{ "id": 3821489, "name": "PENNY FOX, Plaintiff-Appellant v. SARA LEE CORPORATION and JOHN ZIEKLE Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Fox v. Sara Lee Corp.", "decision_date": "2011-04-05", "docket_number": "No. COA10-341", "first_page": "706", "last_page": "715", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "210 N.C. App. 706" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "614 S.E.2d 542", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633177 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "547", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "547", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "547" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/614/0542-01" ] }, { "cite": "395 S.E.2d 85", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "97" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "327 N.C. 283", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2497384 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "304" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/327/0283-01" ] }, { "cite": "682 S.E.2d 741", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "744", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "546 S.E.2d 632", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 14, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Soderlund II" }, { "page": "635" }, { "page": "635", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "635-36" }, { "page": "636" }, { "page": "637", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "637", "parenthetical": "emphasis in original" }, { "page": "640" }, { "page": "640" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "143 N.C. App. 361", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11434800 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Soderlund II" }, { "page": "364" }, { "page": "365" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/143/0361-01" ] }, { "cite": "481 S.E.2d 336", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 11, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Soderlund I" }, { "page": "337" }, { "page": "338" }, { "page": "338" }, { "page": "389-90" }, { "page": "338" }, { "page": "339", "parenthetical": "\"defendants had sufficient notice from the allegations in plaintiff's complaint that he may have been prevented from filing his claims due to mental disability\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "125 N.C. App. 386", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11867926 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Soderlund I" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/125/0386-01" ] }, { "cite": "482 S.E.2d 30", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "33", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "33" }, { "page": "33", "parenthetical": "internal citations omitted" }, { "page": "33" }, { "page": "33" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "125 N.C. App. 637", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11870835 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "641", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "641" }, { "page": "641" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/125/0637-01" ] }, { "cite": "169 N.C. App. 674", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8472679 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "681", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "681" }, { "page": "681" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/169/0674-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 779, "char_count": 22507, "ocr_confidence": 0.749, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.621887471290392e-08, "percentile": 0.2897977835773437 }, "sha256": "505076770ad390627c17da710ed8d73cdae3c29788621e192026bda640ad2b63", "simhash": "1:183afcea253d2e50", "word_count": 3542 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:51:45.819483+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges HUNTER, JR. and BEASLEY concur." ], "parties": [ "PENNY FOX, Plaintiff-Appellant v. SARA LEE CORPORATION and JOHN ZIEKLE Defendants-Appellees" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "McGEE, Judge.\nPenny Fox (Plaintiff) filed a complaint against Sara Lee Corporation (Sara Lee) and John Ziekle (Mr. Ziekle) (collectively, Defendants) on 24 September 2009. In her complaint, Plaintiff alleged that she had been an employee at Sara Lee, and that Mr. Ziekle had been a co-worker. Plaintiff contended that she had been sexually assaulted by Mr. Ziekle and, as a result, suffered severe mental health problems that led to the loss of her job with Sara Lee. Plaintiff asserted claims of assault, battery, false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligence, and sought damages. Sara Lee filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 12(b)(6), contending that all of Plaintiffs claims were barred by the statute of limitations. In an order entered 21 January 2010, the trial court granted Sara Lee\u2019s motion and dismissed Plaintiff\u2019s complaint in its entirety with prejudice. Plaintiff appeals.\nPlaintiff\u2019s Issues on Appeal\nPlaintiff\u2019s notice of appeal states that Plaintiff appeals \u201cfrom the [o]rder entered . . . dismissing . . . Plaintiff\u2019s [c]omplaint on the grounds that her claims are barred by the applicable statutes of limitation and that . . . Plaintiff is not entitled to tolling.\u201d However, in Plaintiff\u2019s brief, she states: \u201cPlaintiff now appeals the dismissal of her claims of intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress against Sara Lee Corporation.\u201d Plaintiff\u2019s arguments on appeal focus solely on her claims for emotional distress and, therefore, she has abandoned her appeal from the trial court\u2019s order dismissing her claims for assault, battery, and false imprisonment. N.C.R. App. P. 28(b)(6) (\u201cIssues not presented in a party\u2019s brief, or in support of which no reason or argument is stated, will be taken as abandoned.\u201d).\nThus, Plaintiff\u2019s sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court properly granted Sara Lee\u2019s motion to dismiss Plaintiff\u2019s claims based on emotional distress. Plaintiff alleged in her complaint that (1) she was sexually molested on 24 August 2005; (2) she reported the molestation to her supervisor; and (3) she had \u201ca complete nervous breakdown.\u201d Plaintiff contended that, \u201c[f]rom September, 2005 until February, 2007, [she] was unable to manage her own affairs.\u201d Plaintiff contends in her brief that the trial court erred in dismissing her complaint because the trial court incorrectly determined that her claims were barred by the statute of limitations. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that her complaint sufficiently alleged that her\nsevere emotional distress manifested itself at the time of her nervous breakdown, which also rendered her unable to manage her . own affairs, making her disabled. Therefore, her cause of action accrued at the same time she became disabled. This disability also tolled the limitations period until. . . her health sufficiently improved for her to manage her own affairs.\nStandard of Review\n\u201c \u2018A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the legal sufficiency of the pleading.\u2019 \u201d Carlisle v. Keith, 169 N.C. App. 674, 681, 614 S.E.2d 542, 547 (2005) (citation omitted). In ruling on a motion to dismiss pursuant N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 12(b)(6), a trial court must determine whether \u201c \u2018the allegations of the complaint, treated as true, are sufficient to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under some legal theory.\u2019 \u201d Carlisle, 169 N.C. App. at 681, 614 S.E.2d at 547 (citation omitted). \u201c \u2018When considering a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the trial court need only look to the face of the complaint to determine whether it reveals an insurmountable bar to plaintiff\u2019s recovery.\u2019 \u201d Id. (citation omitted). Pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 12(b)(6), a motion to dismiss may be an appropriate method of asserting that the statute of limitations has expired for a given cause of action. Carlisle, 169 N.C. App. at 681, 614 S.E.2d at 547. \u201c[Dismissal of an action on the pleadings based on a plea in bar of the statute of limitations is proper only when \u2018all the facts necessary to establish the plea in bar . . . are either alleged or admitted in the plaintiffs pleadings, construing plaintiffs pleadings liberally in\u2019 \u201d favor of the plaintiff. Russell v. Adams, 125 N.C. App. 637, 641, 482 S.E.2d 30, 33 (1997) (citation omitted).\nStatute of Limitations\nThe parties agree that Plaintiff\u2019s claims in this case are governed by a three-year statute of limitations. See Id. at 640, 482 S.E.2d at 33 (\u201cCauses of action for emotional distress, both intentional and negligent, are governed by the three-year statute of limitation provisions of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 l-52(5)[.]\u201d). However, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 l-17(a) (2009) provides, in pertinent part, that a \u201cperson entitled to commence an action who is under a disability at the time the cause of action accrued may bring his or her action within the [applicable statute of limitations], after the disability is removedf.]\u201d For the purposes of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 l-17(a), \u201ca person is under a disability if the person ... is incompetent as defined in G.S. \u00a7 35A-1101(7) or (8).\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 l-17(a)(3). N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 35A-1101(7) (2009) provides the following definition of \u201cincompetent adult\u201d:\n\u201cIncompetent adult\u201d means an adult or emancipated minor who lacks sufficient capacity to manage the adult\u2019s own affairs or to make or communicate important decisions concerning the adult\u2019s person, family, or property whether the lack of capacity is due to mental illness, mental retardation, epilepsy, cerebral palsy, autism, inebriety, senility, disease, injury, or similar cause or condition.\nPlaintiff asserts that her \u201csevere emotional distress was not manifest and the tort was not complete until the nervous breakdown; the same nervous breakdown that disabled... Plaintiff and tolled the limitations period.\u201d Sara Lee counters that Plaintiff\u2019s \u201cclaims accrued immediately\u201d and that, when the claims accrued, Plaintiff \u201cwas not disabled or incompetent.\u201d Thus, there are two fundamental issues before us: (1) whether Plaintiff\u2019s complaint contained allegations sufficient to allege she was an \u201cincompetent adult[;]\u201d and (2) whether Plaintiff\u2019s claims accrued before, or concurrently with, the onset of Plaintiff\u2019s alleged disability.\nAs to both of these questions, we find significant guidance from our Court\u2019s decisions in Soderlund v. N.C. School of the Arts, 125 N.C. App. 386, 481 S.E.2d 336 (1997) (Soderlund I) and Soderlund v. Kuch, 143 N.C. App. 361, 546 S.E.2d 632 (2001) (Soderlund II). The facts giving rise to the dispute in Soderlund I and Soderlund II involve the sexual harassment and abuse of a teenage plaintiff by educators at the North Carolina School of the Arts (NCSA) while the teenage plaintiff was a student there. Soderlund I, 125 N.C. App. at 387, 481 S.E.2d at 337. The plaintiff left NCSA in 1984, and he attained the age of majority in 1986. Soderlund II, 143 N.C. App. at 364, 546 S.E.2d at 635. The plaintiff alleged that he suffered extreme guilt and shame and that he was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) in 1993 that was \u201cdirectly caused by defendants\u2019 actions.\u201d Soderlund I, 125 N.C. App. at 389, 481 S.E.2d at 338. In Soderlund I, this Court noted that:\nThe psychologist determined that until plaintiff told his mother about defendants\u2019 actions and the diagnosis was made, plaintiff had not realized nor was he capable of understanding, the effect and consequences of defendants\u2019 conduct, the connection between their conduct and his mental illness, or the fact that he had a cause of action against them.\nId. The plaintiff filed his complaint in 1995 naming as defendants, inter alia, the teachers who had allegedly harassed him as well as NCSA. Id.\nPursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 12(b)(1), (2) and (6), the defendants filed motions to dismiss, arguing that the statute of limitations had expired as to the plaintiff\u2019s claims. Soderlund I, 125 N.C. App. at 389, 481 S.E.2d at 338. The trial court granted the defendants\u2019 motions to dismiss. Id. The plaintiff appealed and the issue of whether the trial court properly granted the defendants\u2019 motions to dismiss was determined by this Court in Soderlund I. Our Court summarized the plaintiff\u2019s position, stating that he\nalleged in his complaint and argues on appeal that his mental illness rendered him incompetent as defined by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 35A-1101(7) (1995) and therefore tolled the applicable statute of limitations in accordance with N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 l-17(a)(3) (1996). \u201cIncompetent adult\u201d is defined by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 35A-1101(7) as \u201can adult or emancipated minor who lacks sufficient capacity to manage his own affairs or to make or communicate important decisions concerning his person, family, or property whether such lack of capacity is due to mental illness, mental retardation, epilepsy, cerebral palsy, autism, inebriety, senility, disease, injury, or similar cause or condition.\u201d\nId. at 389-90, 481 S.E.2d at 338. The plaintiff\u2019s PTSD in Soderlund I was allegedly caused by the defendants\u2019 sexual abuse and harassment of the plaintiff. See Id. Our Court reversed the trial court\u2019s order granting the defendants\u2019 motions to dismiss, and our Court\u2019s ruling was summarized aptly in Soderlund II:\nIn our previous opinion, this Court found that defendants had sufficient notice from the allegations in plaintiff\u2019s complaint that he may have been prevented from filing his claims due to his alleged incompetence, as defined in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 35A-1101(7) (1999). . . . Therefore, we reversed the trial court\u2019s dismissal and remanded the case for a determination of whether plaintiff\u2019s condition rose to the level of incompetence as defined in \u00a7 35A-1101(7), thus tolling the applicable statute of limitations.\nSoderlund II, 143 N.C. App. at 365, 546 S.E.2d at 635 (citation omitted).\nOn remand of Soderlund I, the trial court conducted discovery as ordered by this Court. The defendants then filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court granted. The plaintiff appealed the trial court\u2019s order. Id. This Court stated in Soderlund II:\nWith respect to the applicability of the statute of limitations and the existence of all necessary elements of both intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, the trial court found that plaintiff\u2019s claim lacked a genuine issue of material fact. In finding no genuine issue of material fact as to the statute of limitations, we conclude that [the trial court] was necessarily ruling that plaintiff\u2019s alleged incompetence did not rise to the level of incompetence, as defined in \u00a7 35A-1101(7), necessary to toll the statute of limitations. [The trial court] thereby dismissed plaintiff\u2019s claims with prejudice, and plaintiff now appeals to this Court.\nId. at 365, 546 S.E.2d at 635-36.\nIn Soderlund II, the first of the plaintiff\u2019s arguments on appeal focused on whether the trial court erred in determining when the cause of action for emotional distress accrued. Id. at 366, 546 S.E.2d at 636. The plaintiff argued that his emotional distress claim accrued either after a conversation with his mother in 1992 or after he received a PTSD diagnosis in 1993 and thus the three-year statute of limitations had not run at the time he filed his complaint in 1995. Id. We noted that, \u201c[s]ometimes, causes of action for emotional distress \u2018take years to manifest the severe emotional results required to comp\u00edete the tort.\u2019 However, that is not the case sub judice.\" Id. at 367, 546 S.E.2d at 637 (citation omitted). This Court further stated:\nBy [plaintiff\u2019s] own admission, he manifested signs of \u201csevere emotional distress\u201d \u2014 \u201cshame,\u201d \u201cconfusion,\u201d alcohol abuse, inability \u201cto form healthy relationships,\u201d inability to \u201clead a normal life,\u201d \u201cseveral mental breakdowns,\u201d and \u201ccontemplation of] suicide\u201d \u2014 following his 1986 departure from NCSA and for the next seven years of his life. Based on this evidence, it is clear that plaintiff\u2019s \u201csevere emotional distress\u201d and PTSD diagnosis could have been \u201cgenerally recognized and diagnosed by professionals trained to do so,\u201d at that time.\nId. at 368, 546 S.E.2d at 637 (emphasis in original).\nThis Court then addressed the plaintiff\u2019s alternative argument that \u201cthe trial court erred in not tolling the applicable statute of limitations due to plaintiff\u2019s alleged incompetence as defined in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 35A-1101(7).\u201d Id. at 372, 546 S.E.2d at 640. We held that the plaintiff had failed to show that his emotional distress rose to the level of incompetence and therefore rejected his assignment of error. Id. In so holding, however, this Court conducted the following analysis:\n[The] [p]laintiff\u2019s only allegation regarding his incompetency is' that his mental condition \u201ccause [d] him to be incapable of understanding his legal rights, making or communicating important decisions about those rights or bringing a lawsuit. ...\u201d As stated above, the term \u201caffairs\u201d in \u00a7 35A-1101(7) encompasses more than just one transaction. See id. Moreover, evidence presented during discovery showed that since leaving NCSA in 1986, plaintiff arranged for places to live, signed leases, cooked, went shopping, held several jobs, attended college at two institutions, obtained and renewed driver\u2019s licenses from three states, drove vehicles, owned farmland, traveled and lived in foreign countries, produced a ballet, and created music. The evidence is sufficient to show that plaintiff could and did manage his own affairs and make important decisions concerning his person and property after his 1986 departure from NCSA. Thus, we hold plaintiff was not incompetent as per \u00a7 35A-1101(7), and plaintiff\u2019s mental condition did not warrant tolling the three-year statute of limitations of \u00a7 1-52(5).\nId. at 373, 546 S.E.2d at 640. Thus, our Court\u2019s determination that the plaintiff\u2019s mental condition did not rise to the level of incompetence under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 35A-1101(7) resulted from our determination that there was evidence that the plaintiff \u201ccould and did manage his own affairs and make important decisions concerning his person and property after\u201d suffering the alleged abuse and leaving NCSA. Id.\nIncompetence Under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 35A-1101(7)\nWe first address whether Plaintiffs complaint contained allegations sufficient to allege that she was an \u201cincompetent adult.\u201d Plaintiffs complaint contained the following allegations:\n14. The next day, . . . Plaintiff, the department manager, and . . . Plaintiffs co-worker attended an off-site meeting.... Plaintiff was a nervous wreck and [did] not remember what happened that day.\n15. On August 26, 2005, . . . Plaintiff went to the human resources office and reported Ziekle and the August 24 incident to a human resources director.\n18. The human resources director then referred... Plaintiff to the Sara Lee employee assistance provider (Horizon Care) for mental health treatment. Plaintiffs psychiatrist recommended that Plaintiff be placed on medical leave. Sara Lee Corporation approved the medical leave. Sara Lee Corporation knew that. . . Plaintiff\u2019s mental health prevented her from working or managing her own affairs.\n19. . . . Plaintiffs mental health began to rapidly deteriorate. She had a complete nervous breakdown. Under psychiatric care, . . . Plaintiff was unable to mentally function and could not leave her house by herself.\n27. From September, 2005 until February 2007,... Plaintiffs poor mental health, which was caused by... Defendants\u2019 conduct, prevented . . . Plaintiff from working, managing her own affairs, coping with daily life, or going about by herself. During much of this time, . . . Plaintiff was obliged to live with her parents because she could not manage by herself.\n(Emphasis added). Plaintiff specifically alleged that she was under psychiatric care, could not leave her house by herself, and was \u201cunable to mentally function[.]\u201d Further, Plaintiff alleged that Sara Lee was aware that Plaintiff\u2019s condition \u201cprevented her from working or managing her own affairs.\u201d We hold that Plaintiffs pleadings were sufficient to put Defendants on notice that Plaintiff was prevented from filing her complaint due to her mental condition. See Soderlund I, 125 N.C. App. at 391, 481 S.E.2d at 339 (\u201cdefendants had sufficient notice from the allegations in plaintiff\u2019s complaint that he may have been prevented from filing his claims due to mental disability\u201d).\nAccrual of Plaintiff\u2019s Cause of Action\nWe next address whether Plaintiff\u2019s complaint sufficiently alleged that she was incompetent at the time her cause of action accrued. Ordinarily, a \u201c \u2018cause of action accrues when the wrong is complete, even though the injured party did not then know the wrong had been committed.\u2019 \u201d Housecalls Home Health Care, Inc. v. State,-N.C. App.-, \u2014, 682 S.E.2d 741, 744 (2009) (citation omitted). However,\nsevere emotional distress is an essential element of both negligent and intentional emotional distress claims, [and] the three-year period of time for these claims does not begin to run (accrue) until the \u201cconduct of the defendant causes extreme emotional distress.\u201d In other words, these claims do not accrue until the plaintiff \u201cbecomes aware or should reasonably have become aware of the existence of the injury.\u201d\nRussell, 125 N.C. App. at 641,482 S.E.2d at 33 (internal citations omitted).\nSara Lee contends that Plaintiff alleged that \u201cshe was fully competent when the alleged sexual harassment occurred and for approximately a month afterward, and that she made prompt and timely complaints to management.\u201d However, Sara Lee\u2019s argument ignores the fact that Plaintiff\u2019s causes of action based on emotional distress did not accrue at the time the alleged sexual harassment occurred. Rather, Plaintiff\u2019s causes of action based on emotional distress did not accrue until Plaintiff actually suffered emotional distress. Russell, 125 N.C. App. at 641, 482 S.E.2d at 33. We thus review Plaintiff\u2019s complaint to determine when Plaintiff alleged she had suffered emotional distress.\nOur Supreme Court has held that, in the context of an emotional distress action, \u201cthe term \u2018severe emotional distress\u2019 means any emotional or mental disorder, such as, for example, neurosis, psychosis, chronic depression, phobia, or any other type of severe and disabling emotional or mental condition which may be generally recognized and diagnosed by professionals trained to do so.\u201d Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics, 327 N.C. 283, 304, 395 S.E.2d 85, 97 (1990): Construing Plaintiff\u2019s complaint liberally in favor of Plaintiff, Russell, 125 N.C. App. at 641, 482 S.E.2d at 33, we find that Plaintiff alleged she was a nervous wreck the day after the assault. Sara Lee insists that Plaintiffs causes of action accrued at that time, based on Plaintiffs allegation of being a \u201cnervous wreck.\u201d However, Sara Lee cites no cases, and we are not aware of any, which stand for the proposition that a plaintiffs being a \u201cnervous wreck\u201d supports a claim for severe emotional distress under the definition provided by Johnson.\nPlaintiff next alleged that, after reporting the incident to Sara Lee\u2019s human resources director, Plaintiff was referred to a psychiatrist. Plaintiff\u2019s psychiatrist \u201crecommended that Plaintiff be placed on medical leave.\u201d Plaintiff also stated that her \u201cmental health began to rapidly deteriorate. She had a complete nervous breakdown.\u201d\nThus, Plaintiff\u2019s allegations, construed liberally in her favor, suggest that she had been placed on medical leave, had \u201ca complete nervous breakdown[,]\u201d and became unable to manage her affairs, all at around the same time. We hold that Plaintiff\u2019s complaint sufficiently alleged that she was mentally incompetent, either concurrently with, or before, she suffered \u201csevere emotional distress.\u201d Thus, Plaintiff\u2019s complaint was sufficient to place Defendants on notice that Plaintiff was under a disability when her causes of action accrued, thereby tolling the statute of limitations.\nWe stress that we are reviewing the trial court\u2019s ruling on Sara Lee\u2019s N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 12(b)(6) motion and, therefore, it is not the role of this Court to determine whether Plaintiff was actually incompetent. Rather, as in Soderlund I, our review is to determine whether Plaintiff\u2019s complaint was sufficient to put Defendants on notice that Plaintiff was rendered mentally incompetent as a result of Defendants\u2019 actions and, therefore, was incompetent when her causes of action accrued. As stated above, we hold that Plaintiff\u2019s complaint sufficiently alleged that: (1) Plaintiff became an \u201cincompetent adult\u201d for the purposes of tolling the statute of limitations; and (2) Plaintiff was under a disability at the time she suffered the severe emotional distress which caused her claims to accrue. Therefore, we reverse the trial court\u2019s order granting Sara Lee\u2019s N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss as to Plaintiff\u2019s claims for emotional distress and remand to the trial court.\nAffirmed in part; reversed in part and remanded.\nJudges HUNTER, JR. and BEASLEY concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "McGEE, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Stephen A. Boyce for Plaintiff-Appellant.", "Constangy, Brooks & Smith, LLP, by Robin E. Shea, for Defendant-Appellee Sara Lee Corporation." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "PENNY FOX, Plaintiff-Appellant v. SARA LEE CORPORATION and JOHN ZIEKLE Defendants-Appellees\nNo. COA10-341\n(Filed 5 April 2011)\nStatutes of Limitation and Repose\u2014 emotional distress claim \u2014nervous breakdown \u2014 tolling of limitations period\nA dismissal under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 12(b)(6) based on the statute of limitations was reversed where plaintiff alleged that she had been sexually assaulted at work in August of 2005, that she had a complete nervous breakdown a month later and was unable to manage her affairs from September of 2005 until February of 2007, and she filed her complaint in September of 2009. Plaintiffs argument on appeal focused only on the dismissal of her claims of intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, which are governed by a three-year statute of limitations with a provision that a person who is under a disability at the time the cause of action accrued may bring the action within the limitations period after the disability is removed. The cause of action accrued when plaintiff suffered emotional distress rather than when the harassment occurred, and plaintiff sufficiently alleged that she was mentally incompetent when she suffered the emotional distress.\nAppeal by Plaintiff from order entered 21 January 2010 by Judge James M. Webb in Superior Court, Forsyth County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 12 October 2010.\nStephen A. Boyce for Plaintiff-Appellant.\nConstangy, Brooks & Smith, LLP, by Robin E. Shea, for Defendant-Appellee Sara Lee Corporation." }, "file_name": "0706-01", "first_page_order": 714, "last_page_order": 723 }