{ "id": 4181253, "name": "AFRIKA S. ROBERTS, by and through her Guardian ad Litem, FRANKIE J. PERRY, Plaintiff v. ADVENTURE HOLDINGS, LLC, and, 3311 CAPITAL BOULEVARD, LLC, d/b/a ADVENTURE LANDING, Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "Roberts ex rel. Perry v. Adventure Holdings, LLC", "decision_date": "2010-12-21", "docket_number": "No. COA10-589", "first_page": "705", "last_page": "711", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "208 N.C. App. 705" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "645 S.E.2d 764", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12638600, 12638598, 12638599 ], "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/645/0764-03", "/se2d/645/0764-01", "/se2d/645/0764-02" ] }, { "cite": "635 S.E.2d 431", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12636791 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "432", "parenthetical": "quoting Swift and Co. v. Dan-Cleve Corp., 26 N.C. App. 494, 495, 216 S.E.2d 464, 465 (1975)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/635/0431-01" ] }, { "cite": "653 S.E.2d 240", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12639909 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "242" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/653/0240-01" ] }, { "cite": "668 S.E.2d 33", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12642183 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "36" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/668/0033-01" ] }, { "cite": "646 S.E.2d 809", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12638888 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "811", "parenthetical": "\"the order denying the motion to change venue is an interlocutory order\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/646/0809-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 N.C. 353", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3741921, 3736390, 3747111, 3742191, 3737810, 3742489, 3741659 ], "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/361/0353-03", "/nc/361/0353-07", "/nc/361/0353-01", "/nc/361/0353-04", "/nc/361/0353-06", "/nc/361/0353-05", "/nc/361/0353-02" ] }, { "cite": "216 S.E.2d 464", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "465" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "26 N.C. App. 494", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8553688 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "495" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/26/0494-01" ] }, { "cite": "179 N.C. App. 567", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8237825 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "569", "parenthetical": "quoting Swift and Co. v. Dan-Cleve Corp., 26 N.C. App. 494, 495, 216 S.E.2d 464, 465 (1975)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/179/0567-01" ] }, { "cite": "78 N.C. 235", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8690011 ], "year": 1878, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "237" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/78/0235-01" ] }, { "cite": "141 S.E.2d 490", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "492", "parenthetical": "citing Cloman v. Staton, 78 N.C. 235, 237 (1878)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "264 N.C. 332", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572871 ], "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "334", "parenthetical": "citing Cloman v. Staton, 78 N.C. 235, 237 (1878)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/264/0332-01" ] }, { "cite": "61 S.E.2d 72", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1950, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "73" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "232 N.C. 391", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8603128, 8602959 ], "year": 1950, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "393-94" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/232/0391-02", "/nc/232/0391-01" ] }, { "cite": "17 S.E. 2d 514", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "220 N.C. 355", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11302625 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/220/0355-01" ] }, { "cite": "7 S.E. 2d 557", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "217 N.C. 323", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8606265 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/217/0323-01" ] }, { "cite": "160 S.E. 481", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "201 N.C. 415", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8625833 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/201/0415-01" ] }, { "cite": "188 S.E. 390", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "210 N.C. 679", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8628534 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/210/0679-01" ] }, { "cite": "116 S.E. 728", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "185 N.C. 254", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8655869 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/185/0254-01" ] }, { "cite": "102 S.E. 270", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "179 N.C. 185", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8655413 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/179/0185-01" ] }, { "cite": "666 S.E.2d 751", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "per curiam" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "362 N.C. 507", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4149420 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "per curiam" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/362/0507-01" ] }, { "cite": "187 N.C. App. 326", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8374005 ], "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/187/0326-01" ] }, { "cite": "139 F.Supp. 103", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 4267279 ], "weight": 7, "year": 1956, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "104-05" }, { "page": "105" }, { "page": "106-07" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/139/0103-01" ] }, { "cite": "191 S.E. 229", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "weight": 4, "year": 1937, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "232" }, { "page": "231" }, { "page": "232", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "211 N.C. 526", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8627876 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1937, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "530" }, { "page": "528" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/211/0526-01" ] }, { "cite": "247 S.E.2d 278", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "279", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "279", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "38 N.C. App. 95", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8552133 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "97", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "97" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/38/0095-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-83", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-82", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "692 S.E.2d 483", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "484", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "203 N.C. App. 725", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4175549 ], "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "727", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/203/0725-01" ] }, { "cite": "192 N.C. App. 190", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4160035 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "195" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/192/0190-01" ] }, { "cite": "268 S.E.2d 468", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "471", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "300 N.C. 715", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564683 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "719", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/300/0715-01" ] }, { "cite": "184 N.C. App. 725", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8187734 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "727", "parenthetical": "\"the order denying the motion to change venue is an interlocutory order\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/184/0725-01" ] }, { "cite": "59 S.E.2d 429", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1950, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "232 N.C. 744", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "year": 1950, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "88 S.E. 231", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1916, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "171 N.C. 194", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11269648 ], "year": 1916, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/171/0194-01" ] }, { "cite": "57 S.E.2d 377", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "381" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "231 N.C. 357", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8629835 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "362" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/231/0357-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 764, "char_count": 14905, "ocr_confidence": 0.703, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.4033266686372354e-08, "percentile": 0.3398097726933115 }, "sha256": "356d363129785b301c59872610047c0bc324af73e34705155f591091c2dbd23d", "simhash": "1:8bade466376e86d6", "word_count": 2514 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:19:36.775795+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges ELMORE and THIGPEN concur." ], "parties": [ "AFRIKA S. ROBERTS, by and through her Guardian ad Litem, FRANKIE J. PERRY, Plaintiff v. ADVENTURE HOLDINGS, LLC, and, 3311 CAPITAL BOULEVARD, LLC, d/b/a ADVENTURE LANDING, Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JACKSON, Judge.\nAdventure Holdings, LLC, (\u201cAdventure\u201d) and 3311 Capital Boulevard, LLC, (\u201cCapital\u201d) (collectively \u201cdefendants\u201d) appeal the trial court\u2019s 4 February 2009 order denying their motion to dismiss based upon improper venue. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm in part and remand.\nAdventure is a foreign limited liability company with its principal office in Jacksonville, Florida. Capital is a North Carolina limited liability company with its principal office in Raleigh, North Carolina. Defendants own and operate the amusement park known as Adventure Landing, located on Capital Boulevard in Raleigh.\nOn 10 June 2006, the minor child Afrika Roberts (\u201cRoberts\u201d) visited Adventure Landing with her family. During her visit, Roberts, who was nine years old at the time, was injured in a go-kart accident. As a result of the incident, all of the toes on Roberts\u2019s left foot were amputated. Roberts and her family reside in Virginia.\nOn 24 November 2009, Roberts, through her guardian ad litem (\u201cGAL\u201d) Frankie J. Perry, filed a complaint against defendants, alleging that Roberts\u2019s injuries \u201cwere a direct and proximate result of the negligent and careless conduct of [defendants\u201d and their agents. On 10 December 2009, defendants filed their answer along with motions to dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(3), 12(b)(6), and 12(b)(7) of our Rules of Civil Procedure. On 4 February 2009, the trial court denied defendants\u2019 motions to dismiss as to all three Rules. Defendants appeal the trial court\u2019s order only with respect to Rule 12(b)(3).\nDefendants first contend that the trial court erred in denying their motion to dismiss based upon improper venue. In the alternative, defendants\u2019 second argument is that the case sub judice should have been transferred to Wake County. We agree with defendants that Durham County is not the proper venue for this action, and we think that transfer of venue, rather than dismissal, is the appropriate remedy.\nInitially, we note that defendants\u2019 appeal is interlocutory, because it \u201cdoes not dispose of the case, but leaves it for further action by the trial court in order to settle and determine the entire controversy.\u201d Veazey v. Durham, 231 N.C. 357, 362, 57 S.E.2d 377, 381 (citing Johnson v. Roberson, 171 N.C. 194, 88 S.E. 231 (1916)), reh\u2019g denied, 232 N.C. 744, 59 S.E.2d 429 (1950). We previously have held\nthat ordinarily an order denying a change of venue is deemed interlocutory and is not subject to immediate appeal. See Frink v. Batten, 184 N.C. App. 725, 727, 646 S.E.2d 809, 811 (2007) (\u201cthe order denying the motion to change venue is an interlocutory order\u201d). However, because the grant or denial of venue established by statute is deemed a substantial right, it is immediately appealable. Gardner v. Gardner, 300 N.C. 715, 719, 268 S.E.2d 468, 471 (1980) (citations omitted).\nOdom v. Clark, 192 N.C. App. 190, 195, 668 S.E.2d 33, 36 (2008). Furthermore, we have explained that \u201c[t]he denial of a motion for change of venue, though interlocutory, affects a substantial right and is immediately appealable where the county designated in the complaint is not proper.\u201d Caldwell v. Smith, 203 N.C. App. 725, 727, 692 S.E.2d 483, 484 (2010) (citations omitted). Therefore, because defendants have alleged that the county indicated in the complaint is improper, we address the merits of defendants\u2019 appeal.\nNorth Carolina General Statutes, section 1-82 provides that an\naction must be tried in the county in which the plaintiffs or the defendants, or any of them, reside at its commencement, or if none of the defendants reside in the State, then in the county in which the plaintiffs, or any of them, reside; and if none of the parties reside in the State, then the action may be tried in any county which the plaintiff designates in his summons and complaint, subject to the power of the court to change the place of trial, in the cases provided by statute[.]\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-82 (2007). According to North Carolina General Statutes, section 1-83,\nIf the county designated for that purpose in the summons and complaint is not the proper one, the action may, however, be tried therein, unless the defendant, before the time of answering expires, demands in writing that the trial be conducted in the proper county, and the place of trial is thereupon changed by consent of parties, or by order of the court.\nThe court may change the place of trial in the following cases:\n(1) When the county designated for that purpose is not the proper one.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-83 (2007). \u201cThe provision in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1-83 that the court \u2018may change\u2019 the place of trial when the county designated is not the proper one has been interpreted to mean \u2018must change.\u2019 \u201d Miller v. Miller, 38 N.C. App. 95, 97, 247 S.E.2d 278, 279 (1978) (citations omitted).\nNorth Carolina courts have not addressed the specific issue of whether or not the residence of a GAL is sufficient to confer venue. Roberts cites Lawson v. Langley for the proposition that, \u201c[i]n actions brought by fiduciaries, the personal residence of the fiduciary controls\u201d with respect to venue. 211 N.C. 526, 530, 191 S.E. 229, 232 (1937). However, because our courts have not addressed this issue explicitly, defendants point us to a South Carolina case, which distinguished a GAL from other types of guardians and then dismissed the action based upon improper venue. Blackwell v. Vance Trucking Company, 139 F.Supp. 103 (1956). We explore the parties\u2019 arguments in turn.\nIn Lawson, our Supreme Court addressed whether or not a \u201cplaintiff, guardi\u00e1n of an incompetent, [has] the right to maintain and try the action in the county of his personal residence[.]\u201d 211 N.C. at 528, 191 S.E. at 231. The Lawson Court recited several statutes in effect at the time and quoted a civil procedure treatise. It then held that, because the treatise \u201csays the personal residence of the fiduciary controls in actions brought by fiduciaries\u201d and because a statute expressly provided that \u201c[e]very guardian shall take possession, for the use of the ward, of all his estate, and may bring all necessary actions therefor[,]\u201d \u201c[t]he guardian can select the forum, as there is no statute to the contrary.\u201d Id. at 530, 191 S.E. at 232 (citations omitted).\nRoberts argues that so long as a GAL is considered a fiduciary, Lawson controls. However, Roberts overlooks the significant differences between a general guardian, such as the plaintiff in Lawson, and a GAL, as we have in the instant case. A general guardian is responsible for the entirety of one\u2019s person and/or estate and maintains such responsibility beyond the context of the courtroom. A general guardian is one \u201cwho has general care and control of the ward\u2019s person and estate.\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 774 (9th ed. 2009). In contrast, a GAL is \u201cappointed by the court to appear in a lawsuit on behalf of an incompetent or minor party.\u201d Id. \u201cAd litem\u201d is a Latin phrase that means \u201c[f]or the purposes of the suit[.]\u201d Id. at 49.\nIn one of our juvenile cases, we discussed the limited role of a GAL who had been appointed based upon the parents\u2019 suspected diminished capacity. See In re L.B., 187 N.C. App. 326, 653 S.E.2d 240 (2007), aff\u2019d, 362 N.C. 507, 666 S.E.2d 751 (2008) (per curiam). We noted that the more expansive role of a general guardian is \u201c \u2018to replace the individual\u2019s authority to make decisions with the authority of a guardian when the individual does not have adequate capacity to make such decisions.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 329, 653 S.E.2d at 242 (quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 35A-1201(a)(3) (2005)) (emphasis in original). \u201cIn contrast, a GAL\u2019s authority is more limited.\u201d Id. In fact, \u201cthe language of the General Assembly is clear that the GAL\u2019s role is limited to one of assistance, not one of substitution.\u201d Id. Even though In re L.B. involved a GAL\u2019s representation of a parent with suspected diminished capacity, its comments are instructive.\nBecause North Carolina courts have not addressed this precise issue, defendants, cite Blackwell, supra. In Blackwell, a minor had been injured in an automobile accident. 139 F.Supp. at 104-05. The minor resided in New York, the defendant resided in North Carolina, and the accident occurred in South Carolina. Id. The minor\u2019s GAL instituted the action in South Carolina, where he was a citizen and resident. Id. at 105. Because the defendant had filed a motion to dismiss based upon improper venue, the question presented was whether or not venue could be based solely upon the GAL\u2019s state of residence. Id. In holding that it could not, the Blackwell court explained that\na guardian ad litem is something quite different [than a general guardian]. He is appointed for the mere temporary duty of protecting the legal rights of an infant in a particular suit and his duties and his office end with that suit. He is not a party in interest in the suit, no property comes into his hands, and he has no powers nor duties either prior to the institution of the suit or after its termination.\nId. at 106-07. Again, some distinctions exist between Blackwell and the case sub judice. Nonetheless, the Blackwell court\u2019s emphasis on the role of a GAL \u2014 as opposed to that of a general guardian of one\u2019s person and/or estate \u2014 and its effect on whether the GAL\u2019s residence may be used to establish venue is applicable to the facts before us. Based upon our own precedent, in addition to the persuasive reasoning of Blackwell, we now hold that a GAL\u2019s county of residence is insufficient, standing alone, to establish venue.\nHere, all real parties in interest are located either out-of-state or in Wake County. Roberts resides in Virginia with her parents. Adventure\u2019s principal office is in Jacksonville, Florida. Capital\u2019s principal office is in Wake County. Adventure Landing \u2014 the site of the incident at issue \u2014 also is located in Wake County. Nevertheless, Roberts\u2019s GAL filed the complaint initiating this action in Durham County. Because the residence of the GAL is the only conceivable connection to Durham County and because we hold that the GAL\u2019s residence, standing alone, is insufficient to establish venue, we conclude that Durham County is an improper venue for the instant action.\nEven though Durham County is not the proper venue for Roberts\u2019s action, we still must decide whether dismissal or transfer of venue is the appropriate remedy. We have held that \u201cvenue is not jurisdictional, but is only ground for removal to the proper county upon a timely objection made in the proper manner.\u201d Miller, 38 N.C. App. at 97, 247 S.E.2d at 279 (citations omitted). Our Supreme Court has explained that\n[a plaintiff] is not entitled to an abatement of this action, even though it be conceded it was instituted in the wrong county. It has been repeatedly held that our statutes relating to venue are not jurisdictional, and that if an action is instituted in the wrong county it should be removed to the proper county, and not dismissed, if the motion for removal is made in apt time, otherwise the question of venue will be waived. G.S. 1-83; Davis v. Davis, 179 N.C. 185, 102 S.E. 270; Roberts v. Moore, 185 N.C. 254, 116 S.E. 728; Bohannon v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 210 N.C. 679, 188 S.E. 390; Shaffer v. Bank, 201 N.C. 415, 160 S.E. 481; Calcagno v. Overby, 217 N.C. 323, 7 S.E. 2d 557; Wynne v. Conrad, 220 N.C. 355, 17 S.E. 2d 514.\nWiggins v. Trust Co., 232 N.C. 391, 393-94, 61 S.E.2d 72, 73 (1950).\nIn a similar case in which a motion to dismiss, rather than a motion to transfer venue, was presented to the trial court, our Supreme Court held that the trial court in that case \u201ccorrectly treated defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss as a motion for a change of venue. . . . In the motion defendant had pointed out that Sampson County was the proper venue.\u201d Coats v. Hospital, 264 N.C. 332, 334, 141 S.E.2d 490, 492 (1965) (citing Cloman v. Staton, 78 N.C. 235, 237 (1878)). In addition, we have held that \u201c \u2018[t]he trial court has no discretion in ordering a change of venue if demand is properly made and it appears that the action has been brought in the wrong county.\u2019 \u201d Baldwin v. Wilkie, 179 N.C. App. 567, 569, 635 S.E.2d 431, 432 (2006) (quoting Swift and Co. v. Dan-Cleve Corp., 26 N.C. App. 494, 495, 216 S.E.2d 464, 465 (1975)), disc. rev. denied, 361 N.C. 353, 645 S.E.2d 764 (2007).\nIn the case sub judice, defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss based upon improper venue reads,\nPlaintiff\u2019s Complaint should be dismissed pursuant to N.C.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(3), since the face of the Complaint discloses that this matter is in the improper venue. None of the parties reside in Durham County and, pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1-82, since [defendant 3311 Capital Boulevard, LLC, resides in Wake County, which is also the sites [sic] of the incident giving rise to this action, Wake County is the proper venue for this case.\nEven though they did not request a transfer of the case to the proper venue, our precedent requires that the motion be treated as such. Accordingly, we hold that, rather than dismissing Roberts\u2019s case, the trial court should have transferred it from Durham County, an improper venue, to Wake County, the proper venue.\nWe affirm the trial court\u2019s denial of defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss based upon improper venue. However, because Durham County is not the proper venue for the case sub judice, we remand to the trial court for entry of an order transferring the case to Wake County.\nAffirmed in part; Remanded.\nJudges ELMORE and THIGPEN concur.\n. This statute applies in eases, such as the case sub judice, that are not covered by the specific provisions listed in North Carolina General Statutes, sections 1-76 through 1-81.1.", "type": "majority", "author": "JACKSON, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Pulley, Watson, King & Lischer, P.A., by Guy W. Crabtree, for plaintiff-appellee.", "Ross & Van Sickle, PLLC, by R. Matthew Van Sickle and C. Thomas Ross, for defendants-appellants." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "AFRIKA S. ROBERTS, by and through her Guardian ad Litem, FRANKIE J. PERRY, Plaintiff v. ADVENTURE HOLDINGS, LLC, and, 3311 CAPITAL BOULEVARD, LLC, d/b/a ADVENTURE LANDING, Defendants\nNo. COA10-589\n(Filed 21 December 2010)\n1. Appeal and Error\u2014 interlocutory order \u2014 improper venue\u2014 denial of motion to dismiss \u2014 substantial right\nThe Court of Appeals addressed the merits of an appeal from an interlocutory order denying a motion to dismiss for improper venue where defendants alleged that the county indicated in the complaint was improper.\n2. Venue\u2014 residence of guardian ad litem \u2014 not alone sufficient\nA guardian ad litem\u2019s residence, standing alone, was not sufficient to establish venue.\n3. Venue\u2014 motion to dismiss \u2014 treated as motion to transfer\nA motion to dismiss for improper venue was treated as a motion to transfer venue and, as venue was improper, the trial court should have transferred the case.\nAppeal by defendants from order entered 4 February 2009 by Judge Orlando F. Hudson, Jr. in Durham County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 28 October 2010.\nPulley, Watson, King & Lischer, P.A., by Guy W. Crabtree, for plaintiff-appellee.\nRoss & Van Sickle, PLLC, by R. Matthew Van Sickle and C. Thomas Ross, for defendants-appellants." }, "file_name": "0705-01", "first_page_order": 729, "last_page_order": 735 }