{
  "id": 8556733,
  "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. TOMMY WAYNE WILLIAMS",
  "name_abbreviation": "State v. Williams",
  "decision_date": "1974-05-15",
  "docket_number": "No. 7414SC278",
  "first_page": "525",
  "last_page": "527",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "21 N.C. App. 525"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.",
    "id": 14983,
    "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 5,
    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "199 S.E. 2d 409",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1973,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "284 N.C. 67",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8559900
      ],
      "year": 1973,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/284/0067-01"
      ]
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    {
      "cite": "196 S.E. 2d 746",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1973,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "283 N.C. 564",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8559399
      ],
      "year": 1973,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/283/0564-01"
      ]
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  "analysis": {
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:32:29.924632+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Judges Morris and Vaughn concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. TOMMY WAYNE WILLIAMS"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "CAMPBELL, Judge.\nThe statute G.S. 14-34.1 under which defendant was indicted reads as follows:\n\u201cDischarging firearm into occupied property. \u2014 Any person who wilfully or wantonly discharges a firearm into or attempts to discharge a firearm into any building, structure, vehicle, aircraft, watercraft, or other conveyance, device, equipment, erection, or enclosure while it is occupied is guilty of a felony punishable as provided in \u00a7 14-2.\u201d\nThis statute was enacted for the protection of occupants of the premises, vehicles, and other property described in the statute. A violation is a serious crime. A homicide committed in the perpetration of the felony can result in conviction for murder in the first degree under the felony murder rule of G.S. 14-17. State v. Tinsley, 283 N.C. 564, 196 S.E. 2d 746 (1973); State v. Williams, 284 N.C. 67, 199 S.E. 2d 409 (1973).\nA person is guilty of the felony created by G.S. 14-34.1 \u201cif he intentionally, without legal justification or excuse, discharges a firearm into an occupied building with knowledge that the building is then occupied by one or more persons or when he has reasonable grounds to believe that the building might be occupied by one or more persons.\u201d State v. Williams, supra. In the instant case the learned trial judge instructed the jury:\n\u201cNow for you to find the defendant guilty, you must be satisfied from the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt of the following: First, that the defendant used a firearm. I instruct you that a pistol, a .38 caliber or thereabouts, is a firearm; second, that he discharged it into a dwelling, a duplex house or apartment; third, that the dwelling was occupied at the time that (the gun was discharged; and fourth, and last, that the defendant acted willfully or wantonly which means that he must have known that one or more persons were in the dwelling or apartment), and if you do not find all of these things and find so from the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt it would be your duty to return a verdict of not guilty.\u201d\nThe defendant duly excepted to the portion of the charge set out above in parentheses.\nDefendant asserts that this instruction equated wilful and wanton conduct with knowledge of occupancy of the building and attempted thereby to condense two separate elements of the crime into one.\nWe are of the opinion that this exception is well taken; and while we are advertent to the fact that it purports to be from \u201cPattern Jury Instructions for Criminal Cases in North Carolina,\u201d we think it is incorrect and that the correct definition as to what constitutes the offense is the quotation set out above from State v. Williams, supra.\nSince the case must be tried again, we will not discuss the other assignments of error.\nNew trial.\nJudges Morris and Vaughn concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "CAMPBELL, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Attorney General Robert Morgan by Assistant Attorney General Roy A. Giles, Jr., for the State.",
      "W. Paul Pulley, Jr., by Elisabeth S. Petersen, for defendant appellant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. TOMMY WAYNE WILLIAMS\nNo. 7414SC278\n(Filed 15 May 1974)\nAssault and Battery \u00a7 15\u2014 discharging firearm into occupied dwelling \u2014 \u25a0 instructions \u2014 wilful act \u2014 knowledge of occupancy\nIn a prosecution for wilfully discharging a firearm into an occupied dwelling in violation of G.S. 14-34.1, the trial court erred in instructing the jury that in order to find defendant guilty the jury must find \u201cthat the defendant acted wilfully or wantonly which means that he must have known that one or more persons were in the dwelling,\u201d since the instruction equated wilful and wanton conduct with knowledge of occupancy and thereby attempted to condense two separate elements of the crime into one.\nAppeal by defendant from Clark, Judge, 22 October 1973 Session of Durham Superior Court.\nHeard in the Court of Appeals 19 April 1974.\nDefendant was indicted for discharging a firearm into an occupied dwelling.\nDefendant and Ronnie Coy Hester engaged in a fight about 1:00 a.m. on 9 June 1973 outside a restaurant. After the fight, Hester went home, got out his rifle, unlocked his front door, and \u201csat on the couch and waited\u201d with the lights off. About 4:30 a.m., an automobile stopped in front of Hester\u2019s' house. A man armed with a pistol, whom Hester identified as defendant, leaned out the car window with a pistol and fired five shots into Hester\u2019s dwelling.\nThe only witness for the defense, defendant\u2019s grandmother, stated that defendant arrived home shortly before 11:00 p.m. on the night of 8 June 1973; that his face was cut and swollen; that his finger \u201cwas chewed\u201d; that defendant said he was involved in a fight; and that she bandaged his wounds. The witness also testified that she was a light sleeper; that she checked on defendant several times during the night; and that defendant did not leave the house again that night.\nUpon a verdict of guilty, defendant was sentenced to a prison term of 5-7 years. Defendant appealed.\nAttorney General Robert Morgan by Assistant Attorney General Roy A. Giles, Jr., for the State.\nW. Paul Pulley, Jr., by Elisabeth S. Petersen, for defendant appellant."
  },
  "file_name": "0525-01",
  "first_page_order": 553,
  "last_page_order": 555
}