{ "id": 4181570, "name": "JERRIAN O. LOCKETT, Plaintiff v. SISTER-2-SISTER SOLUTIONS, INC. and ROSA S. LOCKETT (aka ROSA SUTTON), Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "Lockett v. Sister-2-Sister Solutions, Inc.", "decision_date": "2011-01-04", "docket_number": "No. COA09-1387", "first_page": "60", "last_page": "72", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "209 N.C. App. 60" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "665 S.E.2d 586", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12641761 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "588", "parenthetical": "citing In re Baby Boy Scearce, 81 N.C. App. 662, 663-64, 345 S.E.2d 411, 413, disc. rev. denied, 318 N.C. 415, 349 S.E.2d 590 (1986)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/665/0586-01" ] }, { "cite": "648 S.E. 2d 510", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12639083 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "514", "parenthetical": "internal citations omitted" }, { "page": "514", "parenthetical": "internal citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/648/0510-01" ] }, { "cite": "665 S.E.2d 737", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12641777, 12641778, 12641779 ], "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/665/0737-01", "/se2d/665/0737-02", "/se2d/665/0737-03" ] }, { "cite": "362 N.C. 469", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 12641737, 12641777, 12641778, 12641779, 12641780, 12641820 ], "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/665/0459-04", "/se2d/665/0737-01", "/se2d/665/0737-02", "/se2d/665/0737-03", "/se2d/665/0738-01", "/se2d/666/0118-03" ] }, { "cite": "658 S.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12640606 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "4" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/658/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "649 S.E.2d 658", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12639270 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "661", "parenthetical": "quoting Draughon v. Harnett Cty. Bd. of Educ., 158 N.C. App. 208, 212, 580 S.E.2d 732, 735 (2003), aff'd, 358 N.C. 131, 591 S.E.2d 521 (2004) (per curiam)" }, { "page": "661" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/649/0658-01" ] }, { "cite": "637 S.E.2d 528", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12637287 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "530", "parenthetical": "citing Howerton v. Arai Helmet, Ltd., 358 N.C. 440, 470, 597 S.E.2d 674, 693 (2004)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/637/0528-01" ] }, { "cite": "285 S.E.2d 831", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "304 N.C. 389", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8568132, 8568068, 8568039, 8568105, 8568011 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/304/0389-05", "/nc/304/0389-03", "/nc/304/0389-02", "/nc/304/0389-04", "/nc/304/0389-01" ] }, { "cite": "281 S.E.2d 86", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "88" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "53 N.C. App. 492", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521934 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "495" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/53/0492-01" ] }, { "cite": "349 S.E.2d 590", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 N.C. 415", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4737321, 4739148, 4740524, 4738711, 4736029 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/318/0415-05", "/nc/318/0415-01", "/nc/318/0415-04", "/nc/318/0415-03", "/nc/318/0415-02" ] }, { "cite": "345 S.E.2d 411", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "413" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "81 N.C. App. 662", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524992 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "663-64" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/81/0662-01" ] }, { "cite": "192 N.C. App. 528", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4160611 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "530", "parenthetical": "citing In re Baby Boy Scearce, 81 N.C. App. 662, 663-64, 345 S.E.2d 411, 413, disc. rev. denied, 318 N.C. 415, 349 S.E.2d 590 (1986)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/192/0528-01" ] }, { "cite": "296 S.E.2d 302", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "309", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "59 N.C. App. 145", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525918 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "155", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/59/0145-01" ] }, { "cite": "476 S.E.2d 120", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "344 N.C. 438", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 867558, 867563, 867532, 867597, 867540 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/344/0438-05", "/nc/344/0438-04", "/nc/344/0438-02", "/nc/344/0438-03", "/nc/344/0438-01" ] }, { "cite": "470 S.E.2d 354", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "356" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "122 N.C. App. 486", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11918158 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "489" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/122/0486-01" ] }, { "cite": "505 S.E.2d 871", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "348 N.C. 72", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1659876, 1659877, 1659865, 1659868, 1659933 ], "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/348/0072-05", "/nc/348/0072-01", "/nc/348/0072-04", "/nc/348/0072-03", "/nc/348/0072-02" ] }, { "cite": "224 S.E.2d 698", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "699" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "29 N.C. App. 504", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8556400 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "505" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/29/0504-01" ] }, { "cite": "497 S.E.2d 82", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "89" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "128 N.C. App. 334", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11654542 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "344" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/128/0334-01" ] }, { "cite": "505 S.E.2d 142", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "144", "parenthetical": "\"An employee is presumed to be an employee-at-will absent a definite term of employment or a condition that the employee can be fired only 'for cause.' \"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "130 N.C. App. 738", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11470285 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "740", "parenthetical": "\"An employee is presumed to be an employee-at-will absent a definite term of employment or a condition that the employee can be fired only 'for cause.' \"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/130/0738-01" ] }, { "cite": "502 S.E.2d 594", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "347 N.C. 586", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 551075, 551197 ], "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/347/0586-02", "/nc/347/0586-01" ] }, { "cite": "493 S.E.2d 420", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "422", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "424" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "347 N.C. 329", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 551232 ], "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/347/0329-01" ] }, { "cite": "114 S.E. 467", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "weight": 2, "year": 1922, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "470" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "184 N.C. 363", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11270496 ], "year": 1922, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "369" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/184/0363-01" ] }, { "cite": "374 S.E.2d 160", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "162-63" }, { "page": "164" }, { "page": "163" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "92 N.C. App. 161", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526555 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "164" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/92/0161-01" ] }, { "cite": "284 S.E. 2d 495", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "499", "parenthetical": "judge can overrule a denial of a motion for special jury venire, a discretionary motion, previously entered by another judge if \"new evidence\" is presented" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "304 N.C. 557", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569514 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "562-63", "parenthetical": "judge can overrule a denial of a motion for special jury venire, a discretionary motion, previously entered by another judge if \"new evidence\" is presented" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/304/0557-01" ] }, { "cite": "318 S.E. 2d 108", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "110" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "69 N.C. App. 650", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526812 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "652" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/69/0650-01" ] }, { "cite": "185 N.C. App. 176", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8209010 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "181", "parenthetical": "internal citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/185/0176-01" ] }, { "cite": "583 S.E.2d 318", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "320" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "159 N.C. App. 408", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8956450 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "411" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/159/0408-01" ] }, { "cite": "189 N.C. App. 338", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4156363 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "342" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/189/0338-01" ] }, { "cite": "540 S.E.2d 810", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "815", "parenthetical": "\"Rule 56(c" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "141 N.C. App. 628", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9442528 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "635", "parenthetical": "\"Rule 56(c" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/141/0628-01" ] }, { "cite": "321 S.E.2d 240", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "251" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "70 N.C. App. 627", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524317 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "643" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/70/0627-01" ] }, { "cite": "324 S.E.2d 922", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "925", "parenthetical": "\"The trial court must consider all papers before it, including the pleadings and any depositions.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "72 N.C. App. 560", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527190 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "564", "parenthetical": "\"The trial court must consider all papers before it, including the pleadings and any depositions.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/72/0560-01" ] }, { "cite": "591 S.E.2d 521", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "per curiam" }, { "parenthetical": "per curiam" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "358 N.C. 131", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2985562 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "per curiam" }, { "parenthetical": "per curiam" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/358/0131-01" ] }, { "cite": "580 S.E.2d 732", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "735" }, { "page": "735" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "158 N.C. App. 208", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9186665 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "212" }, { "page": "212" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/158/0208-01" ] }, { "cite": "185 N.C. App. 668", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8212179 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "672", "parenthetical": "quoting Draughon v. Harnett Cty. Bd. of Educ., 158 N.C. App. 208, 212, 580 S.E.2d 732, 735 (2003), aff'd, 358 N.C. 131, 591 S.E.2d 521 (2004) (per curiam)" }, { "page": "672" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/185/0668-01" ] }, { "cite": "597 S.E.2d 674", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "693" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "358 N.C. 440", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2986682 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "470" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/358/0440-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 N.C. 85", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3744780 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "88", "parenthetical": "citing Howerton v. Arai Helmet, Ltd., 358 N.C. 440, 470, 597 S.E.2d 674, 693 (2004)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/361/0085-01" ] }, { "cite": "165 S.E.2d 39", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "3 N.C. App. 435", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8555325 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/3/0435-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1090, "char_count": 29582, "ocr_confidence": 0.743, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.13739874409666356 }, "sha256": "4fec970c0f20fed3ddbc497e8ad65e149bf86a9b29575cd5fbb00bf0135d78a3", "simhash": "1:0fe3d6aa0eacbf7e", "word_count": 4794 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:06:47.704823+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges ELMORE and STROUD concur.", "Judge JACKSON concurred prior to December 31, 2010." ], "parties": [ "JERRIAN O. LOCKETT, Plaintiff v. SISTER-2-SISTER SOLUTIONS, INC. and ROSA S. LOCKETT (aka ROSA SUTTON), Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JACKSON, Judge.\nJerrian O. Lockett (\u201cplaintiff\u201d) appeals the trial court\u2019s 6 November 2008 order, which granted summary judgment in favor of defendant Rosa S. Lockett (\u201cLockett\u201d) as to his breach of contract claim; 13 November 2008 order, which granted summary judgment in favor of Lockett as to the claim pursuant to the North Carolina Wage and Hour Act; 16 March 2009 orders, which directed verdict in favor of defendant Sister-2-Sister Solutions, Inc. (\u201cSister-2-Sister\u201d), dismissed plaintiff\u2019s breach of contract claim, and awarded attorneys\u2019 fees to plaintiff; and 20 April 2009 order, which denied plaintiff\u2019s motion to amend judgment. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand in part.\nPlaintiff and Lockett were husband and wife when this action commenced. Lockett and her sister formed Sister-2-Sister in 2000 or 2001, and Lockett directed the day-to-day business of Sister-2-Sister throughout its lifetime. Lockett\u2019s sister left Sister-2-Sister in 2002 or 2003. Plaintiff had been employed by Sister-2-Sister at various times prior to the summer of 2006.\nDuring the summer of 2006, plaintiff and Lockett negotiated the terms of an employment contract (\u201cthe contract\u201d) so that plaintiff would return to North Carolina from his job in Texas. The contract provided, in part, that it could be terminated only for cause: \u201c[Plaintiff] will not be dismissed from Sister 2 Sister One Transportation unless contract has been broken, or not [fulfilling his duty as indicated above.\u201d Plaintiff alleges that on or about 31 July 2007, Sister-2-Sister terminated plaintiff\u2019s employment and that, at that point, plaintiff had not been paid for work he had performed during July 2007.\nOn 11 January 2008, plaintiff filed his complaint against Sister-2Sister and Lockett (\u201cdefendants\u201d), alleging breach of contract and violation of the North Carolina Wage and Hour Act (\u201cWage and Hour Act\u201d). As part of his complaint, plaintiff alleged that Sister-2-Sister \u201chas no independent identity apart from . . . Lockett,\u201d and the trial court, therefore, should \u201cpierce the corporate veil and treat [Sister-2Sister] as the alter ego of. .. Lockett.\u201d\nOn or about 17 October 2008, defendants moved for partial summary judgment as to plaintiff\u2019s breach of contract claim. At the 30 October 2008 hearing on the motion, plaintiff attempted to introduce deposition testimony from Lockett, but the trial court would not receive it. On 6 November 2008, the trial court granted the motion as to Lockett and denied it as to Sister-2-Sister, concluding, inter alia, that plaintiff and Sister-2-Sister \u201centered into an enforceable contract for employment on or about August 9, 2006 [,] which contract provided that plaintiff could only be terminated for cause.\u201d Lockett then moved for summary judgment as to plaintiff\u2019s claim based upon the Wage and Hour Act, and on 13 November 2008, the trial court granted her motion and dismissed her from the action.\nAt the close of plaintiff\u2019s evidence during the 26 February 2009 trial, Sister-2-Sister moved for a directed verdict. On 16 March 2009, the trial court entered a directed verdict in favor of Sister-2-Sister and dismissed plaintiff\u2019s breach of contract claim, concluding, inter alia,\nPursuant to the holding of the Court of Appeals in Freeman v. Hardee\u2019s Food Systems, Inc., 3 N.C. App. 435, 165 S.E.2d 39 (1969), among other cases, the August 10, 2006 employment contract executed by plaintiff and [Sister-2-Sister] is not an enforceable employment contract, and plaintiff\u2019s employment with [Sister-2-Sister] was terminable at the will of either party.\nOn the same date, the trial court entered judgment in favor of plaintiff as to his claim pursuant to the Wage and Hour Act. The trial court awarded plaintiff $840.00 for unpaid wages, $840.00 for liquidated damages, $7,500.00 for reasonable attorneys\u2019 fees, and $344.00 for costs for filing and service fees. On 26 March 2009, plaintiff moved for amendment of judgment, which was denied on 20 April 2009. Plaintiff now appeals the trial court\u2019s 6 November 2008, 13 November 2008, 16 March 2009, and 20 April 2009 orders.\nPlaintiff first argues that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of Lockett as to the breach of contract claim, because there exists a genuine issue of material fact as to her individual liability for breach of contract. We disagree.\nWe review a trial court\u2019s grant of summary judgment de novo. Builders Mut. Ins. Co. v. North Main Constr., Ltd., 361 N.C. 85, 88, 637 S.E.2d 528, 530 (2006) (citing Howerton v. Arai Helmet, Ltd., 358 N.C. 440, 470, 597 S.E.2d 674, 693 (2004)).\n\u201cSummary judgment is appropriate when \u2018there is no genuine issue as to any material fact\u2019 and \u2018any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.\u2019 \u201d Id. (quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 56(c) (2005)). We previously have explained,\n\u201cThe party moving for summary judgment ultimately has the burden of establishing the lack of any triable issue of fact.\nOnce the party seeking summary judgment makes the required showing, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to produce a forecast of evidence demonstrating specific facts, as opposed to allegations, showing that he can at least establish a prima facie case at trial.\u201d\nWilkins v. Safran, 185 N.C. App. 668, 672, 649 S.E.2d 658, 661 (2007) (quoting Draughon v. Harnett Cty. Bd. of Educ., 158 N.C. App. 208, 212, 580 S.E.2d 732, 735 (2003), aff\u2019d, 358 N.C. 131, 591 S.E.2d 521 (2004) (per curiam)).\nWhen a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 56(e) (2007) (emphasis added).\nHere, defendants filed portions of plaintiffs deposition, an affidavit from the chairman of the Board of Directors for Sister-2-Sister, Sister-2-Sister\u2019s bylaws, and a memorandum of law in support of their motion for partial summary judgment. However, no evidence from plaintiff in opposition to the motion appears in the record. During the hearing on the motion, the trial court asked plaintiffs counsel, \u201cWhat about the argument... that defendant makes that [Lockett] should not be a party to this case?\u201d Plaintiffs counsel responded,\nWell, Your Honor, I \u2014 I think that question \u2014 if you \u2014 if you look at our complaint here, paragraphs 4, 5, 6, and 7,1 have alleged that the [trial] [c]ourt should pierce the corporate veil and hold defendant Rosa Lockett individually liable for the acts of the corporation. And certainly I think that the inquiry as to whether or not the [trial] [c]ourt should pierce the corporate veil is a fact question. And there is \u2014 there is absolutely material facts in question on whether or not it\u2019s appropriate to pierce the corporate veil here. And I haven\u2019t seen any case law in defendant\u2019s brief to the contrary that \u2014 that there is no basis to \u2014 -to pierce the corporate veil in this case. So I \u2014 I think, Your Honor, that\u2019s a fact question and absolutely inappropriate for a summary judgment.\nPlaintiff relies solely upon the allegations of alter ego within his complaint, which contravenes the standards set forth in North Carolina General Statutes, section 1A-1, Rule 56(e). Defendants provided evidence that Lockett was acting within the authority vested in her by Sister-2-Sister when she terminated plaintiff\u2019s employment, and in response, plaintiff did not \u201c \u2018produce a forecast of evidence demonstrating specific facts, as opposed to allegations, showing that he can at least establish a prima facie case at trial.\u2019 \u201d Wilkins, 185 N.C. App. at 672, 649 S.E.2d at 661 (quoting Draughon v. Harnett Cty. Bd. of Educ., 158 N.C. App. 208, 212, 580 S.E.2d 732, 735 (2003), aff'd, 358 N.C. 131, 591 S.E.2d 521 (2004) (per curiam)).\nAs part of his first argument, plaintiff also contends that Lockett\u2019s deposition testimony \u2014 which plaintiff\u2019s counsel proffered to the trial court during the summary judgment hearing \u2014 should have been considered prior to the trial court\u2019s ruling upon the motion. Although we agree with plaintiff\u2019s argument, he was not prejudiced by the trial court\u2019s decision not to review Lockett\u2019s deposition testimony.\nInitially we note that the trial court was required to review all of the evidence properly presented to it prior to ruling upon a motion for summary judgment. See Schneider v. Brunk, 72 N.C. App. 560, 564, 324 S.E.2d 922, 925 (1985) (\u201cThe trial court must consider all papers before it, including the pleadings and any depositions.\u201d) (citing Estrada v. Jaques, 70 N.C. App. 627, 643, 321 S.E.2d 240, 251 (1984)). Even though a trial court may exclude from its consideration an untimely affidavit, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 56(c) (2007) (\u201cIf the opposing affidavit is not served on the other parties at least two days before the hearing on the motion, the court may .. . proceed with the matter without considering the untimely served affidavit[.]\u201d), this rule does not apply to the introduction of other evidence such as depositions, Pierson v. Cumberland County Civic Ctr. Comm\u2019n, 141 N.C. App. 628, 635, 540 S.E.2d 810, 815 (2000) (\u201cRule 56(c) does not specify that these other forms of evidence [pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file] be presented at any particular time, much less prior to the hearing. Therefore, we have no basis to conclude that plaintiffs [by first offering certain evidence when the summary judgment hearing was underway] violated the mandates of Rule 56(c)[.]\u201d). Therefore, the trial court should have reviewed Lockett\u2019s deposition \u2014 which plaintiff attempted to introduce during the course of the hearing \u2014 prior to ruling upon defendants\u2019 motion for summary judgment.\nNonetheless, in the case sub judice, the trial court\u2019s error did not prejudice plaintiff, because plaintiff did not attempt to introduce the evidence \u2014 specifically, the depositions of the members of Sister-2Sister\u2019s Board of Directors \u2014 that he now contends would create a genuine issue of material fact as to Lockett\u2019s individual liability. In his brief, plaintiff argues that the depositions of the members of Sister-2Sister\u2019s Board of Directors\nshow[] that the Board had no first-hand knowledge of the allegations made by Rosa Lockett regarding [p]laintiff\u2019s performance of his duties and voted to terminate [p]laintiff\u2019s employment with Sister-2-Sister based solely upon her recommendations. The deposition testimony also shows that the Board conducted no independent investigation of the allegations of Rosa Lockett and made no effort whatsoever to verify the substance thereof.\n(Internal citations omitted). Although plaintiff contends that the \u201cdeposition testimony offered to the trial court at the 30 October 2008 hearing in opposition to [defendants\u2019 [m]otion . . . was that of Rosa Lockett and the members of the Board of Directors of Sister-2Sister[,]\u201d the trial transcript discloses that he offered only Lockett\u2019s deposition.\nPlaintiff offered Lockett\u2019s deposition to the trial court twice during the summary judgment hearing. The first time, plaintiff\u2019s counsel stated,\nAs I understand defendant\u2019s argument is is that the contract itself, taking apart whether or not my client did duties number 1 through 7, whether or not this is a valid contract because it doesn\u2019t have, as defendant\u2019s counsel argues, a definite period. I do have a copy of defendant Rosa Lockett\u2019s deposition testimony that I think is \u2014 may I approach?\nThe trial court then declined to accept the proffered deposition. Later in the hearing, plaintiff\u2019s counsel again offered the deposition, stating,\nAnd if the [e]ourt is at all inclined to look at the client or the parties\u2019 intentions as to this agreement, I believe the [c]ourt has to take a look at the defendant, Rosa Lockett\u2019s, deposition testimony because she clearly states that not only was there \u2014 clearly the only reason [plaintiff] could have been terminated was for his failure to perform the exact seven duties that are set forth in the contract. And if Your Honor would like to review it, I can hand up a copy of the relevant portions of the deposition testimony.\nThe trial court proceeded directly to making its ruling without addressing plaintiff\u2019s offer of evidence. Not only did plaintiff fail to argue that Lockett\u2019s deposition supported a genuine issue of material fact as to her individual liability pursuant to the contract, focusing instead upon its support of the contract\u2019s enforceability, but he also failed to offer depositions from any of the board members which he now contends would support the denial of defendants\u2019 motion for partial summary judgment.\nBecause plaintiff did not attempt to introduce evidence that may have created a genuine issue of material fact as to Lockett\u2019s individual liability and instead, relied upon \u201cthe mere allegations ... of his pleading,\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 56(e) (2007), there existed no genuine issue of material fact as to Lockett\u2019s individual liability based upon the evidence before the trial court. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in granting Lockett\u2019s motion for partial summary judgment as to plaintiff\u2019s breach of contract claim.\nSecond, plaintiff contends that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of Lockett as to the claim pursuant to the Wage and Hour Act, because there exists a genuine issue of material fact as to her individual liability pursuant to the Wage and Hour Act. Based upon our holding, supra, that plaintiff did not offer evidence to support the existence of a genuine issue of material fact as to Lockett\u2019s individual liability, we also hold that the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of Lockett as to plaintiff\u2019s claim pursuant to the Wage and Hour Act.\nPlaintiff\u2019s third contention is that the trial court erred by directing verdict in favor of Sister-2-Sister and dismissing plaintiff\u2019s claim for breach of contract. We agree.-\nWe review a trial court\u2019s ruling upon a motion for directed verdict de novo. Austin v. Bald II, L.L.C., 189 N.C. App. 338, 342, 658 S.E.2d 1, 4 (citing Denson v. Richmond Cty., 159 N.C. App. 408, 411, 583 S.E.2d 318, 320 (2003)), disc. rev. denied, 362 N.C. 469, 665 S.E.2d 737 (2008).\nThis Court previously has held:\nIt is well-established \u201cthat no appeal lies from one Superior Court judge to another; that one Superior Court judge may not correct another\u2019s errors of law; and that ordinarily one judge may not modify, overrule, or change the judgment of another Superior Court judge previously made in the same action. Although an exception has been established for orders that do not resolve an issue but direct some further proceeding prior to a final ruling, \u201cwhen the [trial] judge rules as a matter of law, not acting in his discretion, the ruling finally determines the rights of the parties unless reversed upon appellate review.\u201d\nCail v. Cerwin, 185 N.C. App. 176, 181, 648 S.E. 2d 510, 514 (2007) (internal citations omitted) (alteration in original).\nWe also have held that\na trial judge has the power to modify or change an interlocutory order \u201cwhere (1) the order was discretionary, and (2) there has been a change of circumstances.\u201d Stone v. Martin, 69 N.C. App. 650, 652, 318 S.E. 2d 108, 110 (1984); see also State v. Duvall, 304 N.C. 557, 562-63, 284 S.E. 2d 495, 499 (1981) (judge can overrule a denial of a motion for special jury venire, a discretionary motion, previously entered by another judge if \u201cnew evidence\u201d is presented).\nIverson v. TM One, Inc., 92 N.C. App. 161, 164, 374 S.E.2d 160, 162-63 (1988). \u201c[T]he denial of a motion for summary judgment is an interlocutory order[.]\u201d Id. at 164, 374 S.E.2d at 163.\nIn the case sub judice, the 6 November 2008 and 16 March 2009 orders both found as fact that the contract at issue, on its face, was for an undefined period of time. They both also found that the contract provided that plaintiffs employment could be terminated only for cause. Additional findings in the two orders related only to the identity of the parties and none mentioned or alluded to witness testimony. However, the two trial courts came to mutually exclusive conclusions of law based upon these findings.\nOn 6 November 2008, the trial court concluded as a matter of law that plaintiff and Sister-2-Sister \u201centered into an enforceable contract for employment on or about August 9, 2006[,] which contract provided that plaintiff could only be terminated for cause.\u201d Based upon our case law, another trial court was not free to conclude, as of 16 March 2009, that\n[p]ursuant to the holding of the Court of Appeals in Freeman v. Hardee\u2019s Food Systems, Inc., 3 N.C. App. 435, 165 S.E.2d 39 (1969), among other cases, the August 10, 2006 employment contract executed by plaintiff and [Sister-2-Sister] is not an enforceable employment contract, and plaintiffs employment with [Sister-2-Sister] was terminable at the will of either party.\nAccordingly, the trial court erred in directing verdict in favor of Sister-2-Sister and dismissing plaintiffs breach of contract claim, because both judgments were based upon its conclusion that the contract at issue was legally unenforceable \u2014 a conclusion that it was not free to make, in light of the 6 November 2008 order that specifically had concluded that the contract was enforceable.\nSister-2-Sister contends that the second trial court \u201chad the benefit of hearing actual evidence in the case\u201d and therefore, properly could reconsider the conclusion of law reached by the first trial court. This argument fails. First, Sister-2-Sister\u2019s purported new evidence is \u201cwitness testimony regarding the enforceability of the parties\u2019 employment agreement.\u201d Both trial courts, however, made their conclusions based upon the law and the face of the contract, and witness testimony as to an individual\u2019s intentions or understanding of the contract\u2019s enforceability affects neither the law nor the face of the contract. Furthermore, even if the first trial court had erred in making its legal conclusion that the contract is enforceable, our case law clearly provides that \u201cone Superior Court judge may not correct another\u2019s errors of law[.]\u201d Cail, 185 N.C. App. at 181, 648 S.E.2d at 514 (internal citation omitted).\nSister-2-Sister also argues that, even if the trial court erred in its 16 March 2009 order, the error was not prejudicial and should not result in a new trial. According to Sister-2-Sister, \u201cany reversal or grant of a new trial would not place [p]laintiff in a better position as his claim for breach of contract is not recognized under any of the exceptions to the at-will doctrine.\u201d We disagree.\nOur Rules of Civil Procedure provide that \u201cno error or defect in any ruling or order ... is ground for granting a new trial or for setting aside a verdict or for vacating, modifying, or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action amounts to the denial of a substantial right.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 61 (2005). In order for us to grant a request for a new trial, \u201c[t]here must be a reasonable prospect of placing the party who asks for a new trial in a better position than the one which he occupies by the verdict.\u201d Rierson v. Iron Co., 184 N.C. 363, 369, 114 S.E. 467, 470 (1922). \u201cIf he obtains a new trial he must incur additional expense, and if there is no corresponding benefit he is still the sufferer.\u201d Id.\nIn support of its argument, Sister-2-Sister primarily relies upon our Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Kurtzman v. Applied Analytical Industries, Inc., 347 N.C. 329, 493 S.E.2d 420 (1997), reh\u2019g denied, 347 N.C. 586, 502 S.E.2d 594 (1998), which noted three exceptions to our state\u2019s presumption of employment-at-will: (1) \u201cparties can remove the at-will presumption by specifying a definite period of employment contractually[,]\u201d (2) \u201cfederal and state statutes have created exceptions prohibiting employers from discharging employees based on impermissible considerations such as the employee\u2019s age, race, sex, religion, national origin, or disability, or in retaliation for filing certain claims against the employer[,]\u201d and (3) \u201cthis Court has recognized a public-policy exception to the employment-at-will rule.\u201d Id. at 331, 493 S.E.2d at 422 (citations omitted). However, other cases appear to refer interchangeably to employment for a definite period of time and employment that is terminable only for cause when determining whether a contract is subject to the presumption of at-will employment. See e.g. Wuchte v. McNeil, 130 N.C. App. 738, 740, 505 S.E.2d 142, 144 (1998) (\u201cAn employee is presumed to be an employee-at-will absent a definite term of employment or a condition that the employee can be fired only \u2018for cause.\u2019 \u201d) (citation omitted); Houpe v. City of Statesville, 128 N.C. App. 334, 344, 497 S.E.2d 82, 89 (\u201cA viable claim for breach of an employment contract must allege the existence of contractual terms regarding the duration or means of terminating employment.\u201d) (citing Tatum v. Brown, 29 N.C. App. 504, 505, 224 S.E.2d 698, 699 (1976)), disc. rev. denied, 348 N.C. 72, 505 S.E.2d 871 (1998); Mortensen v. Magneti Marelli U.S.A., 122 N.C. App. 486, 489, 470 S.E.2d 354, 356 (\u201cThe terms of the employment agreement do not expressly state, or imply, that the employment was to be permanent or that the plaintiff could be discharged only for cause. It thus follows that the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant was terminable at the will of either party for any reason . . . .\u201d), disc. rev. denied, 344 N.C. 438, 476 S.E.2d 120 (1996).\nEven the Kurtzman Court held that the circumstances of that case \u201c[did] not constitute additional consideration making what is otherwise an at-will employment relationship one that can be terminated by the employer only for cause.\u201d 347 N.C. at 334, 493 S.E.2d at 424. The implication, then, is that an employment relationship \u201cthat can be terminated by the employer only for cause\u201d would succeed in removing an employment contract from the presumption of at-will employment. The Kurtzman Court also specifically rejected the notion \u201cthat the establishment of \u2018a definite term of service\u2019 is the sole means of contractually removing the at-will presumption.\u201d Id. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court\u2019s error in ruling that the parties\u2019 contract is unenforceable was prejudicial and that our granting plaintiff a new trial does place him in a better position than his current one.\nFourth, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by entering an award of attorneys\u2019 fees in his favor in the amount of $7,500.00. We agree.\nWe review a trial court\u2019s award of attorneys\u2019 fees pursuant to an abuse of discretion standard. Hillman v. United States Liability Ins. Co., 59 N.C. App. 145, 155, 296 S.E.2d 302, 309 (1982) (citations omitted).\n\u201cBefore awarding attorney\u2019s fees, the trial court must make specific findings of fact concerning: (1) the lawyer\u2019s skill; (2) the lawyer\u2019s hourly rate; and (3) the nature and scope of the legal services rendered.\u201d Williams v. New Hope Found., Inc., 192 N.C. App. 528, 530, 665 S.E.2d 586, 588 (2008) (citing In re Baby Boy Scearce, 81 N.C. App. 662, 663-64, 345 S.E.2d 411, 413, disc. rev. denied, 318 N.C. 415, 349 S.E.2d 590 (1986)).\nIn the instant case, the trial court made only one finding of fact with respect to an award of attorneys\u2019 fees: \u201cPlaintiff incurred reasonable attorney\u2019s fees in the amount of SEVEN THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS ($7,500) in connection with the preparation, filing, and prosecution of his North Carolina Wage and Hour Act claim.\u201d As Sister-2-Sister emphasizes, the trial court was not required to adhere to \u201c[p]laintiff counsel\u2019s own estimation of the value of counsel\u2019s services or the alleged amount of time spent proving that [p]laintiff was not paid for several days during July 2007.\u201d However, the trial court was required to make .sufficient findings detailing the reasonable basis for its award. See id. (citation omitted). The trial court may have awarded plaintiff a reasonable amount of attorneys\u2019 fees based upon plaintiff\u2019s counsel\u2019s work with respect to his prevailing claim, but because it did not enumerate any findings as to counsel\u2019s \u201cskill\u201d or \u201chourly rate\u201d or as to \u201cthe nature and scope of the legal services rendered\u201d \u2014 all three of which are required \u2014 id. (citation omitted), we hold that the trial court abused its discretion in its award of attorneys\u2019 fees to plaintiff.\nPlaintiff\u2019s final argument is that the trial court erred in denying his motion for amendment of judgment because he had presented the trial court with ample evidence supporting the motion. Based upon our discussion of plaintiff\u2019s third argument supra, we hold that the trial court erred by denying plaintiff\u2019s motion to amend judgment.\nWehold that the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of Lockett as to plaintiff\u2019s claims of breach of contract and violations of the North Carolina Wage and Hour Act. However, we reverse as to the trial court\u2019s directed verdict in favor of Sister-2-Sister and dismissal of plaintiff\u2019s breach of contract claim. We also remand the issue of the amount of plaintiff\u2019s attorneys\u2019 fees to the trial court for entry of the requisite findings of fact.\nAffirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded in part.\nJudges ELMORE and STROUD concur.\nJudge JACKSON concurred prior to December 31, 2010.\n. Defendant points us to the case of Edwards v. Northwestern Bank, 53 N.C. App. 492, 495, 281 S.E.2d 86, 88 (\u201c \u2018[T]he earlier denial of a motion for summary judgment should not, in any way, be considered a barrier to later consideration of a motion for directed verdict.\u2019 \u201d) (alteration in original) (citation omitted), disc. rev. denied, 304 N.C. 389, 285 S.E.2d 831 (1981). However, that quotation from Edwards, in context, merely emphasizes that motions for summary judgment and directed verdict differ as to the legal standards applied and the burdens placed upon the parties. It does not support the contention that one trial court\u2019s conclusion of law, based upon the same findings of fact, can be overruled by a second trial court.", "type": "majority", "author": "JACKSON, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Lewis Phillips Hinkle, PLLC, by Brian C. Johnston and Elliot I. Brady, for plaintiff-appellant.", "Wilson & Reives, PLLC, by Antwoine L. Edwards, for defendants-appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "JERRIAN O. LOCKETT, Plaintiff v. SISTER-2-SISTER SOLUTIONS, INC. and ROSA S. LOCKETT (aka ROSA SUTTON), Defendants\nNo. COA09-1387\n(Filed 4 January 2011)\n1. Corporations\u2014 piercing corporate veil \u2014 allegation not sufficient\nThe trial court did not err by granting summary judgment for defendant Lockett on a breach of contract claim arising from plaintiffs employment termination. Plaintiff alleged that the corporate veil should be pierced to reach Lockett but did not provide a forecast of evidence to oppose defendant\u2019s motion.\n2. Civil Procedure\u2014 summary judgment \u2014 deposition not considered \u2014 no prejudice\nThe trial court should have reviewed a deposition plaintiff attempted to offer in opposition to a motion for summary judgment, but there was no prejudice because plaintiff offered the deposition on a different issue and did not offer evidence that may have created a genuine issue of fact on the issue at hand.\n3. Employer and Employee\u2014 Wage and Hour Claim \u2014 summary judgment for defendant\nThe trial court did not err by granting summary judgment for defendant Lockett on a Wage and Hour claim arising from plaintiff\u2019s employment termination where plaintiff did not offer evidence to support the existence of a genuine issue of material fact.\n4. Trials\u2014 directed verdict \u2014 based upon ruling of prior judge\nThe trial court erred by directing a verdict for defendant Sister-2-Sister and dismissing plaintiff\u2019s breach of contract claim in an action arising from an employment dispute. The trial court was not free to conclude that the contract was legally unenforceable because of prior rulings by two courts.\n5. Trials\u2014 enforceability of contract \u2014 ruling by first judge determinative\nA trial court did not err by basing its determination of whether a contract was enforceable on a prior determination by another judge where defendant argued that the second judge had the benefit of hearing evidence and could properly reconsider the conclusion of the first. The first and second judge based their conclusions on the law and the face of the contract, which are not affected by evidence of a person\u2019s intent or understanding. Furthermore, one superior court judge may not correct another\u2019s errors of law.\n6. Contracts\u2014 enforceability \u2014 at-will doctrine \u2014 erroneous ruling prejudicial\nThere was prejudice from the court\u2019s erroneous ruling that the parties\u2019 employment contract was unenforceable where granting a new trial placed plaintiff in an improved position.\n7. Attorney Fees\u2014 amount \u2014 findings not sufficient\nThe trial court abused its discretion in the amount of attorney fees it awarded to plaintiff in an employment termination case where the court did not enumerate any findings as to counsel\u2019s skill or hourly rate or as to the nature and scope of the legal services rendered.\nAppeal by plaintiff from orders entered 6 November 2008 by Judge Howard Manning and 13 November 2008, 16 March 2009, and 20 April 2009 by Judge Allen Baddour in Chatham County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 25 March 2010.\nLewis Phillips Hinkle, PLLC, by Brian C. Johnston and Elliot I. Brady, for plaintiff-appellant.\nWilson & Reives, PLLC, by Antwoine L. Edwards, for defendants-appellees." }, "file_name": "0060-01", "first_page_order": 70, "last_page_order": 82 }