrinsic documents and the circumstances surrounding the conveyances, created a material issue of fact regarding the parties\u2019 intentions which was appropriate for resolution by the trial court.\nOur Supreme Court has held\nthat the effect to be given unambiguous language contained in a written instrument is a question of law, but where the language is ambiguous so that the effect of the instrument must be determined by resort to extrinsic evidence that raises a dispute as to the parties\u2019 intention, the question of the parties\u2019 intention becomes one of fact. However, the determination of the parties\u2019 intention is not for the jury but is the responsibility of the judge in construing and interpreting the meaning of the instrument.\nRunyon v. Paley, 331 N.C. 293, 305, 416 S.E.2d 177, 186 (1992). While the parties\u2019 intent must ordinarily be ascertained from the deed or instrument, \u201cwhen the language used in the instrument is ambiguous, the court, in determining the parties\u2019 intention, must look to the language of the instrument, the nature of the restriction, the situation of the parties, and the circumstances surrounding their transaction.\u201d\nThe trial court made twenty findings of fact, including:\n13. In [the Primary Deed], NLH conveyed to Gaddy, subject to the rights of others, the right to use the existing Right-of-Way and Easement 45 feet in width that crosses the most northwesterly portion of the twenty acre tract as shown [on] the survey dated April 7, 2003.\n14. NLH reserved the right to use the portion of the said right of way and easement, 45 feet in width, crossing the northwesterly boundary line of the 20 acre tract conveyed to Gaddy and then to Plaintiffs.\n15. Within the legal description of that [Primary Deed] is a reference to several calls running with the centerline of an existing Right-of-Way and Easement 45 feet in width. These calls are referenced on the April 7, 2003 survey as calls LI through L23.\n16. When NLH purchased the entire acreage, there was in existence a road running through the property. This road is shown on the April 7, 2003 survey by the calls of LI through L23, and was in existence approximately 30 to 40 years before NLH purchased the tract. The existing road is large enough for cars and continues past the LI call to the Defendants\u2019 property.\n17. The intent of NLH was to develop the larger tract with reference to the existing road, and reference to the most northwesterly portion of Plaintiffs\u2019 boundary meant all the existing road beginning with call LI as shown on the April 7, 2003 survey\n18. The intent of NLH was to extend over the exi[s]ting road 22.5 feet on each side of the center line from call LI to the existing 60' easement as shown on the April 7, 2003 survey.\nThe trial court also found that Plaintiffs\u2019 objected to Defendants\u2019 use of that portion of the easement from L6 to LI but that Defendants used the L6 to LI portion of the road to put in a driveway, build their house, and travel to and from their property.\nInitially, it is clear that NLH intended to reserve for itself, its successors, and its assigns an easement 45' in width across an existing right of way that traversed the northwestern boundary of the 20 acre tract it first conveyed from its larger parcel. We acknowledge Plaintiffs\u2019 argument regarding finding of fact 15 that the Primary Deed\u2019s reference to the calls running with the centerline of the existing right of way in the metes and bounds description of the tract being conveyed to Gaddy \u201cdoes not by itself convey that property or object.\u201d However, the fact that the right of way so described follows an existing road that appears on the survey referenced therein, where there is testimony from Mr. Grigg that the surveyor erred in failing to depict the portion of the Reserved Easement from L6 to LI as intended by the grantor NLH, the question is not one of construction, which would render the ambiguity patent, but of identification, raising a latent ambiguity as to the length of the 45' easement in question. Moreover, attorney Mark Lackey was qualified as an expert in real estate law and testified at trial that the Primary Deed \u201cdoes create an ambiguity about where \u2014 -how\u2014how far the right of way goes when it refers specifically to the center line of a right of way that there are no dashed lines to on the plat.\u201d\n\u201cWhen the terms used in the deed leave it uncertain what property is intended to be embraced in it, parol evidence is admissible to fit the description to the land \u2014 never to create a description.\u201d Allen, 311 N.C. at 251, 316 S.E.2d at 271. This case is unlike Oliver v. Ernul, 277 N.C. 591, 178 S.E.2d 393 (1971), where although the road existed prior to the conveyance, the deed failed to create an easement for a road because no reference was made to it in the paper writing. Here, the description of the Reserved Easement in the Primary Deed, while indefinite, followed the description of an existing easement of the same 45-foot width in the same general location, raising the question of whether the \u201cnorthwesterly boundary line\u201d of the 20 acre parcel was to be gleamed from the 7 April 2003 survey or the calls tracking the road in the general property description of the same deed. Moreover, the Primary Deed, read in light of the circumstances and the nature of the land referred to in the instrument, does not leave the length of the easement in a state of absolute uncertainty. Plaintiffs\u2019 and Defendants\u2019 deeds also refer to extrinsic documents that serve as a guide to the ascertainment of the location of the easement. The only thing the language of the relevant deeds leaves unclear is which of two readily identifiable points was intended to represent the end of the 45\u2019 easement that NLH reserved and later granted to its successor, Defendants. Accordingly, \u201c[p]arol evidence is resorted to merely to bring to light this intention,\u201d not \u201cto create it,\u201d Thompson, 221 N.C. at 180, 19 S.E.2d at 485, such that \u201c[Defendants] may offer evidence, parol and other, with reference to such extrinsic matter tending to identify the property, and [Plaintiffs] may offer such evidence with reference thereto tending to show impossibility of identification, i.e., ambiguity.\u201d Prentice, 32 N.C. App. at 382, 232 S.E.2d at 288 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Thus, the language of the Reserved Easement, together with the Primary Deed as a whole, is sufficient to permit the trial court to admit proper evidence tending to fit the description to the land.\nWe conclude that each of the trial court\u2019s findings of fact are supported by competent evidence. Not only does the 7 April 2003 survey locate the original road on the ground, as described in the Primary Deed, but Mr. Grigg also testified that this survey, relied upon by Bankhead in preparing the subsequent surveys referenced in the extrinsic documents, inaccurately depicted the length of the easement. Thus, the trial court properly resolved this genuine issue of material fact by considering other admissible evidence clarifying the intention of the parties. The testimony introduced at trial showed the following regarding the nature of the land: the existing road was wide enough for vehicular travel; at point LI, it widens at a clearing broad enough for cars to turn around before the road turns into Defendants\u2019 property and proceeds entirely within the 18.39 acre parcel; and the steepness, grade, and dense forestry at other potential access points to Defendants\u2019 parcel would render construction of an alternate means of ingress and egress extremely difficult. Mr. Grigg described the part of the road that runs into Defendants\u2019 property as \u201cbe[ing] like a driveway that goes to somebody\u2019s house.\u201d Several photographs introduced at trial also depict the characteristics of the road and surrounding landscape near the area at which Plaintiffs contend the easement ends at L5/L6. Mr. Grigg also testified that he and his partner, Mr. Harrelson, walked the property three or four times before NLH purchased the 61 acres \u201cto see where the corners were, [and they] walked the existing right of way that went up through the middle of the property.\u201d Where Mr. Grigg drafted the deeds from NLH, this is further evidence that he used the phrase \u201cexisting right of way\u201d to refer to the soil road already in place. They had the road regraded and a culvert put in, as it was the intent of NLH that \u201cLI to L6 [would be] used to service, you know, a road that adjoined tracts.\u201d Mr. Grigg further provided his interpretation as the drafter of the various deeds that the phrases \u201cmost northwesterly portion\u201d and \u201cnorthwesterly boundary line\u201d of the 20 acre parcel referred to that length of road from the 60' easement to LI. He continued that the northwestern property line is \u201croughly in the center line of the existing road bed[,] [a]nd so there\u2019s supposed to be \u2014 what we had intended was 22 and a half feet on each side of that property line.\u201d Mr. Grigg indicated that the Riegler survey, which drew the existing 45' easement down to where LI would be on the other maps, better illustrates the intent of NLH with regard to the easements because the \u201cintent was not to limit [Defendants\u2019] use to L5 or L6 in that area . . . [but to] allow access all the way to point LI.\u201d\nWe are also guided by precedent set by our Supreme Court in addressing situations affected by similar ambiguities:\n[W]here the grant of an easement of way does not definitely locate it, it has been consistently held that a reasonable and convenient way for all parties is thereby implied, in view of all the circumstances[.] ... It is a settled rule that where there is no express agreement with respect to the location of a way granted but not located, the practical location and user of a reasonable way by the grantee, acquiesced in by the grantor or owner of the servient estate, sufficiently locates the way, which will be deemed to be that which was intended by the grant.\nAllen, 311 N.C. at 249, 316 S.E.2d at 270 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Here, there was evidence that after NLH conveyed the 20 acres to Gaddy, NLH continued to use the L6 to LI portion of the soil road to show prospective buyers the 18.39 acre tract and Gaddy acquiesced, acknowledging at trial that \u201cit was a good way to come there.\u201d See id. at 251, 316 S.E.2d at 271 (\u201cThe use of the roads in question by plaintiffs\u2019 predecessors in title, acquiesced in by defendants\u2019 predecessors in title of the servient estate, sufficiently locates the roads on the ground, which is deemed to be that which was intended by the reservation of the easements.\u201d); see also Prentice, 32 N.C. App. at 383, 232 S.E.2d at 288 (\u201cWhen the grant does describe with reasonable certainty the easement created and the dominant and servient tenements, but does not definitely locate it, the easement is not held void for uncertainty under the statute of frauds, but instead, the grantee is entitled to a reasonable and convenient way located in the manner and within the limits set forth in the grant. The easement may also be located by the practical location by the grantee, acquiesced in by the grantor.\u201d (internal quotations omitted)). Indeed, when Defendants met with Mr. Harrelson to look at the 18.39 acre property, they entered the parcel from \u201cthe top of the road where it widens out there at point LI\u201d Defendant Terrence Hill testified that he and Mr. Harrelson discussed the easement that spanned Defendants\u2019 eastern property line until reaching point LI. Mr. Harrelson pointed out the iron rebar situated at LI, as depicted on the various surveys, and indicated that the significance of that visible marker was that it would enable Defendants to \u201calways find that point [where their 45' easement ends],\u201d further shedding light on the intent of grantor and grantee at the time the easement at issue was conveyed to Defendants.\nIn light of the above-described deeds, along with the extrinsic documents they reference and in consideration of \u201cthe subject matter involved, the situation of the parties at the time of the conveyance and the purpose sought to be accomplished,\u201d Cochran, 84 N.C. App. at 212, 352 S.E.2d at 463, parol and other evidence was properly admitted to reveal the parties\u2019 intentions regarding the length of the easement. As such, the trial court had at its disposal an abundance of evidence that allowed it to find that NLH intended \u201cto develop the larger tract with reference to the existing road\u201d tracking \u201cthe most northwesterly portion of Plaintiffs\u2019 boundary [which] meant all the existing road beginning with call LI.\u201d Its finding that \u201c[t]he intent of NLH was to extend over the exi[s]ting road 22.5 feet on each side of the center line from call LI to the existing 60' easement\u201d is also supported by competent evidence. We hold that the findings of fact also support the trial court\u2019s conclusions that Defendants have an easement over the centerline of the existing road 45 feet in width as identified by the calls beginning with LI to the 60 foot easement referenced in the Primary Deed and shown on the 7 April 2003 survey and, thus, did not commit trespass across Plaintiffs\u2019 property. We also believe that in endeavoring to give effect to the parties\u2019 intentions, the trial court did in fact construe the deeds of easement with reason and common sense to adopt the interpretation that produced the usual and just result. Brown, 131 N.C. App. at 122, 505 S.E.2d at 324.\nLastly, we address the format of Plaintiffs\u2019 brief. Plaintiffs\u2019 brief was typed using single spacing in direct violation of Appellate Rule 26(g)(1), which states that \u201c[t]he body of text shall be presented with double spacing between each line of text.\u201d N.C.R. App. P. 26(g)(1). \u201cCompliance with the rules ... is mandatory.\u201d Dogwood Dev. & Mgmt. Co., LLC v. White Oak Transp. Co., 362 N.C. 191, 194, 657 S.E.2d 361, 362 (2008). \u201cBut \u2018[r]ules of practice and procedure are devised to promote the ends of justice, not to defeat them.\u201d Id. at 194, 657 S.E.2d at 363 (quoting Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 557, 85 L. Ed. 1037 (1941)). While the Supreme Court of North Carolina has held that noncompliance with the our Appellate Rules may call for sanctions, to include dismissal, \u201cnoncompliance with the appellate rules does not, ipso facto, mandate dismissal of an appeal.\u201d Id. \u201cDespite the Rules violations, we are able to determine the issues in this case on appeal. Furthermore, we note that Defendants, in filing a brief that thoroughly responds to Plaintiffs\u2019 arguments on appeal, were put on sufficient notice of the issues on appeal.\u201d Youse v. Duke Energy Corp., 171 N.C. App. 187, 192, 614 S.E.2d 396, 404 (2005) Though this Court has the authority to sanction Plaintiffs, \u201cthe appellate court may not consider sanctions of any sort when a party\u2019s noncompliance with nonjurisdictional requirements of the rules does not rise to the level of a \u2018substantial failure\u2019 or \u2018gross violation,\u2019 \u201d which is established if the violations would \u201cimpair[] the court\u2019s task of review\u201d or \u201cfrustrate the adversarial process.\u201d Dogwood, 362 N.C. at 199-200, 657 S.E.2d at 366-67 (explaining that N.C.R. App. P. 25(b) allows the appellate court to \u201cimpose a sanction . . . when the court determines that [a] party or attorney or both substantially failed to comply with these appellate rules\u201d and that \u201c[t]he court may impose sanctions of the type and in the manner prescribed by Rule 34\u201d). A review of Plaintiffs\u2019 brief shows that these violations do not \u201cimpair the court\u2019s task of review\u201d or \u201cfrustrate the adversarial process.\u201d Because this violation is not a \u201csubstantial failure\u201d or a \u201cgross violation,\u201d we have addressed the merits of Plaintiffs\u2019 appeal and choose not to impose sanctions. However, we admonish Plaintiff-Appellants\u2019 counsel to comply with N.C.R. App. P. 26(g)(1) in the future.\nAffirmed.\nJudges GEER and JACKSON concur.\n. While the documentary evidence denoting Carpenters Grove Church Road in large part spells \u201cCarpenters\u201d without an apostrophe, as written above, \u201cCarpenter\u2019s\u201d with an apostrophe appears in some exhibits and transcript references. Thus, some quotations throughout the opinion contain the apostrophe if it appears in the original source, and, to avoid any confusion, we note that both spellings refer to the same road.", "type": "majority", "author": "BEASLEY, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Cerwin Law Firm, P.C., by Todd R. Cerwin, for Plaintiff - Appellants.", "The Schweppe Law Firm, P.A., by John V. Schweppe, III, for Defendant-Appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "ROGER P. EDWARDS, JR. and AMANDA M. EDWARDS, Plaintiffs v. TERRENCE G. HILL and LINDA LEE HILL, Defendants\nNo. COA09-1661\n(Filed 7 December 2010)\n1. Trespass\u2014 easements \u2014 parol evidence \u2014 parties\u2019 intentions\nThe trial court did not err by denying plaintiffs\u2019 claim for trespass and ruling that defendants had an easement over the pertinent portion of plaintiffs\u2019 property. The deeds, together with parol evidence emanating from both extrinsic documents and the circumstances surrounding the conveyances, created a material issue of fact regarding the parties\u2019 intentions which was appropriate for resolution by the trial court.\n2. Appeal and Error\u2014 appellate rules violations \u2014 single-spaced brief \u2014 no sanctions\nAlthough plaintiffs\u2019 brief was typed using single spacing in direct violation of N.C. R. App. P. 26(g)(1), the Court of Appeals chose not to impose sanctions because the violation was not a substantial failure or a gross violation that impaired the court\u2019s task of review or frustrated the adversarial process.\nAppeal by Plaintiffs from order entered 11 May 2009 by Judge Ali B. Paksoy in Cleveland County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 19 August 2010.\nCerwin Law Firm, P.C., by Todd R. Cerwin, for Plaintiff - Appellants.\nThe Schweppe Law Firm, P.A., by John V. Schweppe, III, for Defendant-Appellees." }, "file_name": "0178-01", "first_page_order": 202, "last_page_order": 217 }