{
  "id": 4181733,
  "name": "IN THE MATTER OF J.V.J.",
  "name_abbreviation": "In re J.V.J.",
  "decision_date": "2011-03-01",
  "docket_number": "No. COA10-1074",
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      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
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          "parenthetical": "\"As a general rule[] any determination requiring the exercise of judgment [] or the application of legal principles [] is more properly classified a conclusion of law.\""
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          "page": "510",
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          "page": "797"
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      "cite": "57 N.C. App. 213",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C. App.",
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      "cite": "685 S.E.2d 117",
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      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 2009,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "121",
          "parenthetical": "quoting In re Taylor, 57 N.C. App. 213, 214, 290 S.E.2d 797, 797 (1982)"
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:06:47.704823+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Judges GEER and McCULLOUGH concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "IN THE MATTER OF J.V.J."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "STEPHENS, Judge.\nFactual and Procedural Background\nOn 28 December 2009, a juvenile petition was filed against then 15-year-old J.V.J. (\u201cJoseph\u201d), alleging that Joseph assaulted Officer Gary Beneville (\u201cOfficer Beneville\u201d), a school resource officer at Chapel Hill High School, by \u201cstriking, kicking and scratching leaving cuts to [Officer Beneville\u2019s] left arm and hand as well as [his] forehead.\u201d An adjudication hearing on the petition was held at the 20 January 2010 Juvenile Session of Orange County District Court, the Honorable Beverly Scarlett presiding.\nThe evidence presented by the State at the hearing tended to show that on 23 November 2009, Officer Beneville was in the Chapel Hill High School cafeteria when he received a call from the school\u2019s office informing him that Joseph, a student at the school, was in one of the school\u2019s trailers and was \u201cirate at the time and [the office] needed someone to come deal with him.\u201d\nWhen Officer Beneville arrived at the trailer, a teacher informed him that Joseph \u201cwas being belligerent\u201d and \u201cneeded [] to leave.\u201d When Officer Beneville asked Joseph to leave, Joseph \u201cscreamed at [Officer Beneville] several times that he wasn\u2019t going anywhere.\u201d Officer Beneville then picked up Joseph\u2019s belongings, put his hand on Joseph\u2019s shoulder, and attempted to \u201cguide [Joseph] toward the door.\u201d At that point, Joseph \u201cdug his fingernails in [Officer Beneville\u2019s] arm \u2014 kinda with both hands. And then yanked downward. Breaking off the fingernails [] in the skin.\u201d Officer Beneville then \u201cjust pushed [his hand] back up against [Joseph] under his neck, pushed [Joseph] down on the desk and was trying to hold him down. [Joseph] was still kicking and punching and[] scratched [Officer Beneville\u2019s] forehead with one of his fingernails and was screaming [that] he was going to claw [Officer Beneville\u2019s] eyes out.\u201d\nOfficer Beneville let Joseph up after \u201cforty-five [] seconds, maybe a minute,\u201d at which point Joseph \u201cpicked a chair up over his head [] as [if] he was going to throw it at [Officer Beneville].\u201d Officer Beneville then drew his taser and told Joseph, \u201c [I]f you throw that chair I\u2019m going to tase you.\u201d Following \u201ca little bit of a stalemate[,]\u201d Officer Beneville put away the taser, Joseph threw the chair on the floor, and Joseph was escorted to the principal\u2019s office.\nAfter the close of the State\u2019s evidence, Joseph testified that he \u201cbecame irritated [at a teacher] and \u2014 started yelling at her and \u2014 she [(the teacher)] \u2014 then told [him] to leave and \u2014 there were protocols that \u2014 were in place that, because of [his] Asperger\u2019s diagnosis that\u2014 um, they\u2019re suppose to prevent this from happening, but she did not follow those procedures.\u201d Joseph testified that after Officer Beneville arrived and asked Joseph to leave, Officer Beneville grabbed Joseph\u2019s arm and tried to \u201ctug [him] out of [his] seat.\u201d Joseph testified that he \u201cfelt that [he] was being attacked\u201d so he \u201cgrabbed [Officer Beneville\u2019s] arm and tried to pull [it] off[.]\u201d Joseph further testified that the chair he lifted into the air was held only in front of him, and not above his head.\nAt the close of all the evidence, the trial court \u201center[ed] a verdict of responsible\u201d on the charge of assault on a government officer, and on 20 January 2010, the court filed its order adjudicating Joseph delinquent and continuing disposition until 17 February 2010. On 18 February 2010, the court continued disposition because Joseph was \u201ccurrently in the hospital.\u201d Disposition was again continued on 17 March 2010 because Joseph was \u201cunavailable for court.\u201d On 17 March 2010, Joseph filed his notice of appeal from the 20 January 2010 adjudication of delinquency.\nPetition for Writ of Certiorari\nIn juvenile delinquency cases, appeal may only be taken from final orders, including an \u201corder of disposition after an adjudication that a juvenile is delinquent[.]\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-2602 (2009). However, \u201c \u2018[a]n adjudication of delinquency is not a final order\u2019 \u201d and is therefore unappealable. In re M.L.T.H. -, N.C. App. -, -, 685 S.E.2d 117, 121 (2009) (quoting In re Taylor, 57 N.C. App. 213, 214, 290 S.E.2d 797, 797 (1982)); see also N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-2602. Acknowledging these circumstances, Joseph filed a 7 September 2010 petition for writ of certiorari, asking this Court to hear the merits of his appeal of the adjudication order.\nA writ of certiorari may be issued by this Court to permit review of an order of the trial court \u201cwhen no right of appeal from an interlocutory order exists[.]\u201d N.C. R. App. P. 21(a)(1) (2009). In this case, because Joseph has no right to appeal the interlocutory adjudication order \u2014 in that Joseph is not appealing from any final orders pursuant to section 7B-2602 \u2014 and because no appealable final order has yet been entered in the case, we grant certiorari to consider the arguments raised by Joseph regarding his adjudication of delinquency.\nDiscussion\nAs his sole argument on appeal, Joseph contends that the trial court erred by failing \u201cto make sufficient findings of fact to support the conclusion that [Joseph] committed the offense of assault on a government officer.\u201d For the following reasons, we agree.\nWith respect to the findings required of an adjudication order in the juvenile delinquency context, section 7B-2411 provides that\n[i]f the court finds that the allegations in the petition have been proved [beyond a reasonable doubt], the court shall so state in a written order of adjudication, which shall include, but not be limited to, the date of the offense, the misdemeanor or felony classification of the offense, and the date of adjudication.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-2411 (2009) (emphasis added).\nIn this case, the only adjudicatory findings made by the trial court are as follows:\nBased on the evidence presented[,] [t]he following facts have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt:\nThe court finds that [Joseph] is responsible.\n1391-ASSAULT GOVT OFFICAL/ \u2014 14-33(C)(4) CLASS 1A MISD OCCURRED ll-23-09[.]\nWe conclude that these findings are insufficient to satisfy the requirements of section 7B-2411.\nWe agree with the State that section 7B-2411 \u201cdoes not require the [trial] court to delineate each element of an offense and state in writing the evidence which satisfies each element[,]\u201d and we recognize that section 7B-2411 does not specifically require that an adjudication order \u201ccontain appropriate findings of fact[,]\u201d as does section 7B-807, the statute governing orders of adjudication in the abuse, neglect, or dependency context. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 7B-807(b), 2411 (2009). Nevertheless, at a minimum, section 7B-2411 requires a court to state in a written order that \u201cthe allegations in the petition have been proved [beyond a reasonable doubt].\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-2411. The \u201callegations in the petition\u201d in this case are the following:\n[Joseph] unlawfully and willfully did assault . . . and strike [Officer Beneville,] a government.officer, by striking, kicking and scratching leaving cuts to [his] left arm and hand as well as [his] forehead.\nAt the time of the offense [Officer Beneville] was attempting to discharge the following duty of his[] office[:] [Joseph] had been instructed by [Officer Beneville] to leave the classroom. [Joseph] refused[]. When [Officer Beneville] put [his] hand on [Joseph], [Joseph] began clawing at [Officer Beneville\u2019s] left arm.\nThe adjudication order in this case fails to address any of these allegations as required by section 7B-2411. Indeed, the adjudication order does not even summarily aver that \u201cthe allegations in the petition have been proved[.]\u201d The form on which the trial court made its findings contains a large blank area where the court is to state its findings. Rather than addressing the allegations in the petition in the blank area, the court used the space to (1) indicate, through a fragmentary collection of words and numbers, that an offense occurred and (2) state that Joseph was \u201cresponsible,\u201d which, as the trial court noted at the close of the adjudication hearing, is a verdict and may more properly be characterized as a conclusion of law rather than a finding of fact. Cf. In re Helms, 127 N.C. App. 505, 510, 491 S.E.2d 672, 675 (1997) (\u201cAs a general rule[] any determination requiring the exercise of judgment [] or the application of legal principles [] is more properly classified a conclusion of law.\u201d). In our view, these \u201cfindings\u201d insufficiently address the allegations in the petition. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court erred by failing to include the requisite findings in its adjudication order. As such, we remand this case to the trial court to make the statutorily mandated findings in Joseph\u2019s adjudication order.\nREMANDED.\nJudges GEER and McCULLOUGH concur.\n. \u201cJoseph\u201d is a pseudonym to protect the juvenile\u2019s privacy.\n. On 19 May 2010, subsequent to Joseph\u2019s appeal of the adjudication order, the trial court entered a temporary disposition order pursuant to section 7B-2605, which provides that \u201c[p] ending disposition of an appeal, the release of the juvenile, with or without conditions, should issue in every case unless the court orders otherwise. For compelling reasons ... the court may enter a temporary order affecting the custody or placement of the juvenile . . . .\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-2605 (2009).",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "STEPHENS, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Charles G. Whitehead, for the State.",
      "Appellate Defender Staples Hughes, by Assistant Appellate Defender David W. Andrews, for Respondent."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "IN THE MATTER OF J.V.J.\nNo. COA10-1074\n(Filed 1 March 2011)\nJuveniles\u2014 delinquency \u2014 assault on government officer \u2014 sufficiency of findings of fact\nThe Court of Appeals granted a juvenile\u2019s petition for writ of certiorari and concluded that the trial court erred by failing to make sufficient findings of fact under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-2411 to support the conclusion that the juvenile committed the offense of assault on a government officer. The case was remanded for additional findings.\nOn writ of certiorari to review order filed 20 January 2010 by Judge Beverly Scarlett in Orange County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 27 January 2011.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Charles G. Whitehead, for the State.\nAppellate Defender Staples Hughes, by Assistant Appellate Defender David W. Andrews, for Respondent."
  },
  "file_name": "0737-01",
  "first_page_order": 747,
  "last_page_order": 751
}