{ "id": 4181029, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JAMES DONOVAN FORD, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Ford", "decision_date": "2010-12-21", "docket_number": "No. COA10-470", "first_page": "699", "last_page": "704", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "208 N.C. App. 699" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "287 N.E.2d 513", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "515-16", "parenthetical": "holding stop was \"proper\" where Illinois law required \"rear registration plate [to] be so lighted that it is clearly legible from a distance of fifty feet to the rear\" and arresting officers testified that \"license plate light was out\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "7 Ill. App. 3d 417", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2668742, 2673798 ], "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "420-21", "parenthetical": "holding stop was \"proper\" where Illinois law required \"rear registration plate [to] be so lighted that it is clearly legible from a distance of fifty feet to the rear\" and arresting officers testified that \"license plate light was out\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/7/0417-01", "/ill-app-3d/7/0417-02" ] }, { "cite": "658 S.E.2d 643", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12640657 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "645" }, { "page": "645-46", "parenthetical": "\"The constitutionality of a traffic stop depends on the objective facts, not the officer's subjective motivation.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/658/0643-01" ] }, { "cite": "517 U.S. 806", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11746960 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "813" }, { "page": "98" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/517/0806-01" ] }, { "cite": "157 P.3d 893", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "898", "parenthetical": "\"Here, [officer] had a reasonable articulable basis to stop the vehicle for a traffic infraction, the non-working license plate light.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "138 Wash. App. 463", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Wash. App.", "case_ids": [ 3729939 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "470-471", "parenthetical": "\"Here, [officer] had a reasonable articulable basis to stop the vehicle for a traffic infraction, the non-working license plate light.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/wash-app/138/0463-01" ] }, { "cite": "19 S.W.3d 762", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.3d", "case_ids": [ 9136756 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "766", "parenthetical": "agreeing with \"lower courts' conclusion that the initial stop of [defendant]'s pick-up truck was a legal stop, based upon his violation of the license plate light law\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw3d/19/0762-01" ] }, { "cite": "695 N.E.2d 314", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "316", "parenthetical": "concluding traffic stop was constitutional \"[b]ecause Officer Kraft observed violations of the traffic code with respect to illumination of the rear license plate on [defendant's vehicle\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "119 Ohio App. 3d 355", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ohio App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1244299 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "358", "parenthetical": "concluding traffic stop was constitutional \"[b]ecause Officer Kraft observed violations of the traffic code with respect to illumination of the rear license plate on [defendant's vehicle\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ohio-app-3d/119/0355-01" ] }, { "cite": "698 N.Y.S.2d 797", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.S.2d", "case_ids": [ 203468 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "799", "parenthetical": "\"Having observed a traffic infraction - the unlighted rear license plate - [the officer] was justified in stopping defendant's vehicle.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ad2d/266/0730-02" ] }, { "cite": "266 A.D.2d 730", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "A.D.2d", "case_ids": [ 202243, 203468 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "732", "parenthetical": "\"Having observed a traffic infraction - the unlighted rear license plate - [the officer] was justified in stopping defendant's vehicle.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ad2d/266/0730-01", "/ad2d/266/0730-02" ] }, { "cite": "107 L. Ed. 2d 118", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "493 U.S. 856", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11389696, 11389346, 11389923, 11389309, 11389538, 11389575, 11389455, 11389807, 11389875, 11389398, 11389754, 11389275, 11389627, 11389502 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/493/0856-10", "/us/493/0856-03", "/us/493/0856-14", "/us/493/0856-02", "/us/493/0856-07", "/us/493/0856-08", "/us/493/0856-05", "/us/493/0856-12", "/us/493/0856-13", "/us/493/0856-04", "/us/493/0856-11", "/us/493/0856-01", "/us/493/0856-09", "/us/493/0856-06" ] }, { "cite": "527 N.E.2d 706", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 10918868 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "708", "parenthetical": "holding stop of vehicle was justified where license plate was not properly illuminated" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ne2d/527/0706-01" ] }, { "cite": "287 Ga. App. 896", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ga. App.", "case_ids": [ 3798938 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "898", "parenthetical": "holding traffic stop was justified \"based on the officer's observance of a traffic violation, the nonfunctioning tag light\"" }, { "page": "917", "parenthetical": "holding traffic stop was justified \"based on the officer's observance of a traffic violation, the nonfunctioning tag light\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ga-app/287/0896-01" ] }, { "cite": "687 So.2d 875", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 7438534 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "878", "parenthetical": "finding stop \"reasonable\" where officers \"believe[d] that [defendant's car had a dim tag light\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/687/0875-01" ] }, { "cite": "589 F. Supp. 2d 777", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3175514 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "783", "parenthetical": "holding absence of functional tag light on rear of defendant's vehicle justified initial traffic stop under Texas law" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp-2d/589/0777-01" ] }, { "cite": "162 L. Ed. 2d 864", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "545 U.S. 1125", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 8229088, 8229155, 8229124, 8229191, 8229068, 8229036, 8229234, 8229014 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/545/1125-04", "/us/545/1125-06", "/us/545/1125-05", "/us/545/1125-07", "/us/545/1125-03", "/us/545/1125-02", "/us/545/1125-08", "/us/545/1125-01" ] }, { "cite": "393 F.3d 52", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 9169175 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "59", "parenthetical": "holding that \"there was justification for stopping [defendant's] vehicle\" where officer \"encountered a vehicle that appeared to be without a working plate light\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/393/0052-01" ] }, { "cite": "694 A.2d 907", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "case_ids": [ 11986459 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "910" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/a2d/694/0907-01" ] }, { "cite": "369 F.3d 1270", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 9249308 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1275-76" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/369/1270-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-129", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 3, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(d)" }, { "page": "(d)" }, { "page": "(d)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "449 U.S. 411", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11716341 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "417" }, { "page": "629" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/449/0411-01" ] }, { "cite": "148 L. Ed. 2d 997", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "531 U.S. 1167", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9787808, 9788992, 9789122, 9788188, 9788430, 9788718, 9787538, 9789235, 9787676, 9788309, 9787422, 9788565, 9788053, 9788860, 9787934 ], "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/531/1167-04", "/us/531/1167-13", "/us/531/1167-14", "/us/531/1167-07", "/us/531/1167-09", "/us/531/1167-11", "/us/531/1167-02", "/us/531/1167-15", "/us/531/1167-03", "/us/531/1167-08", "/us/531/1167-01", "/us/531/1167-10", "/us/531/1167-06", "/us/531/1167-12", "/us/531/1167-05" ] }, { "cite": "490 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 605100 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "7" }, { "page": "10" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/490/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "536 S.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "8", "parenthetical": "quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 104 L. Ed. 2d 1, 10 (1989)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "352 N.C. 227", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 685065 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "239", "parenthetical": "quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 104 L. Ed. 2d 1, 10 (1989)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/352/0227-01" ] }, { "cite": "172 L. Ed. 2d 198", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "362 N.C. 244", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4149866 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "247" }, { "page": "248", "parenthetical": "\"The constitutionality of a traffic stop depends on the objective facts, not the officer's subjective motivation.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/362/0244-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6167798 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "21-22" }, { "page": "906" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/392/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "446 S.E.2d 67", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "70", "parenthetical": "citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 906 (1968)" }, { "page": "70" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "337 N.C. 437", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2549311 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "441", "parenthetical": "citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 906 (1968)" }, { "page": "441" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/337/0437-01" ] }, { "cite": "71 F.3d 783", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 7415125 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "787" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/71/0783-01" ] }, { "cite": "555 S.E.2d 294", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "297" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "147 N.C. App. 94", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9378179 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "97" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/147/0094-01" ] }, { "cite": "543 S.E.2d 823", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "826" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "353 N.C. 332", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 135584 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "336" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/353/0332-01" ] }, { "cite": "291 S.E.2d 618", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "619" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "306 N.C. 132", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567694 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "134" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/306/0132-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 793, "char_count": 14941, "ocr_confidence": 0.723, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.13736302772864364 }, "sha256": "73eb902ceceff10307e20eded6bfa416de10e7ff7b4d6b5c7d56c438402d4840", "simhash": "1:8aebe0fe673e1f76", "word_count": 2391 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:19:36.775795+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges CALABRIA and ELMORE concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JAMES DONOVAN FORD, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "HUNTER, Robert C., Judge.\nDefendant James Donovan Ford appeals from the denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized during a traffic stop. Defendant contends that the police officers that stopped him lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct the stop, and thus the evidence seized was the product of an unconstitutional search and should have been suppressed. We conclude, based on the totality of the circumstances, that the officers had reasonable suspicion to believe that defendant committed a traffic violation supporting the traffic stop. The trial court, therefore, properly denied defendant\u2019s motion to suppress.\nFacts\nOfficers Lance Fusco and Shane Strayer, with the CharlotteMecklenburg Police Department, were patrolling the Eastway area of Charlotte in a marked patrol car during the .evening of 15 October 2008. Around 10:00 p.m. that night, the officers saw a gray Chrysler 300 sedan driving in the neighborhood, but did not notice anything unusual about the car. Later that evening, the officers saw the same car \u201ccircling around\u201d in the neighborhood and \u201cmade a mental note of it.\u201d At approximately 1:45 a.m. on 16 October 2008, they saw the car for the third time, going down Belmont Ave. toward Davidson St. The officers got within 50 feet behind the car to \u201crun the tag[]\u201d to identify the registered owner, but the car\u2019s license plate did not \u201cappear to be lit\u201d and they \u201chad to get really close to read the tag.\u201d Officer Fusco, who was driving the patrol car, turned off the car\u2019s headlights to \u201cverify that [they] couldn\u2019t read the tag.\u201d After determining that they \u201ccouldn\u2019t read the tag ... at fifty feet,\u201d Officer Fusco turned on his blue lights and siren and stopped the gray Chrysler 300, which was driven by defendant. Defendant was cited for failing to maintain a properly functioning tag light. .\nDuring the stop, defendant\u2019s car was searched and, as a result of what was found during the search, defendant was charged with possession of a firearm by a felon, carrying a concealed weapon, maintaining a vehicle for controlled substances, possession with intent to manufacture, sell, or deliver a controlled substance, possession with intent to sell or deliver cocaine, possession of marijuana, possession of drug paraphernalia, and having attained habitual felon status. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the search, contending that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct the traffic stop. The trial court conducted a suppression hearing on 2 September 2009, at which both the State and defendant presented evidence. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court entered an order from the bench, concluding that the officers had \u201creasonable articulable suspicion to stop the vehicle\u201d and denying defendant\u2019s motion to suppress. Defendant subsequently pled guilty to possession of a firearm by a felon and having attained habitual felon status in exchange for the State\u2019s dismissing the remainder of the charges. The trial court consolidated the two charges to which defendant pled guilty and sentenced defendant to a presumptive-range sentence of 110 to 141 months imprisonment. Defendant timely appealed to this Court.\nDiscussion\nDefendant\u2019s only argument on appeal is that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, the appellate court determines whether the trial court\u2019s findings of fact are supported by competent evidence and whether those findings, in turn, support the court\u2019s conclusions of law. State v. Cooke, 306 N.C. 132, 134, 291 S.E.2d 618, 619 (1982). The court\u2019s findings of fact are binding on appeal if they are supported by competent evidence, even if the evidence is conflicting. State v. Buchanan, 353 N.C. 332, 336, 543 S.E.2d 823, 826 (2001). The court\u2019s conclusions of law determining whether an officer had reasonable suspicion is reviewed de novo. State v. Kincaid, 147 N.C. App. 94, 97, 555 S.E.2d 294, 297 (2001).\nThe Fourth Amendment protects individuals \u201cagainst unreasonable searches and seizures.\u201d U.S. Const, amend. IV. Pertinent here, \u201ca traffic stop is valid under the Fourth Amendment if the stop is based on an observed traffic violation or if the police officer has reasonable articulable suspicion that a traffic or equipment violation has occurred or is occurring.\u201d United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783, 787 (10th Cir. 1995). Reasonable suspicion requires that \u201c[t]he stop ... be based on specific and articulable facts, as well as the rational inferences from those facts, as viewed through the eyes of a reasonable, cautious officer, guided by [the officer\u2019s] experience and training.\u201d State v. Watkins, 337 N.C. 437, 441, 446 S.E.2d 67, 70 (1994) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 906 (1968)).\nReasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause, State v. Barnard, 362 N.C. 244, 247, 658 S.E.2d 643, 645, cert. denied, U.S., 172 L. Ed. 2d 198 (2008), and only requires a \u201cminimal level of objective justification, something more than an \u2018unparticularized suspicion or hunch[,]\u2019 \u201d State v. Steen, 352 N.C. 227, 239, 536 S.E.2d 1, 8 (2000) (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 104 L. Ed. 2d 1, 10 (1989)), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1167, 148 L. Ed. 2d 997 (2001). \u201cA court must consider \u2018the totality of the circumstances\u2014 the whole picture\u2019 in determining whether a reasonable suspicion\u201d exists. Watkins, 337 N.C. at 441, 446 S.E.2d at 70 (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 66 L. Ed. 2d 621, 629 (1981)).\nWith respect to whether Officers Fusco and Strayer had reasonable suspicion to stop defendant\u2019s vehicle on 16 October 2008, the trial court found that: \u201cnormal evening and atmospheric conditions\u201d existed at the time the officers pulled behind defendant\u2019s vehicle and attempted to read the vehicle\u2019s license plate; when Officer Fusco \u201cpulled behind this Chrysler vehicle and turned off the lights on.his marked patrol car,\u201d there was \u201ceither no tail light or a tail light that was not functioning sufficiently [so] that the numbers or numerals on the Chrysler tag were not visible within the statutory requirement set forth in 20-129, subsection (d)\u201d; and that \u201cthe officers] did ticket the defendant for the alleged violation\u201d of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-129(d) (2009). Based on these findings, the court concluded that Officers Fusco and Strayer had \u201creasonable suspicion to stop this vehicle.\u201d\nThe stop of defendant\u2019s vehicle was premised on his alleged violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-129(d), which provides, in pertinent part, that every motor vehicle is required to have \u201c[o]ne rear lamp or a separate lamp ... so constructed and placed that the number plate carried on the rear of [the] vehicle shall under [normal atmospheric] conditions be illuminated by a white light as to be read from a distance of 50 feet to the rear of such vehicle.\u201d\nDefendant contends that there is insufficient evidence to support the trial court\u2019s finding that the rear lamp on defendant\u2019s vehicle was either not functioning or not functioning properly to illuminate the license plate so that it could be read from 50 feet. Both Officer Fusco and Officer Strayer testified that they pulled within 50 feet of the rear of defendant\u2019s vehicle around 1:45 a.m. and were unable to read defendant\u2019s license plate, despite having the patrol car\u2019s headlights on. Officer Fusco explained that he then turned off the patrol car\u2019s headlights to \u201cverify\u201d his suspicion that the \u201ctag light [wa]s out[.]\u201d Believing that defendant\u2019s vehicle\u2019s \u201ctag light\u201d was inoperable, the officer\u2019s initiated a traffic stop and cited defendant for failing to maintain a properly functioning tag light. This evidence is sufficient to support the trial court\u2019s finding that defendant\u2019s vehicle\u2019s tag light was not functioning properly, in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-129(d). See Draper v. Reynolds, 369 F.3d 1270, 1275-76 (11th Cir. 2004) (finding sufficient evidence of equipment violation justifying stop where, \u201c[u]nder Georgia law, a tag must be illuminated with a white light so that it is legible from fifty feet to the rear\u201d and sheriff\u2019s deputy \u201ctestified that he stopped [defendant] because he observed that [defendant]\u2019s tag light was out\u201d).\nDefendant nevertheless points to the testimony of Tom Myrick, the operations manager for Triangle Rent-A-Car, who stated that the company\u2019s inspection records indicated that \u201ceverything was fine with the vehicle\u201d when it was rented on 7 October 2009 and when it was returned on 16 October 2009 and that the company had \u201cno records of a burned out taillight on the . . . car[.]\u201d On cross-examination, however, Mr. Myrick testified that although part of the company\u2019s inspection process is to inspect each rental car\u2019s tag light, its \u201cinspectors [do not] get fifty feet away from the vehicle and inspect the tag light[.]\u201d Mr. Myrick, moreover, indicated that when defense counsel wrote the company a letter asking for any records indicating whether the vehicle had any problems with bumt-out taillights, he searched the company\u2019s records, but did not actually inspect the car.\nContrary to defendant\u2019s contention, Mr. Myrick\u2019s testimony \u2014 that the car was generally \u201cfine\u201d before and after the rental period during which the stop occurred and that the car did not have a documented history of burnt-out taillights \u2014 fails to directly controvert Officer Fusco\u2019s and Officer Strayer\u2019s testimony that defendant\u2019s vehicle\u2019s tag was not sufficiently illuminated to be legible from 50 feet away on the night of the stop. See id. (\u201cAt his deposition, [defendant] testified that he picked up his truck at the wrecker yard between eleven a.m. and noon the next day and that his tag light was working. That the tag light was working to an unknown extent during daylight does not directly contradict [the officer]\u2019s position that the registration plate was not clearly legible from fifty feet away on the night of the stop____\u201d); State v. Taylor, 694 A.2d 907, 910 (Me. 1997) (\u201cAlthough [defendant] testified that the light was illuminated when he checked it after leaving the police station, Officer Green testified that he observed from seventy-five feet away that the light was defective. Officer Green\u2019s testimony about whether the light was illuminated while [defendant] operated his car is not directly controverted and supports an articulable and reasonable suspicion that a traffic violation was occurring.\u201d).\nThe trial court\u2019s finding that Officers Fusco and Strayer observed an on-going equipment violation \u2014 the failure to maintain a properly illuminated registration tag \u2014 supports the court\u2019s conclusion that the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop defendant\u2019s vehicle. See, e.g., United States v. Fox, 393 F.3d 52, 59 (1st Cir. 2004) (holding that \u201cthere was justification for stopping [defendant\u2019s] vehicle\u201d where officer \u201cencountered a vehicle that appeared to be without a working plate light\u201d), vacated on other grounds, 545 U.S. 1125, 162 L. Ed. 2d 864 (2005); United States v. Alexander, 589 F. Supp. 2d 777, 783 (E.D. Tex. 2008) (holding absence of functional tag light on rear of defendant\u2019s vehicle justified initial traffic stop under Texas law); Smith v. State, 687 So.2d 875, 878 (Fla. Ct. App. 1997) (finding stop \u201creasonable\u201d where officers \u201cbelieve[d] that [defendant\u2019s car had a dim tag light\u201d); Hampton v. State, 287 Ga. App. 896, 898, 652 S.E.2d 915, 917 (2007) (holding traffic stop was justified \u201cbased on the officer\u2019s observance of a traffic violation, the nonfunctioning tag light\u201d); People v. Sullivan, 7 Ill. App. 3d 417, 420-21, 287 N.E.2d 513, 515-16 (1972) (holding stop was \u201cproper\u201d where Illinois law required \u201crear registration plate [to] be so lighted that it is clearly legible from a distance of fifty feet to the rear\u201d and arresting officers testified that \u201clicense plate light was out\u201d); Walker v. State, 527 N.E.2d 706, 708 (Ind. 1988) (holding stop of vehicle was justified where license plate was not properly illuminated), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 856, 107 L. Ed. 2d 118 (1989); People v. Nelson, 266 A.D.2d 730, 732, 698 N.Y.S.2d 797, 799 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (\u201cHaving observed a traffic infraction \u2014 the unlighted rear license plate \u2014 [the officer] was justified in stopping defendant\u2019s vehicle.\u201d); State v. Cullers, 119 Ohio App. 3d 355, 358, 695 N.E.2d 314, 316 (1997) (concluding traffic stop was constitutional \u201c[b]ecause Officer Kraft observed violations of the traffic code with respect to illumination of the rear license plate on [defendant's vehicle\u201d); State v. England, 19 S.W.3d 762, 766 (Tenn. 2000) (agreeing with \u201clower courts\u2019 conclusion that the initial stop of [defendant]\u2019s pick-up truck was a legal stop, based upon his violation of the license plate light law\u201d); State v. Allen, 138 Wash. App. 463, 470-471, 157 P.3d 893, 898 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007) (\u201cHere, [officer] had a reasonable articulable basis to stop the vehicle for a traffic infraction, the non-working license plate light.\u201d).\nDefendant devotes a significant portion of his brief to his argument that the traffic stop, ostensibly based on the equipment violation, was a pretext for the officers to search the vehicle as they observed it \u201ccircling around\u201d for several hours in a high crime neighborhood. Defendant\u2019s pretext argument was rejected by the United States Supreme Court in Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813, 135 L. Ed. 2d 89, 98 (1996), where the Court held that \u201cthe constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops [does not] dependf] on the actual motivations of the individual officers involved.\u201d Accord State v. Barnard, 362 N.C. 244, 248, 658 S.E.2d 643, 645-46 (2008) (\u201cThe constitutionality of a traffic stop depends on the objective facts, not the officer\u2019s subjective motivation.\u201d). The trial court, therefore, properly denied defendant\u2019s motion to suppress.\nAffirmed.\nJudges CALABRIA and ELMORE concur.\n. The Chrysler 300 was a rental car rented for the period 7-16 October 2008 by someone other than defendant from Triangle Rent-A-Car.", "type": "majority", "author": "HUNTER, Robert C., Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Jay L. Osborne, for the State.", "Mercedes O. Chut for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JAMES DONOVAN FORD, Defendant\nNo. COA10-470\n(Filed 21 December 2010)\nSearch and Seizure\u2014 traffic stop \u2014 inoperable tag light \u2014 reasonable suspicion\nThe trial court properly denied defendant\u2019s motion to suppress evidence of drugs and a firearm found after a traffic stop where defendant was stopped at night for having an inoperable tag light. The trial court\u2019s finding that the officers saw an on-going equipment violation supported the trial court\u2019s conclusion that the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop defendant\u2019s vehicle.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 25 January 2010 by Judge Linwood O. Foust in Mecklenburg County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 17 November 2010.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Jay L. Osborne, for the State.\nMercedes O. Chut for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0699-01", "first_page_order": 723, "last_page_order": 728 }