{ "id": 4181800, "name": "IN THE MATTER OF: RONALD WATSON", "name_abbreviation": "In re Watson", "decision_date": "2011-02-15", "docket_number": "No. COA10-365", "first_page": "507", "last_page": "522", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "209 N.C. App. 507" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "669 S.E.2d 321", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12642297, 12642298 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "322", "parenthetical": "quoting Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, -, 128 S. Ct. 2379, 2387-88, 171 L. Ed. 2d 345, 357 (2008)" }, { "page": "322" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/669/0321-01", "/se2d/669/0321-02" ] }, { "cite": "362 N.C. 319", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4149576, 12641225 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "322", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. 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Supp.", "case_ids": [ 4131299 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "286" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/484/0278-01" ] }, { "cite": "396 F.2d 393", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 2148426 ], "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "396" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/396/0393-01" ] }, { "cite": "348 S.E.2d 801", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "805" }, { "page": "804" }, { "page": "805" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 N.C. 384", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4733184 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "389" }, { "page": "389" }, { "page": "389" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/318/0384-01" ] }, { "cite": "701 S.E.2d 245", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2010, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "364 N.C. 329", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "year": 2010, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "685 S.E.2d 514", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "363 N.C. 121", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4150643 ], "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/363/0121-01" ] }, { "cite": "554 U.S. 164", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3677287 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "2387-88" }, { "page": "357" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/554/0164-01" ] }, { "cite": "362 N.C. 667", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4149820 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "668", "parenthetical": "quoting Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, -, 128 S. Ct. 2379, 2387-88, 171 L. 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Thomas, 331 N.C. 671, 673, 417 S.E.2d 473, 475 (1992)" }, { "page": "724", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "724" }, { "page": "727" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "162 Wis.2d 320", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Wis. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8667139 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/wis-2d/162/0320-01" ] }, { "cite": "217 Ariz. 74", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ariz.", "case_ids": [ 5714815 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "78", "parenthetical": "internal quotations and citations omitted" }, { "page": "687", "parenthetical": "internal quotations and citations omitted" }, { "page": "80" }, { "page": "689" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ariz/217/0074-01" ] }, { "cite": "369 S.E.2d 590", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 7, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "592" }, { "page": "593" }, { "page": "592" }, { "page": "593" }, { "page": "592" }, { "page": "591" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "322 N.C. 600", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2513603 ], "weight": 7, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "603" }, { "page": "604" }, { "page": "603" }, { "page": "604" }, { "page": "603" }, { "page": "601" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/322/0600-01" ] }, { "cite": "194 N.C. 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App.", "case_ids": [ 11437254 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "713" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/143/0712-01" ] }, { "cite": "360 N.C. 449", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3796047 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "452-53" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/360/0449-01" ] }, { "cite": "549 S.E.2d 912", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "913-14", "parenthetical": "domestic violence protective order" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "145 N.C App. 434", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11438328 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "436-37", "parenthetical": "domestic violence protective order" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/145/0434-01" ] }, { "cite": "231 S.E.2d 633", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "634-35", "parenthetical": "involuntary commitment order" }, { "page": "634" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "291 N.C. 693", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8558987 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "694-95", "parenthetical": "involuntary commitment order" }, { "page": "694" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/291/0693-01" ] }, { "cite": "474 S.E.2d 783", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "787" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "344 N.C. 394", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 867707 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "398-99" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/344/0394-01" ] }, { "cite": "271 S.E.2d 72", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "74", "parenthetical": "italics omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "49 N.C. App. 243", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8520575 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "246", "parenthetical": "italics omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/49/0243-01" ] }, { "cite": "232 S.E.2d 492", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "494" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "32 N.C. App. 429", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8551047 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "433" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/32/0429-01" ] }, { "cite": "247 S.E.2d 778", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "781" }, { "page": "781" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "38 N.C. App. 344", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8553754 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "347-48" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/38/0344-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1342, "char_count": 34150, "ocr_confidence": 0.752, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.770845263994211e-08, "percentile": 0.4128176970935371 }, "sha256": "8b214b6a9eef21fdd92efba9229db19f4d2215e568b07306434904cd4841a063", "simhash": "1:8b69d52ef7efbcd4", "word_count": 5524 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:06:47.704823+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges HUNTER, Robert C., and GEER concur." ], "parties": [ "IN THE MATTER OF: RONALD WATSON" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "CALABRIA, Judge.\nRonald Watson (\u201crespondent\u201d) appeals an involuntary commitment order requiring him to be committed to Central Regional Hospital (\u201cCentral\u201d) for inpatient treatment for a period of thirty days, to be followed by outpatient treatment for sixty days. Respondent argues that the trial court erred by allowing him to represent himself at the involuntary commitment hearing or, in the alternative, the trial court erred by failing to conduct the statutorily required inquiry necessary to assure that his waiver of his constitutional right to counsel was knowing, intelligent and voluntary. We agree and vacate the trial court\u2019s order and remand this matter to the trial court for a new hearing.\nI. BACKGROUND\nOn 22 July 2008, Dr. Seth Glickman (\u201cDr. Glickman\u201d) of Duke University Health System (\u201cDuke\u201d) filed an Affidavit and Petition for an involuntary commitment. Specifically, Dr. Glickman requested a court order for a law enforcement officer to take respondent into custody for examination, alleging that respondent was mentally ill and dangerous to himself or others or mentally ill and in need of treatment in order to prevent further disability or deterioration that would predictably result in dangerousness. Dr. Glickman examined respondent after Dr. Matthew Conner had assessed respondent and noted that respondent had been pacing and refused medication. Dr. Glickman found the following pertinent facts:\n[Respondent]... was brought... by police secondary to reported agitation and violence at the home of his parents where he lives. At this time, patient is grossly psychotic with significant paranoia. He requires inpatient psychiatric hospitalization and stabilization.\nDr. Glickman recommended a three day inpatient commitment at Central to determine whether respondent was mentally ill and dangerous to himself or others. That same day, in Durham County District Court, the court filed a \u201cFindings and Custody Order: Involuntary Commitment,\u201d finding that there were reasonable grounds to believe that the facts alleged in the petition were true and that respondent was probably mentally ill and dangerous to himself or others or mentally ill and in need of treatment in order to prevent further disability or deterioration that would predictably result in dangerousness. The court ordered law enforcement officers to transport respondent directly to Central for temporary custody, examination and treatment pending a district court hearing.\nAt 10:00 a.m. on 22 July 2008, respondent was examined by Dr. David Novosad (\u201cDr. Novosad\u201d), a psychiatric resident at Central. As a result of the examination, Dr. Novosad concluded that respondent was mentally ill and dangerous to himself and others. In his report, Dr. Novosad stated that respondent had \u201csignificant paranoia,\u201d that respondent\u2019s \u201ccurrent mental status or the nature of his illness limits or negates his/her ability to make an informed decision to seek treatment voluntarily or comply with recommended treatment,\u201d and that respondent \u201cbelieves the legal system is \u2018out to get him.\u2019 \u201d Dr. Novosad diagnosed respondent with \u201cpsychosis NOS\u201d and recommended a thirty-day inpatient commitment and sixty-day outpatient commitment.\nOn 1 August 2008, a hearing was scheduled in Durham County District Court. Prior to the hearing, respondent asked the trial court who would serve as his court-appointed counsel. The trial court replied, \u201cThat guy right there.\u201d Respondent stated that he had not been introduced to counsel and the trial court granted respondent five minutes to meet with him. After speaking with respondent, counsel told the trial court, \u201cHe wants to represent himself[,]\u201d and \u201cwants me to just assist him.\u201d Counsel told the court that he advised respondent against proceeding pro se, but stated, \u201cif you don\u2019t mind, I\u2019ll stand in for him.\u201d The trial court responded, \u201cAll right. Go ahead.\u201d The trial court then proceeded with the hearing without further discussion.\nAt the hearing, Dr. Novosad testified as an expert in mental health and psychosis. Dr. Novosad stated that he examined respondent on 21 July 2008. Dr. Novosad also testified that respondent lives with his parents and has lived with them for the past forty-eight years of his life. He became upset with his brother who was visiting and kicked a wall at his parents\u2019 home. Prior to this incident, respondent had never been treated for any kind of psychotic disorder. According to Dr. Novosad, respondent: (1) had \u201cbeen increasingly involved with the legal system;\u201d (2) reported that \u201che\u2019s been suffering some legal injustices;\u201d (3) was concerned that he was being \u201cmistreated;\u201d (4) had become \u201cmore aggressive at home;\u201d and (5) used marijuana \u201con a regular basis.\u201d Dr. Novosad concluded that respondent has \u201csignificant\u201d paranoia and \u201cpsychotic disorder not otherwise specified,\u201d with a possibility that respondent suffers from schizophrenia.\nWhile respondent was in Dr. Novosad\u2019s care, respondent received the medication Haloperidol, an antipsychotic medication commonly used for patients with psychotic disorder. Since respondent refused to take the medication orally, Dr. Novosad concluded that, based on respondent\u2019s condition, respondent required the use of forced medication. Dr. Novosad reported that while respondent was on the medication, he was \u201cbehaviorally appropriate . . . [and did] not cause[] any disturbances on the ward,\u201d and was \u201ccompliant with the ward routine\u201d other than taking his medication orally. Dr. Novosad stated that if respondent complied by taking his medication orally, it would be appropriate to discharge him from the hospital.\nDr. Novosad further stated that he was concerned for respondent because respondent denied having a psychiatric problem and needing medication, and would not take his medication orally if discharged from the hospital. Dr. Novosad explained the risks, if respondent would not take his medication orally: \u201c[t]he paranoia and the aggressive behavior at home would . . . worsen, and he would be a . . . risk of danger to . . . himself or others.\u201d Dr. Novosad recommended a thirty-day commitment for inpatient care with a sixty-day outpatient mental health commitment to address the issue of respondent\u2019s psychotic disorder and medication compliance. Dr. Novosad concluded that respondent needed inpatient commitment because \u201coutside the hospital, there\u2019s no way that we could monitor whether he takes his medication . . . .\u201d\nFollowing respondent\u2019s cross-examination, respondent attempted to testify. During respondent\u2019s oath to tell the truth, respondent interrupted the court twice and ordered the trial court to \u201credo\u201d the oath. Respondent then testified that his brother visited the home two weeks ago and they argued about turning down the music.\nRespondent claimed that he had \u201cjust done six-and-a-half months in Durham County Jail for failure to be notified, not failure to appear, as was claimed.\u201d He also claimed that courthouse officers beat him, broke his ribs, and slammed his head on the floor. Therefore, he was \u201cgoing to sue\u201d Durham County for \u201cbrutality\u201d and \u201cfalse arrest.\u201d Respondent said he was \u201cstressed out\u201d because \u201cDurham County Court is corrupt.\u201d Respondent stated that during his prior court appearances, \u201cI was in there representing myself. I had assistant counsel, just like I do today.\u201d Respondent added, \u201cI do not want this case dismissed because I was trying to save a woman\u2019s life ... a convicted felon for . . . conspiring to traffic cocaine. She\u2019s a junkie now, and she asked for my assistance to get off of it.\u201d Respondent claimed that after eight months of trying to help this woman, that he \u201cgot death threats through gunshots around my house.\u201d\nRespondent further stated that every evening since he was in the hospital, he was forced to receive injections \u201cthrough a... long needle in the butt,\u201d that he was \u201cin pain every day, . . . and all I got is a doctor that wants to keep me in \u2014 keep himself in business by keeping me in \u2014 in a \u2014 in a hospital.\u201d He claimed he was \u201ccompletely sane\u201d and that he was \u201cthreatened by the doctors at Duke University ... to either give a blood and urine sample or that [he] would be restrained ... shot with a narcotic and ... a... catheter stuck up [his] penis ....\u201d Respondent asked the court to \u201cbe set free ... and if you don\u2019t set me free, I would rather be in jail then [sic] in a hospital that forces medication on me.\u201d\nThe trial court found that respondent was represented by counsel, and found by clear, cogent and convincing evidence that respondent was \u201cgrossly psychotic with significant paranoia, has exhibited aggressive behavior at home to parents [and] brother, has kicked hole in wall at home, [and] has refused meds.\u201d Based on these findings, the trial court concluded that respondent was mentally ill and a danger to himself and others. The trial court ordered respondent committed for thirty days of inpatient care at Central, to be followed by sixty days of outpatient care.\nRespondent then asked the trial court if the time period of inpatient commitment was three days. When the trial court responded that the period was thirty days, respondent stated, \u201cF[] this court!\u201d ten times then added, \u201cI\u2019m not violent!\u201d as he was carried out of the courtroom.\nOn 29 August 2008, respondent filed a written notice of appeal, but did so in the wrong court. On 14 October 2009, respondent petitioned this Court for writ of certiorari, and we granted respondent\u2019s petition on 28 October 2009. On 16 December 2009, the trial court entered an order finding respondent indigent and appointing the Office of the Appellate Defender to represent respondent.\nII. STANDARD OF REVIEW\nOn appeal of a commitment order[,] our function is to determine whether there was any competent evidence to support the \u201cfacts\u201d recorded in the commitment order and whether the trial court\u2019s ultimate findings of mental illness and dangerous [ness] to self or others were supported by the \u201cfacts\u201d recorded in the order. In re Underwood, 38 N.C. App. 344, 347-48, 247 S.E.2d 778, 781 (1978); In re Hogan, 32 N.C. App. 429, 433, 232 S.E.2d 492, 494 (1977). We do not consider whether the evidence of respondent\u2019s mental illness and dangerousness was clear, cogent and convincing. It is for the trier of fact to determine whether the competent evidence offered in a particular case met the burden of proof. In re Underwood, supra, at 347, 247 S.E.2d at 781.\nIn re Collins, 49 N.C. App. 243, 246, 271 S.E.2d 72, 74 (1980) (italics omitted).\nIII. INITIAL MATTER \u2014 MOOTNESS\nAs an initial matter, we address whether respondent\u2019s appeal is moot.\nUsually, when the terms of a challenged trial court judgment have been carried out, a pending appeal of that judgment is moot because an appellate court decision \u201ccannot have any practical effect on the existing controversy.\u201d Roberts v. Madison Cty. Realtors Ass\u2019n, Inc., 344 N.C. 394, 398-99, 474 S.E.2d 783, 787 (1996). In certain cases, however, the continued existence of the judgment itself may result in collateral legal consequences for the appellant. See, e.g., In re Hatley, 291 N.C. 693, 694-95, 231 S.E.2d 633, 634-35 (1977) (involuntary commitment order); Smith ex rel. Smith v. Smith, 145 N.C App. 434, 436-37, 549 S.E.2d 912, 913-14 (2001) (domestic violence protective order). Possible adverse consequences flowing from a judgment preserve an appellant\u2019s substantial stake in the outcome of the case and the validity of the challenged judgment continues to be a \u201clive\u201d controversy. As a result, an appeal from a judgment which creates possible collateral legal consequences for the appellant is not moot. Hatley, 291 N.C. at 694, 231 S.E.2d at 634.\nIn re A.K., 360 N.C. 449, 452-53, 628 S.E.2d 753, 755 (2006).\nIn the instant case, respondent was committed on 1 August 2008 to an inpatient facility for thirty days followed by sixty days of outpatient care. Respondent\u2019s appeal was heard by this Court on 29 September 2010. However, since the trial court\u2019s order may result in collateral legal consequences for respondent, the validity of the challenged order continues to be a live controversy. Therefore, respondent\u2019s appeal is not moot.\nIV. WAIVER OF COUNSEL\nRespondent argues that the trial court erred by allowing him to represent himself at the district court hearing because the commitment statutes do not allow a respondent facing inpatient involuntary commitment to represent himself, or in the alternative, that the trial court erred by (1) not making the required findings that he was acting with full awareness of his rights and the consequences of his waiver, (2) not inquiring into his mental condition or the complexity of the matter before allowing him to waive his right to counsel, and (3) not acquiring such waiver of counsel in writing. We agree.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 122C-268 (2008), which governs inpatient commitments, states in pertinent part:\nThe respondent shall be represented by counsel of his choice; or if he is indigent within the meaning of G.S. 7A-450 or refuses to retain counsel if financially able to do so, he shall be represented by counsel appointed in accordance with rules adopted by the Office of Indigent Defense Services.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 122C-268(d) (emphases added).\n\u201cThis Court has held that use of the language \u2018shall\u2019 is a mandate to trial judges, and that failure to comply with the statutory mandate is reversible error.\u201d In re Eades, 143 N.C. App. 712, 713, 547 S.E.2d 146, 147 (2001). \u201cWhere the language of a statute is clear, the courts must give the statute its plain meaning[.]\u201d Martin v. N.C. Dep\u2019t of Health & Human Servs., 194 N.C. App. 716, 719, 670 S.E.2d 629, 632 (2009).\nThe language of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 122C-268(d) is clear. A person facing involuntary commitment must be represented by counsel of his choice, and if he is indigent, he must be represented by counsel appointed in accordance with the rules adopted by the Office of Indigent Defense Services (\u201cIDS Rules\u201d).\nRule 1.6 of the IDS Rules, titled \u201cWaiver of Counsel,\u201d states:\nAn indigent person who has been informed of his or her right to be represented by counsel at any in-court-proceeding may, in writing, waive the right to in-court representation by counsel. Any such waiver of counsel shall be effective only if the court finds of record that at the time of waiver the indigent person acted with full awareness of his or her rights and of the consequences of the waiver. In making such a finding, the court shall follow the requirements of G.S. 15A-1242 and shall consider, among other things, such matters as the person\u2019s age, education, familiarity with the English language, mental condition, and the complexity of the matter.\nIDS Rule 1.6 (2008) (emphases added).\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1242 (2008) states:\nA defendant may be permitted at his election to proceed in the trial of his case without the assistance of counsel only after the trial judge makes thorough inquiry and is satisfied that the defendant: (1) Has been clearly advised of his right to the assistance of counsel, including his right to the assignment of counsel when he is so entitled; (2) Understands and appreciates the consequences of this decision; and (3) Comprehends the nature of the charges and proceedings and the range of permissible punishments.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1242 (2008).\nWhile our courts have previously held that the protections afforded by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1242 are mandatory in the context of criminal proceedings, State v. Pruitt, 322 N.C. 600, 369 S.E.2d 590 (1988), we have not addressed whether they are mandatory in the context of involuntary commitment proceedings. \u201cAlthough a civil commitment proceeding cannot be equated to a criminal prosecution, the standards in criminal cases have been examined to determine when waiver [of counsel] can occur.\u201d In re Jesse M., 217 Ariz. 74, 78, 170 P.3d 683, 687 (2007) (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also Matter of S.Y., 162 Wis.2d 320, 469 N.W.2d 836 (1991).\nOur Supreme Court has held that in criminal cases, \u201c \u2018[b]efore allowing a defendant to waive in-court representation by counsel. . . the trial court must insure that constitutional and statutory standards are satisfied.\u2019 \u201d State v. Moore, 362 N.C. 319, 322, 661 S.E.2d 722, 724 (2008) (quoting State v. Thomas, 331 N.C. 671, 673, 417 S.E.2d 473, 475 (1992)). \u201cOnce a defendant clearly and unequivocally states that he wants to proceed pro se, the trial court . . . must determine whether the defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waives the right to in-court representation by counsel.\u201d Thomas, 331 N.C. at 674, 417 S.E.2d at 476 (citations omitted). \u201c[T]he record must show that the defendant was literate and competent, that he understood the consequences of his waiver, and that, in waiving his right, he was voluntarily exercising his own free will.\u201d State v. Thacker, 301 N.C. 348, 354, 271 S.E.2d 252, 256 (1980).\nIn order to determine whether the defendant\u2019s waiver meets this constitutional standard, the trial court must conduct \u00e1 thorough inquiry, and perfunctory questioning is not sufficient. Thomas, 331 N.C. at 674, 417 S.E.2d at 476. \u201cA trial court\u2019s inquiry will satisfy this constitutional requirement if conducted pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1242.\u201d Moore, 362 N.C. at 322, 661 S.E.2d at 724 (citation omitted). The trial court\u2019s inquiry under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1242 \u201cis mandatory and failure to conduct such an inquiry is prejudicial error.\u201d Pruitt, 322 N.C. at 603, 369 S.E.2d at 592.\n\u201c[T]he United States Constitution permits judges to preclude self-representation for defendants adjudged to be \u2018borderline-competent\u2019 based on a \u2018realistic account of the particular defendant\u2019s mental capacities ....\u2019\u201d State v. Lane, 362 N.C. 667, 668, 669 S.E.2d 321, 322 (2008) (quoting Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, -, 128 S. Ct. 2379, 2387-88, 171 L. Ed. 2d 345, 357 (2008)), clarified, 363 N.C. 121, -, - S.E.2d -, and motion granted, - N.C. -, 685 S.E.2d 514 (2009), motion denied, 364 N.C. 329, 701 S.E.2d 245 (2010). Furthermore, \u201c[i]t is the trial court\u2019s duty to conduct the inquiry of defendant to ensure that defendant understands the consequences of his decision.\u201d Pruitt, 322 N.C. at 604, 369 S.E.2d at 593.\nMoreover, \u201c \u2018neither the statutory responsibilities of standby counsel, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1243, nor the actual participation of standby counsel... is a satisfactory substitute for the right to counsel in the absence of a knowing and voluntary waiver.\u2019 \u201d Pruitt, 322 N.C. at 603, 369 S.E.2d at 592 (quoting State v. Dunlap, 318 N.C. 384, 389, 348 S.E.2d 801, 805 (1986)).\nWhile the above-stated cases are criminal cases and not cases of involuntary commitment, we hold that the protections afforded by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1242, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 122C-268(d), and IDS Rule 1.6 are mandatory in involuntary commitment proceedings and that the rationale from the above-cited cases also applies to cases of involuntary commitment.\nWhere, as in both proceedings for juveniles and mentally deficient persons, the state undertakes to act in parens patriae, it has the inescapable duty to vouchsafe due process, and this necessarily includes the duty to see that a subject of an involuntary commitment proceedings is afforded the opportunity to the guiding hand of legal counsel at every step of the proceedings, unless effectively waived by one authorized to act in his behalf.\nHeryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393, 396 (10th Cir. 1968); Johnson v. Solomon, 484 F. Supp. 278, 286 (D. Md. 1979); Towne v. Hubbard, 3 P.3d 154, 159 n.18 (Okla. 2000); Honor v. Yamuchi, 307 Ark. 324, 329, 820 S.W.2d 267, 270 (1991); Perry v. Banks, 521 S.W.2d 549, 554 (Tenn. 1975); In re Fisher, 39 Ohio St. 2d 71, 77, 313 N.E.2d 851, 855-56 (1974). See also In re Det. of J.S., 138 Wn. App. 882, 895, 159 P.3d 435, 442 (2007); In Interest of R.Z., 415 N.W.2d 486, 488 (N.D. 1987); State v. Coliman, 9 Ore. App. 476, 483, 497 P.2d 1233, 1236 (1972); Brunetti, The Right to Counsel, Waiver Thereof, and Effective Assistance of Counsel in Civil Commitment Proceedings, 29 S.W.L.J. 684, 711-12 (1975).\nIn the instant case, just prior to the hearing, the trial court engaged in the following colloquy with respondent:\n[Respondent]: Uh, excuse me; uh ... I -1 want to - to know who\u2019s - who\u2019s s - supposedly representing me.\nThe Court: That guy right there.\nUnknown: Raise your right ha- -\n[Respondent]: Well, I haven\u2019t even been introduced to him yet. (background) Can\u2019t - can\u2019t I even speak to him before a trial starts?\u201d\nSubsequently, the trial court engaged in the following conversation with respondent\u2019s appointed counsel:\nThe Court: Do you want a couple of minutes? (background)\nThe Court: (louder) Do you want a couple of minutes, Mr. Perry?\nMr. Perry: Just five minutes.\nThe Court: That\u2019s fi-, that\u2019s fine. That\u2019ll be fine! You can come down. You-you\u2019re sworn in, but you can be at ease. We\u2019re going to pause for-for a few minutes. That\u2019s fine.\n(pause)\n(background)\nThe Court: All right. Let\u2019s get started. Now, you\u2019ve got the doctor, he\u2019s been sworn in (INAUDIBLE) or?\nMr. Perry: Your Honor, uh, my client wants me to just assist him. He wants to represent himself. But, if you don\u2019t mind, I will -1 advised him against it, but if you don\u2019t mind, I\u2019ll stand in for him.\nThe Court: All right. Go ahead.\nMr. Perry: All right. Thank you.\nThe Court: He\u2019ll be sitting there, but go ahead and \u2014\nThere is nothing in the record indicating that the trial court conducted a thorough inquiry that showed that respondent was literate. In addition, there is nothing in the record indicating that the trial court conducted a thorough inquiry that showed that respondent was competent. The trial court\u2019s determinations of competency to waive counsel may be \u201cbased on observation of the defendant during the proceedings.\" United States v. Vamos, 797 F.2d 1146, 1150 (2d Cir. 1986) (emphasis added).\nAt the hearing in the instant case, the trial court had before it the Affidavit and Petition for Involuntary Commitment, which stated that respondent was \u201cmentally ill and dangerous to himself or others or mentally ill and in need of treatment in order to prevent future disability or deterioration that would predictably result in dangerousness.\u201d The Affidavit and Petition also stated that respondent was \u201cgrossly psychotic with significant paranoia\u201d and required \u201cinpatient psychiatric hospitalization and stabilization.\u201d\nDuring the hearing, Dr. Novosad testified that respondent was refusing his medication and that if respondent did not comply by taking his medication, his paranoia and aggressive behavior would worsen, and he would be a risk of danger to himself or others. While respondent was initially sworn in without incident regarding whether he had an opportunity to meet his court-appointed counsel, in his subsequent swearing-in prior to his testimony, respondent engaged in a belligerent exchange with the trial court over his oath, and ordered the trial court to \u201credo it.\u201d After respondent was sworn in for the second time, he delivered his testimony in a rambling narrative, accusing the court of being corrupt and law enforcement officers of police brutality, claiming to have received death threats and gunshots at his home because he was helping a woman get off drugs, and alleging he was threatened by hospital doctors. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court concluded that respondent was mentally ill and was dangerous to himself and others, and ordered him committed to Central for thirty days of inpatient care.\nWhile the trial court was in the best position to determine respondent\u2019s capacity to waive counsel, these facts should have caused the trial court to question whether to preclude self-representation for respondent in this case based on a realistic account of his mental capacities. Lane, 362 N.C. at 668, 669 S.E.2d at 322.\nAdditionally, there is nothing in the record indicating that the trial court conducted a thorough inquiry that showed that respondent understood and appreciated the consequences of his decision or comprehended the nature of the proceedings and the length or type of commitment he was facing. See Dunlap, 318 N.C. at 389, 348 S.E.2d at 804; see also Eckroth v. B.L.S., 721 N.W.2d 50, 53 (N.D. 2006) (\u201c[I]n order to establish a proper waiver of counsel in a mental health proceeding, the district court must engage in a colloquy on the record, which must mirror the record in a waiver of counsel in the criminal context. Absent such evidence on the record, a respondent in an involuntary commitment proceeding cannot represent himself.\u201d) (internal citations omitted).\nThe trial court did not make sure respondent was acting with full awareness of his rights, nor did it conduct a thorough inquiry as required by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1242. The trial court did not ask or consider respondent\u2019s age, education, mental condition, or the complexity of the proceeding. During the colloquy with the trial court, respondent\u2019s appointed counsel, not respondent, stated that respondent \u201cwants to represent himself,\u201d even though counsel \u201cadvised him against it.\u201d This is insufficient to show compliance with N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1242. See Moore, 362 N.C. at 322, 661 S.E.2d at 724 (suggesting that it is error for the trial court to \u201cdefer[] to defendant\u2019s assigned counsel to provide defendant with adequate constitutional safeguards\u201d rather than conduct \u201cthe appropriate inquiry mandated by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1242\u201d); accord Pruitt, 322 N.C. at 604, 369 S.E.2d at 593 (\u201cHaving a bench conference with counsel is insufficient to satisfy the mandate of [N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1242].\u201d).\nThe State argues that respondent \u201chad the assistance of counsel at [the] hearing\u201d as required by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 122C-268(d). We disagree.\nIn the involuntary commitment order, the trial court found that respondent was represented by counsel. However, there is no competent evidence in the record to support this finding. Mr. Perry clearly notified the court that while he advised respondent against proceeding pro se, he would \u201cstand in for him.\u201d The trial court then responded, \u201cAll right. Go ahead.\u201d We reiterate that \u201c \u2018neither the statutory responsibilities of standby counsel, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1243, nor the actual participation of standby counsel... is a satisfactory substitute for the right to counsel in the absence of a knowing and voluntary waiver.\u2019 \u201d Pruitt, 322 N.C. at 603, 369 S.E.2d at 592 (quoting State v. Dunlap, 318 N.C. 384, 389, 348 S.E.2d 801, 805 (1986)).\nFurthermore, the trial court\u2019s instruction to respondent that his appointed counsel would \u201cbe sitting there\u201d is not sufficient to satisfy the statutory mandate that the court must make a \u201cthorough inquiry\u201d to satisfy itself that the defendant \u201ccomprehends the nature of the charges and proceedings and the range of permissible punishments.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1242. Moreover, respondent did not execute a written waiver as required by the IDS Rules. Therefore, the trial court\u2019s finding that respondent was represented by counsel is not supported by any competent evidence, nor is there evidence that respondent or anyone authorized to act on his behalf effectively waived respondent\u2019s right to counsel.\nBecause the trial court failed to comply with the statutory mandates of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1242, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 122C-268(d) and IDS Rule 1.6, respondent\u2019s waiver of counsel was ineffective and the resulting commitment order must be vacated.\nAlthough the trial court was not required to follow a specific \u201cchecklist\u201d of questions when conducting its inquiry into respondent\u2019s waiver of counsel, we hold that in future cases regarding the waiver of counsel in involuntary commitment proceedings, trial courts should note the language of our Supreme Court in Moore:\nAlthough not determinative in our decision, we take this opportunity to provide additional guidance to the trial courts of this State in their efforts to comply with the \u201cthorough inquiry\u201d mandated by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1242. The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill School of Government has published a fourteen-question checklist \u201cdesigned to satisfy requirements of\u2019 N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1242:\n1. Are you able to hear and understand me?\n2. Are you now under the influence of any alcoholic beverages, drugs, narcotics, or other pills?\n3. How old are you?\n4. Have you completed high school? college? If not, what is the last grade you completed?\n5. Do you know how to read? write?\n6. Do you suffer from any mental handicap? physical handicap?\n7. Do you understand that you have the right to be represented by a lawyer?\n8. Do you understand that you may request that a lawyer be appointed for you if you are unable to hire a lawyer; and one will be appointed if you cannot afford to pay for one?\n9. Do you understand that, if you decide to represent yourself, you must follow the same rules of evidence and procedure that a lawyer appearing in this court must follow?\n10. Do you understand that, if you decide to represent yourself, the court will not give you legal advice concerning defenses, jury instructions or other legal issues that may be raised in the trial?\n11. Do you understand that I must act as an impartial judge in this case, that I will not be able to offer you legal advice, and that I must treat you just as I would treat a lawyer?\n12. Do you understand that you are charged with , and that if you are convicted of this (these) charge(s), you could be imprisoned for a maximum of and that the minimum sentence is ? (Add fine or restitution if necessary.)\n13. With all these things in mind, do you now wish to ask me any questions about what I have just said to you?\n14. Do you now waive your right to assistance of a lawyer, and voluntarily and intelligently decide to represent yourself in this case?\nSee 1 Super. Court Subcomm., Bench Book Comm. & N.C. Conf. of Super. Court Judges, North Carolina Trial Judge\u2019s Bench Book \u00a7 II, ch. 6, at 12-13 (Inst, of Gov\u2019t, Chapel Hill, N.C., 3d ed. 1999) (italics omitted). While these specific questions are in no way required to satisfy the statute, they do illustrate the sort of \u201cthorough inquiry\u201d envisioned by the General Assembly when this statute was enacted and could provide useful guidance for trial courts when discharging their responsibilities under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1242.\nMoore, 362 N.C. at 327-28, 661 S.E.2d at 727. This Court also notes with approval the language in Jesse M.:\n[W]hen the [trial] court is faced with a patient who wants to waive his right to counsel at an involuntary commitment hearing, the court should: (a) advise the patient of his right to counsel; (b) advise the patient of the consequences of waiving counsel, namely, that the patient and not the lawyer will be responsible for presenting his case, cross-examining the petitioner\u2019s witnesses, calling witnesses, and presenting evidence as well as closing argument; (c) seek to discover why the patient wants to represent himself, which may involve a dialogue with counsel or others; (d) learn whether the patient has any education, skill or training that may be important to deciding whether he has the competence to make the decision; (e) determine whether the patient has some rudimentary understanding of the proceedings and procedures to show he understands the right he is waiving; and (f) consider whether there are any other facts relevant to resolving the issue. Once that on-the-record discussion has been completed, the trial court should make specific factual findings supporting the grant or denial of the waiver.\n217 Ariz. at 80, 170 P.3d at 689.\nV. CONCLUSION\n\u201cBecause we dispose of this case on one assignment of error and because the other assigned errors may not arise at retrial, we need not address them.\u201d Pruitt, 322 N.C. at 601, 369 S.E.2d at 591. The involuntary commitment order is vacated and this matter is remanded for a new hearing.\nVacated and remanded for new hearing.\nJudges HUNTER, Robert C., and GEER concur.\n. \u201cNOS\u201d stands for \u201cNot Otherwise Specified.1\n. We note that the commentary to IDS Rule 1.6 implies \u201cthat in some circumstances a person may lack the capacity to waive counsel. For example, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 122C-268(d) provides that in cases in which a person is alleged to be mentally ill and subject to in-patient commitment, counsel shall be appointed if the person is indigent or refuses to retain counsel although financially able to do so.\u201d IDS Rule 1.6, Commentary. Other jurisdictions prohibit a respondent from proceeding pro se at an involuntary commitment proceeding. See In re L.K., 353 Mont. 246, 249, 219 P.3d 1263, 1265 (2009); In re Penelope W., 977 A.2d 380, 382 (Me. 2009).", "type": "majority", "author": "CALABRIA, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Susannah B. Cox, for the State.", "Appellate Defender Staples Hughes, by Assistant Appellate Defender Kristen L. Todd, for respondent-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "IN THE MATTER OF: RONALD WATSON\nNo. COA10-365\n(Filed 15 February 2011)\n1. Appeal and Error\u2014 mootness \u2014 involuntary commitment order\nThe validity of an involuntary commitment order was not moot on appeal even though the commitment term had passed because the order could result in collateral legal consequences.\n2. Mental Illness\u2014 involuntary commitment hearing \u2014 waiver of counsel\nRespondent\u2019s waiver of counsel at an involuntary commitment hearing was ineffective, and the resulting commitment order was vacated, where the trial court did not comply with the statutory mandates of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1242, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 122C-168(d), and IDS Rule 1.6. There was nothing in the record indicating that the trial court conducted a thorough inquiry that showed that defendant was literate and competent, the facts should have caused the trial court to question whether to preclude self-representation for respondent, and there was nothing in the record to indicate a thorough inquiry that showed that respondent understood and appreciated the consequences of his decision, the nature of the proceedings, and the commitment he was facing.\nAppeal by respondent from order entered 1 August 2008 by Judge James T. Hill in Durham County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 29 September 2010.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Susannah B. Cox, for the State.\nAppellate Defender Staples Hughes, by Assistant Appellate Defender Kristen L. Todd, for respondent-appellant." }, "file_name": "0507-01", "first_page_order": 517, "last_page_order": 532 }