{ "id": 4181459, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ROBERT RIGDON SCRUGGS, JR.", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Scruggs", "decision_date": "2011-03-01", "docket_number": "No. COA10-921", "first_page": "725", "last_page": "731", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "209 N.C. App. 725" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "612 S.E.2d 420", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12632827 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "423", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/612/0420-01" ] }, { "cite": "261 S.E.2d 920", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "298 N.C. 808", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8574503, 8574570, 8574549, 8574520, 8574588 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/298/0808-01", "/nc/298/0808-04", "/nc/298/0808-03", "/nc/298/0808-02", "/nc/298/0808-05" ] }, { "cite": "258 S.E.2d 802", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "804" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "43 N.C. App. 346", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8551706 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "349" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/43/0346-01" ] }, { "cite": "292 S.E.2d 578", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "305 N.C. 762", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573543, 8573584, 8573651, 8573620, 8573564 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/305/0762-01", "/nc/305/0762-03", "/nc/305/0762-05", "/nc/305/0762-04", "/nc/305/0762-02" ] }, { "cite": "281 S.E.2d 97", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "102" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "53 N.C. App. 421", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521521 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "428" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/53/0421-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 116-40.5", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "226 S.E.2d 852", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "854" }, { "page": "854", "parenthetical": "\"The technical violation of this statute [G.S. 15A-402]... does not necessarily require exclusion of evidence obtained in the search incident to the arrest.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "30 N.C. App. 311", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8553826 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "314" }, { "page": "314" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/30/0311-01" ] }, { "cite": "665 S.E.2d 438", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "440" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "362 N.C. 412", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4150881 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "415" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/362/0412-01" ] }, { "cite": "170 N.C. App. 299", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9005169 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "304", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/170/0299-01" ] }, { "cite": "363 N.C. 811", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "year": 2010, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "689 S.E.2d 530", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "532" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "297 S.E.2d 540", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "548" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 N.C. 130", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561131 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "143" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/307/0130-01" ] }, { "cite": "462 S.E.2d 524", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "341 N.C. 656", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 793056, 793186, 793211, 793107, 793243 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/341/0656-02", "/nc/341/0656-05", "/nc/341/0656-03", "/nc/341/0656-01", "/nc/341/0656-04" ] }, { "cite": "459 S.E.2d 55", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "57" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "119 N.C. App. 562", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11916476 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "565" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/119/0562-01" ] }, { "cite": "155 L. Ed. 2d 673", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "538 U.S. 982", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9062083, 9061796, 9061898, 9062027, 9061947, 9061618, 9061298, 9061501, 9061750, 9061463, 9061849, 9061563, 9061533, 9061375 ], "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/538/0982-14", "/us/538/0982-09", "/us/538/0982-11", "/us/538/0982-13", "/us/538/0982-12", "/us/538/0982-07", "/us/538/0982-01", "/us/538/0982-04", "/us/538/0982-08", "/us/538/0982-03", "/us/538/0982-10", "/us/538/0982-06", "/us/538/0982-05", "/us/538/0982-02" ] }, { "cite": "568 S.E.2d 608", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "356 N.C. 163", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1511544, 1511451, 1511636, 1511574 ], "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/356/0163-01", "/nc/356/0163-02", "/nc/356/0163-03", "/nc/356/0163-04" ] }, { "cite": "561 S.E.2d 560", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "565" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "149 N.C. App. 756", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9131717 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "762" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/149/0756-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 694, "char_count": 12930, "ocr_confidence": 0.738, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.961721986493819e-08, "percentile": 0.5374610643323221 }, "sha256": "03c9dae70b7c38edc58737d51765fb6f3d10e2999d41f33d03486cbb5cf6fe8a", "simhash": "1:e1bb4474567f0519", "word_count": 2087 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:06:47.704823+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges McGEE and BEASLEY concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ROBERT RIGDON SCRUGGS, JR." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "BRYANT, Judge.\nWhere no error in a defendant\u2019s stop and arrest rises to the level of a substantial violation of Chapter 15A, the trial court does not err in denying the defendant\u2019s motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result thereof.\nFacts\nAround 11 p.m. on 17 July 2009, Officers J.B. Smith and M.A. Graves of the University of North Carolina at Greensboro (\u201cUNCG\u201d) Police Department, were assigned to assist with a traffic checkpoint being conducted by the North Carolina A&T State University (\u201cA&T\u201d) Police Department on the A&T campus in Greensboro. The checkpoint was canceled due to rain, and Officers Smith and Graves instead began a roving patrol in Guilford County looking for traffic violations, with an emphasis on driving while impaired offenses. At the time, a mutual aid agreement existed between the UNCG Police Department and the City of Greensboro which extended the jurisdiction of the UNCG Police Department in certain situations.\nWhile observing traffic on Elm Street in downtown Greensboro, the officers saw defendant Robert Rigdon Scruggs, Jr., driving towards them on a moped. Officer Smith noticed defendant come to a \u201cjerky\u201d stop at an intersection and appear to have trouble maintaining his balance. Once the stoplight changed, defendant passed the car ahead of him on the right and made a right turn onto McGee Street. Officer Smith also believed defendant\u2019s helmet was not in compliance with Department of Transportation regulations. Based on these observations, the officers activated their blue lights and pulled defendant over. Officer Smith testified that, at the time he stopped defendant, he had probable cause to believe he had made an illegal turn and was wearing an illegal helmet, but only reasonable suspicion that defendant was driving while impaired.\nDefendant first told the officers he had not been drinking, but then admitted he had consumed half a glass of red wine with his dinner. During this exchange, Officer Smith noted a moderate odor of alcohol and defendant\u2019s thick speech. The officers administered three field sobriety tests and noted several possible signs of impairment. On this basis, the officers arrested defendant for driving while impaired and transported him to a mobile Intoxilyzer unit. Defendant refused to submit a breath sample, stating \u201cif I take it, I\u2019ll be admitting that I am impaired.\u201d\nOn 2 November 2009, defendant was indicted for driving while impaired and habitual driving while impaired. Defendant entered a plea of not guilty and the matter came on for trial during the 19 April 2010 session of Guilford County Superior Court. During the trial, defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained and statements made following his arrest. Following a hearing outside the presence of the jury, the trial court announced findings of fact and conclusions of law in open court and denied defendant\u2019s motion. No written order was entered.\nDuring the State\u2019s evidence, defendant stipulated to having three prior DWI convictions within ten years of the current charge. The jury returned a guilty verdict, and defendant was sentenced as a habitual impaired driver, receiving an active term of fifteen to eighteen months in prison. Defendant appeals.\nStandard of Review\nOn appeal, defendant argues the trial court committed reversible error in denying his motion to suppress. We disagree.\nOur standard of review from denial of a motion to suppress is well-established:\n\u201cThis Court\u2019s review of a trial court\u2019s denial of a motion to suppress in a criminal proceeding is strictly limited to a determination of whether the court\u2019s findings are supported by competent evidence, even if the evidence is conflicting, and in turn, whether those findings support the court\u2019s conclusions of law.\u201d In re Pittman, 149 N.C. App. 756, 762, 561 S.E.2d 560, 565 (citation omitted), disc. review denied, 356 N.C. 163, 568 S.E.2d 608 (2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 982, 155 L. Ed. 2d 673 (2003). \u201c[I]f so, the trial court\u2019s conclusions of law are binding on appeal.\u201d State v. West, 119 N.C. App. 562, 565, 459 S.E.2d 55, 57, disc. review denied, 341 N.C. 656, 462 S.E.2d 524 (1995). \u201cIf there is a conflict between the state\u2019s evidence and defendant\u2019s evidence on material facts, it is the duty of the trial court to resolve the conflict and such resolution will not be disturbed on appeal.\u201d State v. Chamberlain, 307 N.C. 130, 143, 297 S.E.2d 540, 548 (1982).\nState v. Veazey, \u2014 N.C. App. -, -, 689 S.E.2d 530, 532 (2009), disc. review denied, 363 N.C. 811, \u2014 S.E.2d - (2010). \u201cHowever, the trial court\u2019s conclusions of law are reviewed de novo and must be legally correct.\u201d State v. Hernandez, 170 N.C. App. 299, 304, 612 S.E.2d 420, 423 (2005) (citation omitted).\nAnalysis\nUnlawfully seized evidence is subject to suppression as provided in \u00a7 15A-974:\nUpon timely motion, evidence must be suppressed if:\n(1) Its exclusion is required by the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the State of North Carolina; or\n(2) It is obtained as a result of a substantial violation of the provisions of this Chapter. In determining whether a violation is substantial, the court must consider all the circumstances, including:\na. The importance of the particular interest violated;\nb. The extent of the deviation from lawful conduct;\nc. The extent to which the violation was willful;\nd. The extent to which exclusion will tend to deter future violations of this Chapter.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-974 (2009). Here, defendant concedes that his stop by the officers was based on reasonable suspicion and his arrest was based on probable cause; thus, both the traffic stop and arrest were constitutional. See State v. Styles, 362 N.C. 412, 415, 665 S.E.2d 438, 440 (2008); State v. Mangum, 30 N.C. App. 311, 314, 226 S.E.2d 852, 854 (1976). We are then left to determine whether defendant\u2019s stop and arrest were the result of a substantial violation of Chapter 15A of our General Statutes. Our review of the record indicates that the trial court considered each of the factors listed in \u00a7 15A-974, and that its findings that the stop was constitutional, that any violation of Chapter 15A was not willful and there was nothing to suggest that suppression of the evidence would deter future violations of Chapter 15A are fully supported by competent evidence. We next consider whether the trial court\u2019s conclusions were legally correct.\nThe UNCG Police Department is established, and its jurisdiction defined, by our General Statutes, which provide:\nThe Board of Trustees of any constituent institution of The University of North Carolina, or of any teaching hospital affiliated with but not part of any constituent institution of The University of North Carolina, or the Board of Directors of the North Carolina Arboretum, may establish a campus law enforcement agency and employ campus police officers. Such officers shall meet the requirements of Chapter 17C of the General Statutes, shall take the oath of office prescribed by Article VI, Section 7 of the Constitution, and shall have all the powers of law enforcement officers generally. The territorial jurisdiction of a campus police officer shall include all property owned or leased to the institution employing the campus police officer and that portion of any public road or highway passing through such property or immediately adjoining it, wherever located.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 116-40.5(a) (2009). Further,\n[a] campus police officer: (i) appointed by a campus law-enforcement agency established pursuant to G.S. I16-40.5(a); (ii) appointed by a campus law enforcement agency established under G.S. 115D-21.1(a); or (iii) commissioned by the Attorney General pursuant to Chapter 74E or Chapter 74G of the General Statutes and employed by a college or university which is licensed, or exempted from licensure, by G.S. 116-15 may arrest a person outside his territorial jurisdiction when the person arrested has committed a criminal offense within the territorial jurisdiction, for which the officer could have arrested the person within that territory, and the arrest is made during such person\u2019s immediate and continuous flight from that territory.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-402(f) (2009). However, despite these jurisdictional restrictions, campus police departments, such as UNCG\u2019s, \u201cmay enter into joint agreements with the governing board of any municipality to extend the law enforcement authority of campus police officers into any or all of the municipality\u2019s jurisdiction and to determine the circumstances in which this extension of authority may be granted.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 116-40.5(b).\nSection 3.2 of the mutual aid agreement between the City of Greensboro and the UNCG Police Department extended the authority and jurisdiction of UNCG officers to make arrests off campus when they: 1) have probable cause to believe a felony has been committed; 2) have probable cause to believe that a misdemeanor has been committed and the person to be arrested might otherwise evade apprehension or cause harm to himself, other people or property unless immediately arrested; 3) witness a traffic offense or misdemeanor in a specific area near campus; and 4) see an individual for whom there is an outstanding warrant or order for arrest. Here, the first, third and fourth situations were not present. Rather, the State asserts the officers arrested defendant under the second provision because they had probable cause to believe defendant had committed a misdemeanor in their presence and could harm himself or others if not arrested. As noted above, defendant does not dispute the constitutionality of his arrest, but instead argues that the underlying stop was illegal and the resulting arrest was a substantial violation of \u00a7 15A-402. We are not persuaded by defendant\u2019s contention.\n\u201cThe evidence obtained in [a] search and seizure need not be excluded even if the arrest out of which the search and seizure arose was unauthorized under G.S. 15A-402.\u201d State v. Melvin, 53 N.C. App. 421, 428, 281 S.E.2d 97, 102 (1981), cert. denied, 305 N.C. 762, 292 S.E.2d 578 (1982). In State v. Harris, we considered the effect of a law enforcement officer making a stop outside his statutory jurisdiction pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-402(b).-43 N.C. App. 346, 349, 258 S.E.2d 802, 804, appeal dismissed, 298 N.C. 808, 261 S.E.2d 920 (1979). In that case, a sheriff\u2019s deputy made the stop outside the county where he had jurisdiction. Id. Recognizing that \u201c[t]he statute [\u00a7 15A-402] speaks in terms of \u2018arrest\u2019 and, without reaching the question of whether these events blossomed from an investigatory stop into an \u2018arrest\u2019 in terms of the statute, we note that the stop was constitutional . . . .\u201d Id. We then concluded that \u201c[e]ven if an \u2018arrest\u2019 in terms of the statute, this is not a \u2018substantial\u2019 violation of Chapter 15A which would require exclusion of the evidence.\u201d Id.; see also Mangum, 30 N.C. App. at 314, 226 S.E.2d at 854 (\u201cThe technical violation of this statute [G.S. 15A-402]... does not necessarily require exclusion of evidence obtained in the search incident to the arrest.\u201d).\nAlthough Harris dealt with subsection (b), rather than subsection (f), as here, nevertheless, we find it instructive. Both subsections deal with the jurisdiction of various law enforcement officers and specify who they \u201cmay arrest.\u201d Section 15A-402(f) deals with arrests, and here, defendant\u2019s arrest was both constitutional and specifically permitted under terms of the mutual aid agreement as authorized by \u00a7 116-40.5(a). Just as the out-of-jurisdiction arrest following a constitutional stop in Harris was not a substantial violation of Chapter 15 meriting suppression of evidence, we believe defendant\u2019s stop and arrest here, even if in violation of \u00a7 15A-402, does not rise to the level of a substantial violation. Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying defendant\u2019s motion to suppress the evidence obtained.\nAffirmed.\nJudges McGEE and BEASLEY concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "BRYANT, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General John W. Congleton, for the State.", "James H. Monroe for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ROBERT RIGDON SCRUGGS, JR.\nNo. COA10-921\n(Filed 1 March 2011)\nSearch and Seizure\u2014 traffic stop \u2014 motion to suppress evidence \u2014 reasonable suspicion \u2014 probable cause\nThe trial court did not err in a driving while impaired case by denying defendant\u2019s motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of a stop and arrest. The stop by the officers was based on reasonable suspicion and the arrest was based on probable cause. Further, even if the stop and arrest violated N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-402 based on a university police officer making the stop outside of his statutory jurisdiction, it did not rise to the level of a substantial violation.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 21 April 2010 by Judge Anderson D. Cromer in Guilford County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 11 January 2011.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General John W. Congleton, for the State.\nJames H. Monroe for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0725-01", "first_page_order": 735, "last_page_order": 741 }