{ "id": 4181396, "name": "CHARLES A. STANFORD; DONALD M. STANFORD, JR.; JAMES C. STANFORD; RANDOLPH L. STANFORD; CANDACE STANFORD ROBERTS; LESLEY STANFORD; and ROBIN STANFORD MULKEY, Plaintiffs v. OLIVER JOHNSON PARIS, Personal Representative of the Estate of Charles Whitson Stanford, Jr. (90-E-255, Orange County); OLIVER JOHNSON PARIS, Individually; and JEAN S. MANN, and spouse, EDWARD N. MANN, JR., Level I Defendants, STANFORD PLACE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, a North Carolina limited partnership, (Oliver Johnson Paris, General Partner); OLIVER JOHNSON PARIS, Personal Representative of the Estate of Jane S. Paris (00-E-1010, Mecklenburg County); JANE S. PARIS FAMILY TRUST (Oliver Johnson Paris, Trustee); EDWARD N. MANN, III, and spouse, LINDSAY W. MANN; ORANGE WATER AND SEWER AUTHORITY; MARGARET M. PLESS; JENNIFER MANN HAWLEY, and spouse, LEON L. HAWLEY, JR.; and CHARLES S. MANN, and spouse, LORI A. MANN, Level II Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "Stanford v. Paris", "decision_date": "2011-01-04", "docket_number": "No. COA09-19", "first_page": "173", "last_page": "180", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "209 N.C. App. 173" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "443 S.E.2d 751", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "752", "parenthetical": "concluding that a testamentary gift did not adeem because, at the time of'testator's death, the devise \"remained in the estate,\" testator \"retained legal title to the real estate,\" and the property was not put \"out of [testator's] control\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "115 N.C. App. 170", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12125649 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "171-72", "parenthetical": "concluding that a testamentary gift did not adeem because, at the time of'testator's death, the devise \"remained in the estate,\" testator \"retained legal title to the real estate,\" and the property was not put \"out of [testator's] control\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/115/0170-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 59-56", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "97 S.E.2d 247", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1957, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "250", "parenthetical": "determining that a partner's interest in a partnership is personal property, even when part of a partnership's assets is real estate" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "245 N.C. 648", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8617344 ], "year": 1957, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "651", "parenthetical": "determining that a partner's interest in a partnership is personal property, even when part of a partnership's assets is real estate" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/245/0648-01" ] }, { "cite": "93 N.C. 183", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11272990 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1885, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "185" }, { "page": "185" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/93/0183-01" ] }, { "cite": "62 S.E. 306", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1908, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "307" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "148 N.C. 302", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11269788 ], "year": 1908, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "304" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/148/0302-01" ] }, { "cite": "254 S.E.2d 538", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "541" }, { "page": "543", "parenthetical": "\"[I]f the subject matter of any specific testamentary gift was not found in specie in [a testator's] estate at the time of [his or] her death, that gift would ordinarily be defeated as a matter of law by the principle of ademption.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "41 N.C. App. 15", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8547621 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "18" }, { "page": "22" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/41/0015-01" ] }, { "cite": "143 S.E. 835", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1928, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "838", "parenthetical": "\"A specific legacy is the bequest of a particular thing or money specified and distinguished from all of the same kind, as of a horse, a piece of plate, money in a purse, stock in the public funds, a security for money, which would immediately vest with the assent of the executor.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "195 N.C. 822", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8632289 ], "year": 1928, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "828" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/195/0822-01" ] }, { "cite": "58 S.E.2d 722", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1950, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "723" }, { "page": "724" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "231 N.C. 707", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8631878 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1950, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "709" }, { "page": "709" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/231/0707-01" ] }, { "cite": "364 N.C. 306", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4152680 ], "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "308-11" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/364/0306-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 775, "char_count": 18454, "ocr_confidence": 0.737, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.13738677428684065 }, "sha256": "9121b876d9e36a2749066e4fd0c145dfcbd954a0446971a523371c00ee02e71b", "simhash": "1:4badcd22649ed356", "word_count": 2926 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:06:47.704823+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges STEPHENS and HUNTER, JR. concur." ], "parties": [ "CHARLES A. STANFORD; DONALD M. STANFORD, JR.; JAMES C. STANFORD; RANDOLPH L. STANFORD; CANDACE STANFORD ROBERTS; LESLEY STANFORD; and ROBIN STANFORD MULKEY, Plaintiffs v. OLIVER JOHNSON PARIS, Personal Representative of the Estate of Charles Whitson Stanford, Jr. (90-E-255, Orange County); OLIVER JOHNSON PARIS, Individually; and JEAN S. MANN, and spouse, EDWARD N. MANN, JR., Level I Defendants, STANFORD PLACE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, a North Carolina limited partnership, (Oliver Johnson Paris, General Partner); OLIVER JOHNSON PARIS, Personal Representative of the Estate of Jane S. Paris (00-E-1010, Mecklenburg County); JANE S. PARIS FAMILY TRUST (Oliver Johnson Paris, Trustee); EDWARD N. MANN, III, and spouse, LINDSAY W. MANN; ORANGE WATER AND SEWER AUTHORITY; MARGARET M. PLESS; JENNIFER MANN HAWLEY, and spouse, LEON L. HAWLEY, JR.; and CHARLES S. MANN, and spouse, LORI A. MANN, Level II Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MARTIN, Chief Judge.\nOur recitation of the facts is limited to those events deemed relevant to the issues before us on appeal. Details regarding the later procedural history of this appeal are recounted in Stanford v. Paris, 364 N.C. 306, 308-11, - S.E.2d -, - (2011). This action concerns the distribution of property from the estate of Charles Whitson Stanford, Jr. (\u201ctestator\u201d), who died 19 May 1990, leaving a signed, holographic will dated 24 October 1970. In his will, testator, who never married and had no children, devised \u201c[a]ll stocks, bonds, and real estate, savings account and E Bonds, wheresoever situate,\u201d including \u201call stock in Redfields, Inc. left to [him] by [his] father\u201d to his sisters, Jean Stanford Mann and Jane Stanford Paris. Plaintiffs are the children of testator\u2019s brothers, Donald M. Stanford and William G. Stanford. Testator\u2019s brother, William Stanford, predeceased testator on 3 October 1987, and testator\u2019s brother, Donald Stanford, died on 5 May 1970, almost six months prior to the making of testator\u2019s holographic will.\nRedfields, Inc. was a closely-held North Carolina corporation \u201cengaged in general real estate business.\u201d On 26 August 1975, five years after testator made his will, the five shareholders of Redfields, Inc. \u2014 testator, testator\u2019s sisters Jane Stanford Paris and Jean Stanford Mann, testator\u2019s brother William Stanford, and the widow of testator\u2019s brother Donald Stanford \u2014 dissolved the corporation Redfields, Inc. and formed the partnership \u201cRedfields\u201d \u201c[t]o carry on the business formally [sic] conducted by Redfields, Inc.\u201d Plaintiffs alleged that, \u201cpursuant to the winding up of its corporate affairs,\u201d Redfields, Inc. conveyed \u201cvarious tracts including property that is the subject of the present case\u201d by general warranty deed to the Redfields partnership.\nUpon the termination of the Redfields partnership in 1994 following the deaths of testator and testator\u2019s brother William Stanford, the property that had been conveyed from Redfields, Inc. to the Redfields partnership was distributed. The record shows that testator\u2019s sister Jane Stanford Paris, with her husband Oliver Johnson Paris, and testator\u2019s sister Jean Stanford Mann, with her husband Edward N. Mann, Jr., were among the grantees to whom the properties were conveyed by the Redfields partnership. Plaintiffs allege that, upon Redfields\u2019 liquidation, testator\u2019s sisters received a total of 60% of the Redfields partnership\u2019s property holdings \u2014 20% each from the sisters\u2019 own partnership interests in Redfields, and 10% each from the division of testator\u2019s 20% partnership interest in Redfields.\nOn 13 October 2006 and 9 November 2006, respectively, plaintiffs filed a Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and an Amendment to Complaint in Orange County Superior Court. Oliver Johnson Paris, both individually and as personal representative of testator\u2019s estate, and testator\u2019s sister Jean Stanford Mann and her husband Edward N. Mann, Jr. were named as \u201cLevel I\u201d defendants, who were alleged to be \u201cdirect recipients\u201d of property from testator\u2019s estate that had been held by the Redfields partnership. The named \u201cLevel II\u201d defendants were those individuals and entities alleged to be \u201csubsequent transferees of a portion\u201d of this same property who each have \u201ca current interest in said property.\u201d In their complaint, plaintiffs alleged that \u201c[t]his is an action at law for declaratory judgment... as well as an action in equity for appropriate relief[, and] ... is also an action to quiet title.\u201d Plaintiffs asserted they \u201cinitiate[d] this action to determine the rights and responsibilities of the parties,\u201d and to \u201cask the Court to answer the following:\u201d\nA. Should some portion of the estate of Charles W. Stanford, Jr. have been distributed according to the North Carolina Intestate Succession Act?\nB. If so, what property should have been distributed and to whom?\nC. If so, is there additional injury, and are additional damages due?\nD. If so, who bears the responsibility for the incorrect distribution and why?\nE. If so, should Defendant O.J. Paris be removed as the personal representative of the estate of Charles W. Stanford, Jr.; and should a new personal representative be appointed?\nG. If so, what remedies ought to [sic] employed to accomplish the foregoing?\nEach Level I and Level II defendant filed motions to dismiss plaintiffs\u2019 complaint pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 12(b)(6). On 16 February 2007 and 20 February 2007, the trial court entered orders granting all Level I and Level II defendants\u2019 motions to dismiss all claims, except those made against Level I defendant Oliver Johnson Paris \u2014 individually and as personal representative of testator\u2019s estate \u2014 which were not related to the ownership of real property. Plaintiffs\u2019 request for summary judgment as to all remaining claims was granted in part on 15 November 2007 with respect to two undevised assets \u2014 a 1984 Buick LaSabre and $2,457.19 received by testator\u2019s estate from North Carolina\u2019s Unclaimed Property Program \u2014 which were ordered to be distributed according to North Carolina laws of intestate succession. In this same order, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of defendant Oliver Johnson Paris with respect to testator\u2019s interest in the Redfields partnership, based on the court\u2019s determination that testator\u2019s devise of Redfields, Inc. stock \u201cdid not adeem.\u201d Plaintiffs filed a motion seeking relief from this order, which was denied on 19 March 2008.\nOn 18 July 2008, the trial court entered a Partial Judgment By Consent in which it determined that the parties agreed \u201cto settle any claims related to [the \u2018improper distribution\u2019 of the 1984 Buick LaSabre and the $2,457.19] for a payment of $7,000.00,\u201d and provided that, \u201c[p]ursuant to Rule 54 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, entry of this judgment resolves all remaining issues before the Court with respect to this action and thus constitutes the final judgment in this matter.\u201d Plaintiffs filed their Notice of Appeal to this Court on 15 August 2008 from the trial court\u2019s 18 July 2008 Partial Judgment by Consent, as well as from the court\u2019s 16 February 2007 and 20 February 2007 Rule 12(b)(6) orders, the 15 November 2007 partial summary judgment order, and the court\u2019s 19 March 2008 order denying plaintiffs\u2019 Rule 60 motion.\nPlaintiffs first contend testator\u2019s devise to his sisters Jean Stanford Mann and Jane Stanford Paris of \u201call stock in Redfields, Inc. left to [him] by [his] father, Charles W. Stanford, Sr.\u201d adeemed upon the 1975 dissolution, winding up, and termination of Redfields, Inc., and argue that testator\u2019s interest in the later-formed Redfields partnership should not have passed to testator\u2019s sisters Jean Stanford Mann and Jane Stanford Paris alone, to the exclusion of plaintiffs. We disagree.\n\u201cThe principle of ademption is firmly imbedded in the law of wills, and is recognized in this jurisdiction as applicable to specific legacies as a rule of law rather than of particular intent on the part of the testator.\u201d Green v. Green, 231 N.C. 707, 709, 58 S.E.2d 722, 723 (1950); see also Shepard v. Bryan, 195 N.C. 822, 828, 143 S.E. 835, 838 (1928) (\u201cA specific legacy is the bequest of a particular thing or money specified and distinguished from all of the same kind, as of a horse, a piece of plate, money in a purse, stock in the public funds, a security for money, which would immediately vest with the assent of the executor.\u201d). \u201cAn ademption is, quite simply, the extinguishment of a testamentary gift.\u201d Tighe v. Michal, 41 N.C. App. 15, 18, 254 S.E.2d 538, 541 (1979); see also Green, 231 N.C. at 709, 58 S.E.2d at 724 (\u201c \u2018[Ademption] denotes the act by which a specific legacy has become inoperative on account of the testator\u2019s having parted with the subject of it.\u2019 \u201d (quoting Rue v. Connell, 148 N.C. 302, 304, 62 S.E. 306, 307 (1908))). Specific legacies are said to \u201cbe adeemed when in the lifetime of the testator the particular thing bequeathed is lost, destroyed, or disposed of, or it is changed in substance or form, so that it does not remain at the time the will goes into effect in specie, to pass to the legatees.\u201d Starbuck v. Starbuck, 93 N.C. 183, 185 (1885); Tighe, 41 N.C. App. at 22, 254 S.E.2d at 543 (\u201c[I]f the subject matter of any specific testamentary gift was not found in specie in [a testator\u2019s] estate at the time of [his or] her death, that gift would ordinarily be defeated as a matter of law by the principle of ademption.\u201d). Thus, in the present case, we must determine whether testator\u2019s bequest of Redfields, Inc. stock remained in specie in his estate at the time of testator\u2019s death.\nRedfields, Inc. was a North Carolina corporation \u201cengaged in general real estate business.\u201d According to plaintiffs, between 1968 and 1969, testator\u2019s father conveyed various tracts of land to Redfields, Inc. Testator\u2019s father died testate in May 1970. In his will, testator\u2019s father left testator and testator\u2019s four siblings all of his stock in Redfields, Inc. Testator\u2019s brother Donald Stanford, who died testate a few days after his father, left all of his real and personal property to his wife Patricia. Thus, in 1975, all outstanding shares of Redfields, Inc. were equally distributed among and held by testator, testator\u2019s sisters Jean Stanford Mann and Jane Stanford Paris, testator\u2019s brother William Stanford, and the widow of testator\u2019s brother Donald Stanford \u2014 each of whom owned 100 shares of Redfields, Inc.\nAccording to plaintiffs\u2019 allegations, in August 1975, Redfields, Inc. filed its Articles of Dissolution \u201cpursuant to the written consent of all of the shareholders.\u201d Later that month, those same shareholders formed the partnership \u201cRedfields\u201d \u201c[t]o carry on the business formally [sic] conducted by Redfields, Inc.\u201d Just as the shares of Redfields, Inc. were evenly divided among its five shareholders, these same persons held a one-fifth interest in the net profits and losses of the Redfields partnership and had \u201cequal rights in the management of the [Redfields] partnership business.\u201d Further, according to the Redfields\u2019 partnership agreement, \u201call the shareholders [of Redfields, Inc.] desire[d] to form a Partnership to carry on the business heretofore conducted by the corporation and . . . agreed to surrender all their respected [sic] shares to the corporation in consideration for the receipt as partners of the net assets of the corporation.\u201d Moreover, the partnership agreement provided that \u201c[t]he capital of the partnership shall consist of all the assets of Redfields, Inc., distributed in kind upon its liquidation.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Thus, after making his 1970 will, testator, with his brother, sisters, and brother\u2019s widow, transferred all of Redfields, Inc.\u2019s assets \u2014 consisting of those properties originally acquired by testator\u2019s father that are at issue in the present case \u2014 to the Redfields partnership, which was formed for the express purpose of \u201ccarry[ing] on the business formally [sic] conducted by Redfields, Inc.\u201d\nBased on these circumstances, we do not agree with plaintiffs that testator\u2019s bequest of stock in Redfields, Inc. was sufficiently \u201cchanged in substance or form, so that it d[id] not remain at the time the will [went] into effect in specie.\u201d See Starbuck, 93 N.C. at 185. Rather, we conclude that testator\u2019s gift of his Redfields, Inc. stock, which became the same proportional interest in the same assets left to testator by his father upon their transfer to the Redfields partnership, did remain in testator\u2019s estate in specie as personal property at the time of his death and, therefore, did not adeem upon the dissolution and termination of Redfields, Inc. See also Bright v. Williams, 245 N.C. 648, 651, 97 S.E.2d 247, 250 (1957) (determining that a partner\u2019s interest in a partnership is personal property, even when part of a partnership\u2019s assets is real estate) (citing N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 59-56)); see, e.g., Morrison v. Grandy, 115 N.C. App. 170, 171-72, 443 S.E.2d 751, 752 (1994) (concluding that a testamentary gift did not adeem because, at the time of'testator\u2019s death, the devise \u201cremained in the estate,\u201d testator \u201cretained legal title to the real estate,\u201d and the property was not put \u201cout of [testator\u2019s] control\u201d). Therefore, the trial court did not err by dismissing plaintiffs\u2019 complaint because plaintiffs did not allege facts sufficient to establish that they had a legal right to testator\u2019s interest in the Redfields partnership.\nPlaintiffs also assigned error to the trial court\u2019s 15 November 2007 order, in which the court determined that neither a 1984 Buick LaSabre nor $2,457.19 received by testator\u2019s estate from North Carolina\u2019s Unclaimed Property Program were devised under testator\u2019s 1970 will, and ordered that this property be distributed according to North Carolina\u2019s laws of intestate succession in favor of plaintiffs. Plaintiffs sought relief from this order pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 60 on the ground that the trial court \u201comitted an NCNB checking account of the testator\u201d from the list of assets it determined should pass under the laws of intestacy, which was alleged to contain $39,097.63 at the time of testator\u2019s death.\nHowever, plaintiffs provide no legal argument in their brief in support of this assignment of error. Plaintiffs only direct this Court\u2019s attention to copies of three electronic mail messages sent to the trial court in response to the court\u2019s inquiry as to whether there was \u201cany money, other than the escheat funds, that was not specifically bequeathed by the will.\u201d According to these e-mails: the estate filing reflected \u201ca bank account labeled \u2018NCNB Checking Account\u2019 \u201d; the funds in this account \u201cwere used to pay off debts of the estate or for specific bequests\u201d; and there was \u201cno property other than the Buick and the escheat money that could have passed under the rules of intestate succession.\u201d The record before us contains no further information about this NCNB account, and plaintiffs present only the bare assertion in their primary brief that this was an \u201cintestate checking account.\u201d In the absence of any legal argument in support of this assignment of error, we must deem this assignment of error abandoned. See N.C.R. App. P. 28(b)(6) (amended Oct. 1, 2009) (\u201cAssignments of error... in support of which no reason or argument is stated or authority cited, will be taken as abandoned.\u201d).\nPlaintiffs\u2019 remaining arguments include claims that testator\u2019s sisters and other named defendants are liable to plaintiffs under theories of mistake, constructive fraud, and breach of fiduciary duty. However, since these claims were neither alleged in plaintiffs\u2019 complaint nor considered or determined by the trial court, we decline to.address such matters.\nAffirmed.\nJudges STEPHENS and HUNTER, JR. concur.\n. Plaintiffs did not include a question \u201cF\u201d in their 13 October 2006 Complaint.", "type": "majority", "author": "MARTIN, Chief Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Donald M. Stanford, Jr., pro se, and for plaintiffs-appellants.", "Horack, Talley, Pharr & Lowndes, P.A., by Zipporah Basile Edwards and Robert B. McNeill, for defendants-appellees Oliver Johnson Paris, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estates of Charles Whitson Sanford, Jr. and Jane S. Paris, Stanford Place Limited Partnership (Oliver Johnson Paris, General Partner), and Jane S. Paris Family Trust (Oliver Johnson Paris, Trustee).", "Pendergrass Law Firm, PLLC, by James K. Pendergrass, Jr., for defendants-appellees Edward N. Mann, III and spouse, Lindsay W. Mann.", "Bums, Day & Presnell, P.A., by Lacy M. Presnell, III and James J. Mills, for defendants-appellees Jean S. Mann and spouse, Edward N. Mann, Jr., Jennifer Mann Hawley and spouse, Leon L. Hawley, Jr., and Charles S. Mann and spouse, Lori A. Mann.", "Boxley, Bolton, Garber & Haywood, L.L.P., by Kenneth C. Haywood, and Horack, Talley, Pharr & Lowndes, P.A., by Robert B. McNeill and Zipporah Basile Edwards, for defendantappellee Margaret M. Pless.", "Epting & Hackney, by Robert Epting and Ellen B. Scouten, for defendant-appellee Orange Water and Sewer Authority." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "CHARLES A. STANFORD; DONALD M. STANFORD, JR.; JAMES C. STANFORD; RANDOLPH L. STANFORD; CANDACE STANFORD ROBERTS; LESLEY STANFORD; and ROBIN STANFORD MULKEY, Plaintiffs v. OLIVER JOHNSON PARIS, Personal Representative of the Estate of Charles Whitson Stanford, Jr. (90-E-255, Orange County); OLIVER JOHNSON PARIS, Individually; and JEAN S. MANN, and spouse, EDWARD N. MANN, JR., Level I Defendants, STANFORD PLACE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, a North Carolina limited partnership, (Oliver Johnson Paris, General Partner); OLIVER JOHNSON PARIS, Personal Representative of the Estate of Jane S. Paris (00-E-1010, Mecklenburg County); JANE S. PARIS FAMILY TRUST (Oliver Johnson Paris, Trustee); EDWARD N. MANN, III, and spouse, LINDSAY W. MANN; ORANGE WATER AND SEWER AUTHORITY; MARGARET M. PLESS; JENNIFER MANN HAWLEY, and spouse, LEON L. HAWLEY, JR.; and CHARLES S. MANN, and spouse, LORI A. MANN, Level II Defendants\nNo. COA09-19\n(Filed 4 January 2011)\n1. Wills\u2014 personal property \u2014 stock\u2014no ademption\nThe trial court did not err by dismissing plaintiffs\u2019 complaint in a wills action because plaintiffs did not allege facts sufficient to establish that they had a legal right to testator\u2019s interest in the Redfields partnership. Testator\u2019s gift of his Redfields, Inc. stock remained in testator\u2019s estate in specie as personal property at the time of his death and, therefore, did not adeem upon the dissolution and termination of Redfields, Inc.\n2. Appeal and Error\u2014 preservation of issues \u2014 no legal argument \u2014 assignment of error abandoned\nPlaintiffs\u2019 argument that the trial court erred by omitting testator\u2019s checking account from the list of assets it determined should pass under the laws of intestacy was deemed abandoned where plaintiffs provided no legal argument in their brief in support of the assignment of error.\n3. Appeal and Error\u2014 claims not before trial court \u2014 appellate issues not addressed\nThe trial court declined to address plaintiffs\u2019 remaining arguments in a wills case where the claims were neither alleged in plaintiffs\u2019 complaint nor considered nor determined by the trial court.\nOn remand from the North Carolina Supreme Court by Opinion filed 27 August 2010 with instructions to consider the merits of appeal by plaintiffs from judgment entered 18 July 2008 and from orders entered 16 February 2007, 20 February 2007, 15 November 2007, and 19 March 2008 by Judge Carl R. Fox in Orange County Superior Court.\nDonald M. Stanford, Jr., pro se, and for plaintiffs-appellants.\nHorack, Talley, Pharr & Lowndes, P.A., by Zipporah Basile Edwards and Robert B. McNeill, for defendants-appellees Oliver Johnson Paris, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estates of Charles Whitson Sanford, Jr. and Jane S. Paris, Stanford Place Limited Partnership (Oliver Johnson Paris, General Partner), and Jane S. Paris Family Trust (Oliver Johnson Paris, Trustee).\nPendergrass Law Firm, PLLC, by James K. Pendergrass, Jr., for defendants-appellees Edward N. Mann, III and spouse, Lindsay W. Mann.\nBums, Day & Presnell, P.A., by Lacy M. Presnell, III and James J. Mills, for defendants-appellees Jean S. Mann and spouse, Edward N. Mann, Jr., Jennifer Mann Hawley and spouse, Leon L. Hawley, Jr., and Charles S. Mann and spouse, Lori A. Mann.\nBoxley, Bolton, Garber & Haywood, L.L.P., by Kenneth C. Haywood, and Horack, Talley, Pharr & Lowndes, P.A., by Robert B. McNeill and Zipporah Basile Edwards, for defendantappellee Margaret M. Pless.\nEpting & Hackney, by Robert Epting and Ellen B. Scouten, for defendant-appellee Orange Water and Sewer Authority." }, "file_name": "0173-01", "first_page_order": 183, "last_page_order": 190 }