{ "id": 4181343, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. TONIA KERRIN, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Kerrin", "decision_date": "2011-01-04", "docket_number": "No. COA09-1153", "first_page": "72", "last_page": "83", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "209 N.C. App. 72" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "670 S.E.2d 905", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12642448, 12642449, 12642447 ], "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/670/0905-02", "/se2d/670/0905-03", "/se2d/670/0905-01" ] }, { "cite": "661 S.E.2d 283", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12641009 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "286" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/661/0283-01" ] }, { "cite": "634 S.E.2d 891", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12636697, 12636698 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "adopting Black's Law Dictionary's definition of the term \"conviction\": \" 'The act or process of judicially finding someone guilty of a crime;' the state of having been proved guilty...: 2. The judgment (as by jury verdict) that a person is guilty of a crime.' \"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/634/0891-01", "/se2d/634/0891-02" ] }, { "cite": "632 S.E.2d 768", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12636378, 12636379, 12636380 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "adopting Black's Law Dictionary's definition of the term \"conviction\": \" 'The act or process of judicially finding someone guilty of a crime;' the state of having been proved guilty...: 2. The judgment (as by jury verdict" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/632/0768-01", "/se2d/632/0768-02", "/se2d/632/0768-03" ] }, { "cite": "623 S.E.2d 782", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12634744 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "785" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/623/0782-01" ] }, { "cite": "656 S.E.2d 695", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12640369 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "696", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/656/0695-01" ] }, { "cite": "362 N.C. 684", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "190 N.C. App. 797", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4158316 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "800-01" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/190/0797-01" ] }, { "cite": "360 N.C. 542", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3792064, 3789234, 3788598, 3797047, 3791800, 3791227, 3798558 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "adopting Black's Law Dictionary's definition of the term \"conviction\": \" 'The act or process of judicially finding someone guilty of a crime;' the state of having been proved guilty...: 2. The judgment (as by jury verdict) that a person is guilty of a crime.' \"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/360/0542-06", "/nc/360/0542-03", "/nc/360/0542-02", "/nc/360/0542-01", "/nc/360/0542-07", "/nc/360/0542-05", "/nc/360/0542-04" ] }, { "cite": "360 N.C. 489", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3792225, 3788417, 3791334, 3790022, 3789906, 3789364, 3797885 ], "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/360/0489-03", "/nc/360/0489-05", "/nc/360/0489-02", "/nc/360/0489-06", "/nc/360/0489-07", "/nc/360/0489-04", "/nc/360/0489-01" ] }, { "cite": "175 N.C. App. 586", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8352812 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "589-90" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/175/0586-01" ] }, { "cite": "188 N.C. App. 842", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4155675 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "845", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/188/0842-01" ] }, { "cite": "535 S.E.2d 875", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "878", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "140 N.C. App. 198", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12123845 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "202", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/140/0198-01" ] }, { "cite": "353 S.E.2d 250", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "253" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "84 N.C. App. 517", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12168824 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "521" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/84/0517-01" ] }, { "cite": "693 S.E.2d 168", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Remand for additional findings of fact as to satellite based monitoring determination to trial court, where the State presented evidence at the probation violation hearing which would support required findings of fact" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "311 S.E.2d 552", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "310 N.C. 284", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2402923 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/310/0284-01" ] }, { "cite": "567 S.E.2d 416", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "421", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Boone, 310 N.C. 284, 311 S.E.2d 552 (1984)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "152 N.C. App. 430", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9250381 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "437", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Boone, 310 N.C. 284, 311 S.E.2d 552 (1984)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/152/0430-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 801, "char_count": 28513, "ocr_confidence": 0.741, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.298132930532853e-08, "percentile": 0.33346886247036023 }, "sha256": "2d61d64112104ece7e0d3393479862b493638f15d3e36200acc044bee93d1101", "simhash": "1:ae38dc8ac72d8bd4", "word_count": 4589 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:06:47.704823+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges ELMORE and JACKSON concur.", "Judge JACKSON concurred prior to 31 December 2010." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. TONIA KERRIN, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "STROUD, Judge.\nTonia Kerrin (\u201cdefendant\u201d) appeals from a trial court\u2019s probation violation order and order of forfeiture of her driver\u2019s license for a period of 24 months. Because the trial court did not make the findings of fact required by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1331A that defendant failed to make \u201creasonable efforts\u201d to comply with the conditions of her probation and the term of defendant\u2019s forfeiture exceeded the statutory limits for license forfeiture, we reverse the trial court\u2019s order of forfeiture and remand for further findings.We also remand for correction of a clerical error.\nI. Background\nOn 8 January 2007, defendant was indicted on one count of conspiracy to commit felony larceny and on 15 May 2007 defendant was arrested for one count of assault on a government official during an alleged shoplifting incident in Wake County. On 15 October 2007, pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant pled guilty to one count of felony larceny, one count of conspiracy to commit felony larceny, and one count of assault on a government official. The trial court sentenced defendant to concurrent active terms of 10 to 12 months of imprisonment for the felony larceny conviction and 8 to 10 months of imprisonment for the consolidated conspiracy and assault convictions. The trial court suspended the active terms of imprisonment and placed defendant on supervised probation for a period of 24 months, with 6 months designated as intensive probation. Defendant\u2019s probation was transferred from Wake County to New Hanover County.\nOn 30 September 2008, Probation Officer Mark Pittman filed a probation violation report alleging that defendant had violated the conditions of her probation in that she had a positive drug test for use of cocaine, failed to complete community service, did not report as scheduled on two dates, and was not at her approved residence at curfew on three dates. An order for defendant\u2019s arrest was issued on 31 October 2008 but was recalled on 13 November 2008. Another order for defendant\u2019s arrest was issued on 8 January 2009 for failure to report for a probation hearing on 5 January 2009. Probation Officer Pittman filed another probation violation report on 13 February 2009 alleging that defendant failed to appear for a probation violation hearing, left her approved residence, failed to make her whereabouts known, and had \u201cabsconded supervision.\u201d\nOn 1 April 2009, following a probation revocation hearing, the trial court entered judgment against defendant and concluded that she had violated the conditions of her probation based upon the four violations alleged in the \u201cViolation Report or Notice dated 10/20/08\u201d, revoked her probation, and activated defendant\u2019s sentence of 8 to 10 months. The trial court also ordered that defendant\u2019s driver\u2019s licensing privileges be forfeited for 24 months, beginning on 1 April 2009, the date of the probation revocation hearing, until 1 April 2011. Defendant gave written notice of appeal.\nII. Findings required by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1331A\nDefendant makes two arguments regarding deficiencies in the findings in the forfeiture order. First, defendant contends that \u201cthe trial court committed reversible error in entering a written judgment ordering license forfeiture when the judgment announced in open court was silent as to forfeiture.\u201d Defendant contends that since N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1331A requires the trial court to make findings in the judgment and the trial judge was silent as to forfeiture in open court, the case should be remanded to trial court for entry of judgment consistent with the trial court\u2019s statements in open court and the forfeiture order should be vacated. The State counters that proper findings were made in the trial court\u2019s written order.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1331A(b)(2) (2009) requires forfeiture will occur based upon the trial court\u2019s \u201cfindings in the judgment that the individual failed to make reasonable efforts to comply with the conditions of probation.\u201d In addition, subsection (c) states,\nWhenever an individual\u2019s licensing privileges are forfeited under this section, the judge shall make findings in the judgment of the licensing privileges held by the individual known to the court at that time, the drivers license number and social security number of the individual, and the beginning and ending date of the period of time of the forfeiture ....\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1331A(c).\nContrary to defendant\u2019s contentions, we have held that \u201c [i]n a criminal case, for entry of judgment to occur, a judge must either announce his ruling in open court or sign the judgment containing the ruling and file it with the clerk.\u201d N.C. Dep\u2019t of Corr. v. Brunson, 152 N.C. App. 430, 437, 567 S.E.2d 416, 421 (2002) (citing State v. Boone, 310 N.C. 284, 311 S.E.2d 552 (1984)). Therefore, the trial court was not required to announce all of the findings and details of its judgment in open court. We also note that nothing in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1331A requires the trial court to announce its judgment in open court in addition to entry of a written order. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err by making findings and entry of judgment in a written order on form AOC-CR-317 titled, \u201cFORFEITURE OF LICENSING PRIVILEGES FELONY PROBATION REVOCATION!.]\u201d We therefore reject defendant\u2019s argument that the written order is in error because the trial court did not announce the details of the order in open court.\nDefendant\u2019s second argument is that the trial court failed even in its written order to make the findings of fact required to support an order of forfeiture. Defendant notes that the order does not include the finding required by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1331A(b)(2) that \u201cthe individual failed to make reasonable efforts to comply with the conditions of probation.\u201d Defendant contends that N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1331A provides that license forfeiture does not automatically occur upon any revocation of probation, but- the trial court must also find that the defendant \u201cfailed to make reasonable efforts to comply with the conditions of probation\u201d for forfeiture to take effect. Thus, defendant contends that the trial court\u2019s findings of fact do not support its conclusion of law that defendant was subject to license forfeiture.\nWe must first determine what findings of fact and conclusions of law the trial court made; this determination is complicated by the fact that the order of forfeiture incorporates the judgment of probation revocation, which in turn incorporates the probation violation report. We must look to all three documents to piece together the findings. The order of forfeiture itself includes the following findings of fact:\nOn the basis of the record in this case and any evidence presented, the Court, having entered the attached judgment, which is incorporated by reference, makes the following further findings and includes these findings in the judgment. The judgment is modified to the extent necessary to include these findings, but the inclusion of these findings does not otherwise alter, amend, or modify the judgment in any respect. The Court FINDS that the defendant holds a licensing privilege issued by each of the licensing agencies named below, has been convicted of a felony and is subject to forfeiture of those licensing privileges because: . . .\n2. (Structured Sentencing felonies committed on and after January 1, 1997) the defendant\u2019s probation was revoked or suspended. The period of license forfeiture begins on the \u201cBeginning Date\u201d shown above and ends on the \u201cEnding Date\u201d shown above.\nThe \u201cBeginning Date\u201d entered on the order was \u201c04-01-2009\u201d and the \u201cEnding Date\u201d entered on the order was \u201c04-01-2011[.]\u201d The form which was used for the order, AOC-CR-317 (revised 06/04), also includes a note as follows: \u201cNOTE: The \u201cBeginning Date\" is the date of the entry of this judgment, and the \u201cEnding Date\u201d is the date of the end of the full probationary term imposed at the time of conviction.\u201d (Emphasis in original.) The \u201clicensing agencies named below\u201d blank on the form was filled in as the \u201cNorth Carolina Division of Motor Vehicles[.]\u201d The blanks for the defendant\u2019s drivers license number and social security number were not filled in.\nThe \u201cattached judgment\u201d referred to in the forfeiture order is the probation revocation order entered on the same date. That order included the following findings of fact:\nAfter considering the record contained in the files numbered above, together with the evidence presented by the parties and the statements made on behalf of the State and the defendant, the Court finds:\n1. The defendant is charged with having violated specified conditions of the defendant\u2019s probation as alleged in the... a. Violation Report(s) on file herein, which is incorporated by reference . . .\n2. Upon due notice or waiver of notice ... a. a hearing was held before the Court and, by the evidence presented, the Court is reasonably satisfied in its discretion that the defendant violated each of the conditions of the defendant\u2019s probation as set forth below . . .\n3. The condition(s) violated and the facts of each violation are as set forth ... a. in paragraph(s) 1.2.3.4 in the Violation Report or Notice dated 10-20-08 [sic].\nThe probation violation report of 10-20-08 which was incorporated identified four probation violations, specifically:\n1. Special Condition of Probation \u201cNot use, possess or control any illegal drug or controlled substance unless it has been prescribed for the defendant by a licensed physician and is in the original container with the prescription number affixed on it.. .\u201d in that\nTHAT ON 08-28-09, THE DEFENDANT DID TEST POSITIVE FOR THE ILLEGAL SUBSTANCE OF COCAINE.\n2. Special Condition of Probation \u201cComplete Community Service as directed by the Community Service Coordinator...\u201d in that THE DEFENDANT FAILED TO COMPLETE COMMUNITY SERVICE AS AGREED AND IS 50 HOURS IN ARREARS.\n3. Regular Condition of Probation \u201cReport as directed by the Court or the probation officer to the officer at reasonable times and places ...\u201d in that\nTHAT ON 09-17-08 AND 08-27-08, THE DEFENDANT FAILED TO REPORT AS SCHEDULED AND FAILED TO CALL PRIOR TO MISSING THESE [] APPOINTMENTS TO MAKE OTHER ARRANGEMENTS.\n4. Special Condition of Probation \u201cNot be away from the defendant\u2019s residence during the specified hours as set by the court or probation officer ...\u201d in that\nTHAT ON 08-23-08 AT 7 PM, 08-15-08 AT 8:14PM, AND 08-11-08 AT 8:32PM., THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT AT HER APPROVED RESIDENCE AS REQUIRED BY CURFEW.\nDefendant is correct that the trial court failed to make any finding of fact that she \u201cfailed to make reasonable efforts to comply with the conditions of probation.\u201d See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1331A(b)(2). None of the three documents which comprise the order make any mention of \u201creasonable efforts\u201d or lack thereof. The only substantive findings of fact were that defendant violated four specific conditions of her probation; these findings were required to support the probation revocation order, but no additional findings were made other than the fact that she had a license issued by the North Carolina Department of Motor Vehicles which was subject to forfeiture.\nAlthough the trial court failed to make the required findings of fact, if there was evidence upon which the trial court could have made these findings, it would be proper for us to remand to the trial court for entry of additional findings. See State v. King, -N.C. App.-, 693 S.E.2d 168 (2011) (Remand for additional findings of fact as to satellite based monitoring determination to trial court, where the State presented evidence at the probation violation hearing which would support required findings of fact). Therefore, we must next consider whether the State presented any evidence before the trial court which could support a finding that defendant \u201cfailed to make reasonable efforts to comply with the conditions of probation\u201d as to the probation violations upon which the revocation was predicated.\nDefendant\u2019s probation officer, Officer Pittman, and defendant testified at the 1 April 2009 probation revocation hearing regarding defendant\u2019s compliance with the conditions of her probation. Officer Pittman testified that defendant had violated her probation by testing positive for cocaine on 28 August 2008; missing office appointments with Officer Pittman on 17 September 2008 and 27 August 2008; and failing to meet with Officer Pittman at her residence every two months. We note these were specific violations in Officer Pittman\u2019s 30 September 2008 probation violation report. However, Officer Pittman testified that defendant had also violated her probation by failing to appear for her 6 January 2009 probation hearing and \u201cabsconding supervision[.]\u201d This specific violation was in Officer Pittman\u2019s 13 February 2009 violation report. Officer Pittman further testified that defendant had only made contact sporadically; had been charged with additional crimes since being placed on probation; had been incarcerated in Anson County; and had been released from incarceration in Anson County before her \u25a0 probation revocation hearing scheduled for 5 January 2009 but did not attend that hearing. He also stated that after defendant\u2019s failure to appear, she contacted him by phone, but because she knew that there were probation warrants out for her arrest, she did not report to him or turn herself in; and she was arrested in late March 2009, as part of a police \u201csting.\u201d Officer Pittman also testified that \u201c[according to family,\u201d defendant was \u201cavoiding supervision by not making herself available.\u201d Thus, it appears that the State presented evidence which supported the violations alleged in both the 13 February 2009 and 30 September 2008 probation violation reports, as well as evidence regarding defendant\u2019s failure to exercise reasonable efforts to comply with the conditions of her probation as to both violation reports.\nOur Court has recognized that \u201cprobation revocation hearings are not formal criminal proceedings requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt\u201d and that \u201cthe State\u2019s burden of proof during probation revocation hearings is to present evidence that reasonably satisfies the trial court in its discretion that defendant has violated a valid condition of probation.\u201d State v. Tozzi, 84 N.C. App. 517, 521, 353 S.E.2d 250, 253 (1987). No prior case has addressed the burden of proof under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1331A, as to forfeiture of licensing privileges, but the same burden of proof would logically apply to this determination as to the revocation of probation. Thus, the State had a burden of proof to \u201cpresent evidence that reasonably satisfies the trial court in its discretion[,]\u201d see id., that the def\u00e9ndant had not made \u201creasonable efforts\u201d to comply with at least one condition of probation. The testimony by Officer Pittman shows that the State did present evidence regarding defendant\u2019s lack of \u201creasonable efforts to comply with the conditions\u201d of her probation. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1331A(b)(2). The transcript also contains testimony from defendant as to her efforts to comply with the conditions of her probation. As the statute requires findings as to defendant\u2019s reasonable efforts to comply with the conditions of her probation and there was evidence in the trial transcript regarding defendant\u2019s efforts to comply with the conditions of probation, we reverse the trial court\u2019s order forfeiting defendant\u2019s license privileges for a period of 24 months and remand to the trial court for further findings as to whether defendant failed to \u201cmake reasonable efforts to comply with the conditions of probation.\u201d See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1331A(b)(2).\nWe further note that form AOC-CR-317 does not contain a section specifically designated for the trial court to make findings as to defendant\u2019s \u201creasonable efforts to comply with the conditions of probation[]\u201d as required by N.C. Gen. Stat.' \u00a7 15A-1331A(b)(2). We therefore encourage revision of form AOC-CR-317 to add this required finding, which may help to avoid future errors based upon omission of this finding in orders for forfeiture of a defendant\u2019s licensing privileges.\nAdditionally, we must address a clerical error in the trial court\u2019s findings in its 1 April 2009 order revoking defendant\u2019s probation. A clerical error has been defined by this Court as \u201c[a]n error resulting from a minor mistake or inadvertence, esp. in writing or copying something on the record, and not from judicial reasoning or determination.\u201d State v. Jarman, 140 N.C. App. 198, 202, 535 S.E.2d 875, 878 (2000) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Here, as stated above, the only two probation violation reports filed by Officer Pittman were dated 30 September 2008 and 13 February 2009. However, in its written order revoking defendant\u2019s probation, the trial court found that the conditions violated by defendant and the facts of each violation were set forth in paragraphs one through four of the violation report dated \u201c10/20/2008[.]\u201d Officer Pittman\u2019s 30 September 2008 probation violation report states that the probation violation hearing date was scheduled for \u201c10-20-2008[.]\u201d Therefore, the entry of \u201c10/20/2008\u201d in the trial court\u2019s order appears to have been \u201c[a]n error resulting from a minor mistake or inadvertence, esp. in writing or copying something on the record.\u201d See id. We also note that at the 1 April 2009 probation violation hearing, evidence was presented regarding defendant\u2019s violations based upon both the 30 September 2008 and the 13 February 2009 probation violation reports. \u201cWhen, on appeal, a clerical error is discovered in the trial court\u2019s judgment or order, it is appropriate to remand the case to the trial court for correction because of the importance that the record \u2018speak the truth.\u2019 \u201d State v. Smith, 188 N.C. App. 842, 845, 656 S.E.2d 695, 696 (2008) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, we remand to the trial court for correction of this clerical error, to correctly identify the probation violation report or reports and to make findings regarding the conditions which the trial court found that defendant had violated.\nIII. Defendant\u2019s term of license forfeiture\nDefendant also argues on appeal that \u201cthe trial court committed reversible error by suspending [her] license for 24 months from the date of her probation revocation hearing when only 6 Vz months of her probationary period remained.\u201d Even though we have reversed the order of forfeiture of defendant\u2019s licensing privileges based on the lack of required findings of fact, the trial court on remand will make additional findings and may again order a term of forfeiture of defendant\u2019s licensing privileges. Therefore, we will address defendant\u2019s argument.\nThe relevant portions of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1331A state:\n(b) Upon conviction of a felony, an individual automatically forfeits the individual\u2019s licensing privileges for the full term of the period the individual is placed on probation by the sentencing court at the time of conviction for the offense, if:\n(1) The individual is offered a suspended sentence on condition the individual accepts probation and the individual refuses probation, or\n(2) The individual\u2019s probation is revoked or suspended, and the judge makes findings in the judgment that the individual failed to make reasonable efforts to comply with the conditions of probation.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1331A (Emphasis added).\nThe plain language of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1331A(b) sets forth a specific term for which a court can order forfeiture of an individual\u2019s licensing privileges: \u201cfor the full term of the period the individual is placed on probation by the sentencing court at the time of conviction for the offense].]\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1331A(b). The statute provides for the \u201csentencing court\u201d to set a term of probation \u201cat the time of conviction for the offense[.]\u201d The term \u201cconviction\u201d clearly refers to the conviction for the offense(s) for which a defendant is placed on probation.\nWe have held that, under the traditional definition, \u201cconviction\u201d refers to the jury\u2019s or fact-finder\u2019s guilty verdict. State v. McGee, 175 N.C. App. 586, 589-90, 623 S.E.2d 782, 785, disc. review denied, 360 N.C. 489, 632 S.E.2d 768, appeal dismissed, disc. review denied, 360 N.C. 542, 634 S.E.2d 891 (2006) (adopting Black\u2019s Law Dictionary\u2019s definition of the term \u201cconviction\u201d: \u201c \u2018The act or process of judicially finding someone guilty of a crime;' the state of having been proved guilty...: 2. The judgment (as by jury verdict) that a person is guilty of a crime.\u2019 \u201d). Id. Likewise, the North Carolina Structured Sentencing Statutes provide, in pertinent part, \u201ca person has been convicted when he has been adjudged guilty or has entered a plea of guilty or no contest.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1331(b) (2007). \u2022\nState v. Delrosario, 190 N.C. App. 797, 800-01, 661 S.E.2d 283, 286, disc. review denied, 362 N.C. 684, 670 S.E.2d 905 (2008). Because the statute specifies that the \u201csentencing court\u201d sets the term of probation upon which the forfeiture is based \u201cat the time of conviction[,]\u201d it appears that the trial court at' the probation revocation hearing does not have discretion to extend an individual\u2019s forfeiture beyond the ending date of the individual\u2019s term of probation as set at the time of conviction. The \u201csentencing court\u201d here is clearly referring to the judge sentencing the individual for the original conviction and placing the defendant on probation, not a judge revoking an individual\u2019s probation at a later date. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1331A(b). The State argues that the \u201cterm of probation\u201d which is set at the time of conviction refers only to the length of time set at the time of conviction, here 24 months, but that the starting date of the 24 months may begin at any time, including the date of revocation. According to the State\u2019s proposed interpretation, the revoking court would have the discretion to order forfeiture for any period of time up to the maximum term as set at the time of conviction, but no more than that term, although the term would begin only upon revocation. However, the statutory language is simply too specific to support the State\u2019s proposed interpretation. A court which revokes a defendant\u2019s probation may order a forfeiture of an individual\u2019s license pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1331A(b)(2) at any time during the individual\u2019s probation term, but the specific term of forfeiture cannot exceed the individual\u2019s original probation term as set by the \u201csentencing court\u201d at the time of conviction. Accordingly, it appears that N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1331A does not grant a trial court discretion to extend a defendant\u2019s forfeiture of licensing privileges beyond the term of his or her original term of probation as set by the sentencing court at the time of his conviction.\nHere, defendant was placed on 24 months probation by the sentencing court, starting on 15 December 2007, and ending on 15 December 2009. Defendant\u2019s probation was revoked on 1 April 2009, approximately 8 months before defendant\u2019s term of probation was set to expire. The trial court ordered defendant\u2019s forfeiture of her license for 24 months from the date of revocation or until 1 April 2011. As this forfeiture term extends beyond defendant\u2019s original probation term as set \u201cat the time of conviction\u201d by the \u201csentencing court[,]\u201d we hold that this forfeiture term was in error. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court\u2019s order as to the term of defendant\u2019s forfeiture. If the trial court on remand makes findings that defendant \u201cfailed to make reasonable efforts to comply with the conditions of probation!,]\u201d see N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1331A(b)(2), and orders forfeiture of defendant\u2019s licensing privileges, then the term of forfeiture cannot extend beyond 15 December 2009, the ending date of her original term of probation as set by the sentencing court at the time of her conviction.\nIn further examination of form AOC-CR-317, we note that it includes a suggestion to the trial court by its \u201cNOTE: The \u2018Beginning Date\u2019 is the date of the entry of this judgment, and the \u2018Ending Date\u2019 is the date of the end of the full probationary term imposed at the time of conviction.\u201d The State interprets this \u201cNOTE\u201d as meaning that the \u201cBeginning Date\u201d is the date of entry of \u201cthis judgment,\u201d normally the same date as the revocation of probation; this is correct. The State interprets the \u201cEnding Date\u201d as a date which is calculated by the revoking court (as opposed to the sentencing court) by adding the length of time of the original probationary period, here 24 months, to the \u201cbeginning date.\u201d Although we do not agree that form AOC-CR-317 means exactly what the State contends, we agree it is one reasonable interpretation of the rather cryptic \u201cNOTE[.]\u201d However, we believe the State\u2019s interpretation of the AOC form, and the statute, to be incorrect. We therefore encourage further revision of form AOC-CR-317 to clarify this issue and perhaps avoid future errors based upon misinterpretation of the form.\nIV. Conclusion\nAccordingly, we reverse the trial court\u2019s order of license forfeiture and remand for further findings.\nREVERSED AND REMANDED.\nJudges ELMORE and JACKSON concur.\nJudge JACKSON concurred prior to 31 December 2010.\n. The probation violation report was actually dated 30 September 2008; on that report, defendant\u2019s probation violation hearing was set for 20 October 2008, although the hearing did not occur on that date.\n. Although plaintiff has not made any argument regarding the absence of findings as to \u201cthe drivers license number and social security number of the individual,\u201d we note that N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1331A(c) provides that the trial court \u201cshall\u201d make these findings; the order does not contain these findings. We also question the wisdom of requiring a defendant\u2019s full social security number to be listed on a judgment which is a matter of public record, given\u201ethe recent increases in identity theft and fraudulent use of social security numbers.\n. As noted above, this date is in error; the probation violation report was dated 30 September 2008.'", "type": "majority", "author": "STROUD, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy A. Cooper, III, by Assistant Attorney General Karissa J. Davan, for the State.", "Faith S. Bushnaq, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. TONIA KERRIN, Defendant\nNo. COA09-1153\n(Filed 4 January 2011)\n1. Probation and Parole\u2014 driver\u2019s license forfeiture \u2014 findings of fact \u2014 written order\nThe trial court did not err in a probation revocation proceeding by making findings of fact and entry of judgment in a written order on form AOC-CR-317. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1331A did not require the trial court to announce its judgment in open court in addition to entry of a written order and the trial court was not required to announce all of the findings and details of its judgment in open court.\n2. Probation and Parole\u2014 driver\u2019s license forfeiture \u2014 insufficient findings of fact \u2014 matter remanded\nThe trial court erred in a probation revocation proceeding by ordering the forfeiture of defendant\u2019s driver\u2019s license where the trial court failed to make the findings of fact required by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1331A(b)(2) to support the order. The order did not include a finding concerning whether defendant failed to make reasonable efforts to comply with the conditions of probation. As there was evidence in the record from which the trial court could have made this finding, the matter was remanded to the trial court.\n3. Probation and Parole\u2014 order \u2014 remanded\u2014clerical correction\nThe Court of Appeals remanded an order revoking defendant\u2019s probation for correction of clerical errors.\n4. Probation and Parole\u2014 driver\u2019s license forfeiture \u2014 term not to exceed original probation term\nThe trial court committed reversible error by suspending defendant\u2019s driver\u2019s license for 24 months from the date of her probation revocation hearing when only 6 Vi months of her probationary period remained. A court which revokes a defendant\u2019s probation may order a forfeiture of an individual\u2019s driver\u2019s license pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1331A(b)(2) at any time during the individual\u2019s probation term, but the specific term of forfeiture cannot exceed the individual\u2019s original probation term as set by the sentencing court at the time of conviction.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered on or about 1 April 2009 by Judge Phyllis M. Gorham in Superior Court, New Hanover County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 11 March 2010.\nAttorney General Roy A. Cooper, III, by Assistant Attorney General Karissa J. Davan, for the State.\nFaith S. Bushnaq, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0072-01", "first_page_order": 82, "last_page_order": 93 }