{ "id": 8556674, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CHARLES LEWIS HARMON", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Harmon", "decision_date": "1974-05-15", "docket_number": "No. 746SC171", "first_page": "508", "last_page": "511", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "21 N.C. App. 508" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "202 S.E. 2d 358", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "20 N.C. App. 571", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8554427 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/20/0571-01" ] }, { "cite": "144 S.E. 2d 569", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "265 N.C. 524", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8576044 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/265/0524-01" ] }, { "cite": "144 S.E. 2d 572", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "574" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "265 N.C. 528", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8576067 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "530" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/265/0528-01" ] }, { "cite": "12 S.E. 2d 258", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "218 N.C. 722", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8624322 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/218/0722-01" ] }, { "cite": "161 S.E. 2d 737", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "274 N.C. 49", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559360 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/274/0049-01" ] }, { "cite": "180 S.E. 2d 7", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "278 N.C. 476", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560709 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/278/0476-01" ] }, { "cite": "185 S.E. 2d 677", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "280 N.C. 273", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571097 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/280/0273-01" ] }, { "cite": "177 S.E. 2d 874", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "878" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "277 N.C. 410", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565616 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "417" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/277/0410-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 422, "char_count": 7758, "ocr_confidence": 0.597, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.2770812829670818e-07, "percentile": 0.7843845336156664 }, "sha256": "d53b9771d7262c134a78c16f4a62bb529eea0fa1b652b3bb83a38c61a67a0d05", "simhash": "1:3334e22fde2c08e7", "word_count": 1272 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:32:29.924632+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Chief Judge Brock and Judge Parker concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CHARLES LEWIS HARMON" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "BALEY, Judge.\nThe identification of defendant was the principal point at issue in the trial court. The victim, Robert Edwin Hall, testified that the defendant was the man who robbed and stabbed him. Defendant contends that this identification testimony should not have been admitted. \u201cWhen the admissibility of in-court identification testimony is challenged on the ground it is tainted by out-of-court identification (s) made under constitutionally impermissible circumstances, the trial judge must make findings as to the background facts to determine whether the proferred testimony meets the tests of admissibility. When the facts so found are supported by competent evidence, they are conclusive on appellate courts.\u201d State v. McVay, 277 N.C. 410, 417, 177 S.E. 2d 874, 878; accord, State v. Taylor, 280 N.C. 273, 185 S.E. 2d 677; State v. Smith, 278 N.C. 476, 180 S.E. 2d 7. In this case the court complied fully with the requirements of the MeVay case. A voir dire hearing was held, and at the conclusion of the hearing the court made findings of fact. In these findings of fact the court stated that Hall looked directly into the face of defendant when he was robbed; that after the robbery, a police officer showed Hall a group of photographs, and Hall picked out a photograph of defendant; that this identification procedure was carried out properly and without undue suggestiveness; and that regardless of any possible defects in the photographic identification procedure, Hall\u2019s in-court identification testimony was based on his original observation of defendant at the time of the robbery. These findings of fact are amply supported by the evidence, and they fully justify the court\u2019s decision to admit the identification testimony into evidence.\nThe trial court sustained objections to questions by defense counsel on cross-examination of Hall, but there are no answers placed in the record from which any determination of possible prejudice could be made. The questions were of doubtful relevance either to the issue of guilt or innocence or for purposes of impeachment. The court was clearly within its discretion in limiting cross-examination when it sustained these objections. 1 Stansbury, N. C. Evidence (Brandis rev.) \u00a7\u00a7 35, 42; Potts v. Howser, 274 N.C. 49, 161 S.E. 2d 737; Foxman v. Hanes, 218 N.C. 722, 12 S.E. 2d 258.\nDefendant argues that since the State offered no evidence specifically indicating that defendant used a deadly weapon, the court should have instructed the jury on the lesser included offenses of common law robbery, larceny from the person and simple assault. The uncontradicted evidence shows that the victim, Hall, was cut severely, and that nineteen stitches were required to close the wound. Obviously, such a severe injury could not have been inflicted except by the use of a knife or other deadly weapon, and therefore the court acted properly in refusing to charge on the lesser included offenses.\nDefendant asserts that the trial court failed to instruct the jury properly on \u201cfelonious taking.\u201d \u201cFelonious taking\u201d is an essential element of the crime of armed robbery, and it means \u201c \u2018a taking with the felonious intent on the part of the taker to deprive the owner of his property permanently and to convert it to the use of the taker.\u2019 \u201d State v. Mundy, 265 N.C. 528, 530, 144 S.E. 2d 572, 574. In every armed robbery case the judge must instruct the jury on this element of the crime, but lie need not use the specific words \u201cfelonious taking\u201d; he is only required to describe in accurate terms the state of mind necessary for the crime. Id.; State v. Spratt, 265 N.C. 524, 144 S.E. 2d 569. In this case the court charged as follows:\n\u201cFor you to find the defendant guilty of robbery with a dangerous weapon, the State must prove seven things beyond a reasonable doubt.\n* * *\n\u201cFourth, that at the time of the taking [of Hall\u2019s property] , the defendant intended to deprive him of its use permanently.\n\u201cFifth, the defendant knew he was not entitled to take the property.\u201d\nThis is a sufficient description of the state of mind which is necessary to commit the crime of armed robbery. State v. Scarborough, 20 N.C. App. 571, 202 S.E. 2d 358.\nThe other assignments of error concerning the summarizing of evidence and instructions in the charge have been carefully considered and determined to be without merit.\nDefendant has received a fair trial free from prejudicial error.\nNo error.\nChief Judge Brock and Judge Parker concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "BALEY, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Morgan, by Assistant Attorney General James E. Magner, Jr., for the State.", "Cherry, Cherry and Flythe, by Thomas L. Cherry and Ernest L. Evans, for defendant appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CHARLES LEWIS HARMON\nNo. 746SC171\n(Filed 15 May 1974)\n1. Criminal Law \u00a7 66 \u2014 in-court identification of defendant \u2014 observation at crime scene as basis\nThe trial court did not err in allowing an in-court identification of defendant where the \u25a0 evidence on voir dire indicated that the victim looked directly into the face of defendant when he was robbed, the victim picked defendant\u2019s photograph out of a group shown him by police, the photographic identification procedure was carried out properly and without undue suggestiveness, and, regardless of any possible defects in the photographic identification, the victim\u2019s in-court identification testimony was based on the original observation of defendant at the time of the robbery.\n2. Criminal Law \u00a7 88\u2014 cross-examination \u2014 limitation proper\nThe trial court acted within its discretion in limiting defendant\u2019s cross-examination of the robbery victim where the questions asked were of doubtful relevance either to the issue of guilt or innocence or for purposes of impeachment.\n3. Assault and Battery \u00a7 16; Robbery \u00a7 5\u2014 armed robbery \u2014 assault with deadly weapon \u2014 failure to submit lesser degrees of crime \u2014 no error\nIn a prosecution for armed robbery and assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury, the trial court did not err in failing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offenses of common law robbery, larceny from the person, and simple assault, though the State offered no evidence specifically indicating that defendant used a deadly weapon, since the uncontradicted evidence showed that the victim was cut severely, and such a wound could not have been inflicted except by the use of. a knife or other deadly weapon.\n4. Robbery \u00a7 5\u2014 armed robbery \u2014 felonious taking \u2014 instruction on state of mind\nTrial court\u2019s instruction in an armed robbery case that to find defendant guilty the jury must find that at the time of the taking defendant intended to deprive the victim of the use of the property permanently and that defendant knew he was not entitled to take the property was a sufficient description of the state \u25a0 of mind which is necessary to commit the crime of armed .robbery, and it was not necessary that the court use the words \u201cfelonious taking\u201d' in its instruction.\nAppeal by defendant from Rome, Judge, 8 October 1978 Session of Superior Court held in Hertford County.\nDefendant was indicted for armed robbery and for assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury. The State\u2019s evidence tended to show that on the night of 3 May 1973 defendant stabbed Robert Edwin Hall in the stomach and removed a wallet containing $530 from Hall\u2019s pocket. Because of the injuries inflicted by defendant, Hall was hospitalized for ten days, and nineteen stitches were taken in his stomach.\nDefendant testified that he had not robbed or stabbed Hall. The jury found defendant guilty of armed robbery and assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury. From judgment imposing a prison sentence of 28 to 30 years, defendant appeals.\nAttorney General Morgan, by Assistant Attorney General James E. Magner, Jr., for the State.\nCherry, Cherry and Flythe, by Thomas L. Cherry and Ernest L. Evans, for defendant appellant." }, "file_name": "0508-01", "first_page_order": 536, "last_page_order": 539 }