{ "id": 4181687, "name": "LYNDA SPRINGS, Plaintiff v. CITY OF CHARLOTTE, TRANSIT MANAGEMENT OF CHARLOTTE, INC., and DENNIS WAYNE NAPIER, Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "Springs v. City of Charlotte", "decision_date": "2011-01-18", "docket_number": "No. COA09-839", "first_page": "271", "last_page": "284", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "209 N.C. App. 271" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "618 S.E.2d 838", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633894 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "843" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/618/0838-01" ] }, { "cite": "663 S.E.2d 351", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12641513 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "353", "parenthetical": "quoting Miller v. Forsyth Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 173 N.C. App. 385, 391, 618 S.E.2d 838, 843 (2005)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/663/0351-01" ] }, { "cite": "657 S.E.2d 415", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12640477 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "417" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/657/0415-01" ] }, { "cite": "636 S.E.2d 808", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12637122, 12637123 ], "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/636/0808-01", "/se2d/636/0808-02" ] }, { "cite": "619 S.E.2d 516", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633983 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "520" }, { "page": "520-21", "parenthetical": "\"Section 7A-314(a) provides for the payment of witnesses who are in attendance at trial pursuant to a subpoena.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/619/0516-01" ] }, { "cite": "637 S.E.2d 299", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12637253 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "302" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/637/0299-01" ] }, { "cite": "657 S.E.2d 669", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12640566, 12640567 ], "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/657/0669-01", "/se2d/657/0669-02" ] }, { "cite": "362 N.C. 180", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 12640567 ], "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/657/0669-02" ] }, { "cite": "651 S.E.2d 395", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12639609 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "399", "parenthetical": "holding court erred in granting defendants' motion for JNOV where plaintiffs' expert testified to \" 'a high degree of certainty' \" as to cause of injury" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/651/0395-01" ] }, { "cite": "663 S.E.2d 450", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12641536 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "453" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/663/0450-01" ] }, { "cite": "655 S.E.2d 875", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12640275 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "878" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/655/0875-01" ] }, { "cite": "356 N.C. 667", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1511585, 1511553, 1511438, 1511279, 1511377 ], "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/356/0667-04", "/nc/356/0667-03", "/nc/356/0667-05", "/nc/356/0667-01", "/nc/356/0667-02" ] }, { "cite": "166 S.E.2d 663", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "670", "parenthetical": "internal citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "275 N.C. 250", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8558370 ], "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "260", "parenthetical": "internal citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/275/0250-01" ] }, { "cite": "173 N.C. 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App.", "case_ids": [ 8157293 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "417-18", "parenthetical": "holding court erred in granting defendants' motion for JNOV where plaintiffs' expert testified to \" 'a high degree of certainty' \" as to cause of injury" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/186/0412-01" ] }, { "cite": "581 S.E.2d 750", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "754", "parenthetical": "explaining that while \"an expert's 'speculation' is insufficient to establish causation,\" \"medical certainty is not required\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "357 N.C. 228", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 491657 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "234", "parenthetical": "explaining that while \"an expert's 'speculation' is insufficient to establish causation,\" \"medical certainty is not required\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/357/0228-01" ] }, { "cite": "127 S.E.2d 548", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1962, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "549" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "257 N.C. 767", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571181 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1962, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "767" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/257/0767-01" ] }, { "cite": "538 S.E.2d 912", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "915" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "353 N.C. 227", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 135777 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "231" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/353/0227-01" ] }, { "cite": "678 S.E.2d 232", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "363 N.C. 372", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "191 N.C. App. 367", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4158984 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "371-72" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/191/0367-01" ] }, { "cite": "342 S.E.2d 522", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "316 N.C. 549", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4698102 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/316/0549-01" ] }, { "cite": "336 S.E.2d 124", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "127-28", "parenthetical": "internal citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "77 N.C. App. 680", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525031 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "686", "parenthetical": "internal citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/77/0680-01" ] }, { "cite": "693 S.E.2d 640", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "644-45" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "363 N.C. 715", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4150995 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "722-23" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/363/0715-01" ] }, { "cite": "188 N.C. App. 430", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4156336 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "434" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/188/0430-01" ] }, { "cite": "683 S.E.2d 728", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "735", "parenthetical": "quoting Scarborough v. Dillard's Inc., 188 N.C. App. 430, 434, 655 S.E.2d 875, 878 (2008), rev'd on other grounds, 363 N.C. 715, 693 S.E.2d 640 (2009)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "200 N.C. App. 142", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4172009 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "149", "parenthetical": "quoting Scarborough v. Dillard's Inc., 188 N.C. App. 430, 434, 655 S.E.2d 875, 878 (2008), rev'd on other grounds, 363 N.C. 715, 693 S.E.2d 640 (2009)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/200/0142-01" ] }, { "cite": "576 S.E.2d 330", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "565 S.E.2d 248", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "252" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "151 N.C. App. 244", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. 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App. 404", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4167431 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "410" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/197/0404-01" ] }, { "cite": "522 S.E.2d 587", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 7, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "588" }, { "page": "588" }, { "page": "589" }, { "page": "589" }, { "page": "589-90" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "135 N.C. App. 784", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. 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App. 480", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4176757 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "494-95" }, { "page": "494-95" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/204/0480-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1334, "char_count": 34120, "ocr_confidence": 0.75, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.543093970602512e-08, "percentile": 0.5249070505654962 }, "sha256": "f18fddd311166541056a3073db7a656d2e4a51ce76c04b83724b9fb1423980cc", "simhash": "1:1bab5068f43b5c12", "word_count": 5586 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:06:47.704823+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges CALABRIA and STEPHENS concur." ], "parties": [ "LYNDA SPRINGS, Plaintiff v. CITY OF CHARLOTTE, TRANSIT MANAGEMENT OF CHARLOTTE, INC., and DENNIS WAYNE NAPIER, Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "GEER, Judge.\nDefendants City of Charlotte (\u201cthe City\u201d), Transit Management of Charlotte (\u201cTMOC\u201d), and Dennis Wayne Napier appeal from a judgment entered in a negligence action brought by plaintiff Lynda Springs following a motor vehicle accident. We uphold the trial court\u2019s denial of the motion for a directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict (\u201cJNOV\u201d) on the issue of permanent injuries, but we agree with defendants that the trial court erred in not providing a written opinion setting out its reasons for denying the JNOV motion with respect to the award of punitive damages as required by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 ID-50 (2009) and Hudgins v. Wagoner, 204 N.C. App. 480, 494-95, 694 S.E.2d 436, 447-48 (2010), disc. review denied, - N.C. \u2014, 706 S.E.2d 250 (2011). We also hold that the trial court did not fully comply with thestatutes governing awards of costs, and, therefore, on remand, the court must reconsider its costs decision in addition to providing a written opinion setting out its reasons for upholding the punitive damages award.\nFacts\nTMOC is a company that employs and manages bus drivers for the City. On 16 June 2004, Mr. Napier, an employee of TMOC, was operating a City bus within the course and scope of his employment when the bus rear-ended a van stopped at a red light at an intersection. Earl Springs, the driver of the rear-ended van, had been driving his wife, Mrs. Springs, home from a medical appointment. Mrs. Springs cannot walk and is wheelchair-bound due to Multiple Sclerosis (\u201cMS\u201d). Mrs. Springs was secured in her wheelchair beside her husband in the van.\nSeveral seconds after Mr. and Mrs. Springs stopped at the intersection, the bus driven by Mr. Napier slammed into the back of the van at a rate of speed somewhere between 25 and 45 miles per hour. After the impact, the van traveled about 342 feet, with the bus leaving 70 feet of skid marks and traveling 25 feet after impact.\nThe impact broke the back of Mrs. Springs\u2019 wheelchair, causing her to be catapulted into the back of the van, striking multiple parts of her body. Mrs. Springs was transported to Presbyterian Hospital, where she was examined by Dr. John Clark. Dr. Clark observed multiple lacerations caused by flying glass. He diagnosed Mrs: Springs with an acute cervical strain, a sprained dorsal spine, and contusions to the right shoulder and elbow.\nFive months later, in November 2004, Mrs. Springs was diagnosed with avascular necrosis in her right shoulder \u2014 a lack of blood supply to the bone resulting in a dying of the bone. She continues to have right shoulder and bilateral shoulder pain and limited range of motion. Prior to the collision, she was able to transfer herself to and from her wheelchair, cook, clean, assist in her bathing, change her catheter, and drive a motor vehicle unassisted. Since the collision, she has not been able to do these tasks because of the injuries and pain in her shoulders.\nOn 14 June 2007, Mrs. Springs filed suit against defendants, alleging negligence by defendants and negligent entrustment, hiring, and retention by TMOC and the City. At trial, defendants stipulated that Mr. Napier was negligent, that he collided with the Springs van, and that the collision caused injuries to Mrs. Springs. Defendants disputed, however, that any permanent conditions suffered by Mrs. Springs were caused by the accident. On 8 August 2008, the jury returned a verdict for Mrs. Springs against all defendants, awarding her $800,000.00 in compensatory damages. The jury also found that Mrs. Springs was injured by TMOC\u2019s willful or wanton conduct and was entitled to recover $250,000.00 from TMOC in punitive damages.\nThe trial court entered judgment on the verdict on 15 August 2008. On 21 August 2008, defendants filed a motion for JNOV and a motion for a new trial. Mrs. Springs filed a motion to tax costs against defendants on 21 August 2008 and an amended motion to tax costs on 25 August 2008. On 6 November 2008, the trial court entered an order granting Mrs. Springs costs in the amount of $58,034.17. The trial court also entered an order denying defendants\u2019 motions for JNOV and for a new trial. Defendants timely appealed to this Court.\nI\nDefendants first argue that the court erred in sending the issue of permanent injuries to the jury because Mrs. Springs failed to present sufficient evidence of causation of her injuries. This Court has explained:\nWith respect to the evidence sufficient to warrant an instruction as to permanency, our Supreme Court has made the following remarks:\nTo warrant an instruction permitting an award for permanent injuries, the evidence must show the permanency of the injury and that it proximately resulted from the wrongful act with reasonable certainty. While absolute certainty of the permanency of the injury and that it proximately resulted from the wrongful act need not be shown to support an instruction thereon, no such instruction should be given where the evidence respecting permanency and that it proximately resulted from the wrongful act is purely speculative or conjectural.\nShort v. Chapman, 261 N.C. 674, 682, 136 S.E.2d 40, 46-47 (1964). Thus, a permanency instruction is proper if there is sufficient evidence both as to (1) proximate cause and (2) the permanent nature of any injuries.\nMatthews v. Food Lion, Inc., 135 N.C. App. 784, 785, 522 S.E.2d 587, 588 (1999).\nIn this case, the issue is the sufficiency of Mrs. Springs\u2019 evidence of proximate causation of her injuries. Defendants argue that the evidence presented by Mrs. Springs regarding causation through Dr. David Kingery, a board-certified expert in orthopedics and one of Mrs. Springs\u2019 treating physicians, was merely \u201cspeculative.\u201d They contend that their expert evidence showed that the real causes of Mrs. Springs\u2019 shoulder condition were preexisting, progressive problems and that she would have been in the same condition even if the accident had never occurred. According to defendants, the trial court, therefore, erred in denying their motion for a directed verdict and their motion for JNOV on the issue of permanent injuries.\n\u201cThe standard of review of the denial of a motion for a directed verdict and of the denial of a motion for JNOV are identical. We must determine \u2018whether, upon examination of all the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and that party being given the benefit of every reasonable inference drawn therefrom and resolving all conflicts of any evidence in favor of the non-movant, the evidence is sufficient to be submitted to the jury.\u2019 \u201d Shelton v. Steelcase, Inc., 197 N.C. App. 404, 410, 677 S.E.2d 485, 491 (internal citation omitted) (quoting Denson v. Richmond County, 159 N.C. App. 408, 411, 583 S.E.2d 318, 320 (2003)), disc. review denied, 363 N.C. 583, 682 S.E.2d 389 (2009).\n\u201cA motion for either a directed verdict or JNOV \u2018should be denied if there is more than a scintilla of evidence supporting each element of the non-movant\u2019s claim.\u2019 \u201d Id. (quoting Branch v. High Rock Realty, Inc., 151 N.C. App. 244, 250, 565 S.E.2d 248, 252 (2002), disc. review denied, 356 N.C. 667, 576 S.E.2d 330 (2003)). \u201cA \u2018scintilla of evidence\u2019 is defined as \u2018very slight evidence.\u2019 \u201d Everhart v. O\u2019Charley\u2019s Inc., 200 N.C. App. 142, 149, 683 S.E.2d 728, 735 (2009) (quoting Scarborough v. Dillard\u2019s Inc., 188 N.C. App. 430, 434, 655 S.E.2d 875, 878 (2008), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 363 N.C. 715, 693 S.E.2d 640 (2009)).\nAt trial, Mrs. Springs presented sufficient evidence to permit a jury to attribute her avascular necrosis and right shoulder pain to the accident. Dr. Clark, who treated Mrs. Springs in the emergency room immediately after the accident, testified that he saw no indication of advanced avascular necrosis or arthritis in Mrs. Springs\u2019 right shoulder. He diagnosed Mrs. Springs as suffering a contusion of the right shoulder, as well as a contusion of her right elbow, an acute cervical strain, and a sprained dorsal spine. Photographs taken after the accident showed extensive bruising of both of Mrs. Springs\u2019 shoulders and arms.\nDr. Kingery saw Mrs. Springs on referral from her primary care physician for treatment of the pain in her right shoulder and right elbow. X-rays of her elbow were negative, causing him to conclude that her elbow pain was the result of a contusion. The x-rays of her shoulder, however, \u201cshowed arthritis, but showed a condition called avascular necrosis as a cause for that arthritis.\u201d He gave Mrs. Springs a \u201cdiagnosis [of] progressive arthritis due to avascular necrosis of the right shoulder.\u201d\nDr. Kingery saw no reference in Mrs. Springs\u2019 records, radiographs, or MRIs indicating that Mrs. Springs had been diagnosed with avascular necrosis of the right shoulder prior to the accident on 16 June 2004. Dr. Kingery acknowledged that avascular necrosis can have different causes, but identified two possible causes for Mrs. Springs\u2019 avascular necrosis: \u201cTrauma and in all likelihood, although I have not seen all of the evidence, prednisone usage for her MS or multiple sclerosis.\u201d Dr. Kingery was then asked, based on the facts of the collision and the examination by Dr. Clark in the emergency room, whether he had \u201ca medical opinion [he could] state with reasonable certainty as to whether or not the collision, and the injury she received in that collision, caused the avascular necrosis.\u201d Dr. Kingery responded: \u201cMy medical opinion is that the injury she experienced in her June \u2014 in June, either caused or aggravated a condition that resulted in [her] subsequent inability to use particularly her right arm for future function.\u201d\nDr. Frederick Pfeiffer, a neurologist who had treated Mrs. Springs for nearly 20 years, also testified that he was not aware of Mrs. Springs ever having been diagnosed with avascular necrosis prior to the accident. Further, he explained:\nMultiple sclerosis does not cause a vascular [sic] necrosis. There are medicines that we give that can cause a vascular [sic] necrosis, but [Mrs. Springs] hasn\u2019t had that very much. . . .\nMultiple sclerosis wouldn\u2019t cause pain that hurts when you move your arms or try to hold your arms over your head.\nAccording to Dr. Emmet Dyer, a neurosurgeon who treated Mrs. Springs, no MRI or x-ray of Mrs. Springs\u2019 shoulder that he had reviewed indicated that she ever had avascular necrosis prior to the accident. Dr. Dyer further explained that \u201c[b]ased on a reasonable degree of medical certainty, I do think that her cervical spondylosis and resulting pain was aggravated by a rear-end accident.\u201d\nDefendants, however, argue that Dr. Kingery\u2019s testimony as to the cause of Mrs. Springs\u2019 condition was merely speculative and insufficient to prove causation because other portions of his testimony \u201ctended to show his opinion was really a guess.\u201d In support of their position, defendants cite Sabol v. Parrish Realty of Zebulon, Inc., 77 N.C. App. 680, 686, 336 S.E.2d 124, 127-28 (1985) (internal citation omitted), aff\u2019d per curiam, 316 N.C. 549, 342 S.E.2d 522 (1986), in which the Court held: \u201cPlaintiff must not only show that the damage might have been caused because of the defendant\u2019s negligence, but must show by reasonable affirmative evidence that it did so originate. If all that can be said is that the defendant may have done the acts which caused the injury, and it is equally true that defendant may not have, then the evidence is merely conjectural and is not sufficient to go to the jury.\u201d\nIn this case, in contrast to Sabol, the expert witness testimony did not suggest that two potential causes of the avascular necrosis were equally possible. Although Dr. Kingery acknowledged that, as a general matter, there are various possible causes for avascular necrosis, he testified that, in his opinion, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, the accident caused or aggravated Mrs. Springs\u2019 condition.\nThis case is also unlike Azar v. Presbyterian Hosp., 191 N.C. App. 367, 663 S.E.2d 450 (2008), cert. denied, 363 N.C. 372, 678 S.E.2d 232 (2009), Young v. Hickory Bus. Furn., 353 N.C. 227, 538 S.E.2d 912 (2000), and Maharias v. Weathers Bros. Moving & Storage, 257 N.C. 767, 127 S.E.2d 548 (1962), the remaining cases upon which defendants rely. In Azar, the expert witness testified that the plaintiff\u2019s bedsores were \u201c \u2018at least one cause of infection\u2019 \u201d and that she died \u201c \u2018as a result of all of [her] complications,\u2019 \u201d but could not identify which complication was the ultimate cause of her death. 191 N.C. App. at 371-72, 663 S.E.2d at 453. In Young, the expert witness testified that there were several potential causes of the plaintiff\u2019s fibromyalgia other than her work-related back injury, but that he had not performed any testing to determine what was, in fact, the cause of her symptoms. 353 N.C. at 231, 538 S.E.2d at 915. And, in Maharias, the expert witness testified that a particular event \u201c \u2018could have\u2019 \u201d caused the injury and that it was \u201c \u2018possible\u2019 \u201d that it could have happened from any number of causes. 257 N.C. at 767, 127 S.E.2d at 549.\nHere, by contrast, Dr. Kingery had considered the possible causes of Mrs. Springs\u2019 right arm condition and, based on his review of the facts, his treatment of Mrs. Springs, and Mrs. Springs\u2019 history, ultimately testified to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that the accident caused or aggravated Mrs. Springs\u2019 condition. This testimony was not merely conjectural, but rather was sufficient evidence of causation supporting the court\u2019s decision to send the iss\u00fae to the jury. See Holley v. ACTS, Inc., 357 N.C. 228, 234, 581 S.E.2d 750, 754 (2003) (explaining that while \u201can expert\u2019s \u2018speculation\u2019 is insufficient to establish causation,\u201d \u201cmedical certainty is not required\u201d). See also Weaver v. Sheppa, 186 N.C. App. 412, 417-18, 651 S.E.2d 395, 399 (2007) (holding court erred in granting defendants\u2019 motion for JNOV where plaintiffs\u2019 expert testified to \u201c \u2018a high degree of certainty\u2019 \u201d as to cause of injury), disc. review allowed, 362 N.C. 180, 657 S.E.2d 669, aff\u2019d per curiam, 362 N.C. 341, 661 S.E.2d 733 (2008); Seay v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 180 N.C. App. 432, 436, 637 S.E.2d 299, 302 (2006) (\u201c \u2018In order to be sufficient to support a finding that a stated cause produced a stated result, evidence on causation must indicate a reasonable scientific probability that the stated cause produced the stated result.\u2019 \u201d (quoting Johnson v. Piggly Wiggly of Pinetops, Inc., 156 N.C. App. 42, 49, 575 S.E.2d 797, 802, disc. review denied, 357 N.C. 251, 582 S.E.2d 271 (2003))).\nDefendants point to Dr. Kingery\u2019s statement on cross-examination that prednisone usage \u201ccould\u201d have caused her avascular necrosis and argue that Dr. Kingery \u201cpresented only a choice of possibilities as to the cause of Mrs. Springs\u2019 pain.\u201d Matthews is, however, materially indistinguishable and controlling on this point.\nIn Matthews, 135 N.C. App. at 784-85, 522 S.E.2d at 588, a slip-and-fall case, the defendant argued that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to warrant an instruction as to the permanency of the plaintiff\u2019s injury. The Court rejected this argument based on an expert witness\u2019 testimony that, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, the plaintiff\u2019s fall caused her herniated disk, and she would continue to experience pain for the rest of her life as a result of the fall. Id. at 786, 522 S.E.2d at 589.\nThe defendant in Matthews, however, like defendants here, pointed to the expert witness\u2019 testimony on cross-examination regarding the plaintiff\u2019s prior history of back problems unrelated to the fall as \u201ceffectively nullifying] his testimony on direct regarding permanency and proximate cause.\u201d Id. On cross-examination, the expert witness had agreed that more likely than not the plaintiff\u2019s prior car injury would have led to future back pain and that even if she had not slipped and fallen, the plaintiff would have continued to suffer residual back pain unrelated to any fall at the defendant\u2019s store. Id. at 786-87, 522 S.E.2d at 589. This Court held that the cross-examination did not nullify the direct examination testimony because the expert witness \u201cneither corrected nor contradicted himself in his cross-examination.\u201d Id. at 787, 522 S.E.2d at 589-90.\nHere, Dr. Kingery, like the expert in Matthews, testified on direct examination to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that the accident caused or aggravated Mrs. Springs\u2019 right arm and shoulder condition. The evidence defendants point to on cross-examination that steroid use \u201ccould\u201d have caused the avascular necrosis did not \u201cnullify\u201d Dr. Kingery\u2019s direct testimony. Id. On direct examination, prior to giving his ultimate opinion on causation, Dr. Kingery had identified steroid use as one of two possible causes of Mrs. Springs\u2019 avascular necrosis, just as he did during cross-examination. On cross-examination, Dr. Kingery simply repeated the steroid possibility, but did not recant or in any way correct or contradict his opinion on direct examination that he believed the accident had in fact caused or aggravated the right shoulder condition.\nIn addition, in viewing the evidence presented at trial in the light most favorable to Mrs. Springs, we cannot consider Dr. Kingery\u2019s testimony in isolation. Dr. Pfeiffer testified-that although some medicines used to treat MS can cause avascular necrosis, Mrs. Springs \u201chasn\u2019t had that very much.\u201d Thus, although Dr. Kingery acknowledged that avascular necrosis can come from either trauma or steroids, Dr. Pfeiffer\u2019s testimony would permit a jury to find that Mrs. Springs had not taken enough steroids to cause avascular necrosis, leaving the trauma from the accident as the likely cause.\nDefendants also point to other evidence in the record that they contend supports their contention that Mrs. Springs\u2019 condition was not caused by the accident and that there were other \u201ccredible alternative explanations.\u201d This argument disregards the standard of review: \u201c[0]n a motion for directed verdict[,] conflicts in the evidence unfavorable to the plaintiff must be disregarded.\u201d Polk v. Biles, 92 N.C. App. 86, 88, 373 S.E.2d 570, 571 (1988), disc. review denied, 324 N.C. 337, 378 S.E.2d 798 (1989). Conflicts in the evidence and contradictions within a particular witness\u2019 testimony are \u201cfor the jury to resolve.\u201d Shields v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 61 N.C. App. 365, 374, 301 S.E.2d 439, 445, disc. review denied, 308 N.C. 678, 304 S.E.2d 759 (1983). Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying defendants\u2019 motion for a directed verdict and in instructing the jury on the issue of permanent injuries.\nII\nDefendant TMOC challenges the punitive damages award entered against it. Under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1D-I5(a) (2009), \u201c[p]unitive damages may be awarded only if the claimant proves that the defendant is liable for compensatory damages and that one of the following aggravating factors was present and was related to the injury for which compensatory damages were awarded: (1) Fraud[;] (2) Malice[; or] (3) Willful or wanton conduct.\u201d The plaintiff \u201cmust prove the existence of an aggravating factor by clear and convincing evidence.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1D-I5(b). In this case, Mrs. Springs contended that TMOC engaged in willful or wanton conduct.\nAfter the jury awarded punitive damages in the amount of $250,000.00, TMOC filed a motion for JNOV, asserting with respect to the punitive damages award that \u201c[t]here was no competent evidence of any willful or wanton conduct which would rise to a level allowing any punitive damages.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 ID-50 provides: \u201cWhen reviewing the evidence regarding a finding by the trier of fact concerning liability for punitive damages in accordance with G.S. 1D-I5(a), or regarding the amount of punitive damages awarded, the trial court shall state in a written opinion its reasons for upholding or disturbing the finding or award.\u201d We agree with TMOC\u2019s argument on appeal that the trial court failed to comply with N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 ID-50 because it did not set out in a written opinion its reasons for upholding the jury\u2019s punitive damages award.\nOur Supreme Court addressed the requirements of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 ID-50 in Scarborough v. Dillard\u2019s, Inc., 363 N.C. 715, 722-23, 693 S.E.2d 640, 644-45 (2009):\n[T]he language of [this] statute does not require findings of fact, but rather that the trial court \u201cshall state in a written opinion its reasons for upholding or disturbing the finding or award. In doing so, the court shall address with specificity the evidence, or lack thereof, as it bears on the liability for or the amount of punitive damages.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 ID-50. That the trial court utilizes findings to address with specificity the evidence bearing on liability for punitive damages is not improper; the \u201cfindings,\u201d however, merely provide a convenient format with which all trial judges are familiar to set out the evidence forming the basis of the judge\u2019s opinion. The trial judge does not determine the truth or falsity of the evidence or weigh the evidence, but simply recites the evidence, or lack thereof, forming the basis of the judge\u2019s opinion. As such, these findings are not binding on the appellate court even if unchallenged by the appellant. These findings do, however, provide valuable assistance to the appellate court in determining whether as a matter of law the evidence, when considered in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, is sufficient to be considered by the jury as clear and convincing on the issue of punitive damages.\n(Emphasis added.)\nThis Court recently applied Scarborough and N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 ID-50 in Hudgins, 204 N.C. App. at 494-95, 694 S.E.2d at 447. In Hudgins, as in this case, the trial court denied the defendants\u2019 motion for JNOV as to punitive damages, but it did not enter a written opinion stating its reasons for upholding the award. Id. at 495, 694 S.E.2d at 447. On appeal, this Court held: \u201cThe case sub judice does not contain a written opinion stating the trial court\u2019s reasons for upholding the final award. Pursuant to the Supreme Court\u2019s express holding [in Scarborough] and clear instruction based upon a statutory mandate, we are constrained to reverse the trial court\u2019s denial of defendants\u2019 motion for JNOV with respect to punitive damages, and we remand the matter for the limited purpose of entering a written opinion as to those damages in view of Scarborough.\u201d Id., 694 S.E.2d at 447-48. Because of the absence of a written opinion and the need for remand, the Court did not address the merits of the defendants\u2019 argument that there was insufficient evidence to support the punitive damages award.\nWe are bound by Scarborough and Hudgins. Since the trial court\u2019s order addressing defendants\u2019 motion for JNOV simply stated that the motion was denied without complying with N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 ID-50, we must remand to allow the trial court to enter a written opinion setting out its reasons for upholding the punitive damages award. We cannot address the merits of TMOC\u2019s arguments regarding the sufficiency of the evidence in the absence of the required written opinion.\nIII\nLastly, defendants argue that the trial court violated N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-305(d) (2009) by reimbursing Mrs. Springs for certain expert witness fees. In her motion for costs, Mrs. Springs sought a total of $58,099.92: $44,854.61 for subpoenaed expert witnesses\u2019 fees for time spent in trial preparation and at trial, $7,817.64 for deposition expenses, $740.75 for mediation expenses, $110.00 for a filing fee, and $4,576.92 for trial exhibits. The tri\u00e1l court granted her motion and awarded costs in the amount of $58,034.17.\nDefendants contend that under the amended version of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-305(d), effective 1 August 2007, they are liable only for the actual time spent by the experts testifying on the stand and that the trial court thus erred to the extent that its award covered the experts\u2019 time spent in preparation or waiting to testify. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-305(d) sets out the costs that the trial court is \u201crequired to assess.\u201d Lord v. Customized Consulting Specialty, Inc., 164 N.C. App. 730, 734, 596 S.E.2d 891, 895 (2004). Under the recently added N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-305(d)(ll), a trial court is required to assess costs for \u201c[Reasonable and necessary fees of expert witnesses solely for actual time spent providing testimony at trial, deposition, or other proceedings.\u201d We agree with defendants that, given the unambiguous language used, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-305(d)(ll) refers to an expert witness\u2019 actual time testifying and not any other time.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-305(d) may not, however, be read alone, but rather must be \u201cread in conjunction with\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-314 (2009), which governs fees for witnesses. Morgan v. Steiner, 173 N.C. App. 577, 583, 619 S.E.2d 516, 520 (2005), disc. review denied, 360 N.C. 648, 636 S.E.2d 808 (2006). N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-314(a) provides that a witness under subpoena \u201cshall be entitled to receive five dollars ($5.00) per day, or fraction thereof, during his attendance.\u201d Logically, as Morgan assumed, this provision allows for a fee for attendance at trial. 173 N.C. App. at 583-84, 619 S.E.2d at 520-21 (\u201cSection 7A-314(a) provides for the payment of witnesses who are in attendance at trial pursuant to a subpoena.\u201d).\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-314(d) \u201cmodifies\u201d \u00a7 7A-314(a) by permitting the trial court, in its discretion, to increase a subpoenaed expert witness\u2019 compensation for attendance at trial. State v. Johnson, 282 N.C. 1, 27-28, 191 S.E.2d 641, 659 (1972). See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-314(d) (\u201cAn expert witness . . . shall receive such compensation and allowances as the court..., in its discretion, may authorize.\u201d). As this Court has explained, \u201c[t]he public policy\u201d underlying the rule allowing payment of a fee to subpoenaed witnesses, including expert witnesses, \u201cis that a witness should be compensated for what.he is obligated by the State to do.\u201d Greene v. Hoekstra, 189 N.C. App. 179, 181, 657 S.E.2d 415, 417 (2008).\nDefendants\u2019 argument addresses only N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A- 305(d)(ll) and not N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-314. If we were to accept defendants\u2019 contention that a trial court may only include within an award of costs expert witness compensation for time spent actually testifying, we would effectively render meaningless N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-314(d). Under established principles of statutory construction, \u201c[a] statute is not deemed to be repealed merely by the enactment of another statute on the same subject. The later statute on the same subject does not repeal the earlier if both can stand, or where they are cumulative, and the court will give effect to statutes covering the same subject matter where they are not absolutely irreconcilable and when no purpose of repeal is clearly indicated.\u201d Person v. Garrett, 280 N.C. 163, 165-66, 184 S.E.2d 873, 874 (1971).\nSince, when the General Assembly amended N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-305, it left N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-314 intact, it must have intended that \u00a7 7A-314 continue to have meaning. Significantly, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 6-20 (2009) specifically anticipates that N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-305(d) will not necessarily be the only statute addressing a trial court\u2019s authority to award costs: \u201cCosts awarded by the court are subject to the limitations on assessable or recoverable costs set forth in G.S. 7A-305(d), unless specifically provided for otherwise in the General Statutes.\u201d (Emphasis added.) This Court has, in fact, recently held: \u201cAs \u00a7 7A-305(d)(ll) now codifies the trial court\u2019s authority to award discretionary expert witness fees (formerly read into subsection (1)) the statutory provision for expert witness fees must likewise be read in conjunction with \u00a77A-314.\u201d Jarrell v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hosp. Auth., 206 N.C. App. 559, 563, 698 S.E.2d 190, 193 (2010).\nWe believe that N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-305(d)(ll) and N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-314 can both be given effect. If a cost is set forth in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-305(d), \u201c \u2018the trial court is required to assess the item as costs.\u2019 \u201d Priest v. Safety-Kleen Sys., Inc., 191 N.C. App. 341, 343, 663 S.E.2d 351, 353 (2008) (quoting Miller v. Forsyth Mem\u2019l Hosp., Inc., 173 N.C. App. 385, 391, 618 S.E.2d 838, 843 (2005)). Accordingly, under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-305(d)(11), a trial court is required to include within an award of costs expert fees for time spent by the witness actually testifying. In addition, however, under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-314(d), the trial court has discretion to award expert fees for an expert witness\u2019 time in attendance at trial even when not testifying. Further, the trial court has discretion to award travel expenses for experts as provided under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-314(b).\nNevertheless, we find no authority in the current statutes authorizing the trial court to assess costs for an expert witness\u2019 preparation time. Despite Mrs. Springs\u2019 argument to the contrary, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-305(d)(l), which provides for an award of \u201c[w]itness fees, as provided by law,\u201d does not authorize the trial court to award any fees for expert witnesses. It is well established that \u201ca section of a statute dealing with a specific situation controls, with respect to that situation, other sections which are general in their application. In such situation the specially treated situation is regarded as an exception to the general provision.\u201d State ex rel. Utils. Comm\u2019n v. Lumbee River Elec. Membership Corp., 275 N.C. 250, 260, 166 S.E.2d 663, 670 (1969) (internal citation omitted). Consequently, \u00a7 7A-305(d)(11) controls over the more general \u00a7 7A-305(d)(1).\nThe trial court erred to the extent that it awarded as costs expert witness fees not specifically provided for by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-305(d)(ll) or \u00a7 7A-314. We, therefore, reverse the award of costs and remand for reconsideration in light of the controlling statutes.\nAffirmed in part; reversed and remanded in part.\nJudges CALABRIA and STEPHENS concur.\n. Although defendants, at times, articulate the issue as an error in the jury instructions, it is apparent from defendants\u2019 arguments that they are actually contending that Mrs. Springs failed to prove causation.\n. On this issue, Mrs. Springs argues alternatively that the trial court erred in excluding portions of the testimony of Dr. Dyer and that the excluded evidence would have provided further support regarding causation. Because that testimony was never considered by the jury, this argument cannot provide an alternative ground for upholding the decision below, but rather would be appropriate under N.C.R. App. P. 28(c) as an argument for allowing a new trial instead of ordering entry of a JNOV for defendants (relief not sought by Mrs. Springs). Since we have upheld the trial court\u2019s decision based on the existing evidence, we do not address this issue.\n. On this issue, Mrs. Springs also contends the trial court should have allowed her to present evidence of additional collisions caused by Napier after her collision. Although Mrs. Springs offers this argument as an alternative basis for upholding the punitive damages award, citing former N.C.R. App. P. 10(d), we fail to see how evidence never heard by the jury can be used to support the jury\u2019s verdict. Although this argument could be asserted as a basis for a new trial, pursuant to N.C.R. App. P. 28(c), we do not address the issue as we are remanding the punitive damages issue to the trial court.\n. Although defendants generally state in their appellate brief that the trial court was not authorized to award \u201c \u2018additional cost[s]\u2019 \u201d (which, in Mrs. Springs\u2019 motion, referred to the filing fee and exhibit costs), defendants do not articulate any basis for overturning the award as to those costs. Defendants only specifically challenge the award with respect to costs for expert witnesses. We, therefore, address solely this issue and express no opinion as to any other issues defendants could have raised.", "type": "majority", "author": "GEER, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "The Odom Firm, PLLC, by T. LaFontine Odom, Sr., Thomas L. Odom, Jr., and David W. Murray, for plaintiff-appellee.", "Robert D. McDonnell for defendants-appellants Transit Management of Charlotte, Inc. and the City of Charlotte; and Frank B. Aycock, II for defendant-appellant Dennis Wayne Napier." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "LYNDA SPRINGS, Plaintiff v. CITY OF CHARLOTTE, TRANSIT MANAGEMENT OF CHARLOTTE, INC., and DENNIS WAYNE NAPIER, Defendants\nNo. COA09-839\n(Filed 18 January 2011)\n1. Medical Malpractice\u2014 causation \u2014 sufficiency of the evidence\nThere was sufficient evidence of causation in an automobile accident case to deny defendants\u2019 motion for a directed verdict and send the case to the jury where defendants contended that a preexisting condition made the evidence of causation speculative. Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, an expert who had been one of plaintiff\u2019s treating physicians considered the possible causes of plaintiff\u2019s condition and, based on his review of the facts, plaintiff\u2019s history, and his treatment of plaintiff, testified to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that the accident caused or aggravated plaintiff\u2019s condition. Conflicts in the evidence are for the jury.\n2. Damages and Remedies\u2014 punitive \u2014 JNOV denied \u2014 no written opinion\nA punitive damages award in an automobile accident case was remanded where defendants\u2019 motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict was denied without a written opinion stating the reasons for upholding the final award, as required by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 ID-50.\n3. Costs\u2014 expert witness \u2014 time preparing, at trial, and testifying \u2014 travel expenses\nThe trial court must include in an award of costs expert fees for time spent testifying (N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-305(d)), and has the discretion to award expert fees for time attending at trial when not testifying (N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-314(d)) and travel expenses (N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-314(b)). However, there was no authority to assess costs for an expert\u2019s preparation time.\nAppeal by defendants from judgment entered 15 August 2008 and orders entered 6 November 2008 by Judge Timothy L. Patti in Mecklenburg Cpunty Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 14 January 2010.\nThe Odom Firm, PLLC, by T. LaFontine Odom, Sr., Thomas L. Odom, Jr., and David W. Murray, for plaintiff-appellee.\nRobert D. McDonnell for defendants-appellants Transit Management of Charlotte, Inc. and the City of Charlotte; and Frank B. Aycock, II for defendant-appellant Dennis Wayne Napier." }, "file_name": "0271-01", "first_page_order": 281, "last_page_order": 294 }