{ "id": 4180750, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. BRYAN CROWDER, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Crowder", "decision_date": "2010-12-21", "docket_number": "No. COA09-1364", "first_page": "723", "last_page": "729", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "208 N.C. App. 723" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "660 S.E.2d 574", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12640925 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "576" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/660/0574-01" ] }, { "cite": "561 S.E.2d 271", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "355 N.C. 289", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 219942, 220040, 220152, 220091, 220125 ], "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/355/0289-03", "/nc/355/0289-01", "/nc/355/0289-05", "/nc/355/0289-04", "/nc/355/0289-02" ] }, { "cite": "553 S.E.2d 71", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "78", "parenthetical": "finding invalid and vacating special condition of probation that was imposed orally at trial but not provided to defendant in a written statement" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "146 N.C. App. 360", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11357582 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "369", "parenthetical": "finding invalid and vacating special condition of probation that was imposed orally at trial but not provided to defendant in a written statement" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/146/0360-01" ] }, { "cite": "609 S.E.2d 253", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "254" }, { "page": "255" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "169 N.C. App. 193", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8469014 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "195" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/169/0193-01" ] }, { "cite": "190 N.C. App. 458", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4158284 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "459" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/190/0458-01" ] }, { "cite": "353 S.E.2d 250", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "253" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "84 N.C. App. 517", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12168824 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "521" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/84/0517-01" ] }, { "cite": "512 S.E.2d 424", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "350 N.C. 302", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 132302 ], "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/350/0302-01" ] }, { "cite": "496 S.E.2d 842", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "846" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "129 N.C. App. 52", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11648214 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "58" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/129/0052-01" ] }, { "cite": "510 S.E.2d 413", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "414", "parenthetical": "internal citation and internal quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "132 N.C. App. 209", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11237366 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "211", "parenthetical": "internal citation and internal quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/132/0209-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 592, "char_count": 12702, "ocr_confidence": 0.749, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.317852702137001e-08, "percentile": 0.4376739724980105 }, "sha256": "cadc49fd66dc6319516c6d19eb345815bcde8ddb8e359bcec3811aa99c0f58b4", "simhash": "1:8f7b7b43b4eb14f5", "word_count": 2070 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:19:36.775795+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges JACKSON and BEASLEY concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. BRYAN CROWDER, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "GEER, Judge.\nDefendant Bryan Crowder appeals from the trial court\u2019s revocation of his probation. Defendant was accused of violating a special condition of probation included in the written judgments, namely that he \u201c[n]ot reside in a household with any minor child,\u201d along with two conditions not. contained in the written judgments. Because defendant was never provided written notice of the latter two conditions, and the State presented no evidence as to the former, we hold that the trial court erred in concluding that defendant violated his probation.\nFacts\nOn 10 March 2008, defendant pled guilty to three counts of indecent liberties with a minor. On 26 March 2008, the trial court sentenced him to an active sentence on one count. On the remaining two counts, the trial court imposed two consecutive presumptive-range sentences of 19 to 23 months imprisonment, suspended those sentences, and placed defendant on supervised probation for 36 months. Because defendant\u2019s offenses involved the sexual abuse of a minor, the special conditions of his probation included a condition that he was \u201c[n]ot to reside in a household with any minor child.\u201d The conditions of probation recorded in the two written judgments do not otherwise prohibit defendant from having contact with minors other than the victim of the offenses.\nOn 19 May 2009, defendant\u2019s probation officer, Brandi Renfro, issued two probation violation reports against defendant, each alleging the same violation of his probationary sentence. The report stated that defendant willfully violated:\n1. Sex Offender Special Condition Number\nTHE PROBATIONER IS ORDERED TO NOT RESIDE IN A HOUSEHOLD WITH A MINOR CHILD. HE IS ALSO ORDERED TO \u201cNOT SOCAILIZE [sic] OR COMMUNICATE WITH INDIVIDUALS UNDER THE AGE OF 18 IN WORK OR SOCIAL ACTIVITIES UNLESS ACCOMPANIED BY A RESPONSIBLE ADULT WHO IS AWARE OF THE ABUSIVE PATTERNS AND IS APPROVED IN WRITING BY THE SUPERVISING OFFICER\u201d, AS WELL AS \u201cNOT BE ALONE WITH ANY MINOR CHILD BELOW THE AGE OF 18 YEARS OF AGE [sic] UNLESS APPROVED BY HIS SUPERVISING OFFICER IN WRITING.\u201d ON 05/19/2009 THE PROBATIONER WAS FOUND TO HAVE A MINOR CHILD AT HIS RESIDENCE WITHOUT THE PERMISSION OF THE OFFICER OR THE COURT.\nThe trial court conducted a probation violation hearing on 9 July 2009. The State\u2019s evidence showed that on 19 May 2009, a probation officer arrived at defendant\u2019s home to conduct a curfew check and saw a juvenile leaving defendant\u2019s camper. The juvenile was the daughter of defendant\u2019s fianc\u00e9e and was not the victim of defendant\u2019s prior offenses. The probation officer testified:\nThe situation that happened on the 19th day of May when the surveillance officer went to the residence, he pulled up at the residence. The young child came out of the camper and the Defendant was also located inside the camper. It is in fact Your Honor a camper. We are not talking about some 2500 square foot home, it is a mobile camper. They were inside the residence, and they were inside that residence together. The Defendant cannot have that child there in his residence. It is a condition of his probation in black and white.\nShe added: \u201cHe knows he can\u2019t have that child in that residence and that is exactly where [the child] was.\u201d Defendant, however, introduced into evidence a letter from his fianc\u00e9e\u2019s mother in which she stated that the child resided in the maternal grandmother\u2019s home.\nThe trial court asked the probation officer if defendant\u2019s \u201cprobationary judgment [was] altered in some way by the probation office other than what Judge Baker said to where he would be permitted to have somebody there if you all approved it?\u201d The probation officer testified that the written judgments imposing probation had not been altered. According to the probation officer, other than the alleged violation, defendant substantially complied with the conditions of his probation, including attending sex offender treatment.\nDefendant contended that he was never alone unsupervised with the child and argued that the child did not \u201creside\u201d there, as prohibited by his probation. The trial court responded, \u201cThat is usually a fairly narrow constriction [sic] of that requirement [counsel]. He is not supposed to have any children anywhere around him.\u201d\nThe trial court found that defendant had willfully violated the conditions of his probation as alleged in the violation report. The trial court then revoked defendant\u2019s probation and activated one term of 19 to 23 months imprisonment in case 07 CRS 745, but modified defendant\u2019s other term of probation in case 07 CRS 50590 to begin after he is released from prison. Defendant timely appealed to this Court.\nDiscussion\nOn appeal, defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his probation because the State failed to present evidence that he violated a valid condition of his probation. Probation \u201cis an act of grace by the State to one convicted of a crime. [Thus], a proceeding to revoke probation is not bound by strict rules of evidence and an alleged violation of a probationary condition need not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.\u201d State v. Hill, 132 N.C. App. 209, 211, 510 S.E.2d 413, 414 (1999) (internal citation and internal quotation marks omitted). \u201cAll that is required is that the evidence be sufficient to reasonably satisfy the judge in the exercise of his sound discretion that the defendant has willfully violated a valid condition of probation.\u201d State v. White, 129 N.C. App. 52, 58, 496 S.E.2d 842, 846 (1998), disc. review improvidently allowed in part and aff\u2019d in part per curiam, 350 N.C. 302, 512 S.E.2d 424 (1999). \u201cAny violation of a valid condition of probation is sufficient to revoke defendant\u2019s probation.\u201d State v. Tozzi, 84 N.C. App. 517, 521, 353 S.E.2d 250, 253 (1987). A finding of a violation of probation, \u201cif supported by competent evidence, will not be overturned absent a showing of manifest abuse of discretion.\u201d State v. Young, 190 N.C. App. 458, 459, 660 S.E.2d 574, 576 (2008).\nThe violation reports in this case alleged that defendant violated three conditions of his probation: (1) \u201cnot reside in a household with a minor child\u201d; (2) not socialize or communicate with minors unless accompanied by an adult who has been approved by a probation officer in writing; and (3) not be alone with a minor unless a probation officer gives approval in writing. The first condition, included in defendant\u2019s written judgments, is required by statute as a mandatory special condition of probation for sex offenders. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1343(b2)(4) (2009).\nUnder N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1343(b2)(4), a sex offender, while on probation, may \u201c[n]ot reside in a household with any minor child if the offense [of which he was convicted] is one in which there is evidence of sexual abuse of a minor.\u201d In announcing its decision to revoke defendant\u2019s probation, the trial court, in this case, explained its view that \u201creside,\u201d as used in the statute, means that defendant \u201cis not supposed to have any children anywhere around him.\u201d Based on the probation officer\u2019s testimony at trial, she appeared to share the same interpretation of \u201creside.\u201d\nThis interpretation of \u201creside\u201d- as used in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1343(b2)(4) is contrary to State v. Strickland, 169 N.C. App. 193, 609 S.E.2d 253 (2005). In Strickland, the defendant challenged the constitutionality of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1343(b2)(4), arguing that the statute was constitutionally overbroad and that it violated his constitutional right to the care and custody of his child without due process. 169 N.C. App. at 195, 609 S.E.2d at 254. This Court upheld the constitutionality of the statute based on the fact that the defendant \u201cwas not prohibited by the contested condition from seeing his child. The contested condition of probation did not prevent defendant from visiting his child in the home where his wife and child were residing. The condition simply prevented him from also residing in that home, for the probationary period.\u201d Id. at 196-97, 609 S.E.2d at 255.\nThus, in Strickland this Court construed the word \u201creside\u201d much more narrowly than the trial court did in this case in order to ensure the constitutionality of the probation condition. Strickland establishes that the condition is not violated simply when a defendant sees or visits with a child. Contrary to the trial court\u2019s determination, the condition did not prevent defendant from having a child \u201canywhere around him.\u201d\nHere, we need not specifically decide how long a child must be in a residence with a defendant to constitute \u201cresiding\u201d within the meaning of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1343(b2)(4). The State did not present any evidence and did not argue at the trial level that defendant was doing anything more than visiting with his fianc\u00e9e\u2019s child, which Strickland holds is not sufficient to establish a violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1343(b2)(4). The only evidence in the record regarding the child\u2019s residence, while not dispositive, is the letter from the child\u2019s maternal grandmother stating that the child lived with her. Although the State argues on appeal that the evidence implies \u201cthat since the minor in question was the child of the defendant\u2019s fianc\u00e9 [sic], the minor\u2019s presence was not merely sporadic,\u201d the record contains no evidence that the child did more than visit defendant on one occasion. Accordingly, the record does not contain evidence supporting a finding that defendant violated the special condition of probation set out in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1343(b2)(4).\nWith respect to the two remaining conditions listed in the probation violation report, although they are set out in quotation marks in the report, neither the record on appeal nor the transcript indicates the source \u2014 or any support \u2014 for those conditions, which were not included in defendant\u2019s written judgments. In addition, at the probation hearing, the probation officer testified that the conditions of probation set forth in the written judgment had not been modified. At most, it appears that defendant\u2019s probation officer may have orally spoken with defendant about being around his fianc\u00e9e\u2019s children. The State does not argue otherwise.\nIt is well established that