{ "id": 4180643, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ANTONIO LAMONT BAKER", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Baker", "decision_date": "2010-12-07", "docket_number": "No. COA10-98", "first_page": "376", "last_page": "387", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "208 N.C. App. 376" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "620 S.E.2d 204", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12634098 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "209", "parenthetical": "holding no material conflict in the evidence existed where the evidence presented during the suppression hearing consisted of the testimony of law enforcement officers who were cross-examined by defense counsel" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/620/0204-01" ] }, { "cite": "653 S.E.2d 187", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12639898 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/653/0187-01" ] }, { "cite": "646 S.E.2d 768", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12638872, 12638873, 12638871 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/646/0768-02", "/se2d/646/0768-03", "/se2d/646/0768-01" ] }, { "cite": "638 S.E.2d 516", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12637384 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "523" }, { "page": "523" }, { "page": "523" }, { "page": "523" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/638/0516-01" ] }, { "cite": "673 S.E.2d 394", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12642934 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "395", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Shelly, 181 N.C. App. 196, 204-05, 638 S.E.2d 516, 523, disc. rev. denied, 361 N.C. 367, 646 S.E.2d 768 (2007)" }, { "page": "395" }, { "page": "395" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/673/0394-01" ] }, { "cite": "638 S.E.2d 907", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12637418, 12637419, 12637420 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/638/0907-01", "/se2d/638/0907-02", "/se2d/638/0907-03" ] }, { "cite": "621 S.E.2d 306", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12634314 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "observing that use of the words \"must\" and \"shall\" in a statute are deemed to indicate a legislative intent to make the provision of the statute mandatory such that failure to observe it is fatal to the validity of the action" }, { "page": "309" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/621/0306-01" ] }, { "cite": "681 S.E.2d. 866", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "unpublished" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "198 N.C. App. 704", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "unpublished" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "682 S.E.2d 212", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "675 S.E.2d 79", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "80" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "196 N.C. App. 90", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4166767 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "91" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/196/0090-01" ] }, { "cite": "379 S.E.2d 30", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "37" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "324 N.C. 373", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2483734 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "384" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/324/0373-01" ] }, { "cite": "298 S.E.2d 331", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 N.C. 357", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8562375 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/307/0357-01" ] }, { "cite": "686 S.E.2d 905", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "concluding no seizure occurred for purposes of the Fourth Amendment when officer did not physically block defendant's vehicle from leaving the driveway with his patrol vehicle and neither activated the siren or blue-lights" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "201 N.C. App. 566", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4173206 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "concluding no seizure occurred for purposes of the Fourth Amendment when officer did not physically block defendant's vehicle from leaving the driveway with his patrol vehicle and neither activated the siren or blue-lights" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/201/0566-01" ] }, { "cite": "100 L. Ed. 2d 565", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. 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App. 660", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527416 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/100/0660-01" ] }, { "cite": "174 N.C. App. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8350238 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "8-9" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/174/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "187 N.C. App. 465", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8374810 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/187/0465-01" ] }, { "cite": "311 S.E.2d 281", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "285" }, { "page": "285" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "310 N.C. 274", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2403051 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "279" }, { "page": "279" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/310/0274-01" ] }, { "cite": "268 S.E.2d 452", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "457" }, { "page": "457" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "300 N.C. 678", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564413 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "685" }, { "page": "685" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/300/0678-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 N.C. 367", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3738022, 3740167, 3745816, 3741226, 3742387, 3736020, 3736344, 3744345 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/361/0367-05", "/nc/361/0367-06", "/nc/361/0367-01", "/nc/361/0367-03", "/nc/361/0367-02", "/nc/361/0367-08", "/nc/361/0367-07", "/nc/361/0367-04" ] }, { "cite": "181 N.C. App. 196", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8373323 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "204-05" }, { "page": "204-05" }, { "page": "204" }, { "page": "204-05" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/181/0196-01" ] }, { "cite": "195 N.C. App. 554", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4165417 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "555", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Shelly, 181 N.C. App. 196, 204-05, 638 S.E.2d 516, 523, disc. rev. denied, 361 N.C. 367, 646 S.E.2d 768 (2007)" }, { "page": "555" }, { "page": "555-56" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/195/0554-01" ] }, { "cite": "360 N.C. 652", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3787808, 3793442, 3790828, 3795150, 3793998, 3797936, 3792754, 3791351, 3796858, 3790044 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/360/0652-05", "/nc/360/0652-06", "/nc/360/0652-10", "/nc/360/0652-08", "/nc/360/0652-03", "/nc/360/0652-02", "/nc/360/0652-04", "/nc/360/0652-01", "/nc/360/0652-07", "/nc/360/0652-09" ] }, { "cite": "174 N.C. App. 567", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8352646 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "observing that use of the words \"must\" and \"shall\" in a statute are deemed to indicate a legislative intent to make the provision of the statute mandatory such that failure to observe it is fatal to the validity of the action" }, { "page": "570" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/174/0567-01" ] }, { "cite": "240 S.E.2d 367", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "noting that, when a statute employs the word \"may,\" it ordinarily shall be construed as permissive and not mandatory, but legislative intent must control the statute's construction" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "294 N.C. 90", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8570942 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "noting that, when a statute employs the word \"may,\" it ordinarily shall be construed as permissive and not mandatory, but legislative intent must control the statute's construction" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/294/0090-01" ] }, { "cite": "541 S.E.2d 218", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "141 N.C. App. 675", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9442902 ], "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/141/0675-01" ] }, { "cite": "555 S.E.2d 294", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "147 N.C. App. 94", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9378179 ], "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/147/0094-01" ] }, { "cite": "446 S.E.2d 579", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "337 N.C. 132", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2550000 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/337/0132-01" ] }, { "cite": "603 S.E.2d 831", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "834" }, { "page": "834" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "166 N.C. App. 711", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8413576 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "715" }, { "page": "715" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/166/0711-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1001, "char_count": 30441, "ocr_confidence": 0.721, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.1788144581077027e-07, "percentile": 0.5881885391773806 }, "sha256": "2f876e1b9f3c25b45b0178363cb04b0d61f559b5d98c67bc913062df36514e50", "simhash": "1:ebc84622668e2a54", "word_count": 5006 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:19:36.775795+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges ELMORE and STEPHENS concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ANTONIO LAMONT BAKER" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JACKSON, Judge.\nAntonio Lamont Baker (\u201cdefendant\u201d) appeals his 17 September 2009 conviction for carrying a concealed gun and possession of a firearm by a felon and his sentence of imprisonment. For the reasons stated herein, we reverse and remand with instructions.\nDuring the evening of 23 October 2008 Officer Mike Moseley (\u201cOfficer Moseley\u201d), a seven-year veteran of the Roanoke Rapids Police Department (\u201cRRPD\u201d), was on duty and conducting routine patrol. Officer Moseley and other officers were patrolling in the general vicinity of a nursing facility known as Guardian Care with the purpose of investigating past crimes and preventing future crime. Within the immediately preceding twenty-four hour period, just before midnight on 22 October 2008, Officer Moseley had responded to two incidents of breaking and entering of a vehicle that occurred in the parking lot of Guardian Care as well as two incidents of vandalism that occurred at separate locations within one block of Guardian Care. At the time of the 23 October 2008 patrol, RRPD did not have any suspects in custody related to the 22 October 2008 incidents. Officer Moseley testified that the only description of possible perpetrators of the 22 October 2008 crimes was that \u201cpeople from Guardian Care observed males in the vicinity.\u201d\nJust before 11:00 p.m. on 23 October 2008, Officer Moseley encountered defendant walking in front of Guardian Care. Defendant was wearing dark outer clothing, including a jacket and pants. Upon seeing defendant, Officer Moseley activated his blue lights and maneuvered his patrol vehicle to a position behind defendant. Officer Moseley made radio contact with dispatch at 10:57 p.m. to notify them that he was exiting his patrol vehicle for the purpose of making a \u201cfield contact.\u201d A second officer, Officer Hardy, arrived at the scene and assumed the role of backup officer. Other officers arrived at the scene during Officer Moseley\u2019s encounter with defendant.\nAfter exiting his patrol vehicle, Officer Moseley approached defendant and asked him for his name, what he was doing on the street at that time of the night, and whether he had any outstanding warrants. Defendant responded by providing his name, denying that he had any warrants, and stating that he was walking home from his girlfriend\u2019s house. While defendant was speaking, Officer Moseley detected the odor of alcohol and observed that defendant was \u201creal fidgety\u201d and \u201clooking around.\u201d Officer Moseley told defendant he was going to \u201cpat him down real quick\u201d and asked defendant if he had any weapons on him, to which defendant replied \u201cno.\u201d In response to Officer Moseley\u2019s statement of intent to pat him down, defendant raised his hands as if to submit to the search.\nThe pat-down search performed by Officer Moseley consisted of Officer Moseley placing his right hand over the top of defendant\u2019s shirt and outer jacket at the level of defendant\u2019s waistband, and revealed an object that felt like the butt of a gun. Officer Moseley announced the presence of what he believed to be a gun to Officer Hardy, who was standing several feet behind defendant. Officer Moseley then handed Officer Hardy a pair of handcuffs, and Officer Hardy handcuffed defendant while Officer Moseley retrieved the gun from defendant\u2019s waistband.\nThe officers charged defendant with misdemeanor carrying a concealed gun in violation of North Carolina General Statutes, section 14-269(A1) and possession of a weapon while intoxicated in violation of section 131.02 of the Roanoke Rapids Code of City Ordinances. Upon learning that defendant previously had been convicted of a felony, officers charged defendant with possession of a firearm by a felon in violation of North Carolina General Statutes, section 14-415.1. On 16 February 2009, a grand jury returned a true bill of indictment regarding the statutory criminal offenses. On 17 September 2009, the trial court dismissed the charge of possession of a weapon while intoxicated due to insufficient evidence.\nOn 16 September 2009, defendant moved to suppress the evidence against him, reasoning that the evidence was the fruit of an unlawful search and in violation of the rights guaranteed to him by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and similar provisions of the North Carolina Constitution. The evidence presented at the suppression hearing held on 17 September 2009 consisted of testimony from both Officer Moseley and defendant. After receiving the evidence and hearing the arguments of counsel, the trial court denied defendant\u2019s motion to suppress, stating \u201cthe stop was not unreasonable.\u201d A jury trial on the remaining Criminal charges immediately followed the suppression hearing on 17 September 2009, concluding with a verdict of guilty and convicting defendant of carrying a concealed gun and possession of a handgun by a felon. That same day, the trial court entered a judgment and commitment order sentencing defendant to a term of imprisonment between twenty and twenty-four months. From the judgment of conviction and sentencing, defendant appeals.\nDefendant\u2019s first assignment of error is that the trial court\u2019s failure to make findings of fact and conclusions of law in connection with its ruling on defendant\u2019s motion to suppress in violation of North Carolina General Statutes, sections 15A-977 (d) and (f) constitutes reversible error. We agree.\nWhen a motion to suppress is not summarily denied, the trial court \u201cmust make the determination after a hearing and finding of facts.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-977(d) (2007). The trial court then \u201cmust set forth in the record [her] findings of facts and conclusions of law.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-977(f) (2007) (emphasis added).\nBoth defendant and the State contend the standard of review for a trial court\u2019s ruling on a motion to suppress is that the trial court\u2019s findings of fact are conclusive on appeal if supported by competent evidence, even if the evidence is conflicting, and the trial court\u2019s conelusions of law are fully reviewable. State v. Leach, 166 N.C. App. 711, 715, 603 S.E.2d 831, 834 (2004). Defendant, however, recognizing that he has assigned as error the trial court\u2019s failure to make findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to North Carolina General Statutes, sections 15A-977(d) and (f), urges this Court to exercise its discretion to determine whether the trial court\u2019s failure to comply with section 15A-977(f) deprived defendant of meaningful review. The State argues that a trial court\u2019s conclusions of law regarding whether an officer had reasonable suspicion to detain defendant are reviewable de novo. State v. Brooks, 337 N.C. 132, 446 S.E.2d 579 (1994); State v. Kincaid, 147 N.C. App. 94, 555 S.E.2d 294 (2001); State v. Munoz, 141 N.C. App. 675, 541 S.E.2d 218 (2001).\nThe standard of review urged by defendant and the State cannot be the appropriate standard of review when the trial court\u2019s failure to make findings of fact and conclusions of law is assigned as error. We take this opportunity to clarify the appropriate standard of review.\nWe observe that the language of section 15A-977(f) is mandatory \u2014 a trial court \u201cmust set forth in the record [her] findings of fact and conclusions of law.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-977(f) (2007) (emphasis added). Compare In re Hardy, 294 N.C. 90, 240 S.E.2d 367 (1978) (noting that, when a statute employs the word \u201cmay,\u201d it ordinarily shall be construed as permissive and not mandatory, but legislative intent must control the statute\u2019s construction) with State v. Inman, 174 N.C. App. 567, 621 S.E.2d 306 (2005) (observing that use of the words \u201cmust\u201d and \u201cshall\u201d in a statute are deemed to indicate a legislative intent to make the provision of the statute mandatory such that failure to observe it is fatal to the validity of the action), disc. rev. denied, 360 N.C. 652, 638 S.E.2d 907 (2006).\nThe language of section 15A-977(f) has been interpreted as mandatory to the trial court \u201cunless (1) the trial court provides its rationale from the bench, and (2) there are no material conflicts in the evidence at the suppression hearing.\u201d State v. Williams, 195 N.C. App. 554, 555, 673 S.E.2d 394, 395 (2009) (citing State v. Shelly, 181 N.C. App. 196, 204-05, 638 S.E.2d 516, 523, disc. rev. denied, 361 N.C. 367, 646 S.E.2d 768 (2007)) (emphasis added). \u201cIf these two criteria are met, the necessary findings of fact are implied from the denial of the motion to suppress.\u201d Id. The North Carolina Supreme Court has articulated its preference that a trial court make findings of fact, even when no material conflict in the evidence exists, opining that \u201cit is always the better practice to find all facts upon which the admissibility of the evidence depends.\u201d State v. Phillips, 300 N.C. 678, 685, 268 S.E.2d 452, 457 (1980). A record containing findings of fact and conclusions of law will facilitate \u201ca meaningful appellate review of the [trial court\u2019s] decision.\u201d State v. Horner, 310 N.C. 274, 279, 311 S.E.2d 281, 285 (1984).\nIn the absence of controlling authority to the contrary, and in light of the mandatory language contained in section 15A-977(f), we conclude that when a trial court\u2019s failure to make findings of fact and conclusions of law is assigned as error, the appropriate standard of review on appeal is as follows: The trial court\u2019s ruling on the motion to suppress is fully reviewable for a determination as to whether the two criteria set forth in Williams have been met \u2014 (1) whether the trial court provided the rationale for its ruling on the motion to suppress from the bench; and (2) whether there was a material conflict in the evidence presented at the suppression hearing. If a reviewing court concludes that both criteria are met, then the findings of fact are implied by the trial court\u2019s denial of the motion to suppress, Williams, 195 N.C. App. at 555, 673 S.E.2d at 395, and shall be binding on appeal if supported by competent evidence, Leach, 166 N.C. App. at 715, 603 S.E.2d at 834. If a reviewing court concludes that either of the criteria is not met, then a trial court\u2019s failure to make findings of fact and conclusions of law, contrary to the mandate of section 15A-977(f), is fatal to the validity of its ruling and constitutes reversible error. See Inman, 174 N.C. App. at 570, 621 S.E.2d at 309 (2005), disc. rev. denied, 360 N.C. 652, 638 S.E.2d 907 (2006). Accordingly, because the defendant assigns error to the trial court\u2019s failure to make findings of fact and conclusions of law in connection with its ruling on defendant\u2019s motion to suppress, we must review the trial court\u2019s ruling for a determination of whether the trial court provided the rationale for its ruling from the bench and whether there was a material conflict in the evidence presented at the hearing on defendant\u2019s motion to suppress.\nOur analysis begins with the issue we identify as dispositive relating to defendant\u2019s first assignment of error \u2014 whether a material conflict in the evidence presented at the suppression hearing exists. The State argues that the mandate of section 15A-977(f) does not apply because there was no material conflict in the evidence presented at the hearing on defendant\u2019s motion to suppress. While the State concedes that a conflict in the evidence exists regarding defendant\u2019s location in the roadway when Officer Moseley first encountered defendant \u2014 on the side of the road versus in the middle \u2014 the State contends that a conflict of this nature does not rise to the level of a material conflict because it would not affect the ultimate question of whether the stop was reasonable. Defendant argues the trial court was not relieved from the mandate of section 15A-977(f) because a material conflict in the evidence exists relating to the length of the stop, the number of officers on the scene, the purpose of the stop, and the reasonableness of the stop based on an objective standard.\nOur analysis requires that we first determine when a \u201cmaterial conflict in the evidence\u201d exists. The phrase \u201cmaterial conflict\u201d neither appears in the language of section 15A-977(f) nor has it been specifically interpreted by either of our appellate courts.\nTurning to the cases cited by defendant and the State for guidance, we observe that no reviewing court in North Carolina has held a trial court\u2019s failure to make findings of fact and conclusions of law constituted reversible error because of a material conflict in evidence presented at the suppression hearing. See Horner, 310 N.C. 274, 311 S.E.2d 281; Phillips, 300 N.C. 678, 268 S.E.2d 452; Williams, 195 N.C. App. 554, 673 S.E.2d 394; State v. Toney, 187 N.C. App. 465, 653 S.E.2d 187 (2007); State v. Shelly, 181 N.C. App. 196, 204-05, 638 S.E.2d 516, 523, disc. rev. denied, 361 N.C. 367, 646 S.E.2d 768 (2007); State v. Jacobs, 174 N.C. App. 1, 620 S.E.2d 204 (2005); State v. Norman, 100 N.C. App. 660, 397 S.E.2d 647 (1990).\nNotwithstanding the lack of precedent establishing when a material conflict in evidence exists, these cases are instructive because in each of these cases, the evidence presented at the suppression hearing was unchallenged by the opposing party. For example, in Williams, a case with facts very similar to the case sub judice, the Court\u2019s conclusion that no material conflict in the evidence existed at the suppression hearing is supported by the fact that the only evidence received during the suppression hearing was offered by the State, consisting only of the testimony of Officer Nathan Smith. Williams, 195 N.C. App. at 555-56, 673 S.E.2d at 395. See also Toney, 187 N.C. App. 465, 653 S.E.2d 187 (concluding no material conflict in the evidence existed when a police officer was the only witness to testify in connection with the defendant\u2019s motion to suppress such that the trial court\u2019s failure to make findings of fact was not reversible error). It previously has been determined that a material conflict in the evidence does not arise when the record on appeal demonstrates that defense counsel cross-examined the State\u2019s witnesses at the suppression hearing. See Jacobs, 174 N.C. App. at 8-9, 620 S.E.2d at 209 (holding no material conflict in the evidence existed where the evidence presented during the suppression hearing consisted of the testimony of law enforcement officers who were cross-examined by defense counsel). These cases therefore, are distinguishable from the case sub judice because both the State and defendant presented evidence at the suppression hearing.\nThe fact that defendant presented evidence is not, and cannot, by itself, be dispositive of whether a material conflict in the evidence existed. In its argument that no material conflict in the evidence exists, the State urges an interpretation of \u201cmaterial\u201d consistent with its legal definition: \u201cHaving some logical connection with the consequential facts; Of such a nature that knowledge of the item would affect a person\u2019s decision-making; significant; essential.\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary, 1066 (9th ed. 2009). \u201cMaterial,\u201d as used in a context other than section 15A-977(f), also provides guidance. For example, Rule 56(c) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a party is entitled to summary judgment if there is no \u201cgenuine issue as to any material fact.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 56(c) (2007) (emphasis added). In the context of Rule 56(c), facts are material if they are \u201cof such nature as to affect the result of the action.\u201d Kessing v. Mortgage Corp., 278 N.C. 523, 534, 180 S.E.2d 823, 830 (1971). Based on the foregoing, we hold that, for purposes of section 15A-977(f), a material conflict in the evidence exists when evidence presented by one party controverts evidence presented by an opposing party such that the outcome of the matter to be decided is likely to be affected.\nHaving determined what constitutes a material conflict in the evidence, we must now determine whether, at the hearing on defendant\u2019s motion to suppress, defendant presented evidence that controverts evidence presented by the State such that questions of the constitutionality of the stop and, ultimately, the suppression of evidence were likely to be affected. At issue at the hearing on defendant\u2019s motion to suppress was whether defendant was searched and seized in a manner permissible pursuant to the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Our Supreme Court has articulated factors to be considered when making a determination of whether a seizure has occurred. Those factors include \u201cthe number of officers present, whether the officer displayed a weapon, the officer\u2019s words and tone of voice, any physical contact between the officer and the individual, whether the officer retained the individual\u2019s identification or property, the location of the encounter, and whether the officer blocked the individual\u2019s path.\u201d State v. Icard, 363 N.C. 303, 309, 677 S.E.2d 822, 827 (2009). Accordingly, evidence by defendant that controverts the State\u2019s evidence relating to any one of these factors could create a material conflict in the evidence.\nThe State argues that the only conflict in the evidence relates to defendant\u2019s location in the road at the time Officer Moseley encountered defendant \u2014 the middle of the road versus side of the road \u2014 but that a conflict of this nature'is not material because it is not likely to affect the ultimate question of the reasonableness of the stop. Defendant argues that a material conflict in the evidence presented at the suppression hearing exists as it pertains to the length of the stop, the purpose of the stop, defendant\u2019s location on the road, the number of officers present at the scene, and when the other officers arrived at the scene.\nThe record reveals that defendant did not present any evidence to controvert the length of the stop. Officer Moseley testified that approximately two to three minutes had elapsed from the time he exited his patrol vehicle to the time he commenced the pat-down search of defendant. Defendant\u2019s counsel neither cross-examined Officer Moseley regarding the length of the stop nor elicited testimony from defendant regarding the length of the stop during direct examination.\nThe record does reveal, however, that defendant presented evidence to controvert Officer Moseley\u2019s testimony regarding the number of officers present at the scene and when the other officers arrived. Officer Moseley testified that he and Officer Hardy arrived on the scene at approximately the same time and acknowledged that other officers arrived at the scene, but he could not remember whether the officers were present when he patted down defendant and detected the gun. Defendant testified that a total of four officers in four separate police cars were present at the time Officer Moseley asked defendant for his name, with two officers on the same side of the street as defendant and two officers on the other side of the street, with only the blue lights on Officer Moseley\u2019s car activated. Defendant further testified that, after Officer Moseley activated his blue lights, he no longer felt free to leave.\nDefendant\u2019s evidence controverts the State\u2019s evidence and creates a material conflict in the evidence because it is likely to affect the outcome \u2014 the ultimate questions of the constitutionality of the encounter between Officer Moseley and defendant and whether the evidence should be suppressed. The Supreme Court of the United States has declared that a seizure occurs when \u201cin view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.\u201d Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 573, 100 L. Ed. 2d 565, 571-72 (1988). Application of the \u201creasonable person\u201d standard is meant to \u201censure[] that the scope of Fourth Amendment protection does not vary with the state of mind of the particular individual. being approached.\u201d Id. Defendant argues that he was seized for purposes of the Fourth Amendment when Officer Moseley activated his blue lights. The State contends that defendant was free to leave until the time the gun was found.\nBoth defendant and the State agree that Officer Moseley activated his blue lights at the time he first encountered defendant. Officer Moseley testified the reason he activated his blue-lights was to notify other motorists of the presence of his patrol vehicle parked \u201cin the middle of the road partially.\u201d Officer Moseley further testified that defendant was free to leave until the time the gun was detected and that he had not done anything to impede or prevent defendant from leaving. For example, Officer Moseley testified that by positioning his patrol vehicle behind defendant he did not obstruct or impede defendant\u2019s movement. Defendant, however, testified that he did not feel free to leave once Officer Moseley activated his blue-lights because he was aware that he was the only person on the street other than the officers.\nThe activation of blue lights on a police vehicle has been included among factors for consideration to determine when a seizure occurs. See State v. Williams, 201 N.C. App. 566, 686 S.E.2d 905 (2009) (concluding no seizure occurred for purposes of the Fourth Amendment when officer did not physically block defendant\u2019s vehicle from leaving the driveway with his patrol vehicle and neither activated the siren or blue-lights).\nDefendant also testified that, by the time Officer Moseley asked him his name, a total of four police officers, including Officers Moseley and Hardy, were present in four separate patrol vehicles, two on his side of the street and two on the other side of the street, all four officers having arrived at or near the same time. This testimony by defendant controverts the testimony of Officer Moseley that \u201c[o]ther officers were arriving at some point. I don\u2019t recall if they were there by the time I found the gun or not. I don\u2019t think they were.\u201d\nIn ruling on defendant\u2019s motion to suppress, the trial court was faced with deciding, inter alia, whether a seizure for purposes of the Fourth Amendment occurred and, if so, whether the seizure was properly supported by probable cause or reasonable suspicion. The record indicates the trial court\u2019s ruling on the motion to suppress consists only of the following:\nTHE COURT: Your motion to suppress is denied. I find that the stop was not unreasonable. A person in defendant\u2019s position could just as well have been a person who was in distress at that time of night, and the officer would have had an obligation to make \u2014 to stop and see if this person needed help, as well as preventing possible crimes and investigating past crimes, and that the length of the stop prior to the discovery of the weapon was not unreasonable, and therefore the motion to suppress is denied.\nAt the hearing on defendant\u2019s motion to suppress, it was incumbent upon the trial court to determine whether a reasonable person in the position of the defendant would not have felt free to leave. See State v. Freeman, 307 N.C. 357, 298 S.E.2d 331 (1983). While the State presented evidence to the effect that defendant\u2019s freedom to leave had not been impeded upon or restricted and that defendant was free to leave until the time Officer Moseley detected the gun on defendant\u2019s person, defendant presented evidence to the effect that defendant did not feel free to leave when Officer Moseley activated his blue lights and, further, that he was surrounded by a total of four officers in four separate patrol vehicles.\nWe conclude that a material conflict in the evidence presented at the suppression hearing exists because defendant\u2019s evidence controverts the State\u2019s evidence in a manner that affected the outcome of the matter to be decided. Because a material conflict in the evidence presented at the suppression hearing exists, the trial court, by virtue of the mandate of section 15A-977(f) and our holding in Williams, was required to make findings of fact and conclusions of law. The mandate of section 15A-977(f) notwithstanding, we reiterate our Supreme Court\u2019s instruction that \u201cit is always the better practice to find all facts upon which the admissibility of the evidence depends.\u201d Phillips, 300 N.C. at 685, 268 S.E.2d at 457. The trial court\u2019s failure to make findings of fact and conclusions of law, contrary to the mandate of section 15A-977(f), is fatal to the validity of its denial of defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss in this case.\nDefendant also assigned as error the trial court\u2019s failure to suppress the fruits of an unlawful stop and search of defendant in violation of the rights guaranteed by the Constitutions of the United States and of North Carolina. Our ability to undertake meaningful review of this assignment of error is impaired as a consequence of the lack of findings of fact and conclusions of law related to defendant\u2019s first assignment of error. As our Supreme Court said in Horner, \u201c[findings and conclusions are required in order that there may be a meaningful appellate review of the decision,\u201d 310 N.C. at 279, 311 S.E.2d at 285. Due to our inability to conduct a meaningful appellate review, and because the trial court committed reversible error related to defendant\u2019s first assignment of error, we need not address the merits of this issue.\nAccordingly, we reverse and remand to the Superior Court, Halifax County, for findings of fact and conclusions of law relating to the denial of defendant\u2019s motion to suppress.\nReversed and Remanded.\nJudges ELMORE and STEPHENS concur.\n. A \u201cfield contact\u201d refers to a form routinely filled out by RRPD officers that records information related to contact made with citizens within an officer\u2019s patrol area that are \u201cout and about at night.\u201d The field contact forms are retained by the RRPD and used to identify potential suspects of crimes reported at or near locations of a field contact.\n. The holding of Williams notwithstanding, the authority upon which Williams relies raises a question of whether satisfaction of both criteria is a necessary condition precedent to relieving a trial court from the mandate of section 15A-977(f) to make findings of fact and conclusions of law. In Williams, this Court relied on Shelly as authority for the stated rule. The Shelly Court relied bn the holdings of two other cases to identify instances in which a trial court\u2019s failure to malee findings of fact was held not to constitute reversible error. Specifically, the Shelly Court relied on State v. Jacobs, 174 N.C. App. 1, 620 S.E.2d 204 (2005), as authority for the proposition that a trial court does not commit reversible error when it fails to enter written findings of fact if the trial court provided the rationale for its ruling from the bench. State v. Shelly, 181 N.C. App. 196, 204, 638 S.E.2d 516, 523, disc. rev. denied, 361 N.C. 367, 646 S.E.2d 768 (2007). The Shelly Court relied on State v. Phillips, 300 N.C. 678, 268 S.E.2d 452 (1980), as authority for the proposition that a trial court does not commit error when it admits challenged evidence without making specific findings of fact when no material conflict in the evidence exists. Shelly, 181 N.C. App. at 204-05, 638 S.E.2d at 523. The Shelly Court then concluded that both conditions had been satisfied in the case it was deciding. There is no discussion or other language appearing in Shelly to indicate that both conditions must be satisfied as conditions precedent to relieving a trial court of the mandate of section 15A-977(f). We conclude, however, that Williams controls this appeal since \u201ca subsequent panel of the same court is bound by\u201d the decisions of a prior panel \u201cunless it has been overturned by a higher court.\u201d In the Matter of Appeal from Civil Penalty, 324 N.C. 373, 384, 379 S.E.2d 30, 37 (1989). Any concerns the parties may have as to controlling legal authority for this appeal, therefore, \u201cmust be addressed to the Supreme Court and the General Assembly.\u201d Jailall v. Dept. of Public Instruction, 196 N.C. App. 90, 91, 675 S.E.2d 79, 80, disc. rev. and cert. denied, - N.C. -, 682 S.E.2d 212 (2009).\n. But see State v. Collins, 198 N.C. App. 704, 681 S.E.2d. 866 (2009) (unpublished) (concluding the trial court\u2019s finding of fact that \u201cthe officer activated his blue lights and initiated a seizure of the defendant and his vehicle],]\u201d related to the denial of defendant\u2019s motion to suppress, was binding on appeal because it was supported by competent evidence).", "type": "majority", "author": "JACKSON, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy A. Cooper, III, by Special Deputy Attorney General John J. Aldridge, III, for the State.", "Greene & Wilson, RA., by Thomas Reston Wilson, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ANTONIO LAMONT BAKER\nNo. COA10-98\n(Filed 7 December 2010)\n1. Appeal and Error\u2014 standard of review \u2014 denial of motion to suppress \u2014 no findings or conclusions\nThe appropriate standard of appellate review for the denial of a motion to suppress where the trial court did not make findings of fact and conclusions of law was whether the trial court provided the rationale for its ruling from the bench and whether there was a material conflict in the evidence presented at the suppression hearing. If both criteria are met, then the findings are implied and shall be binding on appeal if supported by competent evidence. If either is not met, then the failure to make findings and conclusions is fatal.\n2. Criminal Law\u2014 denial of motion to suppress \u2014 material conflict in evidence \u2014 definition\nFor purposes of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-977(f) (which requires findings and conclusions after the denial of a motion to suppress), a material conflict in the evidence exists when evidence presented by one party controverts evidence presented by an opposing party such that the outcome of the matter is likely to be affected.\n3. Criminal Law\u2014 denial of motion to suppress \u2014 material conflict of evidence \u2014 defendant\u2019s freedom to leave\nThere was a material conflict in the evidence presented at a suppression hearing where defendant\u2019s evidence that he did not feel free to leave controverted the State\u2019s evidence in a manner that affected the outcome of the matter to be decided. The trial court was therefore required to make findings and conclusions and its failure to do so was fatal to the validity of its denial of defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 17 September 2009 by Judge Alma L. Hinton in Halifax County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 2 September 2010.\nAttorney General Roy A. Cooper, III, by Special Deputy Attorney General John J. Aldridge, III, for the State.\nGreene & Wilson, RA., by Thomas Reston Wilson, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0376-01", "first_page_order": 400, "last_page_order": 411 }