{ "id": 4181551, "name": "LILLIAN DENISE LUCAS, Plaintiff v. DELANO THADDEUS LUCAS, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "Lucas v. Lucas", "decision_date": "2011-02-15", "docket_number": "No. COA09-1004", "first_page": "492", "last_page": "507", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "209 N.C. App. 492" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "631 S.E.2d 156", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12636078 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "163", "parenthetical": "remanding for further findings of fact concerning duration of alimony award where court ordered alimony to \"continue until the death of one of the parties, or plaintiff's remarriage or cohabitation, but failed to make any finding about the reasons for this duration\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/631/0156-01" ] }, { "cite": "657 S.E.2d 724", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12640577 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "731", "parenthetical": "remanding where court found \"plaintiff had the ability to pay [$650 monthly alimony] amount, but provided no explanation as to why it had concluded that defendant was entitled to that specific amount\"" }, { "page": "731", "parenthetical": "remanding where trial court ordered alimony to continue until death or remarriage of defendant but \"included no findings of fact at all to explain its rationale for the duration of the award\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/657/0724-01" ] }, { "cite": "660 S.E.2d 212", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12640855 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "217" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/660/0212-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-200", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "550 S.E.2d 536", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "538", "parenthetical": "remanding for further findings of fact when trial court made finding as to amount of plaintiff's income, but gave \"no indication as to how [plaintiff's income] was calculated\" and Court, therefore, could not \"confirm or deny this finding\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "145 N.C. App. 478", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11438654 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "480", "parenthetical": "remanding for further findings of fact when trial court made finding as to amount of plaintiff's income, but gave \"no indication as to how [plaintiff's income] was calculated\" and Court, therefore, could not \"confirm or deny this finding\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/145/0478-01" ] }, { "cite": "324 S.E.2d 829", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "832-33", "parenthetical": "emphasis original" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 N.C. 770", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4755941 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "776-77", "parenthetical": "emphasis original" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/312/0770-01" ] }, { "cite": "588 S.E.2d 517", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "523", "parenthetical": "remanding where court \"did not make required findings as to the reasons for making the duration of the alimony continuous until defendant dies, remarries, or cohabits\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "161 N.C. App. 414", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8958189 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "421-22", "parenthetical": "remanding where court \"did not make required findings as to the reasons for making the duration of the alimony continuous until defendant dies, remarries, or cohabits\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/161/0414-01" ] }, { "cite": "178 N.C. App. 251", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8377203 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "264" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/178/0251-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-16.9", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 4, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(b)", "parenthetical": "providing that alimony \"shall terminate\" upon remarriage or cohabitation of dependent spouse or upon death of either supporting or dependent spouse" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "279 S.E.2d 356", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "302 N.C. 402", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567083, 8567051, 8567132, 8567023 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/302/0402-03", "/nc/302/0402-02", "/nc/302/0402-04", "/nc/302/0402-01" ] }, { "cite": "272 S.E.2d 11", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "16" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "49 N.C. App. 516", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8522434 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "523" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/49/0516-01" ] }, { "cite": "509 S.E.2d 460", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "462", "parenthetical": "ordering trial court, on remand, to \"make a new award of alimony and make specific findings justifying that award, both as to amount and duration\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "131 N.C. App. 867", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11207054 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "871", "parenthetical": "ordering trial court, on remand, to \"make a new award of alimony and make specific findings justifying that award, both as to amount and duration\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/131/0867-01" ] }, { "cite": "189 N.C. App. 65", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4156933 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "76", "parenthetical": "remanding where court found \"plaintiff had the ability to pay [$650 monthly alimony] amount, but provided no explanation as to why it had concluded that defendant was entitled to that specific amount\"" }, { "page": "76-77" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/189/0065-01" ] }, { "cite": "190 N.C. App. 165", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4157798 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "172" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/190/0165-01" ] }, { "cite": "294 S.E.2d 321", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "324", "parenthetical": "rejecting defendant's argument that alimony findings of fact were inadequate to determine fairness of award that included homeowner's insurance and medical insurance benefits" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "58 N.C. App. 645", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525894 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "649", "parenthetical": "rejecting defendant's argument that alimony findings of fact were inadequate to determine fairness of award that included homeowner's insurance and medical insurance benefits" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/58/0645-01" ] }, { "cite": "306 S.E.2d 140", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "141", "parenthetical": "affirming order \"requiring plaintiff to pay $2,141 a month and provide her with a car and medical insurance\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "63 N.C. App. 728", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526208 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "728", "parenthetical": "affirming order \"requiring plaintiff to pay $2,141 a month and provide her with a car and medical insurance\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/63/0728-01" ] }, { "cite": "2009 WL 2370613", "category": "reporters:specialty_west", "reporter": "WL", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "*5", "parenthetical": "unpublished" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "681 S.E.2d 866", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "unpublished" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "198 N.C. App. 703", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "unpublished" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "295 S.E.2d 764", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "306 N.C. 752", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8574939, 8574900, 8574909, 8574924 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/306/0752-04", "/nc/306/0752-01", "/nc/306/0752-02", "/nc/306/0752-03" ] }, { "cite": "294 S.E.2d 29", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "32" }, { "page": "33", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "58 N.C. App. 524", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525435 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "528" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/58/0524-01" ] }, { "cite": "455 S.E.2d 156", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "340 N.C. 97", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 790217 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/340/0097-01" ] }, { "cite": "442 S.E.2d 90", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "92", "parenthetical": "\"The purpose of alimony is to provide support and maintenance for the dependent spouse.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "114 N.C. App. 360", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527578 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "363", "parenthetical": "\"The purpose of alimony is to provide support and maintenance for the dependent spouse.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/114/0360-01" ] }, { "cite": "205 S.E.2d 547", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "549", "parenthetical": "remanding where Court was \"unable to determine by appellate review the basic facts upon which the trial court predicated its award\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "21 N.C. App. 674", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8557308 ], "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "676", "parenthetical": "remanding where Court was \"unable to determine by appellate review the basic facts upon which the trial court predicated its award\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/21/0674-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 S.E.2d 72", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "320 N.C. 791", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4726496, 4728836, 4728269, 4727919, 4726801 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/320/0791-05", "/nc/320/0791-02", "/nc/320/0791-04", "/nc/320/0791-01", "/nc/320/0791-03" ] }, { "cite": "356 S.E.2d 821", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "822" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "86 N.C. App. 225", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12127229 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "227" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/86/0225-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-16.4", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 75-16.1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 75-1.1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "unfair and deceptive trade practices" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "695 S.E.2d 442", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "447" }, { "page": "448" }, { "page": "448" }, { "page": "448" }, { "page": "448" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "364 N.C. 195", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4152823 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "202" }, { "page": "203-04" }, { "page": "204" }, { "page": "204" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/364/0195-01" ] }, { "cite": "677 S.E.2d 462", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "465" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "196 N.C. App. 770", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4166550 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "774" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/196/0770-01" ] }, { "cite": "276 S.E.2d 718", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "722", "parenthetical": "\"The order appealed from in the case subjudice does not state that the judge found no just cause for delay. Consequently, the order is not an immediately appealable 'final judgment' under Rule 54(b)[.]\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "51 N.C. App. 264", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 2646181 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "266-67", "parenthetical": "\"The order appealed from in the case subjudice does not state that the judge found no just cause for delay. Consequently, the order is not an immediately appealable 'final judgment' under Rule 54(b)[.]\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/51/0264-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-20", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 6, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(c)" }, { "page": "(c)" }, { "page": "(c)" }, { "page": "(c)(l)" }, { "page": "(c)" }, { "page": "(c) and (j)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-16", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 13, "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1159, "char_count": 37287, "ocr_confidence": 0.739, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.610934144688933e-08, "percentile": 0.4503432439497438 }, "sha256": "e7476a5ef8477ffc0864becb538185092f649bcebf078da7909cb8ca09f1b656", "simhash": "1:c3eb742a7ece1dd2", "word_count": 6009 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:06:47.704823+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges McGEE and ERVIN concur." ], "parties": [ "LILLIAN DENISE LUCAS, Plaintiff v. DELANO THADDEUS LUCAS, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "GEER, Judge.\nDefendant Delano Thaddeus Lucas appeals from an equitable distribution and alimony order and judgment. This appeal demonstrates the importance of adequate findings of fact to permit proper appellate review. Without findings of fact setting out the basis for a trial court\u2019s decision, we are unable to determine whether that decision is supported by the evidence, whether it is consistent with the law, and whether it amounts to a reasonable exercise of the trial court\u2019s discretion. The order may be perfectly appropriate, but without proper findings of fact, we are not in a position to make that determination.\nIn this case, we hold, contrary to defendant\u2019s position, that the trial court could, as a general matter, properly include in an award of alimony a requirement that defendant provide plaintiff Lillian Denise Lucas with health insurance coverage. The trial court\u2019s order, however, failed to include any findings of fact to support that portion of its award. In addition, the trial court failed to make adequate findings of fact regarding (1) its determination that defendant engaged in marital misconduct and (2) the duration of the alimony payments. We similarly have concluded that the trial court\u2019s equitable distribution decision lacks adequate findings of fact to explain the basis for the trial court\u2019s distribution of assets and liabilities between the parties. We, therefore, reverse the order and judgment and remand for further findings of fact.\nFacts\nPlaintiff and defendant were married on 31 December 1986 and separated on 31 December 2006. On 13 May 2008, plaintiff filed a complaint for divorce from bed and board, postseparation support, alimony, equitable distribution, and attorneys\u2019 fees. A pretrial order was filed on 29 January 2009. As part of the pretrial order, the parties reached an agreement as to the value, classification, and distribution of most, but not all, of their marital property.\nFollowing a hearing on 29 January 2009, at which the trial court considered the testimony, affidavits, and stipulations of the parties, as well as the pretrial order, the court made the following unchallenged findings of fact. Plaintiff, who has a high school diploma and completed one semester of college, worked for the Cumberland County School System for several years as a teacher\u2019s assistant and data manager making up to $2,048.50 per month until 14 August 2006, when she was hospitalized for 12 days for a nervous breakdown and depression. Plaintiff continues to suffer from depression and receives treatment from psychiatrists, psychologists, and medical doctors for her mental condition and accompanying physical symptoms. She has been prescribed over a dozen medications for daily use to treat depression, anxiety, insomnia, itching, acid reflux, digestive conditions, headaches, allergies, and shaking.\nPlaintiff had been treated for depression for approximately 10 years prior to the date of separation. The first onset of depression occurred at about the same time plaintiff discovered defendant was having affairs with other women. Subsequently, in 2006, plaintiff discovered emails defendant had sent to another woman expressing his love for that woman. Plaintiff also discovered that defendant had sent flowers to another woman, along with a note marking their nine-year anniversary.\nCurrently, plaintiff remains out of work, not having worked since her hospitalization. Plaintiff has been denied Social Security disability benefits. She lives with her mother, and her only sources of income since the date of separation have been unemployment benefits, babysitting money from her adult daughter ($80.00 per week for six months), and $10,000.00 in temporary disability benefits received in 2008. Plaintiff submitted an affidavit showing that her monthly living expenses are $2,200.00 and that she was not receiving any income at the time of the hearing.\nDefendant has worked for UPS as a driver for 39 Vz years and currently earns $72,000.00 per year. In addition, he receives health insurance and pension contributions through his employment.\nThe court ultimately concluded that plaintiff is a dependent spouse and is actually substantially dependent on defendant for maintenance and support, while defendant is a supporting spouse pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-16.1A (2009). The court ordered that defendant pay plaintiff alimony in the amount of $1,750.00 per month, as well as provide her with health insurance coverage.\nWith respect to equitable distribution, the trial court found that \u201can unequal distribution of marital property is equitable given the following distributional factors pursuant to [N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-20(c) (2009)]: the income, property and liabilities of the parties; the duration of the marriage; the separate pensions of the parties; and the physical and mental health of the parties.\u201d The decretal portion of the judgment stated that plaintiff \u201cshall have and recover as part of her equitable share of the marital property and debts\u201d marital assets in the amount of $43,294.50 and marital liabilities in the amount of $10,261.22, resulting in net marital property of $33,033.28. The court provided that defendant\u2019s equitable share of the marital property and debts included $55,161.02 in marital assets and $27,027.00 in marital liabilities. The order and judgment then erroneously recited that defendant was receiving $30,134.02 in net marital property.\nThe judgment was entered on 27 February 2009. The order and judgment stated at the end: \u201cThis Order and Judgment is certified as a final judgment pursuant to rule 54(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure.\u201d Defendant appealed to this Court on 30 March 2009.\nJurisdiction\nAlthough the judgment in this case resolved the claims for alimony and equitable distribution, it did not resolve plaintiff\u2019s claim for attorneys\u2019 fees. Given that the record on appeal indicates that the attorneys\u2019 fees claim is still pending, we must, as an initial matter, address whether this appeal is interlocutory.\nThe trial court purported to certify the order and judgment for immediate appeal pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 54(b) provides, however, that \u201cthe court may enter a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only if there is no just reason for delay and it is so determined in the judgment.\u201d (Emphasis added.) In the absence of a specific finding that \u201cthere is no just reason for delay,\u201d this Court does not have jurisdiction to hear an interlocutory appeal under Rule 54(b). See Cunningham v. Brown, 51 N.C. App. 264, 266-67, 276 S.E.2d 718, 722 (1981) (\u201cThe order appealed from in the case subjudice does not state that the judge found no just cause for delay. Consequently, the order is not an immediately appealable \u2018final judgment\u2019 under Rule 54(b)[.]\u201d). Some other basis must exist for appellate jurisdiction.\nPreviously, this Court has held that an appeal from an alimony order must be dismissed as interlocutory when there is still pending a claim for attorneys\u2019 fees. See Webb v. Webb, 196 N.C. App. 770, 774, 677 S.E.2d 462, 465 (2009). Our Supreme Court, however, in Bumpers v. Cmty. Bank of N. Va., 364 N.C. 195, 202, 695 S.E.2d 442, 447 (2010), questioned Webb, which it described as following a case-by-case approach, and adopted a new rule for determining whether an appeal may proceed when the only remaining claim is one for attorneys\u2019 fees.\nThe Court specifically rejected the case-by-case approach in favor of a \u201cbright-line rule\u201d: when a claim for attorneys\u2019 fees under a particular statute \u201cis not a substantive issue, or in any way part of the merits\u201d of the complaint, then finality of judgment is not precluded. Id. at 204, 695 S.E.2d at 448. In Bumpers, the Supreme Court addressed the propriety of an appeal from a judgment under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 75-1.1 (2009) (unfair and deceptive trade practices) while a claim remained pending for attorneys\u2019 fees under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 75-16.1 (2009). The Court held that because \u201ca party must show that it has prevailed on the substantive claim under section 75-1.1, and that one of the two factors enumerated [in section 75-16.1] exists,... a claim for attorney fees under section 75-16.1 is not a substantive issue, or in any way part of the merits of a claim under section 75-1.1.\u201d Bumpers, 364 N.C. at 203-04, 695 S.E.2d at 448. Accordingly, under the Court\u2019s bright-line rule, a pending claim for attorneys\u2019 fees under \u00a7 75-16.1 does not preclude finality of a judgment resolving all substantive issues of a claim under \u00a7 75-1.1. Bumpers, 364 N.C. at 204, 695 S.E.2d at 448.\nThe attorneys\u2019 fees statute at issue in this case, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-16.4 (2009) (emphasis added), provides that \u201c[a]t any time that a dependent spouse would be entitled to alimony pursuant to G.S. 50-16.3A,... the court may, upon application of such spouse, enter an order for reasonable counsel fees for the benefit of such spouse, to be paid and secured by the supporting spouse in the same manner as alimony.\u201d See also Caldwell v. Caldwell, 86 N.C. App. 225, 227, 356 S.E.2d 821, 822 (\u201cTo recover attorney\u2019s fees pursuant to G.S. 50-16.4 in an action for alimony, the spouse must be entitled to the relief demanded . . . .\u201d), cert. denied, 320 N.C. 791, 361 S.E.2d 72 (1987). Since a claim for attorneys\u2019 fees under \u00a7 50-16.4 is contingent upon the claimant prevailing on the alimony claim, we conclude, in accordance with Bumpers, that a \u00a7 50-16.4 claim \u201cis not a substantive issue, or in any way part of the merits of a claim under\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-16.3A (2009). Bumpers, 364 N.C. at 204, 695 S.E.2d at 448.\nThus, an unresolved claim for attorneys\u2019 fees under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-16.4 does not preclude a determination of finality for a judgment resolving all substantive issues related to a claim for alimony or alimony together with equitable distribution. In this case, aside from the attorneys\u2019 fees issue, there were no unresolved substantive issues, and, therefore, the alimony and equitable distribution judgment was a final judgment, and this appeal is properly before the Court.\nAlimony\nA. Marital Misconduct\nWe first address defendant\u2019s challenge to the trial court\u2019s conclusion that \u201can award of alimony is equitable considering all relevant factors including: the marital misconduct of the Defendant, relative earnings and earning capacity of the parties, the ages and physical, mental and emotional health of the parties and the length of the marriage (20 years).\u201d (Emphasis added.) Defendant contends that the trial court erred in failing to specifically identify the nature of the misconduct and that, in any event, the evidence in this case did not support a finding of marital misconduct.\nUnder N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-16.3A(a), \u201c[t]he court shall award alimony to the dependent spouse upon a finding that one spouse is a dependent spouse, that the other spouse is a supporting spouse, and that an award of alimony is equitable after considering all relevant factors, including those set out in\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-16.3A(b). N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-16.3A(b) provides that \u201c[i]n determining the amount, duration, and manner of payment of alimony, the court shall consider all relevant factors, including,\u201d among 16 specified factors, \u201cmarital misconduct of either of the spouses,\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-16.3A(b)(l).\n\u201cMarital misconduct,\u201d in turn, is defined as \u201cany\u201d of a list of nine types of behaviors occurring \u201cduring the marriage and prior to or on the date of separation.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-16.1A(3). The list includes \u201c[illicit sexual behavior,\u201d defined as \u201cacts of sexual or deviate sexual intercourse, deviate sexual acts, or sexual acts defined in G.S. 14-27.1(4), voluntarily engaged in by a spouse with someone other than the other spouse.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-16.1A(3)(a). It also includes \u201c[i]ndignities rendering the condition of the other spouse intolerable and life burdensome.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-16.lA(3)(f).\nThe order and judgment in this case does not specify what type of \u201cmarital misconduct\u201d the trial court found had occurred. While defendant argues that the findings and evidence do not establish illicit sexual behavior, it may be that the trial court found the existence of indignities. We cannot determine the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding of marital misconduct without knowing which form of marital misconduct the trial court believed occurred and the basic facts supporting that determination. See Briggs v. Briggs, 21 N.C. App. 674, 676, 205 S.E.2d 547, 549 (1974) (remanding where Court was \u201cunable to determine by appellate review the basic facts upon which the trial court predicated its award\u201d). Accordingly, we must reverse the award of alimony and remand for further findings of fact regarding the issue of marital misconduct.\nB. Health Insurance\nNext, defendant challenges the portion of the alimony award requiring defendant to \u201ccontinue to maintain health insurance coverage on\u201d plaintiff. The decretal portion of the order and judgment provided that, \u201c[a]s and in the nature of ALIMONY,\u201d defendant \u201cshall continue to maintain health insurance coverage on the Plaintiff and shall provide to her any and all information and documentation so as to enable her to submit claims on said insurance and/or receive payments and/or reimbursement from claims submitted to the insurance company by her or on her behalf.\u201d Defendant first contends that such an award is not authorized by statute and that the trial court, therefore, exceeded its authority by making this award.\nUnder N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-16.1A(a), alimony is defined as \u201can order for payment for the support and maintenance of a spouse or former spouse, periodically or in a lump sum, for a specified or for an indefinite term, ordered in an action for divorce, whether absolute or from bed and board, or in an action for alimony without divorce.\u201d See also Potts v. Tutterow, 114 N.C. App. 360, 363, 442 S.E.2d 90, 92 (1994) (\u201cThe purpose of alimony is to provide support and maintenance for the dependent spouse.\u201d), aff\u2019d, 340 N.C. 97, 455 S.E.2d 156 (1995). The question here is whether health insurance comes within the meaning of a payment for \u201csupport and maintenance\u201d for purposes of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-16.1A(a) and \u00a7 50-16.3A(a).\nAlthough our courts have not directly addressed this issue, in Whedon v. Whedon, 58 N.C. App. 524, 528, 294 S.E.2d 29, 32, disc. review denied, 306 N.C. 752, 295 S.E.2d 764 (1982), the trial court entered an alimony award that, in part, ordered the husband to transfer possession of one of his cars to the wife and ordered the husband to pay the wife\u2019s automobile liability and collision insurance. On appeal, this Court rejected the husband\u2019s challenge to the insurance payment requirement, holding: \u201cThe insurance payment was a proper incident of the sequestration of the automobile, which was entirely discretionary with the trial court.\u201d Id. The Court also overruled the husband\u2019s challenge to the portion of the order requiring him to pay the wife\u2019s mortgage payments, ad valorem property taxes, and hazard insurance, \u201cfind[ing] no abuse of discretion in the requirement that [the husband] make the necessary mortgage, tax, and insurance payments on the house.\u201d Id. at 529, 294 S.E.2d at 33 (emphasis added). Thus, according to Whedon, automobile and homeowner\u2019s insurance payments are permissible as part of an alimony award.\nConsistent with Whedon, Lee\u2019s North Carolina Family Law explains that a trial court may award as alimony various types of payments, including insurance premiums:\nThe court\u2019s decision to award title or possession of certain property may lead it to order other kinds of alimony as well. For example, a decision to order possession of the marital home may lead the court to order the supporting spouse to make the mortgage payments and pay property taxes; the decision to order possession of an automobile may lead the court to order the supporting spouse also to pay for liability and collision insurance as alimony.\n2 Suzanne Reynolds, Lee\u2019s North Carolina Family Law \u00a7 9.54, at 419 (5th ed. 1999).\nHealth insurance, we believe, is indistinguishable from other types of insurance recognized as permissible forms of support and maintenance. Since a trial court may order a supporting spouse to make homeowner\u2019s and automobile insurance payments on behalf of a dependent spouse, even though such payments are not explicitly authorized under \u00a7 50-16.lA(a) or \u00a7 50-16.3A(a), we conclude that a court may also order a supporting spouse to pay for health insurance for a dependent spouse.\nIn support of his contention, defendant relies on Michael v. Michael, 198 N.C. App. 703, 681 S.E.2d 866, 2009 WL 2370613, *5, 2009 N.C. App. LEXIS 1233, *13 (Aug. 4, 2009) (unpublished), arguing that it \u201cimplies that the award of health insurance is something other than alimony.\u201d Although Michael, as an unpublished opinion, is not controlling, we do not, in any event, agree with defendant\u2019s reading of the opinion. In Michael, the parties had signed a \u201cSeparation and Property Settlement Agreement\u201d in which the parties waived, alimony. This Court simply affirmed the trial court\u2019s order finding that the defendant\u2019s obligation to provide for the plaintiff\u2019s health insurance was not alimony, but, instead, was part of the parties\u2019 property settlement. Nothing in Michael suggests that, in the absence of an agreement waiving alimony, a trial court is prohibited from ordering health insurance coverage as part of an alimony award.\nMoreover, we note that this Court has, on occasion, affirmed alimony orders requiring health insurance payments without discussing whether those payments were authorized under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-16.lA(a) and \u00a7 50-16.3A(a). See Ahern v. Ahern, 63 N.C. App. 728, 728, 306 S.E.2d 140, 141 (1983) (affirming order \u201crequiring plaintiff to pay $2,141 a month and provide her with a car and medical insurance\u201d); Stickel v. Stickel, 58 N.C. App. 645, 649, 294 S.E.2d 321, 324 (1982) (rejecting defendant\u2019s argument that alimony findings of fact were inadequate to determine fairness of award that included homeowner\u2019s insurance and medical insurance benefits).\nDefendant also argues that the trial court failed to include sufficient findings of fact supporting its order that defendant provide health insurance coverage to plaintiff. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-16.3A(c) provides that \u201c[t]he court shall set forth the reasons for its award or denial of alimony and, if making an award, the reasons for its amount, duration, and manner of payment.\u201d If the trial court \u201cfail[s] to state any reason for the amount of alimony, its duration, or the manner of payment,\u201d the order must be remanded. Crocker v. Crocker, 190 N.C. App. 165, 172, 660 S.E.2d 212, 217 (2008). See also Hartsell v. Hartsell, 189 N.C. App. 65, 76, 657 S.E.2d 724, 731 (2008) (remanding where court found \u201cplaintiff had the ability to pay [$650 monthly alimony] amount, but provided no explanation as to why it had concluded that defendant was entitled to that specific amount\u201d); Friend-Novorska v. Novorska, 131 N.C. App. 867, 871, 509 S.E.2d 460, 462 (1998) (ordering trial court, on remand, to \u201cmake a new award of alimony and make specific findings justifying that award, both as to amount and duration\u201d).\nHere, on this issue, the trial court merely found that \u201cdefendant receives health insurance . . . through his employment.\u201d While the language of the decretal portion of the order and judgment suggests that the trial court perhaps expected that plaintiff would simply remain on defendant\u2019s UPS policy, defendant points out that if the parties divorce, plaintiff will no longer be covered as his spouse under his existing policy. The trial court made no findings of fact regarding, for example, the reason that plaintiff needed continued coverage; defendant\u2019s ability to maintain plaintiff on his policy after the divorce; what should occur if defendant is unable to maintain plaintiff on his policy; the cost of maintaining plaintiff on the policy or of providing alternative coverage; whether plaintiff would be able to obtain coverage if not covered under defendant\u2019s plan; what type of coverage would need to be provided; and whether defendant could afford to provide alternative coverage.\nThe trial court\u2019s findings are thus \u201ctoo meager to enable the reviewing court to determine whether the trial judge exercised proper discretion in deciding what defendant was to pay plaintiff, and . . . the findings which were made do not support the judgment.\u201d Tan v. Tan, 49 N.C. App. 516, 523, 272 S.E.2d 11, 16 (1980), disc. review denied, 302 N.C. 402, 279 S.E.2d 356 (1981). \u201cWithout more definite findings on these matters, we are unable to determine whether the judgment is fair to all parties concerned.\u201d Id.\nConsequentiy, while we hold that the trial court could properly decide to include health insurance coverage in the alimony award, its findings of fact are inadequate to support its award. We, therefore, must also reverse this provision in the alimony award and remand for further findings of fact regarding the requirement that defendant \u201ccontinue to maintain health insurance coverage oh the Plaintiff. . . .\u201d\nC. Alimony Termination Provisions\nDefendant also challenges the termination provisions included in the decretal portion of the order and judgment. Under the heading of \u201cTermination Events,\u201d the judgment provides: \u201cDefendant\u2019s obligations for the payment of alimony shall terminate upon the occurrence of a statutory event as noted in NCGS 50-16.9. Defendant\u2019s obligation for the maintenance of Plaintiff\u2019s health insurance shall continue until the first occurrence of: (a) Plaintiff receives Social Security disability and Medicare; or (b) Plaintiff becomes gainfully employed and has health insurance available to her through employment.\u201d\nWe first note that this \u201cTermination Events\u201d portion of the decree is ambiguous. We are unable to understand how the trial court intended the alimony award to terminate in this case. Since the trial court referred to the health insurance payments as \u201cin the nature of ALIMONY,\u201d the judgment could be read as terminating the health insurance upon the occurrence of the events specified in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-16.9(b) (2009) (providing that alimony \u201cshall terminate\u201d upon remarriage or cohabitation of dependent spouse or upon death of either supporting or dependent spouse). On the other hand, the sentence specifically addressing health insurance could require continuation of health coverage even upon the occurrence of a circumstance set out in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-16.9. Although defendant argues that the trial court improperly attempted to exempt health insurance coverage from N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-16.9, we do not believe that the trial court necessarily had that intent. The alimony award must be clarified to specify when the obligation to provide health insurance terminates.\nIn addition, this Court has repeatedly held that an alimony order is inadequate when it contains no findings explaining the reason for the duration chosen \u2014 in this case, findings explaining why the trial court believed it necessary to continue alimony until the occurrence of the events set out in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-16.9. See Hartsell, 189 N.C. App. at 76-77, 657 S.E.2d at 731 (remanding where trial court ordered alimony to continue until death or remarriage of defendant but \u201cincluded no findings of fact at all to explain its rationale for the duration of the award\u201d); Squires v. Squires, 178 N.C. App. 251, 264, 631 S.E.2d 156, 163 (2006) (remanding for further findings of fact concerning duration of alimony award where court ordered alimony to \u201ccontinue until the death of one of the parties, or plaintiff\u2019s remarriage or cohabitation, but failed to make any finding about the reasons for this duration\u201d); Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 161 N.C. App. 414, 421-22, 588 S.E.2d 517, 523 (2003) (remanding where court \u201cdid not make required findings as to the reasons for making the duration of the alimony continuous until defendant dies, remarries, or cohabits\u201d). We must, therefore, also remand for findings of fact regarding the reason for the duration of the $1,750.00 monthly payments and health insurance coverage.\nEquitable Distribution\nWe also agree with defendant that the equitable distribution judgment lacks adequate findings of fact. After making findings about various specific pieces of property, the trial court found \u201cthat an unequal distribution of marital property is equitable given the following distributional factors pursuant to [N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7] 50-20(c): the income, property and liabilities of the parties; the duration of the marriage; the separate pensions of the parties; and the physical and mental health of the parties.\u201d Based on this finding, the court then concluded that \u201c[e]vidence received by the court concerning the distributional factors justify [sic] the equitable division and distribution set forth below in the decretal portion.\u201d\nIn the decretal portion, the court incorporated by reference the parties\u2019 inventory of marital property and debts \u201cas to the classification, value and distribution of marital property except as specifically modified in this order by the court.\u201d The court then provided that plaintiff\u2019s \u201cequitable share of the marital property and debts\u201d was $43,294.50 in marital assets and $10,261.22 in marital liabilities, for a net of $33,033.28 in marital property. The court provided. that defendant\u2019s \u201cequitable share of the marital property and debts\u201d was $55,161.02 in marital assets and $27,027.00 in marital liabilities, for, according to the order and judgment, a net of $30,134.02 in marital property. It appears that there was an error in subtraction, and the correct net marital property figure for defendant should have been $28,134.02.\nAs an initial matter, the equitable distribution portion of the order and judgment does not appear to comply with N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-20(c) (2009). N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-20(c) provides that \u201c[t]here shall be an equal division by using net value of marital property and net value of divisible property unless the court determines that an equal division is not equitable. If the court determines that an equal division is not equitable, the court shall divide the marital property and divisible property equitably\u201d after considering 12 factors. Here, the trial court found that \u201can unequal distribution of marital property is equitable\u201d rather than that \u201can equal division by using net value of marital property\u201d is not equitable.\nWe do not believe that this difference is a matter of semantics. Rather, as our Supreme Court explained in White v. White, 312 N.C. 770, 776-77, 324 S.E.2d 829, 832-33 (1985) (emphasis original):\nThe trial court in the present case indicated that \u201cpursuant to G.S. 50-20, an equal division of the marital property of the parties is presumed appropriate.\u201d The statute in fact does more. It does not create a \u201cpresumption\u201d in any of the senses that term has been used to express \u201cthe common idea of assuming or inferring the existence of one fact from another fact or combination of facts.\u201d 2 Brandis on North Carolina Evidence, \u00a7 215 (2d ed. 1982). Instead, the statute is a legislative enactment of public policy so strongly favoring the equal division of marital property that an equal division is made mandatory \u201cunless the court determines that an equal division is not equitable.\u201d N.C.G.S. 50-20(c). The clear intent of the legislature was that a party desiring an unequal division of marital property bear the burden of producing evidence concerning one or more of the twelve factors in the statute and the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that an equal division would not be equitable. Therefore, if no evidence is admitted tending to show that an equal division would be inequitable, the trial court must divide the marital property equally.\nWhen evidence tending to show that an equal division of marital property would not be equitable is admitted, however, the trial court must exercise its discretion in assigning the weight each factor should receive in any given case. It must then make an equitable division of the marital property by balancing the evidence presented by the parties in light of the legislative policy which favors equal division.\nConsequently, in order to divide a marital estate other than equally, the trial court must first find that an equal division is not equitable and explain why. Then, the trial court must decide what is equitable based on the factors set out in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-20(c)(l)-(12) after balancing the evidence in light of the policy favoring equal division.\nGiven the language of the trial court\u2019s order, we cannot be assured that the trial court gave proper consideration to the policy favoring an equal division of the estate. On remand, the trial court must make the determinations required by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-20(c) and White. This remand does not mean that the trial court\u2019s ultimate decision was in error- \u2014 we simply need to have an order demonstrating consideration of the policies and factors established by the General Assembly.\nPerhaps because of the trial court\u2019s failure to precisely follow the statute, the order and judgment is unclear as to how the trial court decided upon its distribution or why this particular distribution was in fact equitable. First, we have had difficulty determining how the figures were derived. With respect to the marital assets, the trial court accepted defendant\u2019s figure regarding the value of assets allocated to him. With respect to plaintiffs marital assets, however, the court valued those assets at $43,294.50, even though the parties had both agreed that the value of the assets distributed to plaintiff is $42,344.50. There is a difference of $50.00 not accounted for.\nIn addition, the order and judgment appears to conclude that a 52%/48% split (using the trial court\u2019s exact numbers) or a 54%/46% split (after correcting the subtraction error) is equitable. As defendant points out, however, that is not actually what the trial court did.\nThe trial court found \u2014 contrary to defendant\u2019s contention but consistent with the pretrial order \u2014 that an IRA account valued at $42,924.54 was marital property and not defendant\u2019s separate property. The court further found that the funds in that account were used to pay off marital debt, although the finding does not specify the amount of the debt paid. There are no findings as to whether the entire value of the account was exhausted by marital debt, taxes, and penalties; whether some of the funds were used for some other purpose as well; or whether some amount remained. The court then found that \u201cthe use of these marital funds to pay off the joint marital debts should be reflected as the parties each being assigned one half of those marital liabilities which is consistent with the contentions of the Plaintiff.\u201d\nThe trial court did not make a specific finding as to who would be awarded the IRA marital property. We can deduce from the parties\u2019 inventory that the IRA was awarded to defendant \u2014 both parties distributed the IRA to defendant. The trial court\u2019s decree also incorporated that inventory by reference except as modified by the order. The court\u2019s order does not, however, contain any explanation regarding why the trial court decided to distribute the IRA to defendant when at least part of it had been exhausted by marital debt and then to split the marital debt between the parties. By doing so, the trial court\u2019s order makes it appear as if defendant is receiving the benefit of $55,161.02 in marital assets, when $42,924.54 (or 78%) of those assets are the IRA, which has been at least partially exhausted by marital debt.\nDefendant argues, therefore, that the nature of the division of property and assets is more unequal than appears on the face of the order. Defendant contends that \u201c [t]he result was an award to Plaintiff of a net amount with an actual value of $43,294.50, or about 71% of the total marital assets; and an award to Defendant of a net amount with an actual value of $17,842.79, or about 29% of the total.\u201d The trial court\u2019s order does not address this issue or explain why it viewed this result \u2014 assuming without deciding that it is correct mathematically\u2014 as equitable.\nWe must, therefore, also remand for further findings of fact as to the basis for the distribution amounts. See Vadala v. Vadala, 145 N.C. App. 478, 480, 550 S.E.2d 536, 538 (2001) (remanding for further findings of fact when trial court made finding as to amount of plaintiff\u2019s income, but gave \u201cno indication as to how [plaintiff\u2019s income] was calculated\u201d and Court, therefore, could not \u201cconfirm or deny this finding\u201d).\nWe do not address defendant\u2019s contention that the award of marital debt, already paid, to plaintiff was \u201can unwarranted windfall.\u201d We cannot determine whether this approach is reasonable or supported by the law and the evidence until we know the basis for the trial court\u2019s decision. As N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-200) mandates, \u201c[i]n any order for the distribution of property made pursuant to this section, the court shall make written findings of fact that support the determination that the marital property and divisible property has been equitably divided.\u201d\nConclusion\nWe must reverse and remand the Equitable Distribution and Alimony Order and Judgment for further findings of fact. With respect to the award of alimony, the trial court shall, on remand, make further findings of fact regarding the health insurance coverage, marital misconduct, the duration of the alimony, and the \u201cTermination Events.\u201d As for equitable distribution, the trial court shall on remand make additional findings as required by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-20(c) and (j) and sufficient findings to explain the basis for the court\u2019s division of the property and the liabilities.\nReversed and remanded.\nJudges McGEE and ERVIN concur.\n. Although the trial court\u2019s order implies that the marital debt paid with the IRA funds and divided equally between the parties totaled $20,522.44, the record suggests that the total amount of debt paid off with the IRA funds was $29,000.00. The order, however, contains no findings reconciling this difference. If the roughly $8,500.00 debt not accounted for represented separate debt of either party, that could be relevant to the distribution of the IRA funds. Without findings of fact specifically addressing what happened with the IRA, we cannot know for sure.", "type": "majority", "author": "GEER, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "No brief filed on behalf of plaintiff-appellee.", "John K. Bums for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "LILLIAN DENISE LUCAS, Plaintiff v. DELANO THADDEUS LUCAS, Defendant\nNo. COA09-1004\n(Filed 15 February 2011)\n1. Appeal and Error\u2014 interlocutory orders and appeals \u2014 final judgment \u2014 alimony and equitable distribution order \u2014 attorney fees remaining \u2014 not substantive\nAn alimony and equitable distribution judgment was final and appeal was not from an interlocutory order even though attorney fees had not been determined. A claim for attorney fees under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 50-16.4 is not a substantive issue or in any way part of the merits of the claim.\n2. Divorce\u2014 alimony \u2014 marital misconduct \u2014 findings not sufficient\nAn award of alimony was remanded for further findings regarding marital misconduct where, the order and judgment did not specify the type of marital misconduct the court had found.\n3. Divorce\u2014 alimony \u2014 health insurance\nThe trial court could include the maintenance of health insurance in an alimony award since health insurance is indistinguishable from other types of insurance that have been recognized as permissible forms of support and maintenance.\n4. Divorce\u2014 alimony \u2014 health insurance \u2014 findings\nAn alimony award that included health insurance was remanded where the findings were not sufficient to allow the reviewing court to determine whether the trial judge exercised proper discretion.\n5. Divorce\u2014 alimony \u2014 duration\u2014findings\u2014not sufficient\nAn alimony award was remanded for further findings regarding the duration of the payments and the health insurance coverage where the award was ambiguous as to termination and did not include findings explaining the reason for the duration chosen.\n6. Divorce\u2014 equitable distribution \u2014 unequal distribution\u2014 findings that equal division not equitable \u2014 not sufficient\nAn equitable distribution judgment lacked adequate findings of fact where the trial court found that \u201can unequal distribution of marital property is equitable\u201d rather than that \u201can equal division by using net value of marital property\u201d is not equitable. In order to divide a marital estate other than equally, the trial court must first find that an equal division is not equitable and explain why.\n7. Divorce\u2014 equitable distribution \u2014 distribution amounts\u2014 not sufficient\nAn equitable distribution award was remanded for further findings as to the distribution amounts where the appellate court had difficulty determining how the figures were derived.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 27 February 2009 by Judge Melinda H. Crouch in New Hanover County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 9 March 2010.\nNo brief filed on behalf of plaintiff-appellee.\nJohn K. Bums for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0492-01", "first_page_order": 502, "last_page_order": 517 }