{ "id": 3822211, "name": "KENNETH R. LAMM, Plaintiff v. PAMELA R. LAMM, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "Lamm v. Lamm", "decision_date": "2011-03-01", "docket_number": "No. COA10-536", "first_page": "181", "last_page": "192", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "210 N.C. App. 181" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "325 N.C. 152", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2491380 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/325/0152-01" ] }, { "cite": "641 S.E.2d 404", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12637854 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "409" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/641/0404-01" ] }, { "cite": "603 S.E.2d 890", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12631961 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "893" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/603/0890-01" ] }, { "cite": "166 N.C. App. 693", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12631961, 8413444 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "697" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/603/0890-01", "/nc-app/166/0693-01" ] }, { "cite": "182 N.C. App. 52", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8168382 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "59" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/182/0052-01" ] }, { "cite": "491 S.E.2d 672", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "675", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "127 N.C. App. 505", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11798267 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "510", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/127/0505-01" ] }, { "cite": "579 S.E.2d 379", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "382", "parenthetical": "citing Turner, 325 N.C. at 165, 381 S.E.2d at 714" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "357 N.C. 133", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 491774 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "138", "parenthetical": "citing Turner, 325 N.C. at 165, 381 S.E.2d at 714" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/357/0133-01" ] }, { "cite": "381 S.E.2d 706", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "714" }, { "page": "714" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "408 S.E.2d 729", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "731", "parenthetical": "\"Where no exception is taken to a finding of fact by the trial court, the finding is presumed to be supported by competent evidence and is binding on appeal.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "330 N.C. 93", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2510111 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "97", "parenthetical": "\"Where no exception is taken to a finding of fact by the trial court, the finding is presumed to be supported by competent evidence and is binding on appeal.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/330/0093-01" ] }, { "cite": "586 S.E.2d 250", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "253-54", "parenthetical": "quotations and citations omitted" }, { "page": "254" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "357 N.C. 471", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 491698 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "474-75", "parenthetical": "quotations and citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/357/0471-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-13.5", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(d)(2) and (3)" }, { "page": "(d)(3)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "325 N.C. 152", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2491380 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "165" }, { "page": "165" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/325/0152-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1021, "char_count": 27195, "ocr_confidence": 0.75, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.7492960360752035e-08, "percentile": 0.29823398970364684 }, "sha256": "c9aa16284e300a77b0ca71bca843ce962b169b422582feb89df7819bc674f180", "simhash": "1:a2ead6665fce1ffc", "word_count": 4441 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:51:45.819483+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges HUNTER, Robert C., and CALABRIA concur." ], "parties": [ "KENNETH R. LAMM, Plaintiff v. PAMELA R. LAMM, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "ELMORE, Judge.\nPamela R. Lamm (defendant) appeals an order and judgment modifying a child custody order and imposing Rule 11 sanctions on her. For the reasons set out below, we affirm.\nI. Background\nKenneth R. Lamm (plaintiff) and defendant were married on 28 December 1985 and divorced on 19 May 2005. They had three children together during their marriage: Caroline, bom in 1988, Samantha, bom in 1992, and Cody, bom in 2001. When plaintiff left the marriage, he began a relationship with Janet Markham (Janet), who gave birth to Amy, plaintiffs child, in 2005. Plaintiff and Janet married on 27 May 2005.\nBefore the final divorce decree, the trial court appointed Dr. David A. Zoll, Ph.D., \u201cto conduct an impartial evaluation of the parties and the parties\u2019 minor children.\u201d Dr. Zoll concluded that, in order to safeguard the relationship between Cody and plaintiff, physical custody of Cody should be granted to plaintiff. In addition, he concluded that defendant should maintain custody of both Caroline and Samantha. Dr. Zoll went on to testify that he believed that defendant \u201clacked the ability to manage emotional distress\u201d and that Cody may have viewed having a good relationship with his father as \u201ctraitorous\u201d to his mother, with whom he was very close. Dr. Zoll noted that Cody had a \u201cparticularly strong attachment to his older sister, [Caroline].\u201d He also testified that defendant, whether deliberately or not, was unable to refrain from expressing her anger regarding the separation and divorce in front of the children. According to Dr. Zoll, if Cody continued to live with defendant and his older sisters, and if their hostile and negative statements continued, then Cody\u2019s relationship with plaintiff would be \u201cminimal or non-existent.\u201d\nAfter hearing all of the evidence, the trial court concluded that defendant \u201cis the party who will better promote the interest and welfare of the . . . minor children and should be awarded their custody subject to reasonable visitation privileges being granted to the Plaintiff with the minor child, [Cody].\u201d The trial court also found that, \u201c[i]f [Cody] continues to live with the defendant and his sisters, and, if their anger, hostile actions, and negative statements are not curtailed, [Cody\u2019s] relationship with the plaintiff will be minimal or non-existent.\u201d Continuation of these actions, the court noted, could result in a change of custody. Then, in a child custody order dated 13 February 2006, the court granted defendant primary custody of the three children and awarded plaintiff visitation rights with Cody.\nCody has been under the care of Christian Psychotherapy Service since 2005. His first therapist was Traci Smith, a licensed clinical social worker, with whom he attended fifty-one sessions. Cody\u2019s therapists have been a \u201cmatter of contention and inflexibility\u201d between the parties. Plaintiff has attempted to bring Cody to therapists in his hometown, Elizabeth City, but defendant has objected to each one, thereby preventing therapy. In July 2007, Janet stated that she believed that Traci Smith was biased in favor of defendant, and, for that reason, Traci Smith withdrew. Cody then began therapy with Dr. Barry Burijon, another therapist at Christian Psychotherapy Service. The trial court found that, \u201c [according to Dr. Burijon[, Cody\u2019s] behavior is regressing, he has no emotional energy, he is sullen, withdrawn and mistrusting.\u201d Plaintiff had expressed a lack of confidence in Dr. Burijon\u2019s ability to remain objective, and the trial court agreed that it was no longer possible for Dr. Burijon \u201cto objectively and effectively engage in any meaningful family counseling.\u201d\nBeginning in 2006, Cody began to exhibit violent behavior when visiting plaintiff: he knocked down his half-sister, Amy, who was only one year old at the time; he drew a line across her throat; and he kicked the family puppy. Cody also made statements expressing a hatred towards his father and a desire to kill him. However, there was also evidence that indicated that Cody was neither withdrawn nor depressed during his visits with plaintiff.\nFollowing Cody\u2019s violent outbursts and defendant\u2019s refusals to allow plaintiff to select a therapist he found suitable, plaintiff filed a motion to modify custody on 31 July 2007. On 24 January 2008, the trial court appointed Harold J. May, Ph.D., to perform an impartial custody evaluation of the parties and their minor children. The trial court found that, while Dr. May\u2019s findings were not specific findings about plaintiff and defendant, they did corroborate the court\u2019s own findings regarding the characteristics of the parties.\nWhile the motion to modify was pending, defendant filed a motion for emergency child custody on 11 June 2009 (emergency custody motion), the day that plaintiff\u2019s five-week summer visitation was scheduled to begin. The emergency motion alleged that Cody was \u201cexposed to a substantial risk of bodily injury or sexual abuse, and an immediate order curtailing Plaintiff\u2019s visitation is necessary pursuant to\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-13.5(d)(2) and (3). Specifically, defendant alleged that Cody had \u201creturned from visitation at Plaintiffs house, on several occasions, with his rectal area red and raw. The child has refused to state how the area become red. The child does not have a red rectal area while in his mother\u2019s care.\u201d The trial court granted an emergency custody order, pending a hearing scheduled for 26 June 2009. Pasquotank County Department of Social Services (DSS) performed an investigation based on defendant\u2019s allegations, and Kids First, a child advocacy agency, made an additional examination. The DSS interview included interviews with Cody and other family members as well as reviews of custody evaluations by both Dr. Zoll and Dr. May. The investigating social worker found the report to be unsubstantiated, and the therapists at Kids First found no evidence of sexual abuse. Based on these findings and other evidence offered during the 26 June 2009 hearing, the court dismissed the emergency custody order.\nOn 7 August 2009, the trial court ordered primary custody to be granted to plaintiff until a final decision could be made. On 1 October 2009, the trial court entered a judgment and order placing primary custody of Cody with plaintiff. In its order, the trial court found that defendant\u2019s emergency custody motion had been made \u201cwithout basis in law or in fact and was interposed for [the] improper purpose\u201d of \u201cblock[ing] Plaintiff\u2019s scheduled summer visitation.\u201d Defendant now appeals.\nII. Arguments\nDefendant presents two arguments on appeal: (1) The trial court erred by modifying the custody order because its conclusions of law did not address whether the change in custody was in the child\u2019s best interest, and (2) the trial court erred by imposing Rule 11 sanctions on defendant. We address each argument in turn.\nA. Modification of custody order\nOur Supreme Court concisely set out the method by which we review modifications to existing child custody orders:\nWhen reviewing a trial court\u2019s decision to grant or deny a motion for the modification of an existing child custody order, the appellate courts must examine the trial court\u2019s findings of fact to determine whether they are supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.\nOur trial courts are vested with broad discretion in child custody matters. This discretion is based upon the trial courts\u2019 opportunity to see the parties; to hear the witnesses; and to detect tenors, tones, and flavors that are lost in the bare printed record read months later by appellate judges. Accordingly, should we conclude that there is substantial evidence in the record to support the trial court\u2019s findings of fact, such findings are conclusive on appeal, even if record evidence might sustain findings to the contrary.\nIn addition to evaluating whether a trial court\u2019s findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, this Court must determine if the trial court\u2019s factual findings support its conclusions of law. With regard to the trial court\u2019s conclusions of law, our case law indicates that the trial court must determine whether there has been a substantial change in circumstances and whether that change affected the minor child. Upon concluding that such a change affects the child\u2019s welfare, the trial court must then decide whether a modification of custody was in the child\u2019s best interests. If we determine that the trial court has properly concluded that the facts show that a substantial change of circumstances has affected the welfare of the minor child and that modification was in the child\u2019s best interests, we will defer to the trial court\u2019s judgment and not disturb its decision to modify an existing custody agreement.\nShipman v. Shipman, 357 N.C. 471, 474-75, 586 S.E.2d 250, 253-54 (2003) (quotations and citations omitted).\nHere, with respect to her argument that the trial court erred by modifying the existing custody order, plaintiff has challenged the trial court\u2019s first conclusion of law and findings of fact 7 and 21. We first address the adequacy of conclusion of law 1, which states: \u201cThat substantial changes in circumstances affecting the best interests of the minor child herein have occurred warranting a modification of the February 14, 2006[,] Child Custody Order herein.\u201d\nPlaintiff first argues that this conclusion of law is inadequate because, as the sole conclusion of law supporting the trial court\u2019s custody modification, it does not demonstrate that the trial court \u201cdecide[d] whether a modification of custody was in the child\u2019s best interests.\u201d See id. at 475, 586 S.E.2d at 254. Plaintiff correctly points out that the trial court conflated into a single conclusion of law the three conclusions that must precede a modification of an existing custody order: (1) that \u201cthere has been a substantial change in circumstances,\u201d (2) that the substantial \u201cchange affected the minor child,\u201d and (3) that \u201ca modification of custody [is] in the child\u2019s best interests[.]\u201d Id. However, a single conclusion of law may still address all three required legal conclusions, even if they might be more obviously addressed in three separate conclusions of law. This particular conclusion of law does just that. The conclusion clearly states that substantial changes in circumstance have occurred, that these substantial changes affected the minor child, and that these substantial changes warrant a modification of the existing custody order because they affect the best interests of the minor child.\nThe key language is \u201cwarranting a modification.\u201d A modification is only warranted if a change in custody is in the child\u2019s best interest. Thus, if a trial court concludes that a modification is warranted, it follows that a change in custody is in the child\u2019s best interest. The contrapositive, for those who find the alternate wording more convincing, is that if a change is not in the child\u2019s best interest, no modification is warranted. The conclusion, read as a whole, demonstrates that the trial court reached all three required legal conclusions necessary to support a custody order modification.\nWe next examine whether the conclusion of law is supported by the findings of fact. Plaintiff challenged only findings of fact 7 and 21 in her brief, and, therefore, the remaining findings of fact are binding on appeal. See Koufman v. Koufman, 330 N.C. 93, 97, 408 S.E.2d 729, 731 (1991) (\u201cWhere no exception is taken to a finding of fact by the trial court, the finding is presumed to be supported by competent evidence and is binding on appeal.\u201d) (citations omitted). The two challenged findings of fact are quite lengthy, but plaintiff challenges only small portions of them:\n7. . . . Statements made by [Cody] to the social worker who conducted the investigation are clear indications of how he perceived his mother\u2019s and sisters\u2019 feelings toward Plaintiff, Janet Lamm (Plaintiff\u2019s current wife) and [Amy] Lamm (Plaintiff and Janet Lamm\u2019s daughter). Those statements include the following:\na. [Samantha] hates dad.\nb. Mom doesn\u2019t like Janet and talked about Janet and dad a lot.\nc.I don\u2019t have to be nice to [Amy] or mind Janet.\n* * *\n21. ... To refer to Plaintiff as \u201cKen\u201d, indicating a level of distance, could only have originated in [defendant\u2019s] home.\nWith respect to finding of fact 7, defendant argues, \u201cNeither the social worker nor any other witness testified [Cody]\u2019s statements were \u2018indications\u2019 of anything.\u201d This argument misses the point. The trial court did not say that a witness stated that Cody\u2019s statements were indications of his perceptions of his mother and sisters\u2019 opinions; the court made this inference itself on the basis of witness testimony. The finding of fact is supported by the following testimony by Dr. May, discussing a report drafted by a social worker:\n[Cody] went on fairly extensively to talk about [Samantha], he did not like her. She was always picking on him, mean to him, always hitting him, punches in the arms, back, chest.\nWhen asked why she would punch him, he said, \u201cEvery time I tell her I like Dad, she hits me.\u201d\nHe said, \u201cWhen Mom is away, she also hits me for no reason.\u201d\nIn talking about the other sister, [Caroline], he said that he got along better with her than with [Samantha] but stated that she does not like \u2014 [Caroline]\u2014she does not like Dad, and [Samantha] hates them.\nWhen asked why they hate Daddy, he said because of what they did.\nWhen asked what he did, he stated that he did not know and said that his mom hates Janet and his dad.\nMom tells him that Janet is not his real mother and he is to never call Janet his mother.\nThat if he called Janet \u201cMom,\u201d he stated Mom will be mad with him and punish him.\nHis mother told him that his dad doesn\u2019t love him, but he said, \u201cbut he loves [Amy].\u201d\nAnd [Cody] stated that he sometimes does not know what to say when his mother asks him if he\u2019s had a good time at his dad\u2019s house.\nThis testimony supports the trial court\u2019s finding that Cody\u2019s statements to a social worker \u201care clear indications of how he perceived his mother\u2019s and sisters\u2019 feelings toward\u201d plaintiff, Janet, and Amy.\nWith respect to the challenged portion of finding 21, the trial court again made an inference based on the evidence, this time that Cody\u2019s habit of referring to his father by first name could only have been acquired at defendant\u2019s home. Even if we were to hold that this particular portion of this single finding of fact is not'supported by the evidence, the remaining findings of fact still support the trial court\u2019s conclusions. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err by concluding, as a matter of law, that a modification of the 2006 Child Custody Order was warranted.\nB. Rule 11 Sanctions\nDefendant next argues that the trial court erred by imposing Rule 11 sanctions on defendant for filing her emergency custody motion. After the 26 June 2009 hearing, plaintiff filed a motion for attorneys\u2019 fees and costs, alleging that defendant\u2019s emergency custody motion \u201cincluded no specific allegation of [bodily injury or sexual abuse,] only non-specific allegations intended to imply such risks.\u201d Plaintiff further alleged that, at the 26 June 2009 hearing, \u201c[n]o evidence was produced by the Defendant to substantiate a substantial risk of bodily injury or sexual abuse and the Motion, and the Ex Parte hearing held thereon, were frivolous, without basis in law or fact.\u201d Plaintiff moved the court for attorneys\u2019 fees and costs incurred in the defense of defendant\u2019s emergency custody motion. In its order, the court ordered defendant to pay $3,500.00 to plaintiff, \u201crepresenting attorney\u2019s fees incurred by the Plaintiff defending the Motion filed by the Defendant for an emergency Custody Order[.]\u201d\nRule 11(a) provides, in relevant part, as follows:\nThe signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well, grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law . . ., and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. ... If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanetion, which may include an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable attorney\u2019s fee.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 11(a) (2009).\nWe review de novo a trial court\u2019s decision to impose mandatory sanctions under Rule 11(a) of our Rules of Civil Procedure. Turner v. Duke University, 325 N.C. 152, 165, 381 S.E.2d 706, 714 (1989).\nIn the de novo review, the appellate court will determine (1) whether the trial court\u2019s conclusions of law support its judgment or determination, (2) whether the trial court\u2019s conclusions of law are supported by its findings of fact, and (3) whether the findings of fact are supported by a sufficiency of the evidence. If the appellate court makes these three determinations in the affirmative, it must uphold the trial court\u2019s decision to impose or deny the imposition of mandatory sanctions under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 11(a).\nId. \u201cThe appropriateness of a particular sanction is reviewed for abuse of discretion.\u201d Bledsole v. Johnson, 357 N.C. 133, 138, 579 S.E.2d 379, 382 (2003) (citing Turner, 325 N.C. at 165, 381 S.E.2d at 714).\nFollowing Turner, we first determine whether the trial court\u2019s conclusions of law support its decision to impose sanctions. The trial court did make any relevant conclusions of law in its order, but finding of fact 30 is more properly characterized as a mixed conclusion of law and finding of fact. Generally, \u201cany determination requiring the exercise of judgment... or the application of legal principles ... is more properly classified a conclusion of law.\u201d In re Helms, 127 N.C. App. 505, 510, 491 S.E.2d 672, 675 (1997) (citations omitted). A finding of fact that is essentially a conclusion of law will be treated as a fully reviewable conclusion of law on appeal. In re M.R.D.C., 166 N.C. App. 693, 697, 603 S.E.2d 890, 893 (2004). Mislabeling of a finding of fact as a conclusion of law is inconsequential if the remaining findings of fact support the conclusion of law. In re R.A.H., 182 N.C. App. 52, 59, 641 S.E.2d 404, 409 (2007). Finding of fact 30 reads as follows:\nThe Motion for emergency Custody Order herein was without basis 'in law or in fact and was interposed for an improper purpose. Said Motion was dismissed upon the Motion of the Plaintiff at the conclusion of Defendant\u2019s evidence for lack of sufficient evidence to support the claims stated therein. In addition said Motion was filed for an improper purpose, i.e. to block Plaintiffs scheduled summer visitation. Therefore, Plaintiff is entitled to recover attorney fee\u2019s incurred in the defense of said Motion for emergency Custody Order. Plaintiff\u2019s attorney incurred 14.11 hours in defending the Motion for emergency Custody Order. Said number of hours was reasonable and necessary considering the allegations set forth in said Motion. Plaintiff\u2019s attorney charges $250 per hour in representation of parties to domestic and family law cases which hourly rate is inline with the hourly rate charged by other similarly experienced attorneys in the First Judicial District and therefore the sum of $3,500 in attorney\u2019s fees incurred in defending the Motion for emergency Custody Order is reasonable and was necessary.\nThe first sentence of finding of fact 30 is clearly a conclusion of law, not a finding of fact. That conclusion, that defendant\u2019s emergency custody motion \u201cwas without basis in law or in fact and was interposed for an improper purpose[,]\u201d supports the trial court\u2019s decision to impose sanctions.\nNext, we examine whether the trial court\u2019s conclusions of law are supported by its findings of fact. A trial court cannot enter an order changing custody ex parte\nunless the court finds that the child is exposed to a substantial risk of bodily injury or sexual abuse or that there is a substantial risk of bodily injury or sexual abuse or that there is a substantial risk that the child may be abducted or removed from the State of North Carolina for the purpose of evading the jurisdiction of North Carolina courts.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-13.5(d)(3) (2009). In both the hearing and the order, the trial court was clearly focused on defendant\u2019s implied allegation that Cody was being sexually abused while in his father\u2019s custody. Given the narrow exception set out in the statute, the trial court\u2019s focus on Cody\u2019s exposure to a substantial risk of sexual abuse was entirely appropriate. Indeed, the trial court explained, in finding of fact 23, that \u201c[t]he emergency Order would never have been issued except for allegations of possible sexual abuse, in that the other allegations contained in the Motion were allegations that the Court was already aware of and had already been presented, in most part, in previous testimony.\u201d During the 26 June 2009 hearing, defendant presented evidence by multiple experts in support of her motion, but, as the trial court found in finding of fact 10, a physical examination of Cody conducted at Children\u2019s Hospital of the King\u2019s Daughters \u201crevealed no evidence of sexual abuse and resulted in no referral to the Department of Social Services as would be required by law if there were suspicions of sexual abuse.\u201d The trial court found, in finding of fact 11, that \u201ca forensic interview was conducted at Kids First, a child advocacy agency in Elizabeth City, from which no evidence of sexual abuse was found.\u201d The trial court also found that defendant had filed her emergency custody order on \u201cthe first day of Plaintiff\u2019s scheduled summer visitation with\u201d Cody after \u201cPlaintiff had previously refused Defendant\u2019s request to rearrange the summer vacation.\u201d The trial court concluded, in finding of fact 23, that Cody\u2019s \u201cstatements are consistent with a pattern of continuing alienating behavior. This conclusion seems particularly true in light of the . . . the timing of the emergency Order in to it (examination at CHKD with no finding or suspicion of abuse).\u201d All of these findings, taken together, support the trial court\u2019s conclusion that defendant filed the emergency custody motion for an improper purpose.\nFinally, we examine whether these findings of fact are supported by sufficient evidence. After reading the 26 June 2009 hearing transcript, we are satisfied that the findings of fact are supported by sufficient evidence. No testimony supported defendant\u2019s insinuation that Cody had been sexually abused, and we find testimony to support the other findings cited above. At the end of the hearing, the trial court accurately summarized defendant\u2019s evidence:\nSo what we\u2019re looking at is has Mrs. Lamm carried the burden required to show that there is a substantial risk of bodily injury or sexual abuse.\nAnd I cannot find that she has done that today.\nMuch of the evidence that has been presented is evidence that clearly goes to what is in the best interest of the child in permanent custody and permanent visitation arrangements.\nBut it does not \u2014 what has been presented today does not rise to the level that North Carolina law requires for the issuance of or the continuation of an emergency custody order.\nHaving made the three Turner determinations in the affirmative, we must uphold the trial court\u2019s decision to impose mandatory sanctions under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 11(a). We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court\u2019s sanction, the award of $3,500.00 in attorneys\u2019 fees to plaintiff. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court\u2019s imposition of Rule 11(a) sanctions in its 1 October 2009 order.\nC. Appellate Rules Violations\nAlthough neither party has alleged any violations of our Rules of Appellate Procedure, we bring to both parties\u2019 attention the inclusion of social security numbers in the record on appeal, in violation of Rule 9(a)(4) of our Rules of Appellate Procedure. See N.C.R. App. P. 9(a)(4) (2011) (\u201cSocial security numbers shall be deleted or redacted from any document before including the document in the record on appeal.\u201d). The record includes no fewer than four different individuals\u2019 social security numbers, including a social security number belonging to a minor child. Rule 9(b)(2) specifies that \u201c[i]t shall be the duty of counsel for all parties to an appeal to avoid including in the record on appeal matter not necessary for an understanding of the issues presented on appeal, such as social security numbers referred to in Rule 9(a)(4). The cost of including such matter may be charged as costs to the party or counsel who caused or permitted its inclusion.\u201d N.C.R. App. P. 9(b)(2) (2011). We impose no sanction at this time, but we advise counsel for both parties to avoid this misstep in the future.\nIII. Conclusion\nThe order below is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nJudges HUNTER, Robert C., and CALABRIA concur.\n. We use pseudonyms for all four children referenced in this opinion, recognizing that not all of them were minors at the time of the appeal.", "type": "majority", "author": "ELMORE, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Aldridge, Seawell & Spence, LLP, by W. Mark Spence, for plaintiff.", "Wyrick Robbins Yates & Ponton LLP, by K. Edward Greene, Tobias S. Hampson, and Edward Eldred, for defendant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "KENNETH R. LAMM, Plaintiff v. PAMELA R. LAMM, Defendant\nNo. COA10-536\n(Filed 1 March 2011)\n1. Child Custody and Support\u2014 custody change \u2014 single conclusion \u2014 sufficient\nThe trial court\u2019s single conclusion in a child custody case reached all three of the required legal conclusions for modifying a child custody order. The court\u2019s conclusion clearly stated that substantial changes in circumstances had occurred, that these substantial changes affected the minor child, and that these substantial changes warranted a modification of the existing custody order because they affected the best interests of the child.\n2. Child Custody and Support\u2014 custody change \u2014 findings\u2014 inferences supported by evidence\nDisputed findings by the trial court in a child custody action were inferences supported by the evidence, and the findings supported the conclusions.\n3. Pleadings\u2014 Rule 11 sanctions \u2014 emergency custody motion\nThe trial court did not abuse its discretion by imposing Rule 11 sanctions on defendant for filing an emergency custody motion. The three determinations required under Turner v. Duke University, 325 N.C. 152, were answered affirmatively.\n4. Appeal and Error\u2014 record \u2014 social security numbers\nAlthough sanctions were not imposed, counsel were cautioned against including social security numbers in the record on appeal.\nAppeal by defendant from order and judgment entered October 2009 by Judge C. Christopher Bean in Pasquotank County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 17 November 2010.\nAldridge, Seawell & Spence, LLP, by W. Mark Spence, for plaintiff.\nWyrick Robbins Yates & Ponton LLP, by K. Edward Greene, Tobias S. Hampson, and Edward Eldred, for defendant." }, "file_name": "0181-01", "first_page_order": 189, "last_page_order": 200 }