{ "id": 4182028, "name": "ASHLEY v. THE CITY OF LEXINGTON; RALPH ASHLEY, JEAN ASHLEY, ALEXANDER AUGOUSTIDES, CAROLYN AUMAN, LUTHER T. BARBER, SYLVIA BARBER, D.H. BEAM, JAY BELK, PAM BELK, ANTHONY J. BOLO, JR., MARION J. BONNOM, KEITH BOST, SHERRY BOST, RICKY BOYD, MICHAEL P. BRALKOWSKI, RHONDA W. BRALKOWSKI, JIM BUCHANAN, BETSY BUCHANAN, PEGGY BURCHETT, JERRY BURKHART, JERI BURKHART, BOBBY BYERLY, PATSY BYERLY, JIM CAMERON, BETSY CAMERON, BRAD CATES, JODI CATES, CORY COOPER, AMANDA COOPER, WILLIAM H. COX, DENNIS JEFFREY COOPER, NAOMA WAGNER CRABTREE, TRUSTEE, SHIRLEY E. CROTTS, LARRY H. CROTTS, PERRY K. CROTTS, HENRY C. CROUSE, KAREN CROUSE, DAN R. DAUGHETY, SUSAN G. DAUGHETY, JUDITH M. DAVIS, BOBBY N. DICKERSON, ELLEN F. DICKERSON, ED DROZD, NANCY DROZD, RONALD DURHAM, DENISE DURHAM, DAVID NATHANIEL DURRELL, MELADIE DURRELL, RICKY EVERHART, DANNY EVERHART, MELISSA EVERHART, LISA EVERHART, TED G. EVERHART, BETTIE H. EVERHART, JOHN EVERS, GAIL EVERS, ROBERT G. FLOYD, EMMA R. FLOYD, JOHN FRANK, TRUDY FRANK, JIMMY FREEMANN, LYNNE FREEMANN, EDWARD FRIEDMANN, BERTHA FRIEDMANN, CARL GARRISON, ROBERT GREER, JANICE GREER, THOMAS O. GRUBBS, JR., TONY HARTLEY, NANCY HARTLEY, CHARLES HARTSOOK, RUTH HARTSOOK, MICHAEL V. HIGGINS, PATRICIA A. HIGGINS, RICKY L. HILL, DEBORAH Y. HILL, GIG HILTON, SUSAN HILTON, JERRY HUNT, MARTHA HUNT, R. FRANK HUNTER, MARGARET HUNTER, CRAIG IDOL, GINA IDOL, ROBERT D. KETCHIE, FAYE B. KETCHIE, SANDRA KNAPP, PATRICK KNAPP, CONNIE MASON LAUGHTER, CLINTON LeGETTE, MARY LOU LeGETTE, LLOYD LEONARD, KIM LEONARD, PHIL LOHR, MILTON R. LOMAX, RANDALL J. LONG, BETTY L. MASON, PAUL MARTIN, WANDA MARTIN, JERRY MAYES, VICKI MAYES, PHILLIP McKINNEY, BEVERLY McKINNEY, BETTY C. MICHAEL, ROY STEVEN MICHAEL, JOHNNY MORGAN, PAULETTE MORGAN, MIKE MORGAN, RUFFIN MORGAN, KENNETH D. MOTLEY, DON MYERS, JUDY MYERS, JAN MYERS, TONYA MYERS, MATT O'BRYANT, MICHELLE O'BRYANT, ANN R. PARKER, TIM PALMER, SHIRLEY PARKS, STEVEN PARKS, GLENDA PARKS, WATTS B. PARRISH, LARRY KIGER POPE, JR., GAY PLEASANTS, RICHARD G. REESE, BETTY REESE, LEON L. RIVES, II, CATHERINE N. ROBERTSON, RAFAEL ROCA, T. SAINTSING, SANDRA SAINTSING, MARVIN SANDIFER, CAROLE P. SANDIFER, ELSIE SAUL, GLENN A. SCOTT, CYNTHIA S. SCOTT, RICK SMITH, RICK SMITH, GWINNIE SMITH, STEVEN SMITH, LAURA SMITH, VERONICA SROKA, LYNN STEWART, JANE STEWART, JACKIE SHOAF, JERRY SHOAF, CAROL STOTT, DAVID STOTT, TONY TOWNSEND, CAROLYN J. TOWNSEND, WILLIAM F. TUCKER, BETTY S. TUCKER, BRIAN TURLINGTON, JENNIFER TURLINGTON, WILLIE VAUTER, VONCEIL VAUTER, JUNE G. WALDEN, CURTIS JAE WALDEN, KATHY D. WALL, DOUG WALSER, MARY WALSER, GARY G. WIKSTROM, BUSTER B. WILLIS, BRENDA P. WILLIS, BEN WILSON, SHELLY WILSON, WALTER L. WILSON, ED WORKMAN, ANITA WORKMAN, JOE T. YARBROUGH, FAYE YOUNG, LOUISE W. YOUNG, Petitioners, v. THE CITY OF LEXINGTON, a North Carolina Municipality, Respondent; ELAINE S. ALEXANDER, LINDA BECK, MISTY CLODFELTER, JUDI L. COCHRAN, LOUIS C. COLEMAN, LOUISE S. COLEMAN, RUBY LOUISE CROSS, WILLIAM CROSS, LORETTA CROTTS, SHELL CROTTS, MARTY F. CURRY, GREG D. DYSON, MARK EVANS, JANET EVERHART, LORRAINE H. FURR, LORRAINE H. FURR, RICHARD E. FURR, ROY LEE GATES, BARBARA GATES, GARY GOBBLE, KAREN GOBBLE, GRETA W. HAMM, JOHN CHARLES HAMM, BETTY B. HONBAIER, TERRY HUGHES, ALLISON M. KEENE, CAROLYN LOMAN, THAMAR DARRELL LOMAN, HELEN KIVETT, CAROLYN S. McCARN, JOHNNY N. McCARN, LEROY McCARN, RUBY McCARN, DEBORAH MEDLIN, PAUL MEDLIN, CARLTON E. MOBEY, BILLY RAY PLEASANT, HARVEY POTTER, VICTOR SMITH, PAUL R. STOGNER, SARAH STOGNER, VERA F. WALDEN, DORIS R. WALSER, SANDRA H. WALKER, SHIRLEY F. WEAVER, JEFFREY K. WHITE, ELWOOD YOUNTS, NAOMI R. YOUNTS, Petitioners, v. THE CITY OF LEXINGTON, a North Carolina Municipality, Respondent; SOY KHOUN, SUSAN LONG, MELIDA SUZY MELGAR, BOBBY D. WALSER, Petitioners, v. THE CITY OF LEXINGTON, a North Carolina Municipality, Respondent", "name_abbreviation": "Ashley v. City of Lexington", "decision_date": "2011-01-04", "docket_number": "No. COA10-314", "first_page": "1", "last_page": "18", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "209 N.C. App. 1" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. 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THE CITY OF LEXINGTON RALPH ASHLEY, JEAN ASHLEY, ALEXANDER AUGOUSTIDES, CAROLYN AUMAN, LUTHER T. BARBER, SYLVIA BARBER, D.H. BEAM, JAY BELK, PAM BELK, ANTHONY J. BOLO, JR., MARION J. BONNOM, KEITH BOST, SHERRY BOST, RICKY BOYD, MICHAEL P. BRALKOWSKI, RHONDA W. BRALKOWSKI, JIM BUCHANAN, BETSY BUCHANAN, PEGGY BURCHETT, JERRY BURKHART, JERI BURKHART, BOBBY BYERLY, PATSY BYERLY, JIM CAMERON, BETSY CAMERON, BRAD CATES, JODI CATES, CORY COOPER, AMANDA COOPER, WILLIAM H. COX, DENNIS JEFFREY COOPER, NAOMA WAGNER CRABTREE, TRUSTEE, SHIRLEY E. CROTTS, LARRY H. CROTTS, PERRY K. CROTTS, HENRY C. CROUSE, KAREN CROUSE, DAN R. DAUGHETY, SUSAN G. DAUGHETY, JUDITH M. DAVIS, BOBBY N. DICKERSON, ELLEN F. DICKERSON, ED DROZD, NANCY DROZD, RONALD DURHAM, DENISE DURHAM, DAVID NATHANIEL DURRELL, MELADIE DURRELL, RICKY EVERHART, DANNY EVERHART, MELISSA EVERHART, LISA EVERHART, TED G. EVERHART, BETTIE H. EVERHART, JOHN EVERS, GAIL EVERS, ROBERT G. FLOYD, EMMA R. FLOYD, JOHN FRANK, TRUDY FRANK, JIMMY FREEMANN, LYNNE FREEMANN, EDWARD FRIEDMANN, BERTHA FRIEDMANN, CARL GARRISON, ROBERT GREER, JANICE GREER, THOMAS O. GRUBBS, JR., TONY HARTLEY, NANCY HARTLEY, CHARLES HARTSOOK, RUTH HARTSOOK, MICHAEL V. HIGGINS, PATRICIA A. HIGGINS, RICKY L. HILL, DEBORAH Y. HILL, GIG HILTON, SUSAN HILTON, JERRY HUNT, MARTHA HUNT, R. FRANK HUNTER, MARGARET HUNTER, CRAIG IDOL, GINA IDOL, ROBERT D. KETCHIE, FAYE B. KETCHIE, SANDRA KNAPP, PATRICK KNAPP, CONNIE MASON LAUGHTER, CLINTON LeGETTE, MARY LOU LeGETTE, LLOYD LEONARD, KIM LEONARD, PHIL LOHR, MILTON R. LOMAX, RANDALL J. LONG, BETTY L. MASON, PAUL MARTIN, WANDA MARTIN, JERRY MAYES, VICKI MAYES, PHILLIP McKINNEY, BEVERLY McKINNEY, BETTY C. MICHAEL, ROY STEVEN MICHAEL, JOHNNY MORGAN, PAULETTE MORGAN, MIKE MORGAN, RUFFIN MORGAN, KENNETH D. MOTLEY, DON MYERS, JUDY MYERS, JAN MYERS, TONYA MYERS, MATT O\u2019BRYANT, MICHELLE O\u2019BRYANT, ANN R. PARKER, TIM PALMER, SHIRLEY PARKS, STEVEN PARKS, GLENDA PARKS, WATTS B. PARRISH, LARRY KIGER POPE, JR., GAY PLEASANTS, RICHARD G. REESE, BETTY REESE, LEON L. RIVES, II, CATHERINE N. ROBERTSON, RAFAEL ROCA, T. SAINTSING, SANDRA SAINTSING, MARVIN SANDIFER, CAROLE P. SANDIFER, ELSIE SAUL, GLENN A. SCOTT, CYNTHIA S. SCOTT, RICK SMITH, RICK SMITH, GWINNIE SMITH, STEVEN SMITH, LAURA SMITH, VERONICA SROKA, LYNN STEWART, JANE STEWART, JACKIE SHOAF, JERRY SHOAF, CAROL STOTT, DAVID STOTT, TONY TOWNSEND, CAROLYN J. TOWNSEND, WILLIAM F. TUCKER, BETTY S. TUCKER, BRIAN TURLINGTON, JENNIFER TURLINGTON, WILLIE VAUTER, VONCEIL VAUTER, JUNE G. WALDEN, CURTIS JAE WALDEN, KATHY D. WALL, DOUG WALSER, MARY WALSER, GARY G. WIKSTROM, BUSTER B. WILLIS, BRENDA P. WILLIS, BEN WILSON, SHELLY WILSON, WALTER L. WILSON, ED WORKMAN, ANITA WORKMAN, JOE T. YARBROUGH, FAYE YOUNG, LOUISE W. YOUNG, Petitioners, v. THE CITY OF LEXINGTON, a North Carolina Municipality, Respondent. ELAINE S. ALEXANDER, LINDA BECK, MISTY CLODFELTER, JUDI L. COCHRAN, LOUIS C. COLEMAN, LOUISE S. COLEMAN, RUBY LOUISE CROSS, WILLIAM CROSS, LORETTA CROTTS, SHELL CROTTS, MARTY F. CURRY, GREG D. DYSON, MARK EVANS, JANET EVERHART, LORRAINE H. FURR, LORRAINE H. FURR, RICHARD E. FURR, ROY LEE GATES, BARBARA GATES, GARY GOBBLE, KAREN GOBBLE, GRETA W. HAMM, JOHN CHARLES HAMM, BETTY B. HONBAIER, TERRY HUGHES, ALLISON M. KEENE, CAROLYN LOMAN, THAMAR DARRELL LOMAN, HELEN KIVETT, CAROLYN S. McCARN, JOHNNY N. McCARN, LEROY McCARN, RUBY McCARN, DEBORAH MEDLIN, PAUL MEDLIN, CARLTON E. MOBEY, BILLY RAY PLEASANT, HARVEY POTTER, VICTOR SMITH, PAUL R. STOGNER, SARAH STOGNER, VERA F. WALDEN, DORIS R. WALSER, SANDRA H. WALKER, SHIRLEY F. WEAVER, JEFFREY K. WHITE, ELWOOD YOUNTS, NAOMI R. YOUNTS, Petitioners, v. THE CITY OF LEXINGTON, a North Carolina Municipality, Respondent. SOY KHOUN, SUSAN LONG, MELIDA SUZY MELGAR, BOBBY D. WALSER, Petitioners, v. THE CITY OF LEXINGTON, a North Carolina Municipality, Respondent." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "McGEE, Judge.\nThis case is before our Court on appeal from a judicial review of three annexation ordinances (the ordinances) by the Superior Court of Davidson County. By agreement of the parties, all three appeals have been combined for hearing. The parties to this appeal are the City of Lexington, North Carolina (Respondent) and certain residents and owners of property located in the three areas Respondent sought to annex (Petitioners). Respondent and Petitioners appeal orders partially granting and partially denying both parties\u2019 motions for summary judgment.\nRespondent passed a resolution on 14 April 2008 (the resolution) declaring its intent to annex three areas of land bordering Respondent. These areas are known as the Old Salisbury Road Annexation Area, the East Center Street Annexation Area, and the Biesecker Road Annexation Area (collectively, the annexation areas). The East Center Street Annexation Area includes a land bridge connecting the developed area to be annexed to the city boundary. By statute, the land bridge in the East Center Street Annexation Area cannot exceed twenty-five percent of the total area to be annexed, and must be adjacent on at least sixty percent of its boundary to a combination of the city boundary and the developed portion of the annexation area. All three annexation areas (excluding the land bridge) are developed but lack sewer service. The resolution described the areas to be annexed by metes and bounds descriptions that rely, in part, on thirteen-digit tax identification numbers for certain lots in the area, to locate points on the boundary of the areas to be annexed. The resolution further relied on four maps and stated that the Davidson County Clerk\u2019s Office had additional maps and a list of people identified as owning property in the annexation areas. Respondent sent notice of the resolution to every known property owner in the annexation areas and published the resolution and maps twice in the local newspaper.\nRespondent adopted a report (the report) on the annexations and made it available to the public on 28 April 2009. Twenty-three maps of the annexation areas were included in the report. The report also included a plan for extending sewer services to the annexation areas. Respondent held a public meeting to explain the report and respond to questions on 3 June 2008. Respondent then held a public hearing on the annexations on 8 July 2008.\nRespondent adopted the three ordinances on 21 July 2008. The ordinances contained the same descriptions of the areas to be annexed as those included in the resolution, and also partially relied on the thirteen-digit tax record numbers to help locate the boundaries of the annexation areas. The ordinances were to be effective as of 30 June 2009, but were stayed pending the outcome on appeal.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-47(3)(c) (2009) provides that, if construction of sewer outfall lines is required, construction must be completed within two years of the effective date of annexation. Secondary lines or extensions \u2014 those connecting the main outfall lines to developed property \u2014 are to be built \u201caccording to the policies in effect in such municipality for extending water and sewer lines to individual lots or subdivisions.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 160A-47(3)(b).\nAccording to Respondent\u2019s existing policy, residents may petition Respondent for sewer connection. Should Respondent not have funds available to complete the request, Respondent may either deny the petition or negotiate with the petitioning residents in order to reach an agreement on payment for the connection. Historically, prior to the start of any work on a connection, Respondent has required petitioners to pay a percentage of the connection costs, ranging from fifty percent to one hundred percent of the costs.\nFor the three newly-annexed areas, Respondent committed to building all secondary lines at Respondent\u2019s expense within five years of annexation. Annexation residents were allowed to petition for accelerated sewer lines but Respondent had no funds budgeted for the costs of accelerated connection. Therefore, Respondent could either deny the request or negotiate connection costs with Petitioners. Respondent provided residents with printed request forms for accelerated sewer requests. The forms required residents to pay fifty percent of the connection costs in advance of construction and within fourteen days of being notified of the costs. If these terms were not met, Respondent would deny the accelerated sewer requests and connections would be established, without cost to residents, within five years of annexation.\nA group opposing the annexation, Citizens United Against Forced Annexation, had residents place a sticker on the printed forms that stated: \u201cI agree to the same water/sewer extension policy that is in effect for City residents pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. 160A-47(3)(B).\u201d Respondent refused to accept forms bearing the stickers and so notified residents. After being informed of the denial of forms bearing the stickers, a group of residents went to City Hall and removed the stickers. Respondent still refused to accept any form that at one time had a sticker placed on it. Residents who submitted forms with the stickers were provided with new forms and were told they would need to fill out the new forms in order to request accelerated sewer services.\nAccording to the report, by 15 July 2008, Respondent had received \u201c148 valid forms signed by property owners within the annexation areas requesting that residential .sewer line extensions be accelerated to be made available within two years of the effective date of annexation].]\u201d Once Respondent received the forms, its Public Works Division calculated the costs of the connection and sent contracts to the property owners. The executed contracts, along with fifty percent of the costs, were to be returned within fourteen days. None of the residents who were notified of the costs sent Respondent an executed contract or payment. Therefore, Respondent did not schedule expedited sewer service connections for any property within the annexation areas.\nPetitioners filed three petitions in Davidson County Superior Court seeking judicial review of the ordinances on 15 September 2008. Petitioners challenged the boundary descriptions of the areas to be annexed, alleging that the boundary descriptions were not proper metes and bounds descriptions. Petitioners further argued that Respondent\u2019s requiring fifty percent of payment of the costs of sewer service connections within fourteen days was not part of Respondent\u2019s existing policy regarding extension of sewer lines because this method constituted neither a rejection nor a negotiation.\nBoth parties moved for summary judgment on 9 November 2009. The trial court entered orders on 15 D\u00e9cember 2009, granting: (1) Petitioners\u2019 motion contending that the legal descriptions of the annexation areas included in the ordinances were not sufficient metes and bounds descriptions; (2) Petitioners\u2019 motion contending Respondent\u2019s plan to extend sewer services to the annexation areas was not sufficient; (3) Respondent\u2019s motion contending that the descriptions of the annexation areas included in the resolution, the notices of the public meeting, and the public hearing were sufficient; (4) Respondent\u2019s motion contending that the maps in the report showing the present and proposed boundaries of Respondent and the annexation areas were sufficient; and (5) Respondent\u2019s motion contending that the East Center Annexation Area satisfied the statutory requirements. The orders further stipulated that the ordinances were to be remanded to correct irregularities in the legal description of the land and for correction of Respondent\u2019s plan for accelerated sewer service connections for property owners who submitted proper forms. Respondent and Petitioners appeal.\nStandard of Review\nWithin 60 days following the p\u00e1ssage of an annexation ordinance under authority of this Part, any person owning property in the annexed territory who shall believe that he will suffer material injury by reason of the failure of the municipal governing board to comply with the procedure set forth in this Part or to meet the requirements set forth in G.S. 160A-48 as they apply to his property may file a petition in the superior court of the county in which the municipality is located seeking review of the action of the governing board.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-50(a) (2009). When a petitioner contests the passage of an annexation ordinance, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-50 (2009) states that:\n(f) [] The review shall be conducted by the [trial] court without a jury. The [trial] court may hear oral arguments and receive written briefs, and may take evidence intended to show either\n(1) That the statutory procedure was not followed, or\n(2) That the provisions of G.S. 160A-47 were not met, or\n(3) That the provisions of G.S. 160A-48 have not been met.\n(g) The [trial] court may affirm the action of the governing board without change, or it may\n(1) Remand the ordinance to the municipal governing board for further proceedings if procedural irregularities are found to have materially prejudiced the substantive rights of any of the petitioners.\n(2) Remand the ordinance to the municipal governing board for amendment of the boundaries to conform to the provisions of G.S. 160A-48 if it finds that the provisions of G.S. 160A-48 have not been met; provided, that the [trial] court cannot remand the ordinance to the municipal governing board with directions to add area to the municipality which was not included in the notice of public hearing and not provided for in plans for service.\n(3) Remand the report to the municipal governing board for amendment of the plans for providing services to the end that the provisions of G.S. 160A-47 are satisfied.\n(4) Declare the ordinance null and void, if the [trial] court finds that the ordinance cannot be corrected by remand as provided in subdivisions (1), (2), or (3) of this subsection.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 160A-50. When reviewing an annexation ordinance:\nOur review is limited to the following inquiries: \u201c(1) Did [each] municipality comply with the statutory procedures? (2) If not, \u2022will [the opposing party] \u2018suffer material injury\u2019 by reason of the municipality\u2019s failure to comply?\u201d In re Annexation Ordinance, 278 N.C. 641, 647, 180 S.E.2d 851, 855 (1971). Where annexation proceedings \u201cshow prima facie that there has been substantial compliance with the requirements and provisions of the Act, the burden is upon [the opposing party] to show by competent evidence failure on the part of the municipality to comply with the statutory requirements as a matter of fact, or irregularity in proceedings which materially prejudice^] the substantive rights of [the opposing party].\u201d\nCity of Kannapolis v. City of Concord, 326 N.C. 512, 516, 391 S.E.2d 493, 496 (1990). Our Court has further stated:\nThe scope of judicial review of an annexation ordinance adopted by the governing board of a municipality is prescribed and defined by statute. . . . These statutes limit the court\u2019s inquiry to a determination of whether applicable annexation statutes have been substantially complied with. When the record submitted in superior court by the municipal corporation demonstrates, on its face, substantial compliance with the applicable annexation statutes, then the burden falls on the petitioners to show by competent and substantial evidence that the statutory requirements were in fact not met or that procedural irregularities occurred which materially prejudiced their substantive rights. \u201cIn determining the validity of an annexation ordinance, the court\u2019s review is limited to the following inquiries: (1) Did the municipality comply with the statutory procedures? (2) If not, will the petitioners suffer material injury thereby? (3) Does the area to be annexed meet the requirements of G.S. 160A-48 . . .?\u201d\nHuyck Corp. v. Town of Wake Forest, 86 N.C. App. 13, 15, 356 S.E.2d 599, 601 (1987) (citations omitted); see also Norwood v. Village of Sugar Mountain, 193 N.C. App. 293, 297-98, 667 S.E.2d 524, 527-28 (2008). Our Court has made clear that judicial review of an annexation ordinance is limited by statute:\nG.S. 160A-50(f) provides that a court, in reviewing annexation proceedings, may take evidence intended to show either that the statutory procedure set out in G.S. 160A-49 was not followed, or that the provisions of either G.S. 160A-47 or 160A-48 were not met. The statutory procedure outlined in G.S. 160A-49 requires notice of a public hearing and sets out guidelines for the hearing which is to be held prior to annexation. G.S. 160A-47 requires the annexing city to prepare maps and plans for the services to be provided to the annexed areas. G.S. 160A-48 sets out guidelines for the character of the area to be annexed.\nThe North Carolina Supreme Court and the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals have made it clear that G.S. 160A-50(f) limits the scope of judicial review to the determination of whether the annexation proceedings substantially comply with the requirements of the statutes referred to in G.S. 160A-50(f).\nForsyth Citizens v. City of Winston-Salem, 67 N.C. App. 164, 165, 312 S.E.2d 517, 518 (1984) (citations omitted) (emphasis added); see also In re Annexation Ordinance, 303 N.C. 220, 229-30, 278 S.E.2d 224, 230-31 (1981) (Annexation Case I).\nThe issues in this case were settled by summary judgment.\nSummary judgment is proper \u201cif the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.\u201d On a motion for summary judgment, \u201c[t]he evidence is to be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.\u201d When determining whether the trial court properly ruled on a motion for summary judgment, this court conducts a de novo review.\nBrown v. City of Winston-Salem, 171 N.C. App. 266, 270, 614 S.E.2d 599, 602 (2005) (internal citations omitted).\nPetitioners\u2019 Appeal\nPetitioners\u2019 arguments on appeal rely on Petitioners\u2019 contention that \u201cRespondent did not comply with statutory procedure and did not satisfy the requirements of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-47(1), 160A-47(3)(b), and 160A-49(a), (b) and (e)(1).\u201d Petitioners further argue that Respondent failed to adhere to the requirements of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-48(d). Petitioners argue this Court should reverse certain rulings in the trial court\u2019s orders because Respondent violated N.C.G.S. \u00a7 160A-50 and Petitioners \u201chave suffered, and will suffer, material injury in that they will be required to pay [Respondent] taxes and will be subject to [Respondent] regulations as a result of the involuntary annexation if it is not overturned.\u201d\nPetitioners cite Nolan v. Village of Marvin, 360 N.C. 256, 624 S.E.2d 305 (2006), in support of their contention that taxes and regulations alone are sufficient to demonstrate material prejudice. We disagree.\n[T]he holding in Nolan was based on the fact that the only services proposed to be extended to the area to be annexed were administrative services. The Village of Marvin had no plan to extend police, fire, waste collection or other services to the area to be annexed. Our Supreme Court held that the mere extension of administrative services provided no meaningful benefit to the area to be annexed.\nPinewild Project Ltd. P\u2019ship v. Village of Pinehurst, \u2014 N.C. App. \u2014, \u2014 , 679 S.E.2d 424, 429 (2009) (internal citation omitted). In Nolan, our Supreme Court explained: \u201cThose part-time administrative services, such as zoning and tax collection, simply fill needs created by the annexation itself, without conferring significant benefits on the annexed property owners and residents.\u201d Nolan, 360 N.C. at 262, 624 S.E.2d at 308-09. It was within this context, where the residents of the area to be annexed would be subjected to taxes without receiving any meaningful benefit, that our Supreme Court found the imposition of taxes to constitute material prejudice. We do not interpret Nolan to stand for the proposition that the imposition of taxes will always constitute material prejudice in any involuntary annexation. See Nolan v. Town of Weddington, 182 N.C. App. 486, 492, 642 S.E.2d 261, 265 (2007); Annexation Case I, 303 N.C. at 233, 278 S.E.2d at 233. Were we to so hold, the requirement that Petitioners demonstrate material prejudice would be rendered meaningless, as every annexation subjects those annexed to the taxes and regulations of the annexing municipality. The taxes the petitioners in Nolan would have been subjected to through annexation constituted material prejudice in that case because the petitioners would have received no material benefit in return. In the present case, Petitioners make no such argument, and we do not find Nolan controlling in this case. Because Petitioners advance no compelling argument that any procedural irregularities in the annexation process in this case will result in material prejudice, Petitioners fail to meet their burden on this issue. Kannapolis, 326 N.C. at 516, 391 S.E.2d at 496. We will, however, consider whether Respondent complied with N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-48(d) (2009) because failure to comply with this section could invalidate the annexation for \u201cfailure on the part of the municipality to comply with the statutory requirements as a matter of fact[.]\u201d Kannapolis, 326 N.C. at 516, 391 S.E.2d at 496.\nPetitioners argue that the trial court erred because the size of the land bridge connecting the developed portion of the East Center Street Annexation Area to Respondent exceeded the size allowed by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 160A-48(d). This argument clearly has no merit. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 160A-48(d) states that any required land bridge may not exceed twenty-five percent of the total annexation area. Petitioners contend that the land bridge in the present case \u201cconstitutes about 31% of the East Center Street Annexation Area\u2019s [173.50] total acres.\u201d Petitioners\u2019 claim \u2014 that the land bridge in question constitutes over twenty-five percent of the total annexation area \u2014 appears to originate from selective readings of the report and the ordinances. In a portion of the report labeled \u201cDeveloped for Urban Purposes\u201d that pertained to certain requirements for land use pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 160A-48(c)(3), Respondent included a breakdown of acres for the developed portion of the East Center Street Annexation Area for the purposes of showing the requirements of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 160A-48(c)(3) had been met. In a separate section of the report entitled \u201cLand Bridge,\u201d Respondent explained the requirements of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 160A-48(d), including the requirement that the \u201cland bridge connection may not exceed 25% of the total area to be annexed.\u201d In that section, Respondent stated: \u201cFinally, the total area of the land bridge, 51.39 acres is 22.85% of the total 224.89 acres in the East Center Street Area, which is less than the 25% maximum.\u201d The ordinance for the East Center Street Area includes the same information. The 224.89-acre figure is clearly arrived at by adding the 51.39 acres constituting the land bridge to the 173.50 acres constituting the developed area relevant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 160A-48(c)(3). Because 51.39 acres constitutes less than twenty-five percent of 224.89, the total acreage to be annexed, the trial court did not err in granting Respondent\u2019s motion for summary judgment on this issue. Petitioners\u2019 arguments are without merit.\nRespondent\u2019s Appeal\nRespondent first argues that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Petitioners\u2019 claim that the legal description of the annexation areas included in the ordinances were not sufficient metes and bounds descriptions. We agree. Respondent argues that any failure to adequately describe the area to be annexed pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 49(e)(1) is a procedural error and, therefore, Petitioners must show that they were materially prejudiced thereby. Petitioners argue that our Court has already held that a border description relying on tax parcel identification numbers can be insufficient to meet the description requirement of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 49(e)(1) when the corresponding tax maps were not incorporated into the ordinances by reference. Blackwell v. City of Reidsville, 129 N.C. App. 759, 762-63, 502 S.E.2d 371, 374 (1998). We do not find Blackwell controlling in this case.\nIn Blackwell, our Court held \u201cthat the use of the tax maps, without incorporation by reference, was not a sufficient metes and bounds description.\u201d Id. at 763, 502 S.E.2d at 374. In Blackwell, there was nothing to indicate that the tax identification numbers contained all the necessary information to identify the relevant tax maps, nor any lot\u2019s position on those maps. The Blackwell Court found that \u201cthere [was] nothing in the descriptions or maps in the ordinance that identify [the] numbers in any way.\u201d Id. at 762, 502 S.E.2d at 374. In the present case, Respondent presented uncontradicted evidence from two licensed surveyors that the tax parcel identification numbers included in the ordinances contained all the information needed to both accurately identify and place the lots and the annexation areas\u2019 boundaries on the relevant tax maps, and on the ground. In an affidavit, licensed surveyor David Craver (Craver) stated the following:\nI am personally familiar with how tax maps and other real property records are organized, labeled, and indexed in the Davidson County Register of Deeds and the Davidson County Tax Office. At the Davidson County Tax Office, the parcel ID number assigned to each parcel specifies on which tax map that parcel can be found. For example, if provided the parcel ID number 1135000000003, I have enough information to identify and locate the County tax map where that parcel is found and to locate the parcel on that map. If a legal description identifies parcels using Davidson County parcel ID numbers, the parcels can be identified and located.\nCraver further stated that the descriptions included in the ordinances were \u201call valid metes and bounds descriptions^]\u201d and could \u201cbe used to locate the external boundary of that area, both on a survey map and on the ground.\u201d\nLicensed surveyor Samuel Leonard (Leonard) executed an affidavit that was in agreement with the statements by Craver as quoted above. Leonard further stated that \u201cany person, if provided with a specific parcel ID number, can identify and locate the County tax map where that parcel is found and locate that parcel on that tax map.\u201d Leonard explained:\nEach Davidson County parcel is assigned a specific 13-digit parcel ID number which can be used to locate each particular parcel on a Davidson County tax map. The first two digits in the parcel ID number refer to the Davidson County township in which the parcel is located. The next three digits refer to the specific County tax map containing that parcel. The sixth digit in the parcel ID number denotes whether the parcel is located in a platted subdivision. Specifically, a letter in the sixth position means the parcel is in a subdivision; a number means it is not. The next three digits specify the block on the tax map where the parcel can be found, and the final four digits refer to the lot in that block.\nLeonard further explained that all this information was available to the public. We hold that the information contained in the Davidson County tax parcel ID numbers specifically identified the location of those parcels on the tax maps and on the ground. The inclusion of these tax parcel ID numbers effectively incorporated the corresponding Davidson County tax maps. The purpose and function of the ID numbers is to locate the parcels on the appropriate maps and these ID numbers contain information from which anyone can locate the corresponding parcels on the appropriate maps. We hold the descriptions provided in the ordinances were sufficient to meet the requirement of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 49(e)(1).\nWe further note that the Blackwell Court did not conduct a prejudice analysis in reaching its decision. Our Court has previously held:\nOur appellate courts, in reviewing annexation procedures, have consistently held that substantial compliance is all that is required in meeting the boundary requirements set forth in the statutes. We are persuaded that the metes and bounds description and the maps provided a boundary description which could be established on the ground in substantial compliance with the applicable statutes and that [the trial court] erred in [its] findings and conclusions to the contrary.\nAdditionally, we note that [the trial court\u2019s] order contained no finding or conclusion that the irregularities he saw in the boundary description had \u201cmaterially prejudiced the substantive rights of any of the petitioners.\u201d G.S. 160A-50(g)(l).\nIn re Annexation Ordinance, 62 N.C. App. 588, 598, 303 S.E.2d 380, 385 (1983) (Annexation Case II) (internal citations omitted). Our appellate courts have repeatedly required a showing of prejudice even when the statutory requirements of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 160A-49 have not been met:\nPetitioners have failed to indicate specifically how the metes and bounds description published in the Asheville Citizen-Times varied from the metes and bounds description contained in the annexation ordinance and, more importantly, have failed to indicate that this alleged variance prejudiced them in any manner. See In re Annexation Ordinance (Winston-Salem), 303 N.C. 220, 233, 278 S.E.2d 224, 232 (1981).\nMatheson v. City of Asheville, 102 N.C. App. 156, 171, 402 S.E.2d 140, 148-49 (1991); see also Sonopress, Inc. v. Town of Weaverville, 149 N.C. App. 492, 507-08, 562 S.E.2d 32, 40-1 (2002); In re Durham Annexation Ordinance, 69 N.C. App. 77, 85, 316 S.E.2d 649, 654-55 (1984); In re Annexation Ordinance, 278 N.C. 641, 646-47, 180 S.E.2d 851, 855 (1971) (Annexation Case III); Burnette v. City of Goldsboro, -, N.C. App.-, 654 S.E.2d 834, 2008 N.C. App. LEXIS 129, 4 (N.C. Ct. App. Jan. 15, 2008), review denied, 362 N.C. 469, 665 S.E.2d 737 (2008); Hall v. City of Asheville, -N.C. App. -, 664 S.E.2d 77, 2008 N.C. App. LEXIS 1461, 9-10 (N.C. Ct. App. Aug. 5, 2008), review denied, 363 N.C. 125, 673 S.E.2d 130 (2009).\nWe note that the trial court\u2019s orders granting summary judgment in favor of Petitioners on this issue included no suggestion that Petitioners had suffered any material prejudice. Annexation Case II, 62 N.C. App. at 598, 303 S.E.2d at 385. \u201cWe also note that none of the evidence adduced by petitioners at trial would support any such finding or conclusion.\u201d Id. at 598, 303 S.E.2d at 386. As we have stated above, the mere fact that Petitioners will be subject to new taxes is insufficient to show prejudice. See Nolan, 182 N.C. App. at 492, 642 S.E.2d at 265; Annexation Case I, 303 N.C. at 233, 278 S.E.2d at 233. We therefore reverse this portion of the trial court\u2019s orders and remand for further action consistent with our holding.\nRespondent next argues that the trial court erred in granting Petitioners\u2019 motion for summary judgment with respect to the \u201csufficiency of Respondent\u2019s plan to extend sanitary sewer service to the Annexation Area[s] on an accelerated basis to those Petitioners who submitted requests[.]\u201d We agree.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 160A-47 required Respondent to issue:\n(3) A statement setting forth the plans of the municipality for extending to the area to be annexed each major municipal service performed within the municipality at the time of annexation. Specifically, such plans shall:\nb. Provide for extension of major trunk water mains and sewer outfall lines into the area to be annexed so that when such lines are constructed, property owners in the area to be annexed will be able to secure public water and sewer service, according to the policies in effect in such municipality for extending water and sewer lines to individual lots or subdivisions. If requested by the owner of an occupied dwelling unit or an operating commercial or industrial property in writing on a form provided by the municipality, which form acknowledges that such extension or extensions will be made according to the currant financial policies of the municipality for making such extensions, and if such form is received by the city clerk no later than five days after the public hearing, provide for extension of water and sewer lines to the property or to a point on a public street or road right-of-way adjacent to the property according to the financial policies in effect in such municipality for extending water and sewer lines. If any such requests are timely made, the municipality shall at the time of adoption of the annexation ordinance amend its report and plan for services to reflect and accommodate such requests, if an amendment is necessary. In areas where the municipality is required to extend sewer service according to its policies, but the installation of sewer is not economically feasible due to the unique topography of the area, the municipality shall provide septic system maintenance and repair service until such time as sewer service is provided to properties similarly situated.\nc. If extension of major trunk water mains, sewer outfall lines, sewer lines and water lines is necessary, set forth a proposed timetable for construction of such mains, outfalls and lines as soon as possible following the effective date of annexation. In any event, the plans shall call for construction to be completed within two years of the effective date of annexation.\nd. Set forth the method under which the municipality plans to finance extension of services into the area to be annexed.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 160A-47 (emphasis added). N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-47.1 (2009) mandates that if a municipality required to extend sewer services pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 160A-47 intends to implement any new ordinance or policy\nsubstantially diminishing the financial participation of [that] municipality in the construction of . . . sewer facilities [that] ordinance or policy [must have become] effective at least 180 days prior to the date of adoption by the municipality of the resolution giving notice of intent to consider annexing the area under G.S. 160A-49(a).\nIn the present case, Respondent did not adopt or implement any new ordinances or policies in the 180 days prior to the adoption of its resolution. At all relevant time periods in this case, Respondent\u2019s policy concerning requests for sewer extensions was as follows:\nA. All requests for water and/or sewer extensions must be originated by petition of the applicants desiring service. Separate petitions are required for water and sewer, and either may be extended without the other.\nB. Although [Respondent] is dedicated to the concept of making such extensions, [Respondent] shall not be responsible for such extensions if funds are not available. [Respondent] shall be entitled to consider and implement one of the following options.\n1. [Respondent] may deny the petition.\n2. [Respondent] may negotiate with the petitioners and reach an agreement satisfactory to both parties.\nC. Publicly maintained and dedicated streets or outfall lines within the city limits qualify for water and sewer extensions. Extensions will be made on these streets and outfalls when the petitions are received and approved by the Lexington Utilities Commission and the City Council. Design and cost estimates will be prepared upon receipt of a valid petition and submitted to the Lexington Utilities Commission for review and recommendation. Then, subject to the availability of funds for [Respondent\u2019s] cost, final design will be completed and the extension scheduled for construction. After completion of the extensions, [Respondent] will notify the petitioners that applications for service connection can be made. All participants must pre-pay taps fees and sign billing agreements.\n(Emphasis added.)\nRespondent argues that because it offered to pay fifty percent of the costs of extending sewer service to any resident on an expedited basis, its offer did not \u201csubstantially diminish[] the financial participation\u201d of Respondent, and therefore did not implicate N.C.G.S. \u00a7 160A-47.1. According to Respondent, this is because Respondent had never before offered to pay more than fifty percent of the costs of extending sewer service on an expedited basis and therefore Respondent\u2019s financial participation would have been equal to, or greater than, any prior agreement reached for the extension of sewer services in similar circumstances. We do not read the language of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 160A-47.1 in relative terms. The plain language of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 160A-47.1 requires 180 days notice of any new ordinance or policy that diminishes Respondent\u2019s financial participation. We believe any ordinance or policy that reduces Respondent\u2019s financial participation below one hundred percent constitutes a reduction, and would therefore require 180 days notice as mandated in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 160A-47.1. However, we do not need to make a holding on this issue because we hold that Respondent\u2019s actions were consistent with its existing policy.\nPursuant to its existing policy, Respondent was not required to pay to extend sewer service to Petitioners. According to Respondent\u2019s policy, \u201c[Respondent] shall be entitled to consider and implement one of the following options[:]\u201d either (1), deny a petition outright, or (2), negotiate a mutually acceptable cost-sharing agreement with any petitioner. Though Respondent\u2019s mass mailing of the form agreement did not invite counteroffers, nothing in the relevant policy indicated that Respondent was required to consider any counteroffers. Respondent\u2019s offer to cover fifty percent of the costs of expedited extension of sewer service to any Petitioner appears to have been the best offer Respondent was willing to extend. There is no evidence that Petitioners tested this assumption by attempting to negotiate a better deal for themselves. However, even assuming Petitioners had made that attempt, the policy in effect allowed' Respondent to reject any counteroffer that was not acceptable, just as that same policy allowed Petitioners to reject Respondent\u2019s offer should Petitioners not find it acceptable, and settle for free connection to Respondent\u2019s sewer system within five years rather than sharing the costs and insuring connection within two years. Further, there is nothing in Respondent\u2019s policy that would prevent a fourteen-day deadline requirement as part of an agreement Respondent could find acceptable. We hold Respondent\u2019s actions were consistent with its existing policy. To the extent the trial court\u2019s orders granted summary judgment in favor of Petitioners on this issue, the orders are reversed and remanded to the trial court with direction to enter summary judgment in favor of Respondent on this issue.\nHaving reviewed the record in this matter, we hold that summary judgment should have been granted in favor of Respondent on all issues brought forward on appeal. We remand to the trial court for further action consistent with this opinion.\nAffirmed in part, reversed and remanded in part.\nJudges GEER and STROUD concur.\n. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 160A-48(c)(3) requires that the developed portion of an area to be annexed \u201c[i]s so developed that at least sixty percent (60%) of the total number of lots and tracts in the area at the time of annexation are used for residential, commercial, industrial, institutional or governmental purposes, and is subdivided into lots and tracts such that at least sixty percent (60%) of the total acreage, not counting the acreage used at the time of annexation for commercial, industrial, governmental or institutional purposes, consists of lots and tracts three acres or less in size.\u201d", "type": "majority", "author": "McGEE, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "The Brough Law Firm, by Robert E. Homik, Jr., for Petitioners.", "Parker, Poe, Adams & Bernstein L.L.P., by Anthony Fox, Benjamin Sullivan, and Susan W. Matthews; and Phyllis Penry, for Respondent." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "ASHLEY v. THE CITY OF LEXINGTON RALPH ASHLEY, JEAN ASHLEY, ALEXANDER AUGOUSTIDES, CAROLYN AUMAN, LUTHER T. BARBER, SYLVIA BARBER, D.H. BEAM, JAY BELK, PAM BELK, ANTHONY J. BOLO, JR., MARION J. BONNOM, KEITH BOST, SHERRY BOST, RICKY BOYD, MICHAEL P. BRALKOWSKI, RHONDA W. BRALKOWSKI, JIM BUCHANAN, BETSY BUCHANAN, PEGGY BURCHETT, JERRY BURKHART, JERI BURKHART, BOBBY BYERLY, PATSY BYERLY, JIM CAMERON, BETSY CAMERON, BRAD CATES, JODI CATES, CORY COOPER, AMANDA COOPER, WILLIAM H. COX, DENNIS JEFFREY COOPER, NAOMA WAGNER CRABTREE, TRUSTEE, SHIRLEY E. CROTTS, LARRY H. CROTTS, PERRY K. CROTTS, HENRY C. CROUSE, KAREN CROUSE, DAN R. DAUGHETY, SUSAN G. DAUGHETY, JUDITH M. DAVIS, BOBBY N. DICKERSON, ELLEN F. DICKERSON, ED DROZD, NANCY DROZD, RONALD DURHAM, DENISE DURHAM, DAVID NATHANIEL DURRELL, MELADIE DURRELL, RICKY EVERHART, DANNY EVERHART, MELISSA EVERHART, LISA EVERHART, TED G. EVERHART, BETTIE H. EVERHART, JOHN EVERS, GAIL EVERS, ROBERT G. FLOYD, EMMA R. FLOYD, JOHN FRANK, TRUDY FRANK, JIMMY FREEMANN, LYNNE FREEMANN, EDWARD FRIEDMANN, BERTHA FRIEDMANN, CARL GARRISON, ROBERT GREER, JANICE GREER, THOMAS O. GRUBBS, JR., TONY HARTLEY, NANCY HARTLEY, CHARLES HARTSOOK, RUTH HARTSOOK, MICHAEL V. HIGGINS, PATRICIA A. HIGGINS, RICKY L. HILL, DEBORAH Y. HILL, GIG HILTON, SUSAN HILTON, JERRY HUNT, MARTHA HUNT, R. FRANK HUNTER, MARGARET HUNTER, CRAIG IDOL, GINA IDOL, ROBERT D. KETCHIE, FAYE B. KETCHIE, SANDRA KNAPP, PATRICK KNAPP, CONNIE MASON LAUGHTER, CLINTON LeGETTE, MARY LOU LeGETTE, LLOYD LEONARD, KIM LEONARD, PHIL LOHR, MILTON R. LOMAX, RANDALL J. LONG, BETTY L. MASON, PAUL MARTIN, WANDA MARTIN, JERRY MAYES, VICKI MAYES, PHILLIP McKINNEY, BEVERLY McKINNEY, BETTY C. MICHAEL, ROY STEVEN MICHAEL, JOHNNY MORGAN, PAULETTE MORGAN, MIKE MORGAN, RUFFIN MORGAN, KENNETH D. MOTLEY, DON MYERS, JUDY MYERS, JAN MYERS, TONYA MYERS, MATT O\u2019BRYANT, MICHELLE O\u2019BRYANT, ANN R. PARKER, TIM PALMER, SHIRLEY PARKS, STEVEN PARKS, GLENDA PARKS, WATTS B. PARRISH, LARRY KIGER POPE, JR., GAY PLEASANTS, RICHARD G. REESE, BETTY REESE, LEON L. RIVES, II, CATHERINE N. ROBERTSON, RAFAEL ROCA, T. SAINTSING, SANDRA SAINTSING, MARVIN SANDIFER, CAROLE P. SANDIFER, ELSIE SAUL, GLENN A. SCOTT, CYNTHIA S. SCOTT, RICK SMITH, RICK SMITH, GWINNIE SMITH, STEVEN SMITH, LAURA SMITH, VERONICA SROKA, LYNN STEWART, JANE STEWART, JACKIE SHOAF, JERRY SHOAF, CAROL STOTT, DAVID STOTT, TONY TOWNSEND, CAROLYN J. TOWNSEND, WILLIAM F. TUCKER, BETTY S. TUCKER, BRIAN TURLINGTON, JENNIFER TURLINGTON, WILLIE VAUTER, VONCEIL VAUTER, JUNE G. WALDEN, CURTIS JAE WALDEN, KATHY D. WALL, DOUG WALSER, MARY WALSER, GARY G. WIKSTROM, BUSTER B. WILLIS, BRENDA P. WILLIS, BEN WILSON, SHELLY WILSON, WALTER L. WILSON, ED WORKMAN, ANITA WORKMAN, JOE T. YARBROUGH, FAYE YOUNG, LOUISE W. YOUNG, Petitioners, v. THE CITY OF LEXINGTON, a North Carolina Municipality, Respondent. ELAINE S. ALEXANDER, LINDA BECK, MISTY CLODFELTER, JUDI L. COCHRAN, LOUIS C. COLEMAN, LOUISE S. COLEMAN, RUBY LOUISE CROSS, WILLIAM CROSS, LORETTA CROTTS, SHELL CROTTS, MARTY F. CURRY, GREG D. DYSON, MARK EVANS, JANET EVERHART, LORRAINE H. FURR, LORRAINE H. FURR, RICHARD E. FURR, ROY LEE GATES, BARBARA GATES, GARY GOBBLE, KAREN GOBBLE, GRETA W. HAMM, JOHN CHARLES HAMM, BETTY B. HONBAIER, TERRY HUGHES, ALLISON M. KEENE, CAROLYN LOMAN, THAMAR DARRELL LOMAN, HELEN KIVETT, CAROLYN S. McCARN, JOHNNY N. McCARN, LEROY McCARN, RUBY McCARN, DEBORAH MEDLIN, PAUL MEDLIN, CARLTON E. MOBEY, BILLY RAY PLEASANT, HARVEY POTTER, VICTOR SMITH, PAUL R. STOGNER, SARAH STOGNER, VERA F. WALDEN, DORIS R. WALSER, SANDRA H. WALKER, SHIRLEY F. WEAVER, JEFFREY K. WHITE, ELWOOD YOUNTS, NAOMI R. YOUNTS, Petitioners, v. THE CITY OF LEXINGTON, a North Carolina Municipality, Respondent. SOY KHOUN, SUSAN LONG, MELIDA SUZY MELGAR, BOBBY D. WALSER, Petitioners, v. THE CITY OF LEXINGTON, a North Carolina Municipality, Respondent.\nNo. COA10-314\n(Filed 4 January 2011)\n1. Cities and Towns\u2014 involuntary annexation \u2014 statutory procedure and requirements\nThe trial court did not err in an involuntary annexation case by concluding that respondent complied with statutory procedure and the requirements of N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 160A-47(1), 160A-47(3)(b), and 160A-49(a), (b), and (e)(1). The imposition of taxes did not constitute material prejudice. Further, petitioners advanced no compelling argument that any procedural irregularities in the annexation process resulted in material prejudice.\n2. Cities and Towns\u2014 annexation \u2014 sufficiency of metes and bounds descriptions\nThe trial court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of petitioners on its claim that the legal description of the annexation area included in the ordinances were not sufficient metes and bounds descriptions as required by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 49(e)(1). The tax parcel identification numbers included in the ordinances contained all the information needed to both accurately identify and place the lots and the annexation areas\u2019 boundaries on the relevant tax maps and on the ground. Further, the trial court\u2019s order failed to show petitioners suffered any material prejudice.\n3. Cities and Towns\u2014 annexation \u2014 request for extension of sewer service on accelerated basis\nThe trial court erred by granting petitioners\u2019 motion for summary judgment with respect to the sufficiency of respondent\u2019s plan to extend sanitary sewer service to the annexation areas on an accelerated basis to those petitioners who submitted requests. Respondent\u2019s actions were consistent with its existing policy which did not require it to pay to extend sewer service to petitioners.\nAppeal by Petitioners and Respondent from orders entered 15 December 2009 by Judge Kevin M. Bridges in Superior Court, Davidson County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 15 September 2010. Pursuant to Rule 40 of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure, these cases were consolidated for hearing as they involve common questions of law.\nThe Brough Law Firm, by Robert E. Homik, Jr., for Petitioners.\nParker, Poe, Adams & Bernstein L.L.P., by Anthony Fox, Benjamin Sullivan, and Susan W. Matthews; and Phyllis Penry, for Respondent." }, "file_name": "0001-01", "first_page_order": 11, "last_page_order": 28 }